

The Shared Socioeconomic Pathways and their Energy, Land Use, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions Implications: An Overview

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Authors:

Keywan Riahi*¹, Detlef P. van Vuuren², Elmar Kriegler³, Jae Edmonds⁴, Brian O'Neill⁵, Shinichiro Fujimori⁶, Nico Bauer³, Katherine Calvin⁴, Rob Dellink⁷, Oliver Fricko¹, Wolfgang Lutz¹, Alexander Popp³, Jesus Crespo Cuaresma¹, Samir KC^{1,8}, Marian Leimbach³, Leiwen Jiang⁵, Tom Kram², Shilpa Rao¹, Johannes Emmerling^{9,10}, Kristie Ebi¹¹, Tomoko Hasegawa⁶, Petr Havlik¹, Florian Humpenöder³, Lara Aleluia Da Silva^{9,10}, Steve Smith⁴, Elke Stehfest², Valentina Bosetti^{9,10,12}, Jiyong Eom^{4,13}, David Gernaat², Toshihiko Masui⁶, Joeri Rogelj¹, Jessica Strefler³, Laurent Drouet^{9,10}, Volker Krey¹, Gunnar Luderer³, Mathijs Harmsen², Kiyoshi Takahashi⁶, Lavinia Baumstark³, Jonathan Doelman², Mikiko Kainuma⁶, Zbigniew Klimont¹, Giacomo Marangoni^{9,10}, Hermann Lotze-Campen³, Michael Obersteiner¹, Andrzej Tabeau¹⁴, Massimo Tavoni^{9,10,15}

Affiliations:

¹International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria

²PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, Bilthoven, Netherlands

³Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, Telegrafenberg A31, 14473 Potsdam, Germany

⁴Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Joint Global Change Research Institute at the University of Maryland-College Park, College Park, MD, United States

⁵National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR), 1850 Table Mesa Drive, Boulder, CO, United States

⁶National Institute for Environmental Studies (NIES), Tsukuba, Japan

⁷The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Paris, France

⁸Asian Demographic Research Institute, Shanghai University, Shanghai, China⁹Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milan, Italy

¹⁰Centro Euro-Mediterraneo sui Cambiamenti Climatici, Italy

¹¹School of Public Health, University of Washington, Seattle, United States

¹²Bocconi University, Department of Economics, Italy

¹³KAIST College of Business, Seoul, Republic of South Korea

¹⁴Landbouw Economisch Instituut, Wageningen University and Research Centre, Netherlands

¹⁵Politecnico di Milano, Department of Management and Economics, Italy

*Corresponding author

Email: riahi@iiasa.ac.at

Phone: ++43 676 83807491

40 **Abstract**

41 This paper presents the overview of the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) and their energy, land
42 use, and emissions implications. The SSPs are part of a new scenario framework, established by the
43 climate change research community in order to facilitate the integrated analysis of future climate
44 impacts, vulnerabilities, adaptation, and mitigation. The pathways were developed over the last years as
45 a joint community effort and describe plausible major global developments that together would lead in
46 the future to different challenges for mitigation and adaptation to climate change. The SSPs are based
47 on five narratives describing alternative socio-economic developments, including sustainable
48 development, regional rivalry, inequality, fossil-fueled development, and a middle-of-the-road
49 development. The long-term demographic and economic projections of the SSPs depict a wide
50 uncertainty range consistent with the scenario literature. A multi-model approach was used for the
51 elaboration of the energy, land-use and the emissions trajectories of SSP-based scenarios. The baseline
52 scenarios lead to global energy consumption of 500-1100 EJ in 2100, and feature vastly different land-
53 use dynamics, ranging from a possible reduction in cropland area up to a massive expansion by more
54 than 700 million hectares by 2100. The associated annual CO₂ emissions of the baseline scenarios range
55 from about 25 GtCO₂ to more than 120 GtCO₂ per year by 2100. With respect to mitigation, we find that
56 associated costs strongly depend on three factors: 1) the policy assumptions, 2) the socio-economic
57 narrative, and 3) the stringency of the target. The carbon price for reaching the target of 2.6 W/m²
58 differs in our analysis thus by about a factor of three across the SSP scenarios. Moreover, many models
59 could not reach this target from the SSPs with high mitigation challenges. While the SSPs were designed
60 to represent different mitigation and adaptation challenges, the resulting narratives and quantifications
61 span a wide range of different futures broadly representative of the current literature. This allows their
62 subsequent use and development in new assessments and research projects. Critical next steps for the
63 community scenario process will, among others, involve regional and sectorial extensions, further
64 elaboration of the adaptation and impacts dimension, as well as employing the SSP scenarios with the
65 new generation of earth system models as part of the 6th climate model intercomparison project
66 (CMIP6).

67 **1. Introduction**

68 Scenarios form an essential part of climate change research and assessment. They help us to understand
69 long-term consequences of near-term decisions, and enable researchers to explore different possible
70 futures in the context of fundamental future uncertainties. Perhaps most importantly, scenarios have
71 been crucial in the past for achieving integration across different research communities, e.g., by
72 providing a common basis for the exploration of mitigation policies, impacts, adaptation options and
73 changes to the physical Earth system. Prominent examples of such scenarios include earlier scenarios by
74 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (SA90, IS92, and SRES) and the more recent
75 Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) (Moss et al., 2010; van Vuuren et al., 2011). Clearly, such
76 ‘community’ scenarios need to cover many aspects: they need to describe different climate futures, but
77 ideally also cover different possible and internally consistent socioeconomic developments. Research
78 has shown that the latter may be just as important for climate impacts and adaptation possibilities as for
79 mitigation options (Field et al., 2014; Morita et al., 2000).

80 Moss et al. (2010) described the “parallel process” of developing new scenarios by the climate research
81 community. This process includes the Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs), which cover the
82 climate forcing dimension of different possible futures (van Vuuren et al., 2011), and served as the basis
83 for the development of new climate change projections assessed in the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report
84 (IPCC, 2013; Taylor et al., 2012). Based on two main initial proposals by Kriegler et al. (2012) and van
85 Vuuren et al. (2012), the design of the socioeconomic dimension of the scenario framework was also
86 established (Ebi et al., 2014; Kriegler et al., 2014a; O'Neill et al., 2014; van Vuuren et al., 2014). The new
87 framework combines so-called Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) and the RCPs (and other climate
88 scenarios) in a Scenario Matrix Architecture.

89 This article is the overview paper of a Special Issue on the SSPs where we describe critical subsequent
90 steps to make the framework operational. Elaborate descriptions of the different SSP elements are
91 summarized in fourteen other articles in this special issue complementing this overview paper. To this
92 end, we present new SSP narratives (O'Neill et al., 2016a) and associated quantitative descriptions for
93 key scenario drivers, such as population (KC and Lutz, 2016), economic growth (Crespo Cuaresma, 2016;
94 Dellink et al., 2016; Leimbach et al., 2016), and urbanization (Jiang and O'Neill, 2016). These projections
95 and their underlying narratives comprise the basic elements of the SSPs and have been further used for
96 the development of integrated scenarios, which elaborate the SSPs in terms of energy system and land-
97 use changes (Bauer et al., submitted; Popp et al., submitted) as well as resulting air pollutant (Rao et al.,

98 submitted) and greenhouse gas emissions and atmospheric concentrations. A detailed discussion of
99 integrated scenarios for the individual SSPs (Calvin et al., submitted; Fricko et al., submitted; Fujimori et
100 al., submitted; Kriegler et al., submitted; van Vuuren et al., submitted) complement the special issue.

101 The SSPs and the associated scenarios presented here are the result of an iterative community process,
102 leading to a number of important updates during the last three years. Considerable attention was paid
103 during the design phase to ensure consistency between the different elements. By providing an
104 integrated description - both in terms of the qualitative narratives as well as the quantitative projections
105 - this paper aims at providing a broad overview of the main SSP results.

106 The process of developing the SSPs and IAM scenarios involved several key steps. First, the narratives
107 were designed and subsequently translated into a common set of “input tables”, guiding the
108 quantitative interpretation of the key SSP elements and scenario assumptions (e.g., on resources
109 availability, technology developments and drivers of demand such as lifestyle changes – see O’Neill et al.
110 (2016a) and Appendix A of the Supplementary Material). Second, the narratives were translated into
111 quantitative projections for main socioeconomic drivers, i.e. population, economic activity and
112 urbanization. Finally, both the narratives and the associated projections of socio-economic drivers were
113 elaborated using a range of integrated assessment models in order to derive quantitative projections of
114 energy, land use, and emissions associated with the SSPs.

115 For the quantitative projections of economic growth and the integrated energy-land use-emissions
116 scenarios, multiple models were used, which provided alternative interpretations of each of the SSPs.
117 Among these interpretations so-called “marker” SSPs were selected as representative of the broader
118 developments of each SSP. The selection of markers was guided by two main considerations: the
119 internal consistency of the full set of SSP markers, and the ability of the different models to represent
120 distinct characteristics of the storylines. Identifying the markers involved an iterative process with
121 multiple rounds of internal and external reviews. The process helped to ensure that marker scenarios
122 were particularly scrutinized in terms of their representativeness for individual SSPs and that the relative
123 differences between models were well represented in the final set of SSP markers. It is important to
124 note that while the markers can be interpreted as representative of a specific SSP development, they
125 are not meant to provide a central or median estimate. The “non-marker” scenarios are important, since
126 they provide insights into possible alternative scenario interpretations of the same basic SSP elements
127 and storylines, including a first-order estimate of the (conditional) uncertainties attending to model
128 structure and interpretation/implementation of the storylines. In addition, the non-marker scenarios

129 help to understand the robustness of different elements of the SSPs (see also section 7, below). An
130 important caveat, however, is that the SSP uncertainty ranges are often based on different sample sizes,
131 as not all modelling teams have so far developed a scenario for each of the SSPs. Note also that our
132 results should not be regarded as a full representation of the underlying uncertainties. The results are
133 based on a relatively limited number of three models for the GDP projections and six models for the IAM
134 scenarios. Additional models or other variants of the SSP narratives would influence some of our
135 results. As part of future research, additional SSP scenarios are expected to be generated by a wide
136 range of IAMs to add further SSP interpretations. This will further increase the robustness of uncertainty
137 ranges for individual SSPs and estimates of differences between SSPs.. The set of results comprises
138 quantitative estimates for population, economic growth, energy system parameters, land use,
139 emissions, and concentrations. All the data are publicly available through the interactive SSP web-
140 database at <https://secure.iiasa.ac.at/web-apps/ene/SspDb>.

141 The current set of SSP scenarios consists of a set of baselines, which provides a description of future
142 developments in absence of new climate policies beyond those in place today, as well as mitigation
143 scenarios which explore the implications of climate change mitigation policies. The baseline SSP
144 scenarios should be considered as reference cases for mitigation, climate impacts and adaptation
145 analyses. Therefore, and similar to the vast majority of other scenarios in the literature, the SSP
146 scenarios presented here do not consider feedbacks from the climate system on its key drivers such as
147 socioeconomic impacts of climate change. The mitigation scenarios were developed focusing on the
148 forcing levels covered by the RCPs. The resulting combination of SSPs with RCPs constitutes a first
149 comprehensive application of the scenario matrix (van Vuuren et al., 2014) from the perspective of
150 emissions mitigation (Section 6.3). Importantly, the SSPs and the associated scenarios presented here
151 are only meant as a starting point for the application of the new scenario framework in climate change
152 research. Important next steps will be the analysis of climate impacts and adaptation, the adoption of
153 SSP emissions scenarios in the next round of climate change projections and the exploration of broader
154 sustainability implications of climate change and climate policies under the different SSPs.

155 In the remainder of the paper we first describe in Section 2 the methods of developing the SSPs in more
156 detail. Subsequently, Section 3 presents an overview of the narratives. The basic SSP elements in terms
157 of key scenario driving forces for population, economic growth and urbanization are discussed in
158 Section 4. Outcomes for energy, land-use change and the resulting emissions in baseline scenarios are

159 presented in Section 5, while Section 6 focuses on the SSP mitigation scenarios. Finally, Section 7
160 concludes and discusses future steps in SSP research.

161 **2. Methods**

162 **2.1 Basic elements and baseline scenarios**

163 The SSPs have been developed to provide five distinctly different pathways about future socioeconomic
164 developments as they might unfold in the absence of explicit additional policies and measures to limit
165 climate forcing or to enhance adaptive capacity. They are intended to enable climate change research
166 and policy analysis, and are designed to span a wide range of combinations of challenges to mitigation
167 and adaptation to climate change. The resulting storylines, however, are broader than these dimensions
168 alone – and in fact some of their elements nicely align with scenarios from earlier exercises in the past
169 (Nakicenovic and Swart, 2000; van Vuuren and Carter, 2014).


170 The development of the SSPs comprised five main steps as illustrated in Figure 1:

- 171 • Design of the *narratives*, providing the fundamental underlying logic for each SSP, focusing also
172 on those elements of socioeconomic change that often cannot be covered by formal models.
- 173 • *Extensions of the narratives* in terms of model “input tables”, describing in qualitative terms the
174 main SSP characteristics and scenario assumptions.
- 175 • Elaboration of the basic elements of the SSPs in terms of *demographic and economic drivers*
176 using quantitative models.
- 177 • Elaboration of developments in the energy system, land use and greenhouse gas and air
178 pollutant emissions of the *SSP baseline scenarios* using a set of Integrated Assessment Models
179 (IAMs)
- 180 • Elaboration of these elements by IAMs for the *SSP mitigation scenarios*.

181 The narratives of the SSPs (O'Neill et al., 2016a) were developed using large expert teams that together
182 designed the storylines and ensured their internal consistency. Similarly, different interdisciplinary
183 groups of experts (5-10 people) participated in the development of the model input tables, ensuring
184 sufficient discussion on the interpretation of the different elements (see, e.g., O'Neill et al. (2016a), KC
185 and Lutz (2016), and Appendix A and E of the Supplementary Material).

186 For each SSP, a single population, education (KC and Lutz, 2016) and urbanization projection (Jiang and
187 O'Neill, 2016) was developed, while three different economic modeling teams participated in the
188 development of the GDP projections (Crespo Cuaresma, 2016; Dellink et al., 2016; Leimbach et al.,
189 2016). The GDP projections by Dellink et al. were selected as the representative 'marker' SSP
190 projections. As a next step, the IAM models used the marker GDP and population projections as
191 quantitative inputs for developing the SSP scenarios. Six alternative IAM models were used for the
192 quantification of the SSP baseline scenarios. For each SSP a single IAM interpretation was selected as the
193 so-called representative marker scenario for recommended use by future analyses of climate change, its
194 impacts and response measures (recognizing that often the full space of available scenarios cannot be
195 analyzed). In addition to the marker scenario, each SSP was interpreted by other IAM models, leading to
196 multiple non-marker IAM scenarios for each SSP narrative. The multi-model approach was important for
197 understanding the robustness of the results and the (conditional) uncertainties associated with the
198 different SSPs.

199 Differences between the full set of SSP scenarios include those that are attributable to differences
200 across the underlying narratives, differences in the quantitative interpretation of a given narrative, and
201 differences in IA model structure. For a given SSP, it is useful to have a variety of different quantitative
202 scenarios, since they help to highlight the range of uncertainty that attends to model structures and
203 different interpretations of SSPs. Similarly, SSP scenarios derived from a single IAM helps highlight
204 differences due to variation of the SSP input assumptions alone (see, e.g., the marker papers listed in
205 Table 1). In sum six IAM models participated in the scenario development and five models provided the
206 associated marker scenarios of the five SSPs (see Table 1). Finally, the GHG and aerosol emissions from
207 the IAM models were used in the simple climate model MAGICC-6 (Meinshausen et al., 2011a;
208 Meinshausen et al., 2011b) in order to provide insights into possible consequences for concentrations
209 and related climate change. More documentation on the model systems used in this paper can be found
210 in Appendix D of the Supplementary Material).



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212 **Figure 1: Schematic illustration of main steps in developing the SSPs, including the narratives, socioeconomic scenario drivers**
 213 **(basic SSP elements), and SSP baseline and mitigation scenarios.**

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215 **Table 1: IAM models and their use for the development of the SSP scenarios (for further details on SSP scenarios by model**
 216 **see also Table 2 of the Supplementary Material)**

Model name (hosting institution)	SSP Marker	SSP coverage (# of scenarios)	Model category	Solution Algorithm
AIM/CGE (NIES)	SSP3 (Fujimori et al., submitted)	SSP1, SSP2, SSP3, SSP4, SSP5 (22 scenarios)	General equilibrium (GE)	Recursive dynamic
GCAM (PNNL)	SSP4 (Calvin et al., submitted)	SSP1, SSP2, SSP3, SSP4, SSP5 (20 scenarios)	Partial equilibrium (PE)	Recursive dynamic
IMAGE (PBL)	SSP1 (van Vuuren et al., submitted)	SSP1, SSP2, SSP3, (13 scenarios)	Hybrid (systems dynamic model and GE for agriculture)	Recursive dynamic
MESSAGE-GLOBIOM (IIASA)	SSP2 (Fricko et al., submitted)	SSP1, SSP2, SSP3, (13 scenarios)	Hybrid (systems engineering partial equilibrium models linked to aggregated GE)	Intertemporal optimization

REMIND-MAGPIE (PIK)	SSP5 (Kriegler et al., submitted)	SSP1, SSP2, SSP5, (14 scenarios)	General equilibrium (GE)	Intertemporal optimization
WITCH-GLOBIOM (FEEM)	-	SSP1, SSP2, SSP3, SSP4, SSP5 (23 scenarios)	General equilibrium (GE)	Intertemporal optimization

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218 **2.2 Development of mitigation scenarios**

219 We use the baseline SSP scenarios as the starting point for a comprehensive mitigation analysis. To
 220 maximize the usefulness of our assessment for the community scenario process, we select the nominal
 221 RCP forcing levels of 2.6, 4.5, and 6.0 W/m² in 2100 as the long-term climate targets for our mitigation
 222 scenarios. A key reason for selecting these forcing levels is to provide a link between the SSPs and the
 223 RCPs developed in the initial phase of the community scenario process. Establishing this link is important
 224 as it will enable the impacts, adaptation and vulnerability (IAV) community to use the information on the
 225 SSPs in conjunction with the RCP climate projections archived in the CMIP5 data base (Taylor et al.,
 226 2012). We thus try to get as close as possible to the original RCP forcing pathways, which sometimes
 227 deviate slightly from the 2100 forcing level indicated by the RCP-label (see Section 2 and Section 5 of the
 228 Supplementary Material). In addition, we explore mitigation runs for a target of 3.4 W/m². This
 229 intermediate level of radiative forcing (approximately 550 ppm CO₂-e) is located between very stringent
 230 efforts to reduce emissions given by RCP2.6 (approximately 450 ppm CO₂-e) and less stringent
 231 mitigation efforts associated with RCP4.5 (approximately 650 ppm CO₂-e). Exploring the level of 3.4
 232 W/m² is particularly policy-relevant, considering, for example, recent discussions about scenarios and
 233 the attainability of the 2°C objective, which is broadly in line with scenarios aiming at 2.6 W/m² (Kriegler
 234 et al., 2015; Kriegler et al., 2014b; Riahi et al., 2015; Victor and Kennel, 2014). On the other hand, recent
 235 developments in international climate policy (e.g., the newly adopted Paris Agreement under the United
 236 Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) have renewed attention to the importance of
 237 exploring temperature levels even lower than 2°C, in particular a long term limit of 1.5°C. These
 238 developments were too recent to be taken up already, but are considered in forthcoming work.

239 Finally, since policies and their effectiveness can be expected to vary consistent with the underlying
 240 socioeconomic storylines, we define so-called Shared Policy Assumptions: SPAs (Kriegler et al., 2014a).
 241 The SPAs describe the climate mitigation policy environment for the different SSPs. They are discussed
 242 in more detail in Section 6 of the paper (and the Appendix B and Section 6 of the Supplementary
 243 Material).

244 **3. SSP Narratives**

245 The SSP narratives (O'Neill et al., 2016a) comprise a textual description of how the future might unfold
246 in terms of broad societal trends. Their main purpose is to provide an internally consistent logic of the
247 main causal relationships, including a description of trends that are traditionally difficult to capture by
248 models. In this sense, the SSP narratives are an important complement to the quantitative model
249 projections. By describing major socioeconomic, demographic, technological, lifestyle, policy,
250 institutional and other trends, the narratives add important context for a broad user community to
251 better understand the foundation and meaning of the quantitative SSP projections. At the same time,
252 the narratives have been a key input into the modeling process, since they underpin the quantifications
253 and guided the selection of assumptions for the socioeconomic projections and the SSP energy and land-
254 use transitions described in this special issue.

255 Consistent with the overall scenario framework , the narratives are designed to span a range of futures
256 in terms of the socioeconomic challenges they imply for mitigating and adapting to climate change. Two
257 of the SSPs describe futures where challenges to adaptation and mitigation are both low (SSP1) or both
258 high (SSP3). In addition, two “asymmetric cases” are designed, comprising a case in which high
259 challenges to mitigation is combined with low challenges to adaptation (SSP5), and a case where the
260 opposite is true (SSP4). Finally a central case describes a world with intermediate challenges for both
261 adaptation and mitigation (SSP2).

262 In Table 2 we provide a short summary of the global narratives, which have been used throughout all
263 the papers of this special issue. O'Neill et al. (2016a) provides a more detailed description and discussion
264 of the narratives. In addition, the Supplementary Material (Section 4 and Appendix A) includes specific
265 descriptions of how the global narratives were extended to provide further guidance on scenario
266 assumptions concerning energy demand and supply, technological change, and land-use changes.

267 While the SSPs employ a different scenario design and logic compared to earlier IPCC scenarios, such as
268 the SRES scenarios (Nakicenovic and Swart, 2000), their narratives as well as some of their scenario
269 characteristics show interesting similarities. Analogies between the SRES scenarios and the SSPs were
270 identified already during the SSP development phase (Kriegler et al., 2012; O'Neill et al., 2014), and a
271 systematic attempt to map the SSPs to SRES and other major scenarios was conducted by van Vuuren
272 and Carter (2014). They find that particularly the “symmetric” SSPs (where both the challenges to
273 mitigation and to adaptation are either high or low) show large similarities to some of the SRES scenario

274 families. For example, there is a clear correspondence between the sustainability focused worlds of SSP1
275 and SRES B1. Similarly, the fragmented world of SRES A2 shares many scenario characteristics with SSP3,
276 which is describing a world dominated by regional rivalry. The middle-of-the-road scenario SSP2
277 corresponds well to the dynamics-as-usual scenario SRES B2. And finally, SSP5 shares many storyline
278 elements with the A1FI scenario of SRES, both depicting high fossil-fuel reliance and high economic
279 growth leading to high GHG emissions. For further details about the mapping of the SSPs and earlier
280 scenarios see van Vuuren and Carter (2014).

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282 **Table 2: Summary of SSP Narratives**

SSP1	<p>Sustainability – Taking the Green Road (Low challenges to mitigation and adaptation) <i>The world shifts gradually, but pervasively, toward a more sustainable path, emphasizing more inclusive development that respects perceived environmental boundaries. Management of the global commons slowly improves, educational and health investments accelerate the demographic transition, and the emphasis on economic growth shifts toward a broader emphasis on human well-being. Driven by an increasing commitment to achieving development goals, inequality is reduced both across and within countries. Consumption is oriented toward low material growth and lower resource and energy intensity.</i></p>
SSP2	<p>Middle of the Road (Medium challenges to mitigation and adaptation) <i>The world follows a path in which social, economic, and technological trends do not shift markedly from historical patterns. Development and income growth proceeds unevenly, with some countries making relatively good progress while others fall short of expectations. Global and national institutions work toward but make slow progress in achieving sustainable development goals. Environmental systems experience degradation, although there are some improvements and overall the intensity of resource and energy use declines. Global population growth is moderate and levels off in the second half of the century. Income inequality persists or improves only slowly and challenges to reducing vulnerability to societal and environmental changes remain.</i></p>
SSP3	<p>Regional Rivalry – A Rocky Road (High challenges to mitigation and adaptation) <i>A resurgent nationalism, concerns about competitiveness and security, and regional conflicts push countries to increasingly focus on domestic or, at most, regional issues. Policies shift over time to become increasingly oriented toward national and regional security issues. Countries focus on achieving energy and food security goals within their own regions at the expense of broader-based development. Investments in education and technological development decline. Economic development is slow, consumption is material-intensive, and inequalities persist or worsen over time. Population growth is low in industrialized and high in developing countries. A low international priority for addressing environmental concerns leads to strong environmental degradation in some regions.</i></p>
SSP4	<p>Inequality – A Road Divided (Low challenges to mitigation, high challenges to adaptation) <i>Highly unequal investments in human capital, combined with increasing disparities in economic opportunity and political power, lead to increasing inequalities and stratification both across and within countries. Over time, a gap widens between an internationally-connected society that contributes to knowledge- and capital-intensive sectors of the global economy, and a fragmented collection of lower-income, poorly educated societies that work in a labor intensive, low-tech economy. Social cohesion degrades and conflict and unrest become increasingly common. Technology development is high in the high-tech economy and sectors. The globally connected energy sector diversifies, with investments in both carbon-intensive fuels like coal and unconventional oil, but also low-carbon energy sources. Environmental policies focus on local issues around middle and high income areas.</i></p>
SSP5	<p>Fossil-fueled Development – Taking the Highway (High challenges to mitigation, low challenges to adaptation) <i>This world places increasing faith in competitive markets, innovation and participatory societies to produce rapid technological progress and development of human capital as the path to sustainable development. Global markets are increasingly integrated. There are also strong investments in health, education, and institutions to enhance human and social capital. At the same time, the push for economic and social development is coupled with the exploitation of abundant fossil fuel resources and the adoption of resource and energy intensive lifestyles around the world. All these factors lead to rapid growth of the global economy, while global population peaks and declines in the 21st century. Local environmental problems like air pollution are successfully managed. There is faith in the ability to effectively manage social and ecological systems, including by geo-engineering if necessary.</i></p>

4. Demographic and Economic Drivers

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The second step in developing the SSPs comprised the translation of the qualitative narratives into quantitative projections for the main socioeconomic drivers of the SSPs: population, education, urbanization, and economic development. These projections comprise the basic elements of the SSPs and were constructed at the country level. Aggregated results for the world are shown in Figure 2.


The SSP population projections (KC and Lutz, 2016) use a multi-dimensional demographic model to project national populations based on alternative assumptions on future fertility, mortality, migration and educational transitions. The projections are designed to be consistent with the five SSP storylines. They are cross-classified by age and gender as well as the level of education - with assumptions for female education strongly influencing fertility and hence population growth. The alternative fertility, mortality, and migration assumptions are derived partly from the storylines, reflecting also different educational compositions of the population. The outcomes in terms of total global population sizes of the SSPs cover a wide range. Consistent with the narratives, population is lowest in the SSP1 and SSP5 reaching about 7 billion people by 2100 and the highest in SSP3 reaching 12.6 billion in 2100. The middle of the road scenario (SSP2) depicts a population peaking at 9.4 billion (Figure 2). Compared to the SRES scenarios (Nakicenovic and Swart, 2000), i.e., the previous set of socioeconomic community scenarios, the new set covers a lower range. This is primarily due to the decline of fertility rates in emerging economies over the last two decades as well as the recent expansion of education among young women in least developed countries. Outcomes in terms of educational composition, which has important implications for economic growth and for vulnerability to climate change impacts, also vary widely across SSPs. In SSP1 and SSP5 composition improves dramatically, with the global average education level in 2050 reaching about the current level in Europe. SSP2 also shows substantial increases in educational composition, while in SSP3 and SSP4 increases are small and the global average education level even declines somewhat late in the century.

Similarly, the quantification of the urbanization trends follow the storylines (Jiang and O'Neill, 2016). The projections show that the world continues to urbanize across all SSPs, but rates of urbanization differ widely across them, with urbanization reaching between 60% (SSP3), 80% (SSP2), and 92% (SSP1, SSP4, SSP5) by the end of century (Figure 2). This range is much wider compared to earlier projections (Grübler et al., 2007). The middle of the road SSP2 projection is close to the UN median projection (UN, 2014). In SSP3, urbanization is constrained by slow economic growth, limited mobility across regions and poor urban planning that makes cities unattractive destinations. By contrast, urbanization is assumed to


315 be rapid in both SSP1 and SSP5, which are associated with high income growth. Note, however, that in
316 SSP1 urbanization is desired given the high efficiency that compact urban areas may achieve, while in
317 SSP5 cities become attractive destinations due to other reasons, such as rapid technological change that
318 allows for large-scale engineering projects to develop desirable housing.

319 There are three sets of economic (GDP) projections for each SSP (Crespo Cuaresma, 2016; Dellink et al.,
320 2016; Leimbach et al., 2016). They were developed together with the demographic projections, in order
321 to maintain consistency in assumptions with education and ageing. The three economic projections
322 differ, however, in terms of their focus on different drivers of economic development (technological
323 progress, efficiency improvements in energy use, income convergence dynamics or human capital
324 accumulation). We employ Dellink et al. (2016) as the marker scenario for all SSPs to ensure consistency.
325 The overall range of the SSPs is comparable to the range of earlier GDP projections in the literature
326 (Figure 2). The highest SSP GDP projection (SSP5) depicts a very rapid development and convergence
327 among countries with long-term global average income levels approaching almost 140,000 US\$2005 per
328 year in 2100. By contrast, the lowest projection (SSP3) depicts a development failure with strong
329 fragmentation, leading to slow growth or long-term stagnation in most countries of the world. In the
330 SSP3 world average income stays thus around 20,000 US\$2005 per year in 2100 – this income level is
331 broadly representative of the lowest long-term economic projections in the literature. In all scenarios,
332 economic growth is projected to slow down over time, with average growth rates in the second half of
333 the century roughly half of those in the first half. This slow-down is most marked in middle income
334 countries. Note that all GDP projections were performed using international dollar in purchasing power
335 parity (PPP) rates. An international dollar would buy in the cited country a comparable amount of goods
336 and services a U.S. dollar would buy in the United States.

337 The SSP GDP projections also depict major differences in terms of cross-national inequality. Consistent
338 with the narratives, SSP4 is characterized by the highest levels of inequality, representing a trend-
339 reversal of the recent years (see the Gini index shown in panel D of Figure 2). Due to high fragmentation
340 of the world, inequality also remains relatively high in SSP3 (compared to the other SSPs). The most
341 equitable developments are depicted by SSP1 and SSP5, both featuring a rapid catch-up of the currently
342 poor countries in the world.




SSP projections



----- *Historical development*

Other major studies



343
 344 **Figure 2: Development of global population and education (A), urbanization (B), GDP (C), and GDP per capita and the Gini**
 345 **index (D). The inset in panel A gives the share of people without education at age of >14 years, and the inset in panel D**
 346 **denotes the development of the global (cross-national) Gini index. The SSPs are compared to ranges from other major**
 347 **studies in the literature, such as the IPCC AR5 (Clarke et al., 2014); SRES (Nakicenovic and Swart, 2000), UN, and Grüber et al.**
 348 **(2007). The colored areas for GDP (panel D) denote the range of alternative SSP GDP projections presented in this Special**
 349 **Issue (Dellink et al. (2016), Crespo Cuaresma (2016), Leimbach et al. (2016)).**

350 **5. SSP baseline scenarios**

351 **5.1 Energy system**


352 The SSP baseline scenarios describe alternative path-dependent evolutions of the energy system
353 consistent with the SSP narratives and the associated challenges for mitigation and adaptation. Overall,
354 the SSPs depict vastly different energy futures, featuring a wide range of possible energy demand
355 developments and energy supply structures (Figure 3). These differences emerge due to a combination
356 of assumptions with respect to the main drivers of the energy system, including technological change,
357 economic growth, emergence of new energy services, energy intensity of services, and assumptions with
358 respect to costs and availability of future fossil fuel resources and their alternatives (see Appendix A of
359 the Supplementary Material and Bauer et al. (submitted) for further details).

360 The scale and structure of the future energy supply systems in the SSP scenarios are critical
361 determinants of the challenges for mitigation and adaptation. Two of the SSP baseline scenarios (SSP3
362 and SSP5) have a heavy reliance on fossil fuels with an increasing contribution of coal to the energy mix
363 (Figure 3: panel A and B). In these two SSPs, the challenges for mitigation are thus high. By contrast,
364 SSP1 and SSP4 depict worlds with low challenges to mitigation, and consequently increasing shares of
365 renewables and other low-carbon energy carriers. The “middle of the road” narrative of SSP2 leads to a
366 balanced energy development compared to the other SSPs, featuring a continuation of the current
367 fossil-fuel dominated energy mix with intermediate challenges for both mitigation and adaptation.
368 These characteristics are also shown by the “SSP triangle” in Figure 3. The corners of the triangle depict
369 hypothetical situations where the energy system would rely either fully on coal, “oil & gas” or
370 “renewables and nuclear”. In this energy triangle, baseline scenarios for SSP3 and SSP5 are moving with
371 time closer to the left corner dominated by coal, while SSP1 and SSP4 scenarios are developing toward
372 the renewable and nuclear corner. The SSP2 scenario stays in the middle of the triangle.

373 The SSP baselines also span a wide range in terms of energy demand (Figure 3: Panel C), which is
374 another major factor influencing the future challenges to mitigation and adaptation. At the upper end of
375 the range, the SSP5 scenario exhibits a more than tripling of energy demand over the course of the
376 century (primarily driven by rapid economic growth). As a result, SSP5 is characterized by high
377 challenges to mitigation. Challenges to mitigation are lowest in SSP1 and SSP4 (Figure 3: Panel C), and
378 this is reflected in the scale of energy demand in these scenarios. Demand is particularly low in the SSP1
379 scenarios peaking around 2060 and declining thereafter due to successful implementation of energy

380 efficiency measures and behavioral changes. This leads to a global decoupling of energy demand from
 381 economic growth. Consistent with its intermediate mitigation challenges, final energy demand roughly
 382 doubles in the SSP2 scenario in the long term (2100) depicting a middle of the road pathway. Overall,
 383 the range of energy demand projections associated with the SSPs is broadly representative of the
 384 literature (covering about the 90th percentile range of the scenarios assessed in the IPCC AR5 (Clarke et
 385 al., 2014)).

386 Last but not least, the SSPs provide very different interpretations for energy access and poverty, which is
 387 an important indicator of the challenge to adaptation across the SSPs. The SSP3 and SSP4 baseline
 388 scenarios, for example, depict a failure of current policies for energy access, leading to continued and
 389 increased use of biomass in the households of developing countries (as defined today). By contrast, the
 390 use of coal and traditional biomass in households is reduced significantly in the other three baseline
 391 scenarios, which all portray comparatively more equitable worlds and thus also lower challenges for
 392 adaptation.



393
 394 **Figure 3: Primary energy structure (Panel A + B) and final energy demand (Panel C) of the SSP marker scenarios and**
 395 **corresponding ranges.**


396

397 **5.2 Land-use change**

398 While there is a relatively long tradition of modeling comparisons in the area of energy-economic
399 modeling (Clarke et al., 2009; Clarke et al., 2014; Edenhofer et al., 2010; Kriegler et al., 2015; Kriegler et
400 al., 2014b; Riahi et al., 2015; Tavoni et al., 2015), there are fewer examples of systematic cross-model
401 comparisons of land-use scenarios. Notable exceptions include (Nelson et al., 2014; Popp et al., 2014;
402 Schmitz et al., 2014; Smith et al., 2010; Von Lampe et al., 2014). In this context, the SSPs are the first
403 joint community effort in developing land-use scenarios based on common narratives as well as a
404 harmonized set of drivers.

405 All SSP scenarios depict land-use changes in response to agricultural and industrial demands, such as
406 food, timber, but also bioenergy. The nature and direction of these changes are, however,
407 fundamentally different across the SSPs. They reflect land-use specific storylines that have been
408 developed based on the SSP narratives (Popp et al., submitted) and which have guided assumptions on
409 regulations, demand, productivity, environmental impacts, trade and the degree of globalization of
410 future agricultural and forestry markets.

411 The land-use change components of the SSP baseline scenarios cover a broad range of possible futures.
412 For example, the scenarios show that in the future total cultivated land can expand or contract by
413 hundreds of millionsmillions of hectares over this century (Figure 4). Massive growth of population,
414 relatively low agricultural productivity, and little emphasis on environmental protection makes SSP3 a
415 scenario with comparatively large pressure on the global land-use system. The resulting land-use
416 pattern is one with large-scale losses of forests and other natural lands due to an expansion of cropland
417 and pasture land (Figure 4). In comparison, the SSP1 scenario features a sustainable land transformation
418 with comparatively little pressure on land resources due to low population projections, healthy diets
419 with limited food waste, and high agricultural productivity. Consistent with its narrative, this scenario
420 depicts a reversal of historical trends, including a gradual, global-scale, and pervasive expansion of
421 forests and other natural lands. All other SSP scenarios feature modest changes in land-use with some
422 expansion of overall cultivated lands (Figure 4).



424
 425 **Figure 4: Changes in cropland, forest, pasture and other natural land for the SSP marker baseline scenarios (thick lines) and**
 426 **ranges of other non-marker scenarios (colored areas). Changes are shown relative to the base year of 2010 = 0. In addition to**
 427 **the SSP baseline scenarios also the development of the RCPs (van Vuuren et al, 2011) and the range of the IPCC AR5**
 428 **scenarios are shown (Clarke et al, 2014). Note that cropland includes energy crops. Other natural land includes all land-**
 429 **categories beyond forests, pasture, cropland, and build-up areas (the latter category is comparatively small and has not been**
 430 **quantified by all models).**

431 5.3 Baseline emissions and climate change

432 The pathways for the energy and land-use systems in the SSP scenarios translate into a wide range of
 433 GHG and pollutant emissions, broadly representative of the baseline range of the literature (Figure 5).

434 This is particularly the case for CO₂ emissions, which are strongly correlated with the future challenges
 435 for mitigation. The higher dependence on fossil fuels in the SSP3 and SSP5 baselines result in higher CO₂
 436 emissions and a higher mitigation challenge. Similarly, comparatively low fossil fuel dependence and
 437 increased deployment of non-fossil energy sources (SSP1 and SSP4) results in lower CO₂ emissions and

438 lower mitigation challenges (Figure 5). The SSP2 baseline depicts an intermediate emissions pathway
439 compared to the other baselines, featuring a doubling of CO₂ emissions over the course of the century.

440 CH₄ is the second largest contributor to global warming (after CO₂). Current global emissions are
441 dominated by non-energy sources like livestock, manure management, rice cultivation and enteric
442 fermentation. To a lesser extent energy-related sources, including the production and transport of coal,
443 natural gas, and oil, contribute to the emissions. Population growth and food demand is a strong driver
444 of future CH₄ emissions across the SSPs. It is thus not surprising that CH₄ emissions are highest in the
445 SSP3 baseline and lowest in SSP1. The combination of different energy and non-energy drivers leads in
446 all other SSPs to intermediate levels of CH₄ emissions in the long term. Perhaps noteworthy is the rapid
447 increase of CH₄ emissions in the SSP5 baseline in the near term, which is primarily due to the massive
448 expansion of the fossil fuel infrastructure, particularly for the extraction and distribution of natural gas.

449 Important sources of N₂O emissions today include agricultural soil, animal manure, sewage, industry,
450 automobiles and biomass burning. Agricultural soils and fertilization are the by far largest contributors
451 of N₂O emissions, and remain so across all the SSPs. Emissions are highest in the SSP3 and SSP4
452 baselines due to high population and/or fertilizer use. N₂O emissions are lowest in SSP1, featuring
453 sustainable agricultural practices and low population assumptions.

454 In summary, we find that total CO₂ and CO₂-eq. greenhouse gas emissions and the resulting radiative
455 forcing correlate well with the challenges to mitigation across the SSPs. The results show at the same
456 time, however, that plausible and internally consistent scenarios will not follow strictly the same ranking
457 across all emissions categories (or across all SSP characteristics). It's thus important to note that the
458 aggregated challenge for mitigation and adaptation is not only determined by the baseline but also the
459 climate policy assumptions. The latter critically influence the effectiveness of climate policies, which are
460 introduced on top of the baselines (see next section).


461 An important feature of the SSPs is that they cover a much wider range for air pollutant emissions than
462 the RCPs (Rao et al., submitted). This is so since all the RCPs included similar assumptions about future
463 air pollution legislation, assuming that the stringency of respective emissions standards would increase
464 with raising affluence. It was not intended that the RCPs cover the full range of possible air pollutant
465 emissions. In contrast, the SSPs are based on distinctly different air pollution storylines consistent with
466 the overall SSP narratives. Particularly the upper bound projection of SSP3 features a world with slow
467 introduction of air pollution legislation as well as implementation failures, leading to much higher air

468 pollution emissions levels than in any of the RCPs (see Figure 5). For further details of the air pollution
469 dimension of the SSPs, see Rao et al (submitted) in this special issue.


470 The resulting radiative forcing of the climate system is shown in the last panel of Figure 5. The SSP
471 baselines cover a wide range between about 5.0 to 8.7 W/m² by 2100. Perhaps most importantly, we
472 find that only one single SSP baseline scenario of the full set –SSP5– reaches radiative forcing levels as
473 high as the one from RCP8.5. This is consistent across all IAM models that attempted to run the SSPs. As
474 the SSPs systematically cover plausible combinations of the primary drivers of emissions, this finding
475 suggests that 8.5 W/m² can only emerge under a relatively narrow range of circumstances. In contrast,
476 an intermediate baseline (SSP2) only produces a forcing signal of about 6.5 W/m² (range 6.5 to 7.3
477 W/m²). The lack of other SSP scenarios with climate forcing of 8.5 W/m² or above has important
478 implications for impact studies, since SSP5 is characterized by low vulnerability and low challenges to
479 adaptation. In order to add a high-end counterfactual for impacts to the current set of SSPs, it might be
480 useful to develop a variant of an SSP that would combine high vulnerability with high climate forcing.
481 This could be achieved for example by adding an alternative SSP3 interpretation with higher economic
482 growth, to test whether such scenarios might lead to higher emissions consistent with RCP8.5 (see e.g.,
483 Ren et al., (2015)). The current SSP3 marker scenario leads to a radiative forcing of 7.2 W/m² (range 6.7
484 to 8.0 W/m²).

485 The SSP1 baseline scenarios show the lowest climate signal of about 5 W/m² (range of 5.0 to 5.8 W/m²).
486 In order to reach radiative forcing levels below 5 W/m² it is thus necessary to introduce climate change
487 mitigation policies, which are discussed in the next section.

Greenhouse Gas Emissions (CO₂, CH₄, N₂O, etc..)



Aerosol & Air Pollutant Emissions (Sulfur, Black Carbon, etc..)



490 **Figure 5: Global emissions and global average change in radiative forcing. SSP baseline marker scenarios (and ranges of SSP non-marker baseline scenarios) are compared to**
 491 **the RCPs (van Vuuren et al, 2011) and the full range of the IPCC AR5 scenarios (Clarke et al, 2014).**

492 **6. SSP mitigation scenarios**

493 This section provides an overview of the SSP mitigation scenarios. Further details on the baseline and
494 mitigation scenarios for individual SSPs can be found in this special issue in the five SSP marker scenario
495 papers (Calvin et al., submitted; Fricko et al., submitted; Fujimori et al., submitted; Kriegler et al.,
496 submitted; van Vuuren et al., submitted) and two cross-cut papers on the SSP energy (Bauer et al.,
497 submitted) and land-use transitions (Popp et al., submitted).

498 **6.1 Shared Climate Policy Assumptions**

499 Mitigation costs and attainability of climate targets depend strongly on the design and effectiveness of
500 future mitigation policies. Likewise, adaptation costs and the ability to buffer climate impacts depend on
501 the scope and effectiveness of adaptation measures. These policies may differ greatly across the SSPs,
502 and need to be consistent with the overall characteristic of the different narratives. Based on concepts
503 from Kriegler et al. (2014a), we thus develop so-called shared climate policy assumptions (SPAs) for the
504 implementation of the SSP mitigation scenarios. The mitigation SPAs describe in a generic way the most
505 important characteristics of future mitigation policies, consistent with the overall SSP narrative as well
506 as the SSP baseline scenario developments. More specifically, the mitigation SPAs describe critical issues
507 for mitigation, such as the level of international cooperation (particularly in the short to medium term)
508 and the stringency of the mitigation effort over time. The mitigation SPAs also define the coverage of
509 different economic sectors, and particularly the land-use sector, which traditionally has been a
510 challenging sector for mitigation in many countries.

511 The definitions of the mitigation SPAs were derived by considering three main guiding principles: 1)
512 The SPA/SSP combination is selected with the primary aim to reinforce the challenges for mitigation
513 described by the relative position of each SSP in the challenges space; 2) the expected overall impact of
514 the mitigation policy is selected to be consistent with the SSP storyline (for example, specific sectors or
515 policy measures are less effective in some of the storylines compared to others); and 3) the mitigation
516 SPAs are defined in broader terms only, providing the modeling teams a high degree of flexibility to
517 choose between different possible policy instruments for the implementation of the SPAs into the IA
518 models. The main assumptions of the mitigation SPAs are summarized in Table 3.

519 Consistent with the storyline of strong fragmentation, poverty, and low capacity for mitigation, SSP3
520 assumes an SPA with late accession of developing countries, as well as low effectiveness of the climate

521 policies in the agricultural and land sector (driven by rural poverty and low agricultural productivity). In
 522 comparison, the emphasis of SSP1 on sustainability results in this world in a highly effective and
 523 collaborative policy environment with globally comprehensive mitigation actions. Other SSPs combine
 524 different characteristics of the SPAs as shown in Table 3.

525 The above SPAs and the different underlying socioeconomic and technological assumptions lead to
 526 distinctly different near-term (2030) GHG emissions developments across the SSP scenarios. In the
 527 context of the current international agreements, the marker scenarios of SSP1 and SSP4 depict low
 528 mitigation challenges and thus describe developments that allow a further strengthening of near-term
 529 mitigation measures beyond those described by the intended nationally determined contributions
 530 (INDCs) under the Paris agreement (UNFCCC, 2015). On the other hand, the INDCs are not fully achieved
 531 in the SSP marker scenarios with high challenges to mitigation (SSP3 and SSP5). Near-term emissions of
 532 the middle-of-the-road SSP2 marker scenario are broadly consistent with the INDCs (see Figure S5 in the
 533 Supplementary Material).

534 **Table 3: Summary of Shared Climate Policy Assumptions (SPAs) for mitigation. All SPAs foresee a period with moderate and**
 535 **regionally fragmented action until 2020, but differ in the development of mitigation policies thereafter (see Section 6 and**
 536 **Appendix B of the Supplementary Material for further details and definitions).**

Policy stringency in the near term and the timing of regional participation	Coverage of land use emissions
<p style="text-align: center;">SSP1, SSP4</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Early accession with global collaboration as of 2020</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">SSP1, SSP5</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Effective coverage (at the level of emissions control in the energy and industrial sectors)</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">SSP2, SSP5</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Some delays in establishing global action with regions transitioning to global cooperation between 2020-2040</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">SSP2, SSP4</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Intermediately effective coverage (limited REDD*, but effective coverage of agricultural emissions)</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">SSP3</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Late accession – higher income regions join global regime between 2020-2040, while lower income regions follow between 2030-2050</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">SSP3</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Very limited coverage (implementation failures and high transaction costs)</p>

537 *REDD: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation

538 Finally, it is important to note that while the adaptation dimension have not been quantified in the
 539 scenarios (see also Section 7 on Conclusions), the SSPs differ greatly with respect to the challenges to

540 adaptation as well as the associated effectiveness of possible adaptation policies (O'Neill et al., 2014).
541 For example in SSP1, the capacity to adapt to climate change is high given the well-educated, rich
542 population, the high degree of good governance and the high development of technologies. In addition,
543 also the intact ecosystem services contribute to the adaptive capacity. In SSP3, on the other hand the
544 capacity to adapt to climate change is relative low, given the large, poor population, the lack of
545 cooperation and low of technology development. In SSP4, the capacity to adapt to climate change is
546 relatively low for most of the population in each region, given the unequal distribution of resources. And
547 finally in SSP5, the capacity to adapt to climate change is high given a highly educated and rich
548 population as well as the high level of technology development. SSP2 depicts intermediate adaptation
549 capacity compared to the other SSP scenarios. In future research, the SPAs will need to be extended by
550 an adaptation dimension in order to integrate climate impacts and adaptation into the scenario analysis.

551

552 **6.2 Mitigation strategies**

553 The reduction of GHG emissions can be achieved through a wide portfolio of measures in the energy,
554 industry and land-use sectors, the main sources of emissions and thus global warming (Clarke et al.,
555 2014). In the energy sector, the IA models employ a combination of measures to introduce structural
556 changes through, e.g., replacement of carbon-intensive fossil fuels by cleaner alternatives (such as a
557 switch from coal to natural gas, or the upscaling of renewable energy) and demand-side measures
558 geared toward energy conservation and efficiency improvements (Bauer et al., submitted; Calvin et al.,
559 submitted; Fricko et al., submitted; Fujimori et al., submitted; Kriegler et al., submitted; Popp et al.,
560 submitted; van Vuuren et al., submitted). The latter include also the electrification of energy demand. In
561 addition to structural changes, carbon capture and storage (CCS) can be employed to reduce the carbon-
562 intensity of fossil fuels or can even be combined with bioenergy conversion technologies for the delivery
563 of energy services with potentially net negative emissions. Primary measures in the agricultural sector
564 comprise reduction of CH₄ and N₂O emissions from various sources (livestock, rice, fertilizers) and
565 dedicated measures to reduce deforestation and/or encourage afforestation and reforestation activities.

566 The mitigation effort required to achieve a specific climate forcing target depends greatly on the SSP
567 baseline scenario. Autonomous improvements in some baselines, e.g., in terms of carbon intensity
568 and/or energy intensity (see SSP1, Figure 6) can greatly reduce the residual effort needed to attain long-
569 term mitigation targets. By the same token, however, the lack of structural changes in the baseline


570 (SSP5) or relatively high levels of energy intensity (SSP3) inevitably translate into the need for
571 comparatively higher mitigation efforts.

572 This path-dependency of mitigation is illustrated in Figure 6. It is shown how the introduction of climate
573 policies leads to concurrent improvements of both the energy and the carbon intensity of the economy.
574 At the same time, the figure also clearly illustrates that the required relative “movement” of the
575 mitigation scenarios (i.e., the combination of measures for carbon and energy intensity) are strongly
576 dependent on the position of the baseline (in Figure 6). For example, the carbon and energy intensity
577 improvement rates of the SSP3 baseline are slower even than the recent historical rate (1971-2010).
578 Hence, the distance of the SSP3 baseline to reach stringent climate targets - such as limiting
579 temperature change to below 2°C (see Figure 6) - is much larger than, for example, the distance for the
580 SSP1 baseline scenario. As a matter of fact reaching the lowest target of 2.6 W/m² from an SSP3 baseline
581 was found infeasible across all IAM models (Figure 8).

582 Achieving stringent climate targets requires a fundamental transformation of the energy system,
583 including the rapid upscaling of low-carbon energy (renewables, nuclear and CCS) (Figure 7).
584 Independently of the SSP, we find that for reaching 3.4 W/m² about half of the energy system (range:
585 30-60%) will need to be supplied by low-carbon options in 2050, while for 2.6 W/m² these options need
586 to supply even about 60% (range: 40-70%) of the global energy demand in 2050. This corresponds to an
587 increase of low-carbon energy share by more than a factor of three compared to today (in 2010 the low-
588 carbon share was 17%). In comparison, none of the SSP baselines show structural changes that are
589 comparable to the requirements of 3.4 or 2.6 W/m². Only the SSP1 baseline depicts noteworthy
590 increases reaching a contribution of about 30% of low-carbon energy by 2050 (most SSP3 and SSP5
591 baseline scenarios are showing even a decline of the share of low-carbon energy by 2050 in absence of
592 additional climate policies).

593 CCS plays an important role in many of the mitigation scenarios even though its deployment is subject to
594 large uncertainties (Figure 7, right panel). Therefore, depending on the SSP interpretation of different
595 models, the contribution of CCS ranges from zero to almost 1900 GtCO₂. As shown by the marker SSP
596 scenarios, fossil-intensive baselines, such as SSP3 and SSP5, show generally higher needs for CCS
597 compared to less fossil-intensive baselines. Consistent with the narrative of sustainability, the
598 contribution of CCS is lowest in the SSP1 marker scenario (Figure 7).


599 Important mitigation options outside the energy sector include reduced deforestation, the expansion of
600 forest land cover (afforestation and/or reforestation) as well as the reduction of the greenhouse gas
601 intensity of agriculture (Figure 7, middle panel). While uncertainties for land-based mitigation options
602 are generally among the largest, we nevertheless find that the mitigation strategies of the marker SSP
603 scenarios reflect well the underlying narratives (see also Popp et al. (submitted)). The expansion of
604 forest land cover is an important factor in the mitigation scenarios of the SSP1 marker (Figure 7),
605 followed by SSP2 and SSP4. The IAM model of the SSP5 marker does not consider mitigation-induced
606 afforestation, implying that CO₂ emissions from land use are phased out by reducing and eventually
607 eliminating deforestation in all SSP5 mitigation cases, but no expansion of forest area and associated
608 CO₂ withdrawal occurs. Finally, the SSP3 marker scenario shows a different dynamic due to high
609 pressure on land. Already the SSP3 baseline is characterized by shrinking forest areas. This trend is
610 further accelerated in the mitigation scenarios due to the expansion of bioenergy. SSP3 depicts thus a
611 future world with massive challenges for land-based mitigation, where GHG policies add further
612 pressure on the land system, resulting in competition for scarce resources between food and bioenergy
613 production.



614

615 **Figure 6: Annual long-term improvement rates of energy intensity (final energy/GDP) and carbon intensity (CO₂/final**
 616 **energy). Development in the SSP baseline and mitigation scenarios are compared to scenarios consistent with a likely chance**
 617 **to stay below 2°C from the IPCC AR5 (shaded area). Large icons and colored lines denote the SSP marker and associated**
 618 **mitigation scenarios. Smaller icons denote non-marker IAM interpretations of the SSPs.**

619



620

621 **Figure 7: Major mitigation options in the energy and land-use sector: (a) upscaling of low carbon energy by 2050, (b)**
 622 **expansion of forest land-cover by 2050, and (c) contribution of cumulative CCS over the course of the century. The range of**
 623 **the SSP baseline scenarios are shown as colored bars. Horizontal black lines within the colored bars give the relative position**
 624 **of the SSP baseline marker scenarios. The full range of results for the mitigation scenarios are shown as grey bars. Colored**
 625 **symbols within the grey bars denote the relative position of the marker mitigation scenarios and the horizontal black lines**

626 within the grey bars denote the median across the mitigation scenarios. Note that the number of scenarios differs across the
627 different baseline and mitigation bars.

628 **6.3 Mitigation costs and attainability**

629 The comprehensive mitigation experiments enable us to fill the “matrix” of the scenario framework with
630 mitigation costs from different SSP scenarios (see Figure 8 and Section 1 of the Supplementary
631 Material). For each mitigation target (i.e., 2100 forcing level) and each SSP we have computed costs for
632 the SSP marker model as well as associated ranges of other non-marker IAMs.


633 Mitigation costs are shown in terms of the net present value (NPV) of the average global carbon price
634 over the course of the century. The price is calculated as the weighted average across regions using a
635 discount rate of 5%. We select this cost metric since not all models are able to compute full
636 macroeconomic costs in terms of GDP or consumption losses. Results for those models that report these
637 cost metrics can be found in Section 1 of the Supplementary Material.

638 Our results are consistent with other major comparison studies (Clarke et al., 2014; Kriegler et al., 2015;
639 Riahi et al., 2015) which suggest that carbon prices for achieving specific climate targets may vary
640 significantly across models and scenarios. For example, the average carbon prices for the target of 2.6
641 W/m^2 differ in our analysis by about a factor of three across the marker scenarios from about 9 $\$/tCO_2$ in
642 the SSP1 marker to about 25 $\$/tCO_2$ in the SSP5 marker. Our highest estimate across all scenarios (>100
643 $\$/tCO_2$) is representative of about the 90th percentile of comparable scenarios assessed by the IPCC AR5
644 (category I scenarios, see Clarke et al, 2014), while the lowest in our scenario set is lower than
645 comparable estimates from AR5. In other words, we are able to cover with our limited set of models a
646 large part of the overall literature range. The average carbon price in the middle-of-the-road SSP2-2.6
647 W/m^2 scenario is about 10 $\$/tCO_2$ (range: 10-110 $\$/tCO_2$, Figure 8). The SSP2 marker costs are
648 somewhat lower than the median cost estimate of the scenarios for similar targets assessed by the IPCC
649 AR5 (30 $\$/tCO_2$). The wide range of costs is also an important indication that (consistent with our
650 original objective), the scenarios cover a significant range with respect to the challenges for mitigation.
651 Perhaps more importantly, we can consistently relate the differences in the mitigation costs to
652 alternative assumptions on future socioeconomic, technological and political developments. This
653 illustrates the importance of considering alternative SSPs and SPAs and their critical role in determining
654 the future mitigation challenges.

655 Consistent with the narratives, mitigation costs and thus the challenge for mitigation is found lower in
656 SSP1 & SSP4 relative to SSP3 & SSP5 (Figure 8). Perhaps most importantly, we find that not all targets

657 are necessarily attainable from all SSPs. Specifically the 2.6 W/m² target was found by all models
658 infeasible to reach from an SSP3 baseline, and the WITCH-GLOBIOM model found it infeasible to reach
659 the target in SSP5 (all other models reached 2.6 W/m² from SSP5). The fact that IAMs could not find a
660 solution for some of the 2.6 W/m² scenarios needs to be distinguished from the notion of infeasibility in
661 the real world. As indicated by Riahi et al. (2015) model infeasibilities may occur for different reasons,
662 such as lack of mitigation options to reach the specified climate target; binding constraints for the
663 diffusion of technologies or extremely high price signals under which the modeling framework can no
664 longer be solved. Thus, infeasibility in this case is an indication that under the specific socioeconomic
665 and policy assumptions of the SSP3 scenario (and to a less extent also SSP5 scenario) the transformation
666 cannot be achieved. It provides useful context for understanding technical or economic concerns. These
667 concerns need to be strictly differentiated from the feasibility of the transformation in the real world,
668 which hinges on a number of other factors, such as political and social concerns that might render
669 feasible model solutions unattainable in the real world (Riahi et al., 2015). Infeasibility, in the case of
670 SSP3, is thus rather an indication of *increased risk* that the required transformative changes may not be
671 attainable due to technical or economic concerns.

672 In all other SSPs (Figure 8), IAMs found the 2.6 W/m² to be attainable, and it is possible that yet lower
673 forcing levels might be attainable in some of these SSPs. As a matter of fact, some studies indicate that
674 under certain conditions targets as low as 2.0 W/m² might still be attainable during this century
675 (Luderer et al., 2013; Rogelj et al., 2015; Rogelj et al., 2013a; Rogelj et al., 2013b). As a follow-up
676 research activity to this special issue, the IAM teams are planning to use the SSP framework for a
677 systematic exploration of the attainability of such low targets.



679

680 **Figure 8: Carbon prices and the attainability of alternative forcing targets across the SSPs. The colors of the cells are**
 681 **indicative of the carbon price. The numbers in the boxes denote the carbon price of the marker scenarios with the full range**
 682 **of non-marker scenarios in parenthesis. White cells indicate the position of the respective baseline scenarios. Empty**
 683 **(crossed) cells could not be populated. Carbon prices are shown in terms of the net present value (NPV) of the average global**
 684 **carbon price from 2010 to 2100 using a discount rate of 5%. Mitigation costs for other metrics (GDP losses, consumption**
 685 **losses, and abatement costs) are provided as well in Section 1 of the Supplementary Material. Note that the SSP columns are**
 686 **ordered according to increasing mitigation challenges (low challenges (SSP1/SSP4), intermediate challenges (SSP2) and high**
 687 **mitigation challenges (SSP3/SSP5)).**

688 7. Discussion and conclusions

689 We have shown how different SSP narratives can be translated into a set of assumptions for economic
 690 growth, population change, and urbanization, and how these projections can in turn be used by IAM
 691 models for the development of SSP baseline and mitigation scenarios. By doing so, this paper presented
 692 an overview of the main characteristics of five Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) and related
 693 integrated assessment scenarios. These are provided to the community as one of the main building
 694 blocks of the “new scenario framework” (O’Neill et al, 2014, van Vuuren et al, 2014).

695 This overview paper is complemented by additional articles in this special issue. Together the papers
 696 provide a detailed discussion of the different dimensions of the SSPs with the aim to offer the
 697 community a set of common assumptions for alternative socioeconomic development pathways. These
 698 pathways can be combined with different climate policy assumptions (SPAs) and climate change
 699 projections (e.g., the RCPs) and thus facilitate the integrated analyses of impacts, vulnerability,

700 adaptation and mitigation. The SSP scenarios presented here do not consider feedbacks due to climate
701 change or associated impacts (with exception of the IMAGE scenarios which include the effect of
702 fertilization on forest growth due to changing CO₂ concentrations). This makes these scenarios
703 particularly relevant for subsequent impact studies, since it facilitates the superposition of physical
704 climate changes on top of the SSP scenarios to derive consistent estimates of impacts (or adaptation).
705 The narratives, quantitative drivers, and IAM scenarios serve the purpose of providing the IAV, IAM and
706 climate modeling community with information that enables them to use the scenario framework for a
707 new generation of climate research. This special issue should be seen thus as a starting point for new
708 climate change assessments through the lens of the SSPs and the new scenario framework.

709 We find that while the SSPs and the associated scenarios were designed to represent different
710 characteristics for the challenges to mitigation and adaptation, for many dimensions the resulting
711 quantifications span a wide range broadly representative of the current literature. This is particularly the
712 case for the SSP population and GDP projections as well as for the greenhouse gas emissions of the
713 associated baseline scenarios. For some dimensions the SSPs go even beyond the historical ranges from
714 the literature. This is specifically the case for urbanization where there has been little work in the past to
715 explore the space of possibilities, and for air pollutant emissions. For the latter, the SSP scenarios span a
716 considerably wider range compared to the RCPs, since the SSP scenarios explicitly consider alternative
717 air pollution policy futures (in contrast to the RCPs, which were based on intermediate assumptions for
718 air pollution legislation).

719 Using multiple models for the development of the economic projections and the SSP scenarios was
720 important in order to understand the robustness of the results and to be able to explore structural
721 model uncertainties in comparison to uncertainties conditional on the interpretation of different SSP
722 narratives. The development of the SSPs and their associated scenarios involved multiple rounds of
723 public and internal reviews and the selection of marker SSP scenarios. While the markers can be
724 interpreted as representative of a specific SSP development, they are not meant to provide a central or
725 median interpretation. For each SSP alternative outcomes are possible, and the different IAMs are used
726 to project conditional uncertainties that might be attributed to model structure and/or the
727 interpretation/implementation of the qualitative storylines. Thus, in order to capture these
728 uncertainties it is generally recommended to use as many realizations of each SSP as possible.

729 By employing a systematic mitigation analysis across the SSPs, we have also conducted the first
730 application of the scenario framework for the mitigation dimension. We find that mitigation costs

731 depend critically on the SSPs and the associated socioeconomic and policy assumptions. While our study
732 could not reduce the large uncertainties associated with mitigation costs (Clarke et al., 2014), the SSP
733 mitigation experiments have nonetheless helped to illustrate the role of various sources of uncertainty,
734 including the extent to which mitigation costs may depend on different models or different
735 interpretations of storylines.

736 Another important finding from our assessment is that not all cells of the scenario matrix could be
737 populated. On the high end, only SSP5 led to radiative forcing levels as high as RCP8.5, while at the low
738 end it was not possible to attain radiative forcing levels of 2.6 W/m² in an SSP3 world. However, we
739 cannot rule out the possibility that plausible combinations of assumptions could be identified that would
740 enable the currently empty cells to be populated. For example, somewhat higher economic growth
741 assumptions in a variant of SSP3 might lead to higher climate change (8.5 W/m²; Ren et al., 2015). Such
742 an SSP3 variant would be relevant since it would combine high climate change with high vulnerability.
743 Similarly, the results of the SSPs with low challenges to mitigation, particularly SSP1, indicate that it
744 might be possible to reach yet lower radiative forcing levels than those included in the current matrix.
745 Hence, efforts in the IAM community have started to apply the SSP framework for the development of
746 deep mitigation scenarios that could extend the scenario matrix at the low end.

747 The next steps of the community scenario process will comprise collaboration with the climate modeling
748 teams of CMIP6 (Eyring et al., 2015) to assess the climate consequences of the SSPs. This work is
749 organized as part of ScenarioMIP (O'Neill et al., 2016b). In addition, the modeling protocol that has been
750 developed as part of this study (see Appendix A-C of the supplementary material) is made available to
751 the IAM community in order to enable widespread participation of additional IAM modeling teams in
752 quantifying the SSPs. Most importantly, the SSPs and associated scenarios aim to enable impacts,
753 adaptation and vulnerability researchers to explore climate impacts and adaptation requirements under
754 a range of different socio-economic developments and climate change projections. The plan is for an
755 evolutionary expansion of the scenario framework matrix, so that a large body of literature based on
756 comparable assumptions can emerge. Beyond the work on the global SSPs, important extensions are
757 either planned or are under way (van Ruijven et al., 2014). These include extensions with respect to
758 other sectors (e.g., www.isi-mip.org), specific regions (e.g., for the US (Absar and Preston, 2015) and for
759 Europe (Alfieri et al., 2015)), or increased granularity and heterogeneity, for example, with respect to
760 income distributions or spatially downscaled information on key socioeconomic drivers.

761 All results presented in this special issue are available on-line at the interactive SSP web-database
762 hosted at IIASA: <https://secure.iiasa.ac.at/web-apps/ene/SspDb/>

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