



***Is There a Chance for a
New and Global Détente ?***

DR. BRUNO KREISKY



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DR. BRUNO KREISKY LECTURE SERIES / 1

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
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FOREWORD

Dr. Bruno Kreisky, former Chancellor of Austria, played a key role in the establishment of IIASA in Austria and continues to be one of the Institute's strongest supporters. In recognition of Dr. Kreisky's continuous and dedicated support to the ideals of the Institute, the IIASA Council have established a new series of distinguished lectures, the *Dr. Bruno Kreisky Lecture Series*.

IIASA was honored to have Dr. Kreisky himself inaugurate this new series with a lecture devoted to a key issue of the Institute, "Is there a chance for a new and global détente?". Through this publication we have the pleasure of making this lecture available to a larger audience.

Thomas H. Lee
Director
International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis



IS THERE A CHANCE FOR A NEW AND GLOBAL DETENTE?

BRUNO KREISKY

First of all, I should like to express my appreciation for your decision to establish the *Dr. Bruno Kreisky Lecture Series*. A retired working politician from time to time also needs some support so as not to fall into oblivion. Even if I, for my part, do my best to work against this empirical fact, I am nevertheless grateful when others help me. Even more so when this help comes from an institution that I esteem so highly as IIASA.

Many people know how much I appreciate anecdotes. Therefore, I would like to begin with an anecdote I experienced myself. An important Swedish politician who, presumably, would have had the greatest chance to become the successor to the great Swedish Social Democrat Per Albin Hansson had he not died so young, had invited a number of exiled Social Democrats to speak in the church of his home town, Dalarna.

On the way there he noticed my nervousness. After all, I had never before had an opportunity to speak in a church. He said with sympathy: "Dear friend, of course, I know that you are hesitant to speak in a church, but I can only give you one piece of advice: don't try to speak like a priest and preach — they have the priest for that and they did not invite you for that. They want to listen to you, a political refugee, and you should speak as such."

I always remembered this anecdote and this advice when I was speaking at universities in Austria or elsewhere. I have never tried to imitate those who teach at such institutions. They did not invite me as a professor, and therefore I have always tried to appear as what I am and what Truman, in such complimentary words, said about me once in Kansas City: that I was a working politician. This permits me to steer through the Scylla of a politician and the Charybdis of a statesman.

Since my early youth I had been interested in theoretical questions, as was appropriate for an Austrian Social Democrat coming from the school of Austro-Marxism. Austro-Marxism — if I may, just for once, instruct you — is not the insult into which unfortunately it was turned later, but a school of socialist theoreticians who tried to apply Marxist methods to dominant and urgent problems of the time.

Let me give you some examples: The late President Karl Renner wrote his famous book *Der Kampf der österreichischen Nationen um den Staat*, which deals with the problems of the old monarchy and was first published in 1902. Otto Bauer's book about the nationality problem was later extensively used by Stalin without reference to the author. Another example is the profound book by Rudolf Hilferding (in spite of the fact that he is known as a German Minister of Finance, he was originally Austrian), *Das Finanzkapital*, which is a book by a true follower of Karl Marx and *Das Kapital*. And

finally, I have to mention the book by the Viennese philosopher Professor Max Adler entitled *Die Staatsauffassung des Marxismus*.

These were the textbooks of my youth. It had always been my dream to study the very topical issue of race theory, particularly when Hitler came to power and Nazism was trying to establish the theoretical base for his racism. The available literature on that topic was highly unscientific and surprisingly it is so, to a great extent, even today; although slightly adapted, it has not advanced much further.

The Austro-Marxist theoreticians were heavily influenced in their thinking by one man, Professor Ernst Mach, who, at that time, taught at the Technical University of Vienna. (Let me quote an interesting phenomenon in parentheses: Lenin dealt with this philosopher in his most comprehensive work. The title of the book is *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*. As is appropriate for Marxist authors, it is very difficult to understand. That I have read it is only due to the fact that I spent a lot of time in prison and therefore had time to read this very comprehensive and complicated book. Leading figures in the Soviet Union were deeply surprised to find that I was knowledgeable about the works of Lenin. They were always somewhat taken aback by the fact that someone who had read so much of Lenin had landed on an entirely "wrong" political side.)

In my later studies of economics, which at that time was just approaching the golden age of econometrics, I was concerned with that particular aspect. My studies were facilitated by the fact that I had had good mathematics teachers when I was a student.

Later on I discovered that even that was not sufficient, and I had to study a book that I believe was called *Mathematics for Economists*. It soon turned out that that was not enough either, because modern economics was becoming increasingly dependent on ever more complicated mathematics.

Once, when I was already Foreign Minister, I met the great British Professor Harrod at a reception at the Austrian Embassy in London. With some hesitation I expressed my concern that, as economics was gradually becoming a secret science, there would be much that union leaders would no longer understand, although they, in particular, urgently needed to have some knowledge of economics. Much to my surprise Professor Harrod agreed with me and admitted, somewhat contritely, that the application of ever more complicated mathematical formulae was like the situation of Goethe's famous "sorcerer's apprentice", who could no longer put the broom away in the corner.

Many of my friends also came from the scientific field. One of them, the mathematician Hans Motz, went to school with me and is now, I believe, still in Oxford; another friend of mine is Victor Weisskopf, with whom I am particularly closely connected through a common approach to the most important problems of our time; another friend is Professor von Weizsäcker, the brother of the present Federal President of Germany, whom I met through my Pugwash activities. Another person who impressed me deeply in many discussions was my dear friend Szillard; I also had a close friendship with Lise Meitner and many others, as a result of organizing the second Pugwash Conference in Vienna in the name of President Schärff, the Austrian Federal President at that time.

I was seeking these encounters, not just because I wanted to meet prominent people, but because, time and again, I wanted to see confirmed the importance of science for

politics at a time when this fact — for better or worse, as we know today — had not been widely recognized. I was trying to trace the interconnections between politics and the sciences in my theoretical political efforts.

I do not want to burden you with a reading list on that. I would like to conclude the first part of my talk by saying that in my political life I have very consciously considered myself as one of the *terrible simplificateurs*. In my view the definition of this expression is simple: it is to speak and write in such a way that it is not an insult to the intelligence of an academic audience, and at the same time — what is extremely important to me — that it is also comprehensible to a miner or a steelworker.

Believe me, it is not at all an easy goal to achieve. Someone who is active in politics is, time and again, confronted with the question as to what degree he keeps to the truth. Credibility in politics actually has an axiomatic character. I have found only one formula, which I have repeated over and over again, almost to the point of boredom — the words of the famous Catholic writer Georges Bernanos:

I am here to tell the truth... A man tells the truth when he says what he thinks. To say what one thinks is to give part of one's truth, and the good Lord himself does not ask for more.

I am asking you, therefore, to view my following remarks in this spirit. I will attempt to explain things which seem of relevance to me and try to refrain from speculation, which — believe me — is not so easy for me, because I am very much inclined to it. I am not a political astrologer but, of course, I think a lot about the immediate and longer-term future. In this sense, I should like to turn to some current political issues.

We have to bear in mind that 60% of mankind lives in Asia, a continent with the largest nation in the world, China, which is the second leading center of communism in our time; Japan, technologically the third industrial country in the world, but with regard to efficiency and operational capacity probably the first and fastest rising industrial technological power in the capitalist world economy; these two jointly with the Indian subcontinent, East and South-East Asia together present a front of industrial growth and concentrated resources unheard of only one generation ago.

When I was a political refugee in Sweden during World War II, after having been in a Gestapo prison, I had plenty of time to study Asian problems. At that time I read an interesting book by Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry, which was almost unknown in Europe. It was entitled: *The Official Record, Narrative of the Expedition of an American Squadron to the China Seas and Japan*, and published in 1856. It shows how, in the short period of 120 years, Japan developed from an unknown island, which closed its doors to foreigners, into a highly industrialized state.

Let me tell you about another recent personal experience. I have just come back from an intensive trip to South-East Asia. On this trip I used one European and three Asian airlines, Philippine Air, Thai Air, Singapore Air. And I found out that these are managed excellently. As it happened, I had problems only with one very well-known European airline. It shows that such a highly sophisticated economic and technological

field as air transport can be handled excellently by the so-called developing countries. So I think we should get rid of the technological arrogance often demonstrated by people of the industrialized world.

I would like to talk now about the purely political questions that are the most decisive issues of our time. I want to make some remarks and observations on how to regain a state of détente.

THE POLICY OF CONTAINMENT

I think the historical development after the Potsdam Conference at the end of the war could be divided into three periods. (I am not sure whether historians would accept this system.)

The first period began with the cold war and ended with the policy of containment. The cold war started right after the end of World War II, or rather, as I have already said, after the Potsdam Conference. President Truman, together with Dean Acheson and George F. Kennan, conceived the so-called "policy of containment" as a counter-strategy. To my mind, this policy was extremely successful despite its defensive character. Just allow me to enumerate some very crucial battlefields in this cold war: the Berlin blockade; the exodus of Yugoslavia out of the communist bloc; the civil war in Greece; the Marshall Plan, which was eminently important for the regeneration of the European economy; and, last but not least, the peace treaty with Japan.

Now I have to talk about Austria in this context. The conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the former allies finally took place in 1954 in Berlin. I had the honour to be present. Even though this conference turned out to be a failure, the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Leopold Figl, and I were invited to have lunch with Molotow at the Soviet Embassy in Berlin. There I also met Mr. Gromyko, so we have known each other for 30 years.

I should remind you that Austria had been occupied by the four former allies. At this lunch, Minister Molotow made a suggestion concerning Austria: the Soviet Union was ready to accept an Austrian state treaty if we accepted a symbolic military unit until the signing of a peace treaty with Germany. Minister Figl and I refused this offer.

To our great surprise, a few months later we were invited to Moscow. In the negotiations that followed, results were achieved that we had not even dreamt of: we got back our oil fields; otherwise we would still have the Russians on our oil fields today. They would have gained the right to exploit our oil fields for 30 years ahead — that is to say until next year.

In Moscow we signed a memorandum that Austria would become, in a constitutional framework — and I have to stress in a constitutional framework — a permanently neutral state, but we declared that this permanent neutrality should be adopted by the Austrian parliament after the last foreign soldier had left Austrian soil. (In parentheses I should like to mention that, at that time, the discussion started — and it is still going on today — whether a similar solution could be found for the German problem, with neutral status, a unified Germany.)

During a reception I consulted Anastasius Mikojan, the second most influential Soviet politician at that time, about the German question. His answer was that the neutrality of a state was based on a mere piece of paper. A small country would never dare to ignore this agreement, whereas a big one regarded it just as a piece of paper and might change its mind. And what, he added, are we supposed to do if, for example, Germany, with its 70 million inhabitants, decides to regard her neutrality as no longer valid? "Should we go to war?" Mikojan asked. This seemed to be a very genuine answer to my question whether a solution similar to that adopted for Austria could also be applied to Germany.

I should like to end my remarks on the first part of this period by saying that, in my opinion, the policy of détente to which I feel committed in fact came into existence with the signature of the Austrian State Treaty.

It was the attempt of Krushchev — this is my personal view — not only to revise the Stalinist domestic policy, but the foreign policy as well. What about the Helsinki conference? Helsinki was, in my view, the confirmation of the policy of détente.

Some months ago, I said in a speech before students of the universities of Innsbruck and New Orleans that it is understandable — and I say this without the slightest irony — that the policy of détente looks different to people in Austria, in Finland, in Sweden, in Norway, in Denmark, and above all in Berlin. It is obvious that they feel differently about détente than people in California or Texas do. For the latter it may appear as a policy of appeasement. For us it is pure reality. Certainly, the policy of détente did not eliminate the demarcation line dividing the democratic states from the communist countries in Europe, but it made it more permeable. The bordering states on both sides do not treat each other with the same attitude of enmity as they used to during the cold war.

I have been talking about the importance of the policy of détente for the states on the geographic border of democratic Western Europe and also for the bordering states of the Eastern bloc. It was, to a certain extent, possible for them to develop their national identities.

I consider the friendship between the United States and democratic Europe as an axiom of politics. I have to draw some essential conclusions of particular relevance today. First of all — and I said this a long time before the American election and also recently in Japan before the election — it is the American people who elect their president and they alone — we have neither the possibility nor the right to interfere. We have to accept the results of the elections. And we have to respect the two great democratic institutions in the United States, the Senate and the House of Representatives. But at the same time we have the right to present our views on the political situation today.

Europe, for example, cannot afford any economic warfare with the Soviet Union. The trade percentages between Western Europe and the Soviet Union might give the impression that they are of marginal size — but in reality, especially in certain sectors, as for example the steel industries of Germany, Austria, France, and of other countries, the Soviet Union is a very important trading partner.

Secondly, Europe is not autonomous as regards its energy resources. Only very few European countries have access to British and Norwegian oil. As a consequence, we are forced to a large extent to import gas and oil from the Soviet Union. And, to me, it doesn't make much difference whether one depends on the oil from the Gulf region, i.e.

Iran or Iraq, or from the Soviet Union. On the contrary, the export of gas and oil to Austria, Germany, Italy, and other countries is also of vital importance for the Soviet Union. It means payments in currencies that enable the Soviet Union to finance her own imports. In this field, we cannot accept the suggestions that we should stop our imports of Soviet gas. I am even convinced of the contrary – there is need of overall European cooperation for an integrated energy supply.

On this occasion, it seems to me very interesting to take a look at the European East–West relations in trade. At the height of the cold war, nobody believed that the day would come when economic cooperation between the communist and the Western industrialized countries would become important for world trade as a whole.

In the period of the 1950s, when the cold war reached its climax, exports from the OECD area, the United States and Japan included, to the Comecon countries amounted to 770 million US dollars. In the time of détente, 1980 for example, exports increased to 42.4 billion US dollars – from less than one billion in 1950 to 42.4 billion in 1980. In real terms, of course, this increase is lower than these figures seem to indicate. Nevertheless, they show that the sixties and the seventies were characterized by an impressive expansion of mutual trade and economic cooperation.

During the first half of the 1970s, imports of the Comecon group increased by more than 30% annually, and exports by more than 22%. For well-known reasons, which I need not discuss here, this exchange of goods has recently begun to stagnate. But this is not completely true. In the Financial Times of November 12, 1984, I read that trade between the Western European countries and the Eastern countries had again developed significantly, and it is very interesting that the Eastern European countries have also been able to reduce their debts to a very remarkable extent.

I merely want to draw your attention to the considerable potential of economic development through an intensified exchange of goods, which exists once the right political climate has been established.

CURRENT PROBLEMS

Let me now make some remarks on the third period. I prefer to call it the time of cold peace. We are in the habit of discussing the weakness and the problems of the Soviet Union and its allies. We use expressions such as austerity, inefficiency, failure of the planned economy, a lack of technology, and so on. It is not my task today to discuss these questions, but I believe that we should not ignore our own problems. They are serious enough. Involved in a real arms race, we are not only competing in the field of armaments, but also in economics and politics. The strength of democracies depends, above all, on their own economic and social strength.

And here democracies face some very serious problems. The first one is unemployment. The employment forecast of the OECD was published recently. I would remind you that a year ago the OECD report stated that we would need 20 000 new jobs daily simply to return to the situation of 1979, when 19 million people were unemployed in

the OECD member countries. In this latest report, the OECD talks of an unemployment level of 30 million, and according to the OECD forecast this figure will increase further.

Here we have to face one of the most serious problems of the European industrial states. I don't want to discuss all the problems resulting from this high unemployment rate. I don't want to discuss what it means for the economy, for social peace in a society, and for the morale of a people, including the political morale of a people.

Let me mention another group of problems which seem to me highly important and which will cause a lot of difficulties. These are the problems of agriculture. A specialist in common market agricultural policies, a German professor, recently stated that the agricultural policy within the common market had become absurd.

Of the Common Market budget, two thirds are used to subsidize agriculture. I want to remind you that with all these new loans given by the Monetary Fund to the developing countries we are subsidizing consumption. This is, in my view, a very dishonest way to deal with them, because we have a large number of subsidies everywhere, in the US and in European agriculture. I remember something I heard when I couldn't, as had been wished by some participants, act as a co-chairman of the Cancun conference because of illness and was replaced by my friend Trudeau. Some people participating in this conference told me that President Reagan delivered a speech telling them all that they ought to accept our economic rules, because they were the most efficient and above all, that there should be no subsidies. They should not build up the economy on subsidies. But President Nyerere, a very clever man educated in Anglo-Saxon schools and universities, said to President Reagan: "You are giving very big subsidies to your agriculture." The President turned to one of his collaborators and he answered Nyerere with a smile, "You are quite right." This is a very typical situation we have to face in many international conferences.

I have already told you that two thirds of the budget of the Common Market, which is an association of European industrialized states, are used to subsidize agriculture. We have to keep in mind that only 8% in the member countries of the Common Market work in agriculture. Furthermore, there are many subsidies in the national budgets of the member countries. The Common Market was once a net importer of agricultural products, and it is now a net exporter of sugar, corn, and various other products. It goes without saying that the developing countries have lost many markets, not to mention prices.

To mention another problem: we have not succeeded in finding an efficient means of cooperation between the industrialized countries, between the OECD countries, and the developing countries. We are forcing the developing countries to accept our economic and financial philosophy. Lately this has been demonstrated at the UNIDO conference in Vienna. We gave them a lot of advice based on our own philosophy. As a consequence, they have debts amounting to more than 800 billion dollars.

The Director General of the FAO made a paradoxical revelation, namely that the European Economic Committee, which was actually intended to be a union of industrialized states, has in recent years become the world's largest sugar exporter and the second largest exporter of meat. And all because of the policies of protection and subsidies. The result is that the world market prices of sugar – I am still quoting the Director – meat and cereals have been totally ruined. The loss of foreign currency reserves, which

was enormous because of the outflow, on account of the simultaneously high interest rates, reached an intolerable level.

Let's be quite frank about it: the industrial countries — this is my view — will have to write off a good deal of that money. Through their unrest and continuous conflicts, the thousands of millions of starving people will very soon create a situation in which our Western world will be in danger. According to this view, a system of economic co-operation has to be built up in good time, and very efficient sacrifices have to be made by the Western industrial states. We are on the point of becoming the victims of our own false conceptions.

This has led to an aggravation of the global economic crisis. A few weeks ago the FED had to commit itself practically to the nationalization of the Continental Illinois Corporation, of course in a concealed form. A long time ago Galbraith described the nature of that kind of nationalization. There can be little doubt that the same thing would have to happen with other banks which find themselves in difficulties. We will see it very soon.

It is not my objective to export to the Third World a particular model of society and economics. I think we have to prepare the ground for satisfying the basic needs of the people living in these countries. To put it quite simply: if we want to make the developing countries genuine partners of the industrial states, they must first of all be given the infrastructure they need to enable them to develop their own resources. This also applies to agriculture. When I say infrastructure, I mean transport, water and energy supplies as well as modern telecommunication systems.

To put it in a nutshell: the countries of the Third World are incapable on their own of creating the infrastructure they need in order to play their part in the international division of labor. They require our substantial assistance. Only when they are in possession of a more or less satisfactory infrastructure, will they be able to do so. And this must, of course, include modern vocational training systems adapted to the prevailing conditions. In implementing such far-reaching infrastructural measures it would naturally be impossible to apply the standards currently prevailing in the field of international credits.

When anyone mentions the problems of financing any of these proposals, I can only refer to the fact that between 700 and 750 billion US dollars were spent on armaments during 1982. Willy Brandt said recently that next year nearly 1000 billion dollars will be spent (he is the head of the Commission which works on these problems) and this at a time when both super powers already possess a multiple overkill capacity. The United States is carrying on its armaments program at the cost of a gigantic deficit. And the people of the Soviet Union have to accept long-lasting austerity.

PROSPECTS

Now, as far as the dispute between the two super powers is concerned, I want to make some purely personal and final remarks. On the establishment of the new administration under President Reagan, it seems to me that the United States started with an ideological foreign policy. The verbal ideological warfare culminated in the declaration

of President Reagan that the Soviet Union was the "evil empire". Now President Reagan has completely changed his tone. I hope he will continue to do so in the future. And so has the Soviet Union. It is my opinion that never before have world politics involved such semantic maneuvering as they do today. Nobody can find out what is really happening behind what is supposed to be happening.

I personally believe that the super powers should be prepared to undertake some very substantial confidence-building measures before they sit down and talk about disarmament.

I can see a very important example. Both super powers are interested in a stabilization of the situation in the Middle East. Let's take the case of Lebanon. My personal view is that this question should be dealt with within the framework of the United Nations or within a body which belongs to them. This, and this alone, would make it logical for both the United States and the Soviet Union to negotiate with all the parties concerned — I mean the Arab countries, including the Palestinians, and Israel. But we have to bear in mind that the Middle East problem does, in fact, result from the unsolved Palestinian question.

Here, too, I believe a lot can be done: on the Arab side there is the so-called Fez plan of September 1982. On the other hand, we have the Reagan plan of September 1, 1982. And then we have resolution 242 adopted nearly unanimously by the United Nations. And then eight days after the Fez plan we had Brezhnev's declaration. In order to examine where there are similarities between these proposals and where there are differences, I made my own inquiries and found that there are not so many divergencies between the two proposals that they could not bear discussion.

Let me now mention some other issues which seem important to me. One is what I would like to call the European paradox: today there is no reason whatsoever to motivate a war between European states. I remember when I was a young man there was permanent discussion about the next war between Germany and France, which would lead to a new world war. In today's Europe, there is no cause for such a war. The Russians' talk about a new German revanchism lacks any motivation. In spite of the fact that there is no reason for a war in Europe, we have on this continent today the greatest accumulation of arms, highly sophisticated arms, on both sides of the demarcation line between East and West.

This fact in itself is a threat to peace. There is a general feeling of restlessness, above all among the young generation, about the capability of the governments to guarantee a peaceful future. There is a widespread fear of nuclear war. What we have to overcome is the present substantial and verbal hostility. Then we have to try to overcome the mutual misunderstandings. As far as misunderstandings are concerned, I think it is the special task of the Western democracies in Europe to bridge this gap by continuing the policy of normalization between the democratic states and the communist states in Europe.

There have been attempts which failed recently, for example, between West and East Germany. The idea of economically boycotting the Soviet Union is, in my view, totally pointless, because the intellectual potential of the Soviet Union is quite strong and such a boycott would have only a short-term effect.

A proof of the strength of the Soviet intellectual potential is the fact that they had the Sputnik first, and that they have nearly the same sophistication in armaments as the

United States. Here, I think, no boycott against the Soviet Union is the right approach; offering cooperation would be much better.

I believe that a nuclear "cordon sanitaire" across Europe would be useful, if it were established on both sides of the demarcation line, of course. It would not be more than a homeopathic measure, but it would be a highly important symbolic agreement.

There is no end to the list of possible initiatives and issues. There is plenty of room for normalization and understanding, but there is no doubt that we have to be aware that we are living in a time of political polarization.

Allow me at the end of my speech to quote myself. I said in my speech at the Helsinki conference:

In the documents which we are about to sign, we often find references to the fact that we intended to cooperate in spite of the existing difference in social systems. What are these different systems of which we speak?

Perhaps it would be useful for me to give a word of clarification. Hundreds of millions of people live in countries which are deeply attached to the concept of political democracy. Other hundreds of millions of people live in countries in which the political concepts of the communist parties have been realized, and the autonomous developments in many states are worthy of note.

There is no point in seeking to minimize or even ignore the basic differences of these political systems and orders of society. I therefore welcome the clarification frequently made to the effect that coexistence – by which we mean the form of peaceful relations presently possible – cannot be understood as being valid for the ideological sphere.

I welcome this clarification because the democratic states are firmly determined to obtain a bigger and bigger breakthrough for the idea of democracy. We are convinced that democracy in itself is a creative form of government, and that, within its framework and while observing strictly its principles, major social reforms have taken place and will take place in the future.


Even though every effort should be made to return to a policy of détente so as to secure peace, there should be no illusion as to how far one can proceed on this path at this time of polarization of policy and society. The relationship between the big powers will continue to alternate between mutual antagonism and rapprochement and will, at best, resemble what Schopenhauer, the German philosopher, describes in a fable:

On a cold wintry day a company of porcupines moved closer to each other seeking each other's warmth so as to find protection against the frost. Soon, however, they felt each other's spines – which made them separate again. Whenever, thus, the need for warmth brought them together, the other ill repeated itself. Thus they moved from one pain to the other until they found a proper distance to each other which they could tolerate.

DR. BRUNO KREISKY

Former Federal Chancellor of Austria (1970–1983) and former Minister of Foreign Affairs (1959–1966), Dr. Bruno Kreisky is Vice President of the Socialist International. Born in Vienna in 1911, he joined the Foreign Service in 1946, and served in the Federal President's Office (1951–1953), becoming State Secretary for Foreign Affairs in the Federal Chancellery in 1953. He was elected to Parliament in 1956 and became Chairman of the Socialist Party of Austria in 1967, a post he held until 1983.

Dr. Kreisky's publications include *The Challenge: Politics on the Threshold of the Atomic Age* (1963), *Aspects of Democratic Socialism* (1974), *Neutrality and Co-existence* (1975), and *The Times We Live In: Reflections on International Politics* (1978).



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