

1 Getting it right matters – temperature 2 goal interpretations in geoscience 3 research

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9 10 11 12 **Key Points:**

- 13 • The Paris Agreement long-term temperature goal refers to changes in long-term global
14 climatological averages, excluding natural variability
- 15 • Interpretations of this goal that include natural variability are not consistent with
16 UNFCCC, IPCC and WMO definitions and practice
- 17 • Deviating interpretations that include natural variability significantly distort key policy-
18 relevant insights, like carbon budget estimates

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20 **The adoption of the 1.5°C long-term warming limit in the Paris Agreement made 1.5°C a ‘hot
21 topic’ in the scientific community, with researchers eager to address this issue [Rogelj and
22 Knutti, 2016]. Long-term warming limits have a decades-long history in international policy
23 [Randalls, 2010]. To effectively inform the climate policy debate, geoscience research hence
24 needs a core understanding of their legal and policy context. Here, we describe this context
25 in detail, and illustrate its importance by showing the impact it can have on global carbon
26 budget estimates. We show that definitional clarity is essential on this important matter.**

27
28 Scientific assessments of warming levels of 1.5°C and 2°C global mean temperature (GMT)
29 increase above pre-industrial levels have risen to prominence through the inclusion of these
30 levels in the long-term temperature goal (LTTG) of the Paris Agreement. The goal itself is
31 inscribed in Article 2.1(a) of the Paris Agreement and reads: „Holding the increase in the global
32 average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to
33 limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would
34 significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change“ [UNFCCC, 2015a]. (Note that
35 Article 2.1(a) in its entirety is referred to as the Paris long-term temperature goal [Schleussner
36 et al., 2016], and that this goal includes reference to temperature levels of ‘well below 2°C’
37 and 1.5°C.) The Paris Agreement does not provide a precise definition of what holding ‘well-
38 below 2°C’ or limit to ‘1.5°C’ increase above pre-industrial levels means. When considered in
39 isolation, such references to warming levels thus allow for a wide range of interpretations, not
40 all of which are consistent with their definition in climate policy and practice.

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42 A wide variety of interpretations have indeed already been applied throughout the geoscience
43 literature. For example, temperature targets have been compared to annual global mean
44 temperature evolutions that include natural variability, either generically by using
45 unsmoothed annual mean model output [Chen and Zhou, 2016; Joshi et al., 2011] or explicitly

46 by showing how the Inter-decadal Pacific Oscillation influences the year in which the 1.5°C
47 Paris temperature limit could be breached [Henley and King, 2017]. Other studies have
48 analyzed 1.5°C or 2°C worlds based on decadal-averages around these temperature levels
49 [King et al., 2017], or suggest to use averaging windows which are at least a few decades in
50 width [James et al., 2017]. Studies have furthermore interpreted global mean temperature
51 targets to apply to increases in regional temperatures [Chen and Zhou, 2016; Joshi et al., 2011]
52 or to temperatures over land only [Huntingford and Mercado, 2016]. Finally, studies have also
53 interpreted the temperature levels referred to in the Paris Agreement's long-term
54 temperature goal as long-term climatological global means [Lehner et al., 2017; Sanderson et
55 al., 2016; Sanderson et al., 2017].

56

57 These widely different interpretations lead to quite different insights, and definitional clarity
58 is hence necessary to ensure effective, policy relevant communication and discussions in and
59 outside the geoscience community on this politically sensitive matter. What would be an
60 appropriate interpretation of the temperature limit included in the Paris Agreement? The
61 answer lies in rigorous analysis of the available information and examination of the context –
62 in this case the legal framework of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
63 Change (UNFCCC).

64

65 The 1992 Climate Convention and successive IPCC reports provide a clear guidance here. The
66 Climate Convention (UNFCCC), to which the Paris agreement is a subsidiary legal instrument,
67 contains the definition of climate change in its Article 1 [UNFCCC, 1992]. This definition makes
68 clear that for the purpose of the UNFCCC and any related legal instrument, climate change
69 “means a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that
70 alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate
71 variability observed over comparable time periods”. In addition, the most recent IPCC
72 Assessment (AR5) provides further clarity by defining ‘climate’ as the statistical description in
73 terms of the mean and variability of relevant quantities over a period of time, with a classical
74 period for averaging being 30 years, also commonly used by the World Meteorological
75 Organization (WMO). It further goes on to define ‘climate change’, from any cause, as a
76 statistically identifiable change in ‘climate’ statistics that ‘persists for an extended period,
77 typically decades or longer’ [IPCC, 2013a].

78

79 In the Paris Agreement context, the UNFCCC definitions apply and IPCC Assessment Reports,
80 particularly the Fifth, played a predominant role defining and underpinning the scientific
81 components of the agreement. The formulation that references holding warming ‘well below
82 2°C’ and further limiting increases to ‘1.5°C’ reflects a high-level conclusion by decision
83 makers, which was informed by their constituencies and their interpretations of the overall
84 scientific literature with respect to an acceptable level of level of human induced ‘climate
85 change’ relative to a pre-industrial reference period. Indeed, when the scientific literature
86 relates risks and impacts to global-mean temperature increases, it typically uses GMT increase
87 averaged over periods of 20 to 30 years as a reference, including in the latest reports of IPCC
88 Working Groups I and II [IPCC, 2013b; 2014]. At the same time, such assessments include the
89 effects and risks posed by climate variability relative to a long-term GMT. When, in the period
90 2013 to 2015, the UNFCCC carried out a review of its 2°C long-term global goal to consider
91 strengthening it to 1.5°C, global long-term climatological averages relative to a 1850-1900
92 reference period were used to discuss the different temperature levels considered [UNFCCC,
93 2015b], in line with their use in the IPCC's Reasons for Concern (RFC) [O'Neill et al., 2017].

94

95 Besides its use in impact studies, long-term GMT limits are also used in climate change
96 mitigation studies, which here provide a further supporting perspective. The Paris Agreement
97 indicates that to achieve its long-term temperature goal, greenhouse gas emissions need to
98 be rapidly reduced in order to achieve “*a balance between anthropogenic emissions by*
99 *sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century*”. This is
100 equivalent to achieving global zero greenhouse gas emissions [Schleussner et al., 2016] and
101 linked to scientific findings on emission pathways characteristics in line with interpreting the
102 UNFCCC temperature limits as global long-term climatological averages [Clarke et al., 2014;
103 Rogelj et al., 2015], thus providing another line of evidence.

104

105 As a consequence, it is clear that the temperature references in the Paris Agreement can only
106 be understood as changes in climatological averages attributed to human activity excluding
107 natural variability. Warming levels in the Paris Agreement hence do not refer to temperature
108 modulations that are the result of chaotic patterns of natural variability on time scales of
109 single years, months or days, or of temperature events in one particular geographical location.
110 However, even when interpreting temperature levels embedded within the long-term
111 temperature goal as climatological averages, some important sources of uncertainty remain,
112 for example, related to the precise fraction of GMT increase to date that can be attributed to
113 human activities [Bindoff et al., 2013]. As this uncertainty is carried forward into the future,
114 decision makers have to take it into account by pursuing global emission pathways that limit
115 GMT increase to a given level with a given probability, for example 66 per cent [Clarke et al.,
116 2014].

117

118 Why is the question of interpretation so important? Long-term temperature targets provide
119 guidance for short, mid and long-term global mitigation action, and can be translated into
120 specific carbon budgets over different time periods that can inform mitigation requirements
121 [Clarke et al., 2014; Collins et al., 2013]. This translation from temperature targets to carbon
122 budgets requires specific choices about (i) the nature of the budgets, (ii) the probability and
123 time horizon of achieving a given goal (for example, limiting warming to 1.5°C by 2100 with
124 50 per cent probability), and (iii) has to account for the geophysical uncertainty in the response
125 of the climate system [Collins et al., 2013; Rogelj et al., 2016]. Adopting a different
126 interpretation of the Paris long-term temperature goal will thus also alter carbon budget
127 estimates.

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129 To illustrate this point, we here analyze how temperature target interpretations affect carbon
130 budget estimates and in particular what the effect of including natural variability on an annual
131 basis would be. We derive annual deviations of global mean surface air temperature from the
132 centered 21-year running mean over the period 1900-2090 from 24 CMIP5 coupled climate
133 models (GCMs) and the combined historical and RCP2.6 scenarios. The estimates of natural
134 variability obtained in this way are still an approximation only, as low-frequency variability
135 over multiple decades is not captured by this method. Averaged over all models, we find the
136 66% range of GMT deviations due to internal variability to be normally distributed and of the
137 order of +/-0.1°C (Figure 1, and Figure S1 for individual GCMs). This value is robust over time
138 in RCP2.6 (Figure S2) and over different RCP scenarios (not shown).

139

140 Natural variability results in stochastic fluctuations around the long-term climatological GMT.
141 For instance, in a world with long-term GMT rise stabilized at 1.5°C, annual GMT is expected

142 to *exceed* 1.5°C in half of all years due to internal variability. We now assess changes to the
143 carbon budget for worlds in which we allow annual GMT to exceed 1.5°C in only one in 5, 10
144 or 20 years or, alternatively, never. To this end, we derive the estimated annual warming
145 anomaly for each of these return periods with respect to the long-term mean. Subsequently,
146 to avoid annual warming with a given return period, we lower the long-term GMT target by
147 the estimated maximum annual warming anomaly due to internal variability for each
148 respective return period. We then derive the reduction in carbon budgets for each of these
149 cases by means of the transient temperature response to cumulative emissions of carbon
150 (TCRE, see Table 1).

151
152 For the sake of this illustration, internal variability and the inferred anomalies are assumed to
153 be independent from GMT warming (an assumption supported by CMIP5 model data, see
154 Figure S2). This implies that the estimated carbon budget adjustments can also be used with
155 higher temperature levels, like 2°C or 2.5°C.
156

157 The adoption of annual mean warming targets instead of long-term temperature averages
158 strongly influences the available carbon budget estimated to be compatible with '1.5°C'. In
159 case the annual GMT would only be allowed to exceed the 1.5°C temperature limit once every
160 20 years, the carbon budget would be reduced by about 420 Gt CO₂, nearly 20% of the
161 originally estimated budget since 1870. If the 1.5°C limit should not be breached in any given
162 year, the budget since 1870 is roughly halved, and already overspent today. In other words,
163 there are substantial real-world policy differences involved in re-interpretations of the Paris
164 Agreement's long-term temperature goal. Policymakers in Paris adopted the long-term
165 temperature goal based upon the assessments supplied by the IPCC along with carbon
166 budgets consistent with the goal.

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168 A thorough understanding of how the long-term temperature goal is interpreted in the
169 UNFCCC is thus indispensable for scientific studies to provide policy relevant information and
170 analysis to on-going national, regional and international policy discussions and negotiations
171 implementing the Paris Agreement. It is important that scientists examining this topic are fully
172 aware of the full legal and scientific characteristics of the Paris Agreement LTTG. By
173 contextualising and communicating their insights, researchers can support decision makers in
174 their efforts to pursue science-based policies in a forum that is already overloaded by
175 unsubstantiated noise.

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189 **Tables and figures**

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Exceedance of 1.5°C annual mean warming	1 in 2 years	1 in 5 years	1 in 10 years	1 in 20 years	Never
Equivalent long-term global-mean warming [°C]	1.5	1.41	1.36	1.31	~1
Implied reduction in long-term global-mean warming [°C]	0	0.09	0.14	0.19	0.5
Implied reduction in carbon budget [Gt CO ₂]	0	200	311	422	1110

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Table 1: Implications of annual warming targets for equivalent long-term global-mean warming and respective carbon budgets, based on a TCRE of 1.65 °C / 1000 PgC, the arithmetic mean of the IPCC AR5's likely 0.8 to 2.5 °C / 1000 PgC range [Collins et al., 2013]. Note that the cumulative carbon budget for limiting warming to 1.5°C relative to 1861-1880 in 50% of the model simulations was reported to be of the order of 2300 Gt CO₂, since 1870. This estimate assumes invariable non-CO₂ contributions.




Figure 1: Annual GMT anomalies from running 21-year average for 24 CMIP5 models and the 1900-2090 period (combined historical and RCP2.6 scenario). Levels of annual GMT anomalies for different return times are marked by vertical lines.

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