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Article

Keywords:

Posted Date: September 27th, 2024

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-5111841/v1>

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Additional Declarations: There is **NO** Competing Interest.

Macro-financial transition risks along mitigation pathways: evidence from a hybrid agent-based integrated assessment model*

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Abstract

Although the case for a swift climate transition is clear, its macro-financial viability remains uncertain. To shed light on the macroeconomic and financial response to deep mitigation trajectories controlled by carbon pricing, we integrate a process-based integrated assessment model into a macroeconomic agent-based model. The hybrid framework allows translating energy systems transformations into macro-financial outcomes at business cycle frequency and volatility. The results reveal that rapid transitions induced by fast-growing carbon prices significantly impact unemployment, inflation, and income distribution. Stabilization policies reduce these economic fluctuations, though not completely so in 1.5°C compatible scenarios. Our paper emphasizes the need for coordinating climate and macroeconomic policy during decarbonization. Additionally, it showcases how model integration can lead to a better understanding of the economic implications of low-carbon futures.

*The authors would like to express their gratitude to the participants of the conferences and seminar series at EAEPE 2022 (Naples), CEF 2023 (Nice), EAEPE 2023 (Leeds), WEHIA 2023 (Koper), IAMC 2023 (Venice), and UNIVPM gioveDiSES (Ancona) for helpful comments and suggestions. Also, the authors would like to thank Andrea Roventini for helpful comments and discussion on earlier drafts. All remaining errors are our own. S.R., L.D., J.E., E.K. and M.T. received funding from the European Union's Horizon Europe research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 101081604 (PRISMA), as well as from the Bezos Earth Fund for the Green Macroeconomic Modeling Initiative (GMMI). F.L. and E.C. gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme (Grant agreement No 853050 - SMOOTH). F.L. acknowledges the financial support of the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon Europe Programme (Grant agreement No 101117427 - FIND). Corresponding authors: Luca E. Fierro, fierro@iiasa.ac.at; IIASA International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Schlossplatz 1, 2361 Laxenburg, Austria; Francesco Lamperti, f.lamperti@santannapisa.it, Institute of Economics, Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy and francesco.lamperti@cmcc.it, RFF-CMCC European Institute on Economics and the Environment, Milan.

26 As countries commit to decarbonisation plans, questions around implementation and robust policy
27 design grow in importance. The current consensus is that the world possesses the technology and
28 economic capacity to switch to low-carbon options in many sectors (IPCC, 2022). However, much
29 less is understood about the macroeconomic and financial repercussions of climate neutrality goals
30 at the frequencies of interest to policy-makers (Battiston et al., 2021; Semieniuk et al., 2021). This
31 is a major shortcoming of existing model-based assessments, given the importance of macroeconomic
32 conditions for the political and public support of climate policies and for effective policy design aimed
33 at smoothing the transition and making it inclusive.

34 The major causes of this limited capacity are methodological and disciplinary boundaries. Model-
35 based assessments of decarbonization policies - especially those performed at the community science
36 level - have focused on technological and sectoral strategies as the main outcome variables. Models sup-
37 porting these assessments, including detailed-process Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) (Weyant,
38 2017), typically feature a stylised representation of economic and financial dynamics (Sanders et al.,
39 2022). Though some have quantified the implications of decarbonization for dimensions such as com-
40 petitiveness, trade, and sectoral employment, many scenarios only use changes in real GDP, typically
41 at very low temporal frequency, to capture transition costs. Short-run dynamics and impacts on unem-
42 ployment, balance sheets and the financial system, or inflation are typically not represented. Indeed,
43 none of these macro-financial dimensions is reported in the 1,100 scenarios assessed in the Intergov-
44 ernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Sixth Assessment Report. Moreover, fiscal or monetary policy
45 responses to macroeconomic costs induced by climate policy are not typically considered in ex-ante
46 policy assessment. At the same time, such information is highly sought after by finance ministries and
47 international organizations (e.g. the Network for Greening the Financial System, NGFS), and tran-
48 sition scenarios and their implications are becoming increasingly relevant for private financial sector
49 agents (NGFS, 2023; TCFD, 2023).

50 On the other side, different macroeconomic models have been extended to accommodate energy
51 and climate sides, providing insights into the effects of monetary and fiscal policy for the low-carbon
52 transition, and on the repercussions of moving away from fossil-fuel energy for the macroeconomy.
53 These models include extensions of the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework (DSGE;
54 e.g. Annicchiarico and Di Dio, 2015; Diluiso et al., 2020; Carattini et al., 2023; Comerford and Spi-
55 ganti, 2023), post-keynesian ecological macroeconomic models (e.g. Dafermos et al., 2018; Monasterolo
56 and Raberto, 2019; Mercure et al., 2018; Semieniuk et al., 2022), macroeconomic agent-based models
57 (MABM; e.g. Lamperti et al., 2018; Wieners et al., 2024; Turco et al., 2023), non-linear behavioural
58 macroeconomic frameworks (e.g. Campiglio et al., 2024) as well as network models (e.g. Gualdi and
59 Mandel, 2019; Stangl et al., 2024; Cahen-Fourot et al., 2021). However, the majority of these ap-
60 proaches misses detailed transition dynamics, such as those depicted by process-based IAMs and
61 included in IPCC mitigation pathways. Indeed, they typically feature only a “green” and a “brown”
62 sector.

63 This gap presents an opportunity for fruitful cross-fertilization between modelling methodologies
64 providing diverse yet complementary views on decarbonization dynamics. In this paper we provide
65 - to the best of our knowledge - the first coupling of a macroeconomic agent-based model (DSK)
66 and a process-based IAM (WITCH). Macroeconomic agent-based models offer comprehensive frame-
67 works that integrate both long-term and short-term economic dynamics (Fagiolo and Roventini, 2017;
68 Dawid and Delli Gatti, 2018), encompassing real-financial interactions (Delli Gatti et al., 2010) and
69 balance sheet relationships among economic agents (Caiani et al., 2016). In principle, they enable the

70 assessment of transition and climate costs at business cycle frequency, while also capturing growth
71 implications and financial risks (Castro et al., 2020). Additionally, they report on a richer set of micro
72 and macro variables than many other macroeconomic models (e.g. DSGEs), including unemployment,
73 inflation, and distributional variables. Complementarily, IAMs offer a fine-grained depiction of de-
74 carbonization pathways, including the transformation of the energy and other emitting sectors, their
75 mitigation costs, the investment requirements and energy mix of the economy accounting for all major
76 energy technologies.

77 Soft-coupled models are not a novelty. In the mitigation literature, they have been employed
78 to investigate R&D investment strategies for decarbonization (Aleluia Reis et al., 2023), climate-
79 induced financial instability (Battiston et al., 2017; Roncoroni et al., 2021), macroeconomic effects of
80 climate shocks (Yilmaz et al., 2023), and housing renovations decisions (Niamir et al., 2024). Focusing
81 on transition risks, Allen et al. (2020) and Vermeulen et al. (2018) feed NGFS scenarios defined as
82 carbon price and productivity shocks in a multi-country New Keynesian macro model (NiGEM), which
83 is then linked to sectoral and financial models to perform stress tests. This method allows for studying
84 the heterogeneous effects of climate policies across and within sectors and the dynamics of different
85 financial assets. Comparatively, our IAM-MABM approach allows for a wider range of variables to
86 define scenarios and a more detailed representation of the energy sector which, in particular, includes
87 its balance sheet and cost structure. Moreover, our MABM approach allows us to analyze functional
88 (and potentially personal) income distribution feedback, which remains hindered in standard macro
89 models.

90 We use the WITCH¹ model (Bosetti et al., 2006; Emmerling et al., 2016; Drouet et al., 2021)
91 to generate detailed transition pathways. This process-based integrated assessment model combines
92 an inter-temporal Ramsey-type growth framework with a bottom-up representation of the energy
93 sector. The model divides the world into 17 global regions, each playing a non-cooperative game
94 to maximize welfare in response to climate policies. A key decision in this process is how to allocate
95 R&D investments, which can be directed toward improving energy efficiency or developing carbon-free
96 technologies.

97 The transition pathways produced by WITCH are then fed into the DSK agent-based model.²
98 The DSK model depicts out-of-equilibrium economic dynamics, capturing both short-run fluctuations
99 and long-run growth (Lamperti et al., 2018, 2019, 2021; Reissl et al., 2024). It includes seven types
100 of agents interacting across five markets (see Figure 1). Key variables from the WITCH-generated
101 transition scenarios serve as inputs for the DSK model (see Figure 1), allowing for an assessment of
102 the macroeconomic implications of these transition pathways.

103 We show that an *orderly*, i.e. low unemployment, and *just*, i.e., distributionally balanced, transition
104 are mutually dependent, as the unemployment resulting from aggressive carbon pricing is influenced by
105 how the tax burden is distributed between profit and wage incomes.³ Furthermore, the unequal impact
106 of the carbon tax on the energy sector presents a potential source of instability. While the carbon
107 tax promotes profitability in renewable energy sectors, offering financial support for the transition, it
108 simultaneously undermines profitability in fossil fuel-based sectors, rendering them more susceptible

¹World Induced Technical Change Hybrid.

²“Dystopian Schumpeter Meeting Keynes”, which belongs to the “Keynes + Schumpeter” family of MABMs (e.g. Dosi et al., 2010, 2013, 2017).

³Here we use a loose definition of orderly and just transition. In our setting, an orderly transition is characterized by low unemployment levels, as a proxy for contained macroeconomic imbalances; a just transition is characterized by a relatively high and stable share of labour income, as a proxy for contained socio-economic inequality. See Newell and Mulvaney (2013) and Wang and Lo (2021) for additional discussion.


109 to bankruptcy.

110 The government can mitigate these dynamics by using carbon tax revenues to manage aggregate
111 demand. Redistributing revenues to wage earners can address distributional effects and limit negative
112 macroeconomic impacts, compensating for wage losses and sustaining aggregate demand.

113 We also find that the energy transition will require substantial credit provision for the build-up of
114 renewable energy capacity and that fossil-intensive energy sectors will experience reduced profitability
115 due to carbon pricing and the maintenance of costly stranded assets.

116 Our results contribute to the literature assessing the macroeconomic impacts of climate policies,
117 regarding regressive effects of carbon pricing ([Fremstad and Paul, 2019](#); [Callan et al., 2009](#); [Jiang and
118 Shao, 2014](#); [Farrell, 2017](#); [Känzig, 2023](#)) and the emergence of stranded assets ([van der Ploeg and
119 Rezai, 2020](#); [Cahen-Fourot et al., 2021](#); [Semieniuk et al., 2021, 2022](#)). Empirical evidence regarding
120 the macroeconomic effects of carbon pricing is somewhat mixed, with some studies finding no or
121 even small positive effects on GDP ([Metcalf, 2019](#); [Metcalf and Stock, 2023](#)) and others predicting
122 negative impacts in the short run ([Känzig, 2023](#)). Model-based analyses often predict that aggressive
123 carbon pricing may reduce GDP and employment, but highlight that appropriate revenue recycling
124 can mitigate these outcomes ([Brenner et al., 2007](#); [Conefrey et al., 2013](#); [Allan et al., 2014](#); [Rivera
125 et al., 2016](#); [Vermeulen et al., 2018](#); [Allen et al., 2020](#); [Wieners et al., 2024](#)). Further, they suggest
126 that coordinating climate, monetary and prudential policy can help smooth transition risks, though
127 the desirable mix of such instruments strongly depends on how emission intensive sectors transform
128 ([Annicchiarico et al., 2021](#); [Diluiso et al., 2020](#); [Lamperti et al., 2019, 2021](#)). This calls for a more
129 fine-grained modelling of the energy sector, at the very least. Since the carbon price trajectories we
130 examine manifest in relatively sudden increases in the price of energy, our work also contributes to the
131 macroeconomic literature on energy price shocks ([Wildauer et al., 2023](#); [Turco et al., 2023](#); [Bodenstein
132 et al., 2008](#); [Auclert et al., 2023](#); [Känzig, 2021](#)). Finally, we contribute to the literature on MABMs
133 ([Fagiolo and Roventini, 2017](#); [Dawid and Delli Gatti, 2018](#)) and in particular to two sub-strands.
134 The first regards the analysis of issues related to the green transition (e.g. [Safarzyńska and van den
135 Bergh, 2017](#); [Ponta et al., 2018](#); [Hötte, 2020](#); [Rengs et al., 2020](#)) and energy price shocks ([van der
136 Hoog and Deissenberg, 2011](#); [Turco et al., 2023](#)). The second sub-strand regards the assessment of the
137 macroeconomic consequences of changes in the distribution of income (e.g. [Dosi et al., 2018](#); [Caiani
138 et al., 2019](#); [Terranova and Turco, 2022](#); [Fierro et al., 2023](#)).

Figure 1: Overview of the sectoral structure and inter-sectoral interactions depicted by DSK, the structure of the WITCH model, and the list of variables from WITCH scenarios used as exogenous inputs for DSK




139 Results

140 Macro-financial impacts of the transition

141 We analyze three climate transition scenarios. The “Current Policy” (CP) scenario incorporates
 142 policies implemented by 2020 and serves as a baseline. The other two scenarios are designed to limit
 143 temperature increases to specific values by imposing carbon budgets from 2020 onward. One features
 144 a carbon budget of 1000 GtCO₂, leading to a 2°C temperature increase (2°C), and the other a carbon
 145 budget of 500 GtCO₂, leading to a 1.5°C temperature increase (1.5°C). In both cases, carbon budgets
 146 are met by imposing a global carbon tax. Regarding the DSK policy setting, we initially assume
 147 that carbon tax revenues are entirely retained by the government and that the central bank adopts a

Figure 2: Energy price and transition dynamics. **a-c**, energy mix, defined as the share of total energy produced by each technology, for the three WITCH scenarios. **d-f**, energy price in (2005) dollars per kilowatt-hour in the three WITCH scenarios. X-axes always refer to years.



148 single-mandate Taylor rule, i.e. it adjusts the interest rate to stabilise inflation (section 1.1.6 in SI);
 149 these assumptions will be relaxed in the policy experiments.

150 Figure 2 shows the energy mix and price dynamics for each transition scenario. Keeping tempera-
 151 ture in line with the goals of the Paris Agreement purely through a carbon price leads to a temporary
 152 but sharp increase in energy prices. This is especially the case for the most stringent climate target
 153 of 1.5°C where fossil fuels are phased out rapidly during this decade (Figure 2 upper panel).


154 The energy price shock induced by climate policy leads to a series of macroeconomic adjustments
 155 and fluctuations that emerge from the properties of DSK. Figure 3 illustrates these adjustments by
 156 comparing scenarios. The main macroeconomic outcome is that of temporary stagflation (Figures
 157 3a-3c) and low wage shares (Figure 3d). Unemployment and low economic growth emerge during this
 158 decade in the Paris-compliant scenarios;⁴ the negative impacts on the real economy are accompanied
 159 by periods of high inflation.

160 Figure 4 delves into the mechanisms underlying the dynamics depicted in Figure 3. We find that
 161 a key role is played by the wage share, which significantly declines during the early phase of the
 162 transition when energy prices are high. Moreover, its dynamics closely mirror the unemployment rate
 163 (Figure 4a). By pooling all simulations across the three scenarios and calculating the quasi-elasticities
 164 of unemployment and the wage share with respect to the energy price, we find that high energy prices
 165 are associated with high unemployment and a low wage share (Figures 4c and 4d).

166 Largely unchanged aggregate markups (assumed in the DSK model) imply that carbon pricing and
 167 energy price shocks shift aggregate income from labour to the government (via carbon tax revenue)
 168 and the "green" energy sectors, while firms' income share remains unchanged. This also triggers a

⁴Note that before 2020 in both the 1.5°C and 2C scenarios we observe a period of economic boom characterized by falling unemployment and high GDP. This occurs because, in WITCH, economic agents anticipate the future introduction of the carbon tax and begin investing in green energy technology. This investment stimulates economic activity before the carbon tax is implemented, resulting in a brief positive economic cycle.

Figure 3: Macroeconomic dynamics induced by different mitigation pathways. **a-c**, each line represents averages across 300 simulations, shaded areas are 95% confidence intervals, each colour is associated with a scenario; **c**, GDP loss relative to the CP scenario obtained using the ratio between real GDP in the 2C and 1.5°C scenarios relative to real GDP in the CP scenario; **d**, box-plot showing the distributions of wage shares in 300 simulations for of each scenario, period 2020-2030;



169 shift from labour income to dividend income, which is disproportionately saved rather than spent
170 (Kaldor, 1955; Bhaduri and Marglin, 1990; Dynan et al., 2004; Dutt, 2017). The final effect is a lack
171 of aggregate demand, leading to low employment and output.

172 As a result of cost pass-through,⁵ an energy price surge induced by a rise in carbon prices is always
173 inflationary on impact. In addition, nominal wage growth is pegged to the inflation rate (Equation 2
174 in SI). Higher inflation increases unit labour cost, which in turn feeds back into the general price level.
175 However, wages also respond to labour market conditions, growing slower (faster) when unemployment
176 is high (low). During a stagflationary period, inflation dynamics are hence dampened by weak labour
177 market outcomes.

178 Figure 4b shows that inflation increases together with the energy price at first, but peaks while
179 the latter is still growing and subsequently decreases before the energy price begins its downward
180 trajectory driven by a rapidly growing share of renewables. Figure 5 shows the adjustments in the
181 energy sector, which exhibits a strong increase in credit demand (Figure 5a). This is driven by the
182 green sectors undertaking large investments (Figures 5b-5c) and by the fossil fuel sectors having to
183 pay the carbon tax and sustain costly spare capacity (Figures 5d-5e). The consequent erosion of
184 profitability affects financial stability, leading to an increase in defaults. Coal is especially affected,
185 with default rates in this sector rising to 10-20% for 2°C and 1.5°C targets respectively (Figure 5f).
186 Differently, oil and gas are only marginally impacted. This result confirms that rapid mitigation may
187 generate imbalances harming the financial stability of high emitting sectors (e.g. Mercure et al., 2018),
188 but these risks appear to be concentrated in specific areas (i.e. coal).

⁵During the recent energy crisis due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, firms have generally been able to fully pass energy price shocks (Lafrogne-Joussier et al., 2023) on to final output prices and possibly even increase their mark-ups in the process, giving rise to so-called *sellers' inflation* (e.g. Weber et al., 2024; Weber and Wasner, 2023). Our assumption of full pass-through with largely constant markups can therefore be seen as qualitatively in line with available empirical observations and possibly even somewhat conservative.

Figure 4: Macroeconomic and distributional effects along 1.5°C pathways. **a**, blue and red lines represent averages across 300 simulations of the 1.5°C scenario, the red line is the wage share (right), blue line is the unemployment rate (left); **b**, blue and red lines represent averages across 300 simulations of the 1.5°C scenario, red line is the energy price (right), blue line is the inflation rate (left); **c**, scatterplot of unemployment and logarithm of the energy price, results pooled across 300 simulations of each scenario, period from 2015 to 2050, red line is a non-linear interpolation; **d**, scatterplot of wage share and logarithm of the energy price, results pooled across 300 simulations of each scenario, period from 2015 to 2050, red line is a non-linear interpolation.





Figure 5: Energy sector-finance link, asset stranding and energy sector imbalances in 1.5°C pathways. **a-f**, averages across 300 simulations; **a**, total credit demand of the energy sector across scenarios, expressed in 2022 US T\$⁶. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals; **b**, energy sector credit demand disaggregated by sub-sectors, 1.5°C scenario, expressed in 2022 US T\$⁷; **c**, investment disaggregated by energy sub-sector, 1.5°C scenario, expressed as a share of total investment in the energy sector; **d**, energy sectors costs broken down by cost type and disaggregated by technology-groups. Costs are expressed in proportion to revenues and refer to the 1.5°C scenario for the time window 2020-2025; **e**, capacity utilization disaggregated by energy sub-sector, calculated as the ratio between actual production and the maximum potential production, the horizontal discontinuous line marks target capacity utilization, which is set to 90%⁸; **f**, defaults disaggregated by energy sub-sector expressed as the average ratio of defaulted debt to total debt across simulations, grouped by scenarios, period 2020-2040.



⁷The model output is rescaled in order to obtain the credit demand figure in Trillion 2022 US\$. We calculate the energy sector-wide nominal credit-investment ratio produced by the model for 2022 in the CP scenario. We then multiply that ratio by the empirically observed nominal "power sector investment", as reported by the IEA *World Energy Investment 2023* (IEA, 2023), to infer the equivalent nominal credit demand expressed in Trillion 2022 US\$. Finally, we use this empirically inferred nominal credit demand for 2022 and its counterpart from the model to calculate a rescaling factor which is applied to the simulated time-series across all scenarios.

⁸Note that occasionally capacity utilization can slightly exceed 1. This is because the energy mix is an input taken from WITCH scenarios and, during the transition, some energy sub-sectors in DSK may not yet have obtained the entire capacity needed to satisfy the demand implied by the exogenous energy mix. Since such inconsistencies are small, we allow the respective sectors to exceed full capacity utilization and accommodate the demand implied by the energy mix taken from WITCH.

189 The role of monetary and fiscal policies

190 The simulations shown above point to disruptive business cycle fluctuations arising from the carbon
191 pricing needed to stabilize global warming. So far, however, we did not consider potential monetary
192 and fiscal policy responses. The central bank (CB hereafter) follows a single-mandate Taylor rule
193 aimed purely at inflation stabilization (Section 1.1.6 in SI) and the government retains the entire
194 carbon tax revenue.

195 To conduct a range of monetary and fiscal policy experiments, we relax these assumptions, allowing
196 the CB to respond to unemployment and the government to redistribute carbon tax revenues. As was
197 shown above, the dynamics generated by DSK in the 1.5°C and 2°C scenarios are qualitatively simi-
198 lar. We therefore conducted our policy analysis for the most stringent climate scenario (1.5°C). The
199 alternative monetary policy rule modifies the single-mandate Taylor rule by adding an employment
200 stabilization component that is activated when the unemployment rate exceeds a threshold, leading
201 the central bank to lower its interest rate.⁹ The central bank’s reaction to unemployment is governed
202 by an exogenous parameter, measuring the strength of the central bank’s reactivity to high unem-
203 ployment: the larger the CB’s reactivity to unemployment, the lower the interest rate in case of high
204 unemployment. The fiscal policy experiment involves the redistribution of the carbon tax revenue to
205 households. We assume that a share of current carbon tax revenue is distributed to households as a
206 lump sum transfer. Moreover, we assume that this transfer is treated as being equivalent to labour
207 income, and hence that the same propensity to consume applies to it.


208 Results from our policy experiments are summarised in Figure 6. First of all, they suggest an
209 important role for monetary-fiscal policy coordination to moderate the effects of the carbon tax. We
210 focus on the most period, i.e. 2020-2040, which we split into two decades, and focus on unemployment
211 and public debt-to-GDP ratios. In the first sub-period, fiscal policy is highly effective in reducing
212 unemployment (Figure 6a). This is because, during this period, the carbon tax is high, resulting in
213 large revenues to be redistributed. Monetary policy effects are instead negligible (Figure 6 in SI). This
214 is because, in 2020-2030, the policy rate does not change much across different CB reactivity levels to
215 unemployment (Figure 5 in SI). At the beginning of the transition phase, inflation rises faster than
216 unemployment and hence dominates the Taylor rule. In 2030-2040, carbon tax revenues decline as
217 emissions plummet, meaning that fiscal policy becomes less effective (Figure 7 in SI). However, we
218 observe a stronger role for monetary policy during this period (Figure 6b). In 2030-2040, inflation
219 recedes and so the employment stabilization effect dominates the Taylor rule, resulting in decreasing
220 interest rates.¹⁰

221 We also find that inflation is not responsive to monetary policy during the transition, meaning
222 that lowering the policy rate to fight unemployment does not produce additional inflationary pressure
223 (Figure 6 in SI). This is because inflation during the transition is driven by the energy price, which
224 is exogenous to the policy rate. In the case of cost-push shocks, the main channel through which
225 monetary policy could stabilize inflation is through expectation anchoring. However strong such a

⁹Effectively, we assume a *recession avoidance preference* for the CB (cf. Cukierman and Muscatelli, 2008) with some degree of “recession tolerance”, i.e. the policy rate response to unemployment is not asymmetrical around zero, but instead around a positive threshold level (cf. Bunzel and Enders, 2010). We set the threshold level at 10%, as this high unemployment rate can be considered an alarming indicator of a severe recession in most countries.

¹⁰Central banks typically avoid abrupt changes in the policy rate; instead, they gradually adjust the policy rate towards a specific target. This behaviour is captured by the implemented Taylor rule (Equations 57 and 76 in SI). As a result, the policy rate responds with a certain lag after unemployment reaches its safeguard level and remains relatively low even after unemployment drops below this level (Figure 6 in SI). These two effects together determine the efficacy of monetary policy in the second phase of the transition.

Figure 6: Monetary and fiscal policy to stabilize the transition in 1.5°C pathways. **a-b** and **d-e**, dots refer to averages across 50 simulations, with each dot representing a policy experiment, red dots refer to the baseline configuration, bars are 95% confidence intervals; **a**, average unemployment rate, 2020-2030, 1.5°C scenario, across fiscal policy experiments, i.e. different shares of redistributed carbon tax revenues; **b**, average unemployment rate, 2030-2040, 1.5°C scenario, across monetary policy experiments, i.e. different degrees of CB reactivity to unemployment; **d**, average public debt-to-GDP ratio, 2020-2030, 1.5°C scenario, across monetary policy experiments, normalized at 2015 value; **e**, average public debt-to-GDP ratio, 2030-2040, 1.5°C scenario, across monetary policy experiments, normalized at 2015 value; **c**, average unemployment rate, 2020-2040, 1.5°C scenario, across monetary and fiscal policy experiments; **f**, average public debt-to-GDP ratio, 2020-2040, 1.5°C scenario, across monetary and fiscal policy experiments, normalized at 2015 value.



226 channel might be in the real world, it is absent from our model, meaning that we may underestimate
 227 the inflationary costs of an expansionary monetary policy along the transition.

228 The complementarity between fiscal and monetary policy hence stems from the fact that they are
 229 effective at limiting unemployment during different phases of the transition. Figure 6c illustrates their
 230 complementarity by pooling simulation data across phases. It shows that the average unemployment
 231 rate for the full 2020-2040 period is lowest when fiscal policy redistributes a high share of carbon tax
 232 revenue and monetary policy is expansionary. In addition, monetary-fiscal policy coordination also
 233 has relevant effects on the public budget (Figures 6d, 6e, 6f). In particular, a lower policy rate will
 234 tend to lower the cost of servicing public debt in the latter phase of the simulation, hence creating
 235 fiscal space. Additionally, we observe that carbon tax revenue redistribution has a largely neutral
 236 effect on public debt. When carbon revenue is not redistributed, this represents an additional source
 237 of general revenue for the government. At the same time, however, declines in GDP and employment
 238 imply that other tax revenues will tend to decline, while outlays for unemployment benefits increase.

239 Discussion

240 Mitigation pathways, such as those reviewed in IPCC reports (IPCC, 2022), offer a detailed assessment
241 of decarbonisation dynamics that all key sectors should undergo to meet certain climate targets.
242 However, in their current status, they fail to provide an informative picture of the imbalances that
243 such a process can create at the macro-financial level. Further, they are silent on the behaviour of
244 macroeconomic aggregates at the time scale (e.g. quarterly or annual frequency) that is relevant for
245 designing stabilisation policies accompanying climate ones. This study combined the strengths of two
246 complementary modelling approaches, IAM and MABM, to shed light on the macroeconomic and
247 financial implications of mitigation scenarios. Process-based IAMs generate transition pathways with
248 high technological detail, while the strength of MABMs lies in the joint depiction of short and long-run
249 out-of-equilibrium economic dynamics, distributional feedback effects, and real-financial interactions.
250 This, combined with MABMs' capacity to handle a wide range of relevant economic variables, renders
251 the IAM-MABM link a valuable instrument for refining the estimation of transition costs across various
252 dimensions and transmission channels.

253 By simulating detailed transition scenarios generated by the WITCH IAM in the DSK MABM,
254 we showed that ambitious mitigation trajectories guided by carbon pricing - as the vast majority of
255 pathways in the literature - induce perils to macro-financial stability. Indeed, we showed that scenarios
256 compatible with 2° and 1.5°C tend to generate high unemployment and high inflation, resembling
257 dynamics typical of so-called “stag-flationary” episodes. The source of the instability lies in the rapid
258 transformation of the energy sector and its connection to the financial system. Our results point to
259 the emergence of costly physical stranded assets in the fossil fuel-intensive sectors (see also [Mercure
260 et al., 2018](#); [Semieniuk et al., 2022](#)), which contribute to an erosion of profitability of these sub-sectors
261 during the transition. These decreases in profitability, in turn, result in an increased need for external
262 finance as well as a higher rate of defaults. However, such risks concentrate in the coal sector, while
263 gas and oil face much lower exposure.

264 Further, we showed that that an orderly (low unemployment) and just (low labour share losses)
265 are not independent: they need to align. Indeed, the price of energy can be viewed as a distributional
266 variable and shifts in functional income distribution resulting from climate policy can have undesired
267 macroeconomic consequences. In particular, our results suggest that unless corrective policy action
268 is taken, transition pathways guided by carbon prices are associated with temporary periods of high
269 inflation and high unemployment. This volatility has detrimental consequences for the feasibility of
270 decarbonization. These results point to the need (i) to account for ampler policy packages within
271 mitigation pathways (e.g. [Wieners et al., 2024](#)), (ii) to report climate policy strength beyond carbon
272 pricing.

273 Conducting a battery of fiscal and monetary policy experiments, we showed that redistribution
274 of carbon tax revenue can play an important role in limiting the negative macroeconomic effects of
275 carbon pricing during the early phase of the transition. Expansionary monetary policy, on the other
276 hand, was found to be more effective during the later stages of the transition, suggesting a positive
277 role for monetary-fiscal policy coordination.

278 Overall, our study emphasizes the importance of incorporating a macro-financial dimension into
279 the analysis of mitigation pathways. This addition is essential for a more comprehensive assessment
280 of the viability of decarbonization trajectories and the effectiveness of underlying climate policies. We
281 demonstrate that integrating macroeconomic models with integrated assessment models is a promising

282 approach, although several limitations must be addressed in future research. Specifically, adopting
283 a more disaggregated perspective at the country or macro-regional level is essential to offer clearer
284 insights into practical policymaking.

285 Online Methods

286 This study integrates an agent-based macroeconomic model and a process-based integrated assess-
287 ment model to assess the materiality of transition risks along ambitious (deep) mitigation pathways.
288 Detailed descriptions of the two models can be found in [Reissl et al. \(2024\)](#) (DSK) and [Emmerling
289 et al. \(2016\)](#) (WITCH). Additionally, a thorough discussion of key model features, including necessary
290 extensions to the DSK framework for coupling with WITCH, is provided in Section 1 of the SI. In
291 this section, we outline the main model features relevant to our analysis.

292 The economic core of the DSK model is formed by two vertically integrated agent-based firm
293 sectors, namely consumption good firms and capital good firms (C-Firms and K-Firms hereafter).
294 K-Firms produce machines characterised by heterogeneous labour productivities, energy efficiencies
295 and emission intensities. To produce them, K-Firms use production techniques which are also hetero-
296 geneous in terms of labour productivity, energy efficiency and emission intensity. New capital goods
297 and production techniques are the product of K-Firms' R&D, which determines long-term growth.

298 C-Firms use machines, labour, and energy to produce a homogeneous consumption good. C-Firms
299 buy machines to match expected demand. Firms' activities are financed through retained earnings
300 and, in the case of C-Firms, loans from a banking sector. Households consume and receive income
301 in the form of wages for supplied labour, interest on deposits, dividends from firms, banks and the
302 energy sector, as well as unemployment benefits and occasional government transfers (like redistributed
303 carbon tax revenues). The government collects taxes and spends on unemployment benefits, transfers,
304 and the bailout of failing banks, while the central bank sets the policy rate. The DSK model also
305 includes an energy sector which supplies the firm sector with the energy needed for production, invests
306 in physical capital and finances its activities using internal funds and bank credit.

307 The consumption and capital goods sectors, as well as the banking sector, consist of multiple and
308 heterogeneous agents. We leverage the MABM framework to agentify the WITCH energy sector into
309 eight macro-agents, each representing a distinct energy technology. Households are modelled as an
310 aggregate entity. Table 2 in SI shows the transaction flow matrix of the model, summarising the
311 transactions between sectors and how these are financed.

312 The balance sheet and transaction flow matrices (Section 1, Tables 1-2 in SI) can be used to derive
313 the accounting identities that must be satisfied for the model to be formally stock-flow consistent.
314 To ensure stock-flow consistency during simulations of the model, all transaction flows and balance
315 sheet items are explicitly tracked. At the end of each simulation period, the model performs a series
316 of checks at the agent, sectoral and aggregate levels to ensure that no accounting identities have been
317 violated during the period.

318 The WITCH (World Induced Technical Change Hybrid) model is an integrated modelling frame-
319 work that captures the interactions among climate change, energy systems, and economic growth. It
320 combines a macroeconomic model with a detailed energy system. The macroeconomic (top-down) as-
321 pect uses an intertemporal optimization strategy that incorporates macroeconomic relationships and
322 dynamics over time. Simultaneously, the energy system (bottom-up) component details the technology
323 options available in the energy sector. This dual approach facilitates the cost-effective optimization

324 of strategies to minimize global costs associated with achieving specific climate and energy targets,
325 taking into account investment, operational costs, the repercussions of climate change, and policy
326 instruments such as carbon pricing.

327 The model divides the world into distinct global regions and generates optimal mitigation pathways
328 up to 2100. These pathways are obtained through a welfare maximization process that accounts for
329 regional interactions and the strategic dynamics spawned by global externalities, employing an iterative
330 method to achieve a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.

331 WITCH is distinguished by its dynamic representation of R&D diffusion and innovation in energy
332 efficiency and low-carbon technologies. It encapsulates the broad spectrum of externalities in climate
333 and innovation policy, including the global sharing of knowledge and technology spillovers, which
334 influence each country’s adoption of low-carbon technologies and energy productivity. This is based
335 on regional energy research and development, capital stocks, and the global cumulative installed
336 technology capacity.

337 From an economic point of view, the model simulates a single-sector economy, where output may
338 be influenced by climate impacts (climate change impacts are not activated in this study), and costs
339 related to fossil fuel use and greenhouse gas mitigation are accounted for. It employs a social planner
340 perspective to optimize regional utility, including risk aversion to future consumption levels. A CES
341 function represents the production of goods using capital, labour, and energy services.

342 The energy sector within the WITCH model covers a broad spectrum of primary energy sources,
343 conversion technologies, and consumption sectors. It includes diverse energy carriers, from fossil fuels
344 to renewables, and technologies, from power generation to transportation, representing technological
345 advancements and energy efficiency gains over time.

346 The scenarios generated for this study follow standard policy designs. The Current Policy scenario
347 implements current national climate policies and extrapolates the same effort level across the century
348 using regional carbon prices. Regulations and emission constraints are maintained throughout the
349 century. The climate policies ‘2C’ and ‘1.5°C’ aim for global net-zero emissions, following the design
350 presented in Rogelj et al. (2019). Starting from 2020, a global carbon tax is implemented to reduce
351 CO₂ emissions. Once CO₂ emissions reach net zero, global emissions are maintained at this level
352 until the end of the time horizon. Until the net-zero year, the carbon price is set to limit cumulative
353 emissions to 1000 GtCO₂ for the ‘2C’ scenario and 500 GtCO₂ for the ‘1.5°C’ scenario. Thereafter,
354 the carbon price is adjusted to equal the emission market price to stabilize emissions at zero globally.
355 More details about these two scenarios can be found in Drouet et al. (2021) and Riahi et al. (2021).

356 To couple the two models, we establish a one-way link from WITCH to DSK. Specifically, tech-
357 nology and cost-related variables for the energy sector, along with energy and carbon prices from
358 transition scenarios generated by WITCH, are fed into DSK (see Figure 1). We chose these variables
359 to partially replace the DSK energy sector with that of WITCH. The resulting energy-level variables
360 — such as production, investment, and credit demand — emerge from the interaction between the
361 two models. This interaction combines the microeconomic variables from WITCH (e.g., operation
362 and maintenance costs, energy mix) with the macroeconomic variables from DSK (e.g., aggregated
363 energy demand, financial conditions). Table 1 illustrates how the variables from WITCH and DSK
364 are combined, along with the resulting outputs. For more detailed information, please refer to the SI.

365 WITCH produces scenarios up to 2100. For the current exercise, we only examine their effect on
366 DSK dynamics up to 2050, which is the phase during which the transition takes place in decarboniza-
367 tion scenarios. Since DSK is a single-region model, global-level variables from WITCH are used as

WITCH-DSK coupling

Coupling output	WITCH	DSK	Coupling output
Coupled energy price	Energy price	Inflation	
Energy production	Energy mix	Aggregate energy demand	
Energy expenditures		Aggregate energy demand	Coupled energy price
Coupled carbon tax	Carbon tax	Inflation	
Capacity expansion		Target capacity utilisation	Energy production
Capacity	Capital depreciation		Capacity expansion
Nominal investment	Unit costs of investment Capacity factor		Capacity expansion
Fixed costs	Maintenance costs		Capacity
Operating costs	Production costs		Energy production
Emissions	Emission intensities		Energy production
Carbon tax payments			Emissions Coupled carbon tax
Credit demand		Loan refinancing Deposits	Operating costs Fixed costs Nominal investment Carbon tax payments

Table 1: The first column lists the variables that result from combining WITCH inputs with endogenously produced variables from DSK. The second and third columns indicate which variables from WITCH and DSK are used to produce a particular coupling output variable. The last column indicates that some coupling outputs are recombined with WITCH and/or DSK variables to produce additional coupling outputs.

inputs. Section 1.4 in the SI discusses the calibration and the empirical validation of the modelling framework used in this work.

Macroeconomic policies and climate policies run together in the coupled model. Climate policy is implemented into WITCH, while fiscal and monetary policies are set in DSK. Section 1 of the SI provides additional insights into the policy rules adopted. Section 2 in the SI discusses the transmission of the climate policy shocks at the macroeconomic level (see Section 2.1) and provides additional results on the stabilizing effects of monetary and fiscal interventions (see Sections 2.2 and 2.3, respectively).

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