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**ON WORLD PROBLEMS.  
FACTS AND IMPLICATIONS –  
A HUNGARIAN VIEW.**

Edited by  
Erika Fodor and  
Peter Szalay

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on World Problems and their Perceptions

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INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS  
2361 Laxenburg, Austria



## PREFACE

This volume of Hungarian studies was compiled as part of the UNESCO Major Programme I (Reflection on World Problems and Future-oriented Studies) within the framework of the contract concluded between UNESCO and IIASA. The subject of the contract was the preparation of a study entitled *World Problems and their Perceptions*. The study was compiled in coordination with the Hungarian National Member Organization of IIASA. The *Report*, in addition to the State of the Art part, contains information about the Task Force Meeting which UNESCO and IIASA organized in Budapest, February 1985, on a theme in accordance with the title of the report and the contributions of which will appear later in book form.

This *Collaborative Paper* is part of the background material of the *Report*. It shows a possible perception and interpretation of a group of problems, and the implications arising therefrom.

The *Report* sets out to show what concealed cultural or professional presuppositions there are behind the weight of the different conceptions of so-called global or world problems and how they differ in relation to each other. In this connection it reflects on the UNESCO Medium-Term Plan: "Whatever the approaches adopted, studies on world problems are inevitably linked, by the very nature of the field they cover – which is none other than the present and future of societies – to choices based on presuppositions regarding standards or on systems of values or even on ideological choices. They seem to require, as their necessary complement, an open-minded examination carried out in a context which promotes intellectual cooperation and within which all currents of thought can be freely expressed; and no organization seems to offer such a context more successfully than UNESCO." [4 XC/4 Approved, para. 1017.]

The *Report* tries to justify the hypothesis formulated in UNESCO's Medium-Term Plan and make clear the necessary existence of differing cultural and professional world views in this respect. It shows that there is no one correct point of view, that many rational conceptions of equal value to each other exist, and that in relation to these problems only the acceptance of plural rationality can lead to common solutions. While this conception seems trivial, practice shows that in seeking solutions this approach is not unique and not at all self-explanatory. The *Report* and the *Collaborative Paper* show how the economic, social and cultural conditions, as well as practice, determine the world view, how wide the differences are, and that they necessarily lead to various problem formulations and action plans. In actual fact these outlined differences and knowledge of their explanation can lead the international organizations to the formulation of fuller and, probably, more successful action programmes than previously.

In the *Collaborative Paper* we offer a selection of Hungarian studies prepared recently in various specialized fields, we give an insight into the workshop debates and results of the Hungarian research teams, and last but not least, we try to show the options formed on different topics by Hungarian researchers.

The volume is not a homogenous-topic selection, but at the same time we endeavoured, by examining the facts, to concentrate on different features of the unequal development taking place globally and to indicate the interconnection between the studies. The authors of the studies examine, in a complex way, the world economic and world political changes of the past years, the present state and tendencies of world factors and draw conclusions as to the expected developments.

Naturally, as with all selections, the content of our volume cannot cover the wide range of problems – also formulated by UNESCO's programmes, even though we plan several selections during the programme period. With this initiative, while wishing to give a sample of the work and opinions of Hungarian researchers, we would also like to encourage other national research teams to make a similar statement of opinion, so that we can contribute directly to the dialogue in the range of topics of the world problems programme being discussed also in international organizations.

The range of studies closes with a summary, in which in addition to a summing up of the contents and conclusions of the studies, a sharper formulation is made of those questions to which we want particularly to draw attention at the present stage of the World Problems Programme, covering an extremely wide range of topics.

We take this opportunity to express our thanks to the IIASA leadership and to the Hungarian National Member Organization for making possible the compilation of this *Collaborative Paper* from the membership fees of the Institute handled in Hungary.

*Erika Fodor and Peter Szalay*  
Editors

*Istvan Kiss*  
Project Coordinator



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## I. Asymmetries and inequalities

### WORLD ECONOMY AND THE WORLD FOOD PROBLEM TODAY

by Sándor Surányi, assistant professor,  
Karl Marx University of Economics,  
Budapest

#### Causes of the food problem

There is practically no one field of science that has a monopoly in regard to research on food problems. It involves agro-economic, political, nourishment-science problems just as international economic and political relations. Opinions vary concerning the world food situation and its prospects. There is no common standpoint even on the most effectual method to increase agricultural production in different regions of the developing world, not to mention the problems of population, the measures await realization in the international field, the problems of food aid and the effect of aid, the role of transnational agribusinesses, etc. The production, processing, packing and marketing of many agricultural products are determined by these businesses, in most cases contrary to the long-term interests of the developing countries. They play an important role in the agricultural commodity production and in the supply of necessities for production like chemical fertilizer, herbicide, machinery. How these are used depends more on the multinationals than on the agricultural development policy of the developing countries concerned. Their field of activity extends to many countries and they have ways of avoiding the sphere of state control. Their role can be shown in the negative aspects and methods of implementation of the green revolution /e.g. they promote the export of machine and chemicals to developing countries/.

From whatever angle we examine the food problem it is clear that in recent years the so-called food crisis together with the energy shortage ranks among the main problems of mankind. In both cases there is the fear that the growing world demand will exceed the production /not only in the case of a given country or region/. Looking at the problem from today's angle it would seem that regarding both problems only the development of science and technology can bring a decisive solution.

In a world which is short of food and energy those who have a surplus of these items have a powerful instrument in their hands. The role of the USA cannot be omitted because it supplies an important share of world food production and takes the lion's share in the world trade of food, above all cereals. Today the focal point of the world food problem is the situation in the South Asian and South-East Asian countries, where the density and increase of population draw attention. Countries like India and Bangladesh are extreme examples for analysing food and population problems although here the situation

has eased in the past few years, shifting to the African continent. This is noteworthy for Africa there are more favourable conditions as lower density of population and a larger area of agricultural land. India's population today is 730 million and it will keep growing by more than 2 per cent a year, so by the year 2000 just to assure the population's existence will require a minimum of 225 tonnes of food /1/, about 100 million tonnes more than at present.

Food problems or hunger have been with us since the beginning of mankind's existence but their appearance as a global problem of the world's population is a relatively new phenomenon. The global nature of the problem stems from the fact that the solution sets tasks for and requires sacrifices from not only the governments and populations of the given countries but all countries of the world, and it makes international cooperation and action urgent and indispensable. It's not just a question of generosity on the part of not directly affected countries, but aside from the humanitarian aspects, it is in their interests, too.

In today's world we are seeing a polarization never before experienced in the history of mankind. The main factor is the widening of the gap between the handful of rich capitalist countries and the millions fighting for their existence in the developing countries. At the same time a change is taking place in the power relations of the developed capitalist countries, but the signs of differentiation are strikingly marked among countries and regions of the developing world. Since the problems of food are not on the same scale in the different developing countries there is no doubt that these problems become an important factor in the differentiation of the developing world, especially in the further deterioration of the economic situation of those less developed, oil-importing developing countries.

According to apparently realistic estimates, by the turn of the century the rate of population growth in the developing world will be more rapid than ever, and a considerable a slow-down or change can be expected to come only later. This is reflected in report No. 3. of the Club of Rome /RIC/. Among the topics discussed it found the food crisis particularly severe. The most important factors were defined as follows: the accelerated growth of world population, the growing dependence on limited land and water reserves, high energy prices and rises in food prices which exceed the purchasing power of the majority of the world's people. The report emphasized that all these phenomena set tasks for human society on an international level which have no precedent in history.

The world food situation fundamentally changed after the Second World War. In the years before the war the developing countries had been net food exporters while the developed countries had to import considerable quantities of food. In the past two or three decades as a result of technological development /2/, /successful governmental policy including the effects of international economic intergation/, the level of self-sufficiency in West European countries previously

showing a deficit has grown concerning agricultural products as a whole. In 1934-38, for example, the colonies at that time exported 12 million tonnes of grain a year first of all to the mother-country, but in 1974 they imported 52 million tons, and in 1980 more than 100 million tons. Their share of the turnover of world agricultural products has gradually decreased.<sup>3</sup>

In the post-war years Asia, especially India, came into the forefront of interest. In the middle of the sixties /1966/ India got more than 10 million tonnes of food aid from the United States alone for in India the difference between the rapidly growing population and the domestic production possibilities was growing at an alarming rate. The case of this country, examined by many researchers, gives a clear example of the fact that though the food problem is closely connected with rapid population growth, it cannot be attributed only to that. Behind it there lie grave social problems, first of all the delay of agricultural reforms, inequalities in distribution, polarization of land, ownership, etc. In other words this means that in most cases the reason for starvation came not from an absolute lack of food but from a lack of income and opportunities. A way out of this grave situation has been shown by implementation of the so-called green revolution. As a result of it agricultural production or food production could be stabilized and the direct danger of starvation avoided. The basic problem remained unsolved, and to the earlier social inequalities were added new problems in rural areas, especially as a result of the accelerated polarization of income and property. The technical and investment demands reised by the new technology could be met only by farmers already in a better position /e.g. having irrigated land, living in an area with a relatively developed infrastructure/ and who gained an important earnings surplus from this. For people on smaller or less favourable lands this is impossible or hardly possible.

It is a fact that during the seventies - although a comprehensive reform - India broke away from the group of countries in direct danger and since then there have been no major hitches in the country's agricultural production and food supply.<sup>4</sup> But in 1973-74 a new crisis centre emerged - the drought in the Sahel countries causing severe food crisis in the given seven countries. It became clear that the problem of the African continent are not restricted to these seven countries. During the 70s the food situation in the other countries outside the Sahel area also worsened and Africa was the sole developing region where the per capita food supply also decreased in absolute terms. In the deepening of the crisis the economic structure and the land use and land ownership relations play the main role and not the weather conditions or demographic factors.<sup>5</sup>

The searching for a solution cannot be resticted to problems of technology or growth or production. There is hope to overcome the problem only through joint attention to technical and social aspects. In different forums and international organizations mainly the technical aspects of the problem have been emphasized, assuming the - essentially correct - standpoint that the enlargement of productions is the

way to meet the rapidly growing demands. But this in itself did not and could not bring the desired result. The surplus production cannot solve the problem of "for whom" and income differences hinder the majority or the people from creating even the conditions of existence.

There is no doubt that surplus production should precede population growth. One important, but not the sole, factor of the food problem is the rapid population growth in the developing countries.

In some countries of the Middle East, Africa and Latin America the rate of population growth exceeds 3 per cent annually. And there is nothing to show a radical decrease by the turn of the century. Development in the countries of the third world in the coming years will be overshadowed and determined by the pressure of population growth and it leads to further tension in the field of supply and jobs. The fact is that 70-80 per cent or more of the population work in agriculture and though the urban growth is significant there is no real chance that the people released from agriculture will be absorbed by the urban industrial sectors as happened in earlier times in today's developed capitalist countries.

Although the urban population ratio is relatively low /about 20-30 per cent/ urbanization is rapidly expanding and this is an important factor in the growth of the food problem. The rate of urbanization exceeds the rate of population growth and agricultural production cannot keep up with the rapid growth of market-demands. The majority of the urban population come from the subsistence economy sector. As town-dwellers they are dependent on the food trade and market, but the question of supplying them is unsolved in consequence of production and marketing relations. On the one hand people flocking to the towns do not have enough income to meet their minimum needs. On the other hand the quantity of food cannot meet the existing demand, thus the price-rising effect deepens the problem of the low-income population. However, further urban growth is to be expected. By the year 2000 half of the world's population is expected to be living in cities /75-90 per cent in developed and 25-40 per cent in developing countries.<sup>6</sup>

The growth of food consumption is connected not only with population growth but with the rise in income of the population together with urbanization. As in the developing countries per capita food consumption is low, the increasing income leads to growing food demand.

The demand for food, flexibility of income is very high in these countries. The fact is that the incomes have not increased significantly but the growing demand depends not only on population growth and income growth.

The radical social changes show that stopping the income differences and implementing agrarian reform leads to a growing demand and brings to the surface an as yet unsatisfied - insolvent - demand. Reforms aiming at a more equal distribution of goods have a positive effect on growth of the economy including the long-term growth of agriculture. Their effect on the growth of the demand for food /often direct consumption/ cannot be left out of account. Experience shows

that food demand after realizing socialist-type reforms can grow more rapidly than the general growth of demand.<sup>7</sup> In this way import needs are also increasing in many countries since home production does not cover the surplus consumption. Nevertheless it is hardly possible to query the unavoidable realization of progressive reforms. Output lags behind the growing demand - in the past two decades only a small number of countries have satisfied the growth of market demand national output. In years of crop failure starvation has occurred /e.g. the Sahel countries/ since the reserves could not cover the need or did not exist at all. The situation was of course sharpened by various distribution manipulations.

The food crisis is not restricted to problems of production distribution of food, it comes from a deep agrarian crisis. Independent governments were unable to realize appropriate reforms, the complexity of the grave colonial inheritance hindered the development of national economy besides external and internal conflicts. The mode of development followed in most of the countries was favourable to foreign interest, resulted in foreign capital penetration and further economic distortion. First to suffer was the development of agriculture which remained /in a more complex way than before/ within the sphere of interest of foreign capital. The foreign interest increased especially in African agriculture /not equally in all the countries, most in the countries stimulating private capital development, e.g. Kenya/ thus social inequalities in agriculture became deeper and the penetration of multinationals, of foreign interests provokes the reproduction of a structure not helping the home food supply.

As a whole factors inducing governments to act more forcefully are the following:

1. the changed character of the food crisis and its area of occurrence started to endanger the stability of the political systems. This situation affects not only the "silent" rural population but it starts to become an urban problem as well affecting not only different sectors of town workers but the middle class too, with rising food prices and regular shortages. But the urban population can influence policy more than the poor in the villages, even the lack of food can provoke actions among the urban population endangering also the government. This explains why a considerable part of the narrow resources is spent on food supply to the urban population thus a relatively small part remains for modernization and subvention.
2. the food crisis hinders accumulation and economic development for an enormous food import is needed to calm down the urban population. In most African countries there is no national manufacture of means of production, so development has to be backed by the import of these means and of certain raw material. The redistribution of the low foreign currency supply to food imports hinders the realization of development projects and results in the existing industrial production capacity being underused. On the other hand inflation

imported or provoked by the lack of food and agricultural raw materials - stimulates speculative, unproductive national investments /real states services/.

3. the food crisis induces the rural poor to flock to the cities /where there is a better chance to benefit from foreign food aid/. This leads to contraselection of manpower in the villages /the transmigrants are younger and more educated/.
4. finally, the food crisis helps capitalist countries with surpluses for export to gain and practice political influence.

#### The role and possibility of production growth

We would be oversimplifying the question of we said that the problem was due to the developing countries not carrying on a proper development policy or to their not disposing of an adequate agricultural potential. If we do accept that the problems are largely due to economic policy, institutional and allocation-of means reasons, we have to emphasize that in most cases the stagnation of agricultural production appears real only in the light of the rapid growth of demand. We must not forget that the general growth of agricultural production in the developing countries exceeds the production growth rate of developed countries in the longer term. Of course there is a possibility for more rapid growth the application of modern technology.

Generally speaking there are two ways to increase production. One is the extension of agricultural land, the other is more intensive farming on the given territory. The extension of agricultural land this relatively cheap way to increase production has already been exhausted in most developing countries.

For example, the extension of the arable land by breaking up fallow land, easily usable water reserves, etc. This means that almost the only resource for enlarging the production is the growth of productivity and it can be assured only by technological development.<sup>9</sup> In this sense the acquisition and adaptation of technology and its local application has become a decisive factor for further adjustment. At the same time historic experience shows that agricultural technology is closely linked with the general technological development of the given country. In different isolated sectors of agriculture there are of course possibilities to achieve a considerable growth of productivity irrespective of this /many countries offered and example of this through the realization of the green revolution affecting a small part of the producers/ but in regard to a agriculture as a whole it is unimaginable without the general development of industry and services.

We must not forget another decisive fact that while in the developing countries the agricultural population accounts for two-thirds of the total population, the subsistence economies represent a decisive proportion. Their share of the total output is estimated at between 2/3 and 3/4 although pure subsistence production rarely occurs now-



adays. All this means that development in this field can produce an enormous decisive effect on economic transformation.<sup>10</sup> The working of the subsistence farming sector is different in several respects from the commodity production sector, its reactions to the categories connected with commodity production are also varied.

The food situation in developing countries cannot be characterized merely by comparing production and demand or, more precisely, the real needs. The utilization of goods produced is also important. It is well known that in the developing countries sales /marketing/ suffers from backwardness as much as storage and transport. In the course of harvesting and storage there is a loss of one third. In the short run the quantity of crops saved in this respect can exceed the production growth possibility. Earlier in China and India the underdeveloped market and transport conditions caused an abundance or even an export surplus in one part of the country whilst there was serious starvation in other parts. It is worthwhile to take the backwardness of the market and transport relations into account for they determine not only the rational distribution of home produced products, but the quantity of food that can be obtained through aid or commerce. In India there was the case of cereals being transported in bulk in open trucks to ease the food shortage, but because of the rainy weather it was earing on arrival, thus unfit for human consumption.

The development of harbours and the whole infrastructure falls far behind the food transport and other demands of population growth in the least developed countries. Most of the transportation facilities are owned by developed countries so the monopoly transportation costs are also disadvantageous for the developing countries. Besides, most developing countries suffer from food price fluctuation, too. Food imports impose a serious burden on their balance of payments.

In the middle of 70s, if the least developed countries /under per capita income of 200 dollars/ had bought their total food import under commercial conditions on the international market, this would have claimed 40 per cent of their export income.<sup>11</sup> The situation of the non-petroleum-exporting developing countries is demonstrated by their total grain import which between 1970 and 1980 increased from 2.9 thousand million dollars to 16.4 thousand million, a 19 per cent annual growth.<sup>12</sup> At the same time the conditions for food aid worsened from the middle of the 70s, the proportion of cereals aid and its quantity decreased and stabilized around 9 million tons. The official aid for the development of agriculture with a proportion of 20 per cent reached its peak in 1979, in 1981 was only 18.3 per cent. The conditions for bilateral aid have also worsened and are approaching the commercial loans in this respect. The proportion of restricted aid has grown.<sup>13</sup> For most countries it became impossible to ensure the imports necessary for economic development beside the growing food imports. Only a few countries can cover the growing food deficit from their imports. The generally worsening economic situation forces some countries to cut cereals imports to a certain extent instead of increasing them according to requirements. The per capita consumption of food will necessarily decrease if the filling of deficit gaps cannot be guaranteed by import or aid.

### Asymmetries and inequalities

Among important world problems discussed at forums of the United Nations the world food problem and the obligations of states in this respect have been on the agenda recently. In the past ten years food problems have always been a main topic. It was realized that a considerable part of the world's population is starving or improperly nourished. The question often rises that even in the near future our planet will not be able to supply the growing population with food since we have already reached the stage of a permanent shortage. But there is no real production problem to support this for agricultural and food industry output are constantly increasing. Between 1961-65 /average/ and 1978 production grew 43 per cent and population 29 per cent. There was a certain slow-down since the green revolution got out of breath, this can be seen in figures for production growth in the 70s. Between 1953 and 1961 the production growth was 3.1 per cent annually, and in the 70s only 2.5 per cent. The production growth of the developing countries increased 5-10 per cent but population growth was 3 times more rapid than in the developed countries.<sup>14</sup> So deterioration of the food situation occurs only in the developing world but here it is very differentiated and its main points change after several years. In the 60s Asia was the "neuralgic" continent /especially India/. But the efforts made for an increase of production and a certain reform of distribution resulted in the stabilization of supply and accumulation of safety reserves. In India by the beginning of the 80s compared to the 60s food production had grown from 60 million tons or more than double, indeed in 1983-84 it approached 150 million, this is India's record harvest on the same area of agricultural land. In Africa, during the 70s per capita food output permanently decreased in absolute terms.<sup>15</sup>

In a comprehensive analysis of the food problem the best method is to determine the calorie intake which shows great variety in Africa. Between 1969-71 and 1979-81 the food consumption in calories showed a 4 per cent increase in the whole region. But in 15 of the 45 countries there was a decrease. Greater differences can be found if we analyse different regions of the continent. Divergence from the average was the highest in North Africa with a 20 per cent increase annually. The worst situation was in the Middle East and South Africa with an increase of 3 per cent. At the same time it is interesting to see the so-called "food-gap" /the difference between food output and the estimated growth of demand/ shows 1.3 per cent for the continent and 2.3 per cent for North Africa. The main role in the rapid growth of demand is played decisively by the relatively quick rise in incomes. It should be noted that the figures for caloric intake include food import and food aid as well. In 1980, 25 per cent of export incomes was spent on food imports in Africa and in the Middle-West Africa it was only 8 per cent, but in North Africa it was 45 per cent. Compared to other developing countries the African continent is in an unfavourable situation as it accounts for 15 per cent of the developing world's population and takes 30 per cent of foreign aid and half of the total food aid. According to modest estimates by the turn of the century 900 million inhabitants will have to be supplied, i.e., about double the present figure.<sup>16</sup> Today there are no signs, or at least only a few, that these conditions will be met by the green revolution or any other efforts for development.

According to FAO estimates for 1970-85<sup>17</sup>, the population growth in the developed world is 0.9 per cent annually and the increase of demand computed with the growth of income is 1.5 per cent, whilst the annual growth of food output is 2,4 per cent. By contrast, in the developing countries the annual population growth may reach 2.7 per cent and production is about 2.6 per cent. But the growth of demand may reach 3.6 per cent, which clearly shows the growth of the deficit.

But of course there are differences in this field too in the developing world. The population growth of Africa and the Middle East is 2.9 per cent annually, and the growth of demand 3.8-4 per cent annually. Africa's unfavourable food situation is demonstrated by the following figures: in 1977-79 /on the basis of 1969-71/ out of the 32 African countries examined 23 managed to increase their per capita food output considerably, in 3 countries there was no change and only 6 of them managed to raise it.<sup>18</sup> According to FAO estimates for 1985 the total grain shortages in the developing world is about 85 million tonnes. The total grain import had exceeded this figure already at the beginning of the 80s.

The contradictions of the food situation are marked not only by the fact that in one part of the world, in the developing countries shortages occur regularly and undernourishment is permanent, whilst in the developed countries a surplus and fear of it causes anxiety. The alternating of necessity and abundance is characteristic for the world population. In the case of the most important cereal - wheat one year in ten is probably normal on the average, but in 3 years out of ten there is shortage, and in 4 years out of ten a surplus. In this case too the shortage and the surplus do not occur evenly, which also affects the volume of world trade. Every 2-3 years a quantity differing from the normal has to be marketed to cover the delay and to syphon off the surplus. The smooth settlement of all these problems would need an oversized transport capacity, but it is only able to handle the average turnover with difficulty. In addition there is the fluctuation of fodder production which shows even bigger swings in international transport too.

World trade in agricultural and food products permanently increases. In the 70s its value grew 3.6 times /together with price rises/. Agricultural goods account for about 15 per cent of world exports and most of them meet prime necessities. It is a characteristic feature that while the world trade in industrial products exceeds the growth of production, there is no significant difference in the case of agricultural products. This shows that in this case the development of the international division of labour and of specialization is slower and a considerable part of the international turnover serves to cover permanent or temporary shortages. International division of labour developed mainly among the fodder-producing areas and the livestock breeding branches of the developed countries.

In the world trade of agricultural products inequalities occur in every respect; although most countries take part in this trade the group of determining countries is small. Export concentration is es-

pecially great. In 1976-77, 22 countries exported goods worth more than 1 thousand million dollars, this is 3/4 of the world export. The six countries with an export of more than 5 thousand million dollars had a 43.7 per cent share in the world export.<sup>19</sup> All of the biggest exporters are developed countries, including ones in which there is a vast area of land per person. These include the USA, Canada and New Zealand.

Concerning imports those countries play a great role where the national livestock farming relies on imports of fodder and this need exceeds the home possibilities. In certain developed countries /as Switzerland/ on the basis of imported raw-materials a highly developed food industry has been created.

The food imports of the developing countries /half of it grain/ in 1981 /on the basis of 1969-71/ rose 759 per cent in value, whilst the growth in volume was only 263 per cent. The most significant rise was in the Middle East countries partly because of the rapid population growth and partly because there is a most restricted possibility for national production growth in consequence of the natural conditions. In contrast to the 1355/!! per cent growth of food export in that area, this figure was only 489 per cent in the Far East. In Africa and Latin America this figure was the same as the average figure for the developing world.<sup>20</sup> Although in the case of Latin America the need for currency income considerably restricts imports.

There are many reasons for the growth of world trade in agricultural products. First of all the deepening of the international division of labour in agriculture and in the food industry, and the better transport facilities created by progress in science and technology. But the change in consumption and the shift of production and consumption centres in the capitalist world economy all belong to this topic. The world trade in agricultural products is a question of vital importance for a growing number of developing countries. Two-thirds of the world population lives in the developing world but their share of world food output is only 40-50 per cent. On the pace of it this should push through an increase in world trade, but the figure say different. In 1976, 55 per cent of non-socialist foreign trade in food was handled among the developed capitalist countries and the developed-developing business was only 37 per cent. Business among the developing countries was 8 per cent of the total.

#### Different judgements

There are conflicting views concerning world food situation and especially its future. It is difficult to find one's way in the jungle of literature. The problem cannot be separated from the demographic situation. In this paper we cannot undertake to summarize or systematize the literature dealing with this subject. After all there are two extreme opinions. According to these the food crisis is man-made, production increases and can be further increased, thus this phenomenon

has social reasons only, namely within the framework of the reorganization of the world capitalist system and in connection with the general crisis of capitalism. So it is obvious that the food problem is basically a social problem, therefore it can be solved only through social measures. We cannot accept the often advanced argument that starvation is unavoidable. Today we have all the technological and agrarian knowledge to supply to supply an even larger population than at present. Those millions who are starving today are not destined to this fate for technical reasons. Even in earlier times it was not only production-weather conditions that played a role in starvation but many other causes. An analysis of the situation only confirms that starvation goes hand in hand with poverty and this has social reasons. But average figures for food consumption are not enough to demonstrate this, for these conceal the social-economic circumstances of consumption. In the developing countries we always find a significant income polarization. A survey for a given region in Brazil showed that whilst the average caloric intake in the country is about 2700 calories, the poorest sector has 1240 calories per capita, which is on the hunger level, but the richest sector has no less than 4200 calories. The example of Maharashtra state in India is much the same. In this case consumption varied between 940 and 3150 calories in consequence of income differences. Susan Georg refers to Bertold Brecht who says starvation does not occur by itself but is organized by the corn traders.<sup>21</sup> That quote reflects the truth, which the data confirm, that hunger and malnutrition are a consequence of human activity, and are not unavoidable. Perhaps it is enough to take the example of Cuba or China where as a result of the changed social system there are no significant differences in the average consumption, so there is no hunger, every citizen can take his share of the available food.

Any analysis of the causes of the food problem, from the point of view of content, and logically and historically, should start with a study of colonialism, and the world capitalist system and the international division of labour. The main reason is colonialism, but it only gives a partial explanation. Apart from the main reasons for the food crisis there are other aspects which underline its negative effect. One of them is the weather. The quantity of agricultural production also depends on the weather. So fluctuations are unavoidable. Unexpected changes in weather conditions create the possibility for price rises through different kinds of manipulation in the field of distribution. This was the case in 1972-73. 1972 could be considered as a turning point. After a long while production decreased in that year for the first time. The total corn production dropped by 33 million tonnes although in terms of the population growth /80 million annually/ a 25 million tonnes surplus would have been needed. Unfavourable weather conditions simultaneously appeared in some important production and consumption areas like the Soviet Union, China, India, Australia, the Sahel region. Reserves quickly dropped or were used up. A better organized international trade system or reserves system could overcome such fluctuations without a price rise as has happened in this case.

Rising energy prices have become an important factor in recent years, together with the price rise of fertilizers and transport. During

1972-74 freight charges increased three fold which unfavourably influences the volume of food aid reaching the developing countries.

In the price rise of food /even in the origin of the shortage/ the consumption structure in the developed countries plays an important role. In these countries cereals are still often used as animal feed, since meat plays a leading role in the consumption structure. In 1962-1972 in Japan meat consumption increased 60 per cent. In the developed countries between 1969-71, 370 million tonnes of cereals were used as feedstuff, which is more than the annual human consumption of China and India put together.<sup>25</sup> That represents two thousand million people. The useful effect of cereals in meat is very low.<sup>26</sup> According to estimates, if in China - where four times more pigs are bred than in the USA- they started feeding pigs on cereals, this would mean that none would remain in any part of the world for human consumption. As is known, in the developing countries cereals are used directly as bread or for various local meals. This amounted to 230 kg in the 1969-71 average, but in the United States, for example, this figure was 800 kg. Nine-tenths of the latter was used in the form of meat, poultry or dairy-products after being consumed by animals. In the 10 years till the middle of the 70s the average consumption of Americans increased by 151 kg, which is equivalent to the yearly consumption of an Indian in the low income. In Europe and Japan we get much the same situation. However an increase of meat consumption can be seen in the developing countries, too. In 1970-1980 this was 52 per cent. But the per capita amount of meat consumption /15 kg/ is only one-fifth of that in developed countries.<sup>27</sup>

World food consumption is increasing at an accelerated rate. The 336 kg per capita consumption in 1970 will grow to 534 kg by the year 2000, an almost 60 per cent rise. In the previous 40 years the per capita consumption growth was 20 per cent.<sup>28</sup>

Between 1968-70 the four biggest cereals producing countries, including the United States and Canada, reduced their agricultural land by one-third. According to estimates, if in 1969-72 these countries had kept to the earlier rate of production they would have produced a 90 million ton grain surplus.<sup>29</sup> At the World Food Conference the FAO secretary general estimated that about 8-12 million tons more cereals would have been necessary to avoid starvation at the beginning of the 70s in the most endangered countries /as the Sahel zone/. But this production structure is sensitive only to the solvent demand.

#### The role of the production structure

In contrast to the developed countries the majority of the people in the developing countries live off agriculture and in every developing country agriculture is the most significant sector. The larger part of the population works in this sector and it produces an important part of the national income except for some petroleum-producing developing countries. In Nigeria, for example, the share of agriculture in GNP decreased from 63 per cent in 1960-1979. But in countries like Chad, Uganda this

share was around 50-70 per cent even in 1979. Mass poverty exists mainly in rural areas although poverty among the urban unemployed is more becoming striking. There is an obviously paradoxical situation that in order to produce food agricultural land is needed, but those who live nearest to the land do not get enough food. In 1969 a German research group came to the conclusion regarding Northern India that only 14 per cent of peasants were able to produce the amount of food needed for their families all the year round. For 36 per cent of them the food produced lasted only 7-9 months.<sup>30</sup> According to the World Bank three-quarters of the world's population living in absolute poverty live in Asia. Also noteworthy is the observation that absolute poverty has the same ratio in rarely or densely populated areas.<sup>31</sup> There are more than 80 million small farms of less two hectares in size and these are unable to raise the people living on them above the poverty level. The number of landless agricultural workers constantly grows whilst land, the main means of the economy and of subsistence, is divided up more and more unevenly among different property categories. Land reforms were planned and even started in many places, but as a result of the strong feudal interests and the political power /the main support of the ruling national bourgeoisie, the landowners still enjoying in many respects feudal rights in the villages/ linked to them, these reforms remained only on paper, and the polarization of property confirmed. In South America 17 per cent of the landowners own 90 per cent of the land. In Africa as a whole /together with the large estates belonging to South-African whites/ just under 4 per cent of the land belongs to three-quarters of the population. A World Bank survey covering 22 countries showed that one-third of the active agricultural population had no land at all.

The production structure of agriculture in the developing world shows that in general the bigger the estates the lower the food production. This applies especially to large farms in Africa and Latin America. In today's world economic relations the developing countries "support" the developed countries through cheap labour and generally compressed export prices for the raw materials and industrial plants they produce. The production of these goods calls for disproportionately great energies and land. But whatever they produce /whether products directly suitable for human consumption or raw materials/ the final question is who consumes it. In most cases it is not the producer nor even the producing country. Due to the unfavourable trends in their terms of trade their losses stemming from the international division of labour grow. The situation today is that many countries cannot cover their food imports from income deriving from the export of industrial plants

Industrial plants today occupy the best lands of the developing world. In the Philippines and Mauritius the relative area is 55 and 80 per cent. In Senegal groundnuts alone cover 50 per cent of the agricultural land. In Brazil, U.S. multinational agribusinesses have started on the large-scale monoculture of soybeans at the expense of local producers and local food production.

### Security of world food

Despite the alarming world food situation in the first half of the 70s, by the end of the decade the situation has somewhat improved. In India the build-up of safety reserve helped to ease the situation. Safety reserves are badly needed on a world scale. This was included among the recommendations of the 1974 Rome World Food Conference as follows:

1. The food problem has become fundamental world problem, which can be solved only through the coordination of national and international actions.
2. The final solution can be achieved only by a large-scale growth of food production in the developing countries exceeding the population growth. Food aid, however large, is not a final solution. Economic and social reforms and the establishment of viable large-scale organizations as the cooperatives is essential.
3. A world food security system should be established to stop starvation and periodical shortages.
4. To achieve the main targets proper financial means and political support must be assured. For example a 10 million tonnes supply of grain aid should be assured and a part of the developed countries' production should be set aside to meet emergencies.
5. International trade must be stabilized.
6. To coordinate U.N. campaigns a World Food Council should be established.

In spite of the above, safety reserves are accumulation only in years of good harvest. The problem of international aid is also unsolved, for example 10 million tonnes could not be assured in any years since the Conference.<sup>32</sup> The decreasing aid is due to the developed countries' non-committal attitude. U.S. reserves dropped at the beginning of the 70s and vast cultivation of fallow land. Today on the world market food can be obtained only through commercial channels and this represents a great burden for the non-petroleum-exporting developing countries.<sup>33</sup> All these facts characterize the change of the American "food for peace" programme to a "food for cash" policy.

The emergency situation increase the influence of the many countries disposing of a surplus, firstly USA. Here are examples to show that aid is used as food blackmail and leading American statesmen openly speak about the "corn weapon". The growing number of countries in deficit increases the need for aid thus increasing the dependence and defencelessness of the developing countries faced with an unfavourable world economic situation.

The primitive character of the international food network is shown also in years of good harvest. In 1983, for example, as a result of food weather in most parts of world, world production and reserves increased. In many places there was a problem of overproduction. Prices reduction induce the U.S. administration to cut down the agricultural land. At the end of 1982-83, 45 per cent of world reserves belonged to the United States. In that year the reserves mounted to 21 per cent of consumption, as against 10 per cent 6-7 years earlier. But the high



crop results pointed to the lack of storage capacity. FAO proposed the establishment of an internationally coordinated storage-system. But negotiations on this topic were broken off in 1979 and since then there has been progress in this respect.<sup>34</sup>

But it would lead wrong to have a false sense of security on seeing the growth of reserves. Behind the global growth of food production there lie inequalities. As we have said, 45 per cent of the reserves are in United States hands, which accounts for 80 per cent of the total corn export. At the same time all regions of the world are grain importers with the exception of North America. In addition American corn production is based on non-irrigated land, so it is exposed to the effects of weather changes.

It should be noted that the poorest countries the growth of food production does not lead automatically to favourable changes in the quantity and quality of food consumption. From the point of view of supply seasonal changes in production play a role but from the point of view of demand the lack of income, regardless of production and reserves, restricts the improvement of food consumption.

#### Possibilities for a solution

There are three possibilities to solve the food problem:

1. To supply the developing countries on a trade basis. An essential reform of the international food trade is needed. But there is not much possibility to implement this reform and the import capacity of the given countries is also a restricting factor.
2. The possibility of food aid. According to the experience of past years this can only be considered as a supplementary source.
3. All signs point to the fact that the most effective method is an increase of the food production of the developing countries. As a solution the decrease of food demand has also been raised /a slow-down of population growth/ but this can only be successful over a prolonged period. The slow-down of population growth is an extremely long process. It's like the slowing down of a running car. After you take your foot off gas-pedal the car keeps running till it stops. And by the time the birthrate drops the future mothers have already come into the world.

Ideas have been mooted for suppressing the low efficiency production of cereals as their consumption by animals in the developed countries. But the high meat consumption of the developed countries will hardly change under normal circumstances. Of course we must not forget that the development of production requires time and is a complex process /infrastructure, economic environment, research/ and its costs are constantly rising. Experience gained in the green revolution shows that besides the grave social consequences environmental damage occurs out of the mistaken use of irrigation, fertilizers and insecticides. The working out of modern agrotechnologies used today in the developed countries took place in conditions differing from the tropics. Their trans-

plantation is not easy, it needs a considerable local research opportunities. Yet this is one of the most important links in agricultural development. Only a small part /0.25 per cent/ of the agricultural incomes is used for research in the developing countries, whilst in the developed countries it is 1-2 per cent.<sup>35</sup>

In this field tree tasks can be outlined. First of all the more effectual use of the given resources, the use of plants and animals favourably utilising sunshine, feedstuff, etc. At the same time the acclimatization of plants growing in bad climatic circumstances /cold and dryness/ and the improvement of technology /water storage, irrigation/.

It must be stressed that production growth and improved food supply are not only a question of investments like chemicals, irrigation, etc. Structural transformation in unavoidable and reform are also not to be delayed in the political, social and economic field. Without a consistent radical agrarian reform all these things are inconceivable, but the example of many countries shows that reform in itself is not a panacea, it cannot automatically solve everything. A greater sacrifice by the developed countries is also necessary to further open the way to the developing world for technologies, scientific results already worked out in the developed countries. The present practice of the above through transnational agribusinesses is only the sources of further distortion of the social and production structure. Technologies applicable in tropical conditions should be worked out with the assistance of a suitable research network which could be adjusted to regional requirements.

An important question is incentives to farmers. In Africa farmers get a much lower price for their product than the world market price, especially for food sold on the national market. Export goods are burdened with export tax. This is an easy and rapid source of income for the state budget, but in the long run it decreases the farmers' interest and the increase of productivity. In many places low prices paid to the peasants are part of the cheap urban supply policy, on the other hand it is a major obstacle to the growth of food production. Although subsistence economies are still widespread in agricultural production, the farmers' reaction to the process can be clearly seen. In South Korea where farmers get 600 dollars a ton for rice, the average output is 6.5 tonnes per hectare. In Malaysia the price of rice is 250 dollars a ton and the average output is 2.8 tonnes. In India it is 1.7 tonnes, but the state purchase price is about 70-80 dollars.<sup>36</sup>

It has to be stressed that arable land as the main factor of agriculture, food production. Opinions vary widely on this question too. At present about 10 per cent of the land of the world is under cultivation. It is unquestionable that on the major part of the earth the configurations and climate do not allow for cultivation. There are still unharvested territories, but the major part of the relatively cheaply and easily cultivable land is already under cultivation. Take for example Sudan which wanted to become the "bread-basket" of the Arab world mainly by bringing in new territories, by soil improvement and irrigation. All this would call for such a vast amount of money that it would be

beyond the forces of even rich countries. Besides, deforestation, the destruction of the natural vegetation could have serious consequences for the environment and this would adversely effect the output and exploitation of the lands already under cultivation.

The time and amount of rainfall can be "corrected" by irrigation systems if other conditions are given. At present the areas under irrigated cultivation differ widely. In the developing countries only an eighth of the cultivated land is irrigated and the major part of this is in Asia. In tropical Africa on the other hand only 2 per cent of the cultivated area is under irrigation.<sup>37</sup> The definition of "irrigated area" is wide, in many cases it means only an extension of the rainy season. Besides it deepens the social inequalities since it is attainable mainly only for the richer farmers, they own it and control it. Water-basins involve enormous investment costs and great risk because they do not always bring the desired results.

The use and the production of fertilizers is also very uneven. 25 per cent of the world's population living in developed countries use 85 per cent of the fertilizer. Developing countries need imports in this field too. In 1971, for example, the fertilizer imports of the developing countries amounted to 350 million dollars. By the middle of the 70s they had to pay 2,5 thousand million dollars for the same amount. A FAO committee noted<sup>38</sup> that in the developing countries 80 per cent of the small land-owners do not use fertilizers, most of them because of the high prices.

In spite of this the increase of yields is due 50 per cent to fertilizers. In 1965-76 the annual growth in the use of fertilizer reached 10 per cent in spite of the above-mentioned difficulties /on the world average it increases 5.7 per cent annually/. But even so it was only 24 kg per hectare as against 115 kg in the developed countries. Since 1976 the growth rate has been estimated at an annual 8.5 per cent only. Yet the surplus output attainable with the use fertilizes decreases in the case of a more intensive use fertilizer. In the case of cereals the first 20 kg of fertilizer per hectare results in a 250 kg surplus output, but the top of the scale the use of an extra 1 kg of fertilizer results in hardly more than 1 kg of surplus output.

Concerning the use of fertilizers there are great differences in the developing world. Black Africa for example in 1977-78 got only 718.47 thousand tonnes /4.3 per cent/ out of the 16 381.45 thousand tonnes used in the developing countries. But even inside the regions there are differences. Between 1969-71 and 1977-78 in 6 of the 39 countries in the region surveyed by the World Bank the use of fertilizers decreased. In the Congo, for example, the decrease was an annual 11 per cent, but in Nigeria the increase was 33 per cent annually.<sup>39</sup>

To sum up, we can say that the world food problem and its causes are in complex relation to each other and the factors cannot be examined one-sidedly. The phenomenon itself cannot be explained only by production or social factors. Yet we can conclude that the roots of the world food problem lie mainly in the social relations, in the sphere of distribution and ownership, where essentially there is an incentive for more production more suited the requirements. An important factor of the world food problem is the change on the consumption structure, first of all in the developed capitalist countries. This is indicated by the rising level of consumption of animal-based products, the rise of the share of animal protein in human nourishment. This change in the structure of consumption brings about growth of income on the basis of which we may suppose that in the world food situation the tension will remain since economic growth, the improvement in the level and structure of consumption /besides population growth/ will call for a disproportionately rapid growth of the use of cereals in livestock farming. All this goes together with the rapid growth of world market demand whilst the possibilities to expand grain production are limited by the restrictions characteristic for food production as a whole, namely the material-technical base of land and agriculture.

All this lays a dramatic emphasis on the need for a much better organized international system of distribution and aid, and the careful and rational use of the given sources, namely land, water and material-mental capacities.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

- 1/ Financial Times Survey, Section III., June 11. 1984.
- 2/ In the French economy for example productivity grew at a rate of 5.3 per cent between 1959 and 1980.  
More in Food Policy, Vol.8. No.4. November 1983. p.271.
- 3/ This process is marked by the fact that the agricultural exports of the developed countries between 1970 and 1979 grew from 24.6 thousand million dollars to 39.8 thousand million dollars, meanwhile the agricultural exports of the developing countries grew from 18.7 thousand million to 21.7 thousand million dollars in the same period /at constant price/.  
More in Newsweek, August 16, 1982. Special Advertising Section /Agribusiness in the Developing World, Meeting Food Needs in the Year 2000/.
- 4/ In 1982 per capita cereals production dropped about 10 per cent. In earlier years before this would have caused a severe crisis. In that year however the state direction, the "food for work" programs and mainly the significant safety reserves resulted in a very smooth unfavourable year passing off without serious hitches. /World Food Report 1983. FAO. p.10/.
- 5/ For example, the given property relations and land-tenure relations contributed to the upset of the environmental balance /nomad animal-keeping. over-exploitation of the grazing grounds/ and to the apread of the desert.
- 6/ Éliás-Sebők-Ujhelyi: Agricultural and Food Industrial Products in the New World Economic Situation. Publishing House of Economics and Law, Budapest, 1980. p.37.
- 7/ A. Simantov: The Role of the Developed Countries in World Agricultural Development. In: The World Food Problem Consensus and Conflict, By Radha Sinha /ed./ Pergamon Press 1978. p.642.

- 8-9/ Mainly Africa is an exception to this, where the production growth comes from the extension of the cultivated area also in recent years. Taking into consideration the costs of bringing in new cultivated areas - the possibilities in this region are also lessening. According to OECD estimates the cultivated area decreased to a great extent on a world scale as a result of the population growth. Between 1970 and 1985 there was only 0.08 hectare of grazing ground growth per capita. /Éliás-Sebők-Ujhelyi: of cit. p.40/.
- 10/ In the developed countries the possibility of arable land extension has come to an end, in fact in many cases it is decreasing and being used for industrial and other purposes. In 1961-65 and 1978-80 in the developed countries the production of cereals grew 2.9 per cent annually 0.3 per cent of this growth came from the extension of land and 2.6 per cent from productivity growth. At the same time the cereals production growth of the developing countries was 3 per cent; 1.1 per cent of this came from the extension of land and 1.9 per cent from growth of yields. /Food Policy, Vol.8. No. February 1983, p.69/.
- 11/ A. Simantov: of.cit. p.642. .
- 12/ A. Simantov: of cit. p.643.
- 13/ T.K. Morrison.: Cereal Imports to Developing Countries. Food Policy, Vol.9., No.1. February 1984. p.13.
- 14/ World Food Report, FAO 1983. p.16.
- 15/ Éliás-Sebők-Ujhelyi: of cit. p. 20.
- 16/ In the period between 1969-71 only 5 of the 41 Black African countries with an important agricultural sector could increase their production faster than the population growth. /Cameroun, Central African Republic, Ivory Coast, Rwanda, Sudan/. In many countries the food production per capita decreased more than 20 per cent in the same period of time. /e.g. Angola, Gambia, Ghana, Mauritania, Mozambique, Senegal, Somalia/.
- 17/ Apparent Discrepancy Between Increasing Resource Allocation to Food and Agriculture in africa and the Declining Performance of the Sector. U.N. ECA. Addis Abeba, 1984. p.13. and table No.4.
- 18/ Quotes: Dr. Pál Sárkány: The World Food Crises. Dilemmas of Prognostics. Publishing House of Economics and Law, Budapest, 1979. p. 140.
- 19/ Thandika Mkandawire: The Lagos Plan of Action /LPA/ on Food and Agriculture. Some Reflection. Paper presented at the Conference of Directions of Social Science Research Institutes and Policy-makers on Third U.N. Development Decade, the Monrovia Strategy and the Lagos Plan of Action, March 1-4, 1982, Addis Abeba.

- 20/ Éliás-Sebők-Ujhelyi: of cit. 28-29.
- 21/ It is interesting to note the example of Saudi-Arabia, where within 5 years by the years 1982 the country's self-sufficiency of cereals had been raised from null to 78 per cent. True, it is not cheap for the producers are paid 9 times more than the world price. FAO, Trade Yearbook, 1982. p.368.
- 22/ In more detail: Czagány-Nagy-Tóth: Contributions to research of the world food problem. Közgazdasági Szemle /Economic Review/, Oct. 1982.
- 23/ Susan George: *How the Other Half Dies. The Real Reason of World Hunger.* Penguin, 1978. p.41 and 46.
- 24/ Pál Sárkány: of cit. p.49.
- 25/ Pál Sárkány: of cit. p.52.
- 26/ Animals turn into meat only about 15 per cent of the cereals they eat, thus about 7 kg of cereals are needed for 1 kg of meat. /I.Asimov: *Earth, Our Crowded Spaceship.* The John Day Company New York, 1974. p.90/.
- 27/ T.K. Morrison: of cit. p.13 and Pál Sárkány: of cit. p.52.
- 28/ Éliás-Sebők-Ujhelyi of. cit. p.61.
- 29/ Susan George: of cit. p.24.
- 30/ Susan George: of cit. p.43.
- 31/ Susan George: of cit. p.34.
- 32/ An indication of its size is that in 1980 the wheat production of the developed countries was 295 million tons. In the 1980-81 fiscal year cereals aid to the developing countries was 8.6 million tons, only 3 per cent of the above.
- 33/ In 1976 the developing countries with a food deficit and low income got 28 per cent of their total cereals import as aid. 5 years later only 18 per cent. FAO Food Works, 1963-83. Rome, 1983, p.9.
- 34/ World FAO Report. FAO 1983. London, pp.18-19.
- 35/ Pál Sárkány: of cit. p.1969.
- 36/ Newsweek, August 16, 1982 Special Advertising Section /K.R. Locklin: *Africa: Co-Financing Provides the Capital.*/.

- 37/ Organization of African Unity. The African Food Crisis: Basis for Future Action. Addis Abeba, 1984. p.3.
- 38/ Susan George: of cit. p.303 and 306.
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## EUROPEAN SECURITY AND GLOBAL SECURITY

by László J. Kiss, senior researcher,  
Institute for International Relations,  
Budapest

The Helsinki process as a regional system of cooperative security has been looked upon by many as a building block for international security and cooperation as a whole. It is hardly accidental that the signing of the Helsinki Final Act and the demand for a new international economic order at the forum of the United Nations nearly coincided in time, thus signalling the end of the postwar stage of international relations and the objective necessity of reshaping political and economic relations, regional as well as global, and of meeting intertantional security needs. Of course, it is out of the question that the future system of international cooperative security be mechanically treated as a globalized European "model". The regional systems of cooperative security exclude, for example, a number of elements that are present in Europe and include many that are external to Europe, not to mention the present and future conflicts that accompany the disintegration of the developing world and the reintegration of its detached "fragments".

The sui generis conflicts of the developing world are already well in view, as are those superimposed on the East-West conflict elements and vice versa. This notwithstanding, both in its substance and the methods of multilateral and bilateral diplomacy, as well as in its special complementary nature, self-dynamics and contradictions, the CSCE process can be regarded as a model of cooperative security, one of controlled and active settlement of East-West conflicts, whose applicability extends to areas other than Europa. By way of proving our proposition an analysis of the substance and dynamics of the Helsinki process as well as of its global and interregional implications is indispensable. Firstly the interrelationship of European and global security is one such obvious aspect. On the one hand, not only the world as a whole is influenced by its competing parts, but, through the prism of global problems embracing ecology and the developing world, the internal and external security of the politically, ideologically, and economically diverse systems, are also influenced by the "whole" no less than the quality of their interrelationships.

On the other hand, it is equally clear that in our increasingly interdependent world regional instability may assume a global character and global instability may take on a regional character, which is likely to impose different security "strains" on the regions with different levels of development and differing degrees of capacity for adaptation.

Actually, since the end of the sixties the development of inter-

national relations has entered the stage of globalization.<sup>2</sup> Global issues /the development of the Third World, world economic crises, international arms build-up, etc./ do not primarily affect bilateral relations, but have a direct effect on every country and all alliance systems, posing problems for the world system as a whole. Globalization is expressed also in the fact that the regional military, economic etc. issues acquire global strategic significance and at the same time the global military and economic correlations find a specific regional expression. The accelerated disintegration of the developing world and the political and economic reintegration of its "parts" also indicate the special dynamics of the process of globalization. The process of globalization is especially important due to the fact that the United States as the system organizing power with almost unlimited hegemony of the postwar period has lost positions in guiding globalization on an international scale and that it has not yet been possible to create the worldwide institutional infrastructure of the settlement of global problems in a satisfactory way. The equilibrium achieved in the military sphere of the international balance of forces, in the nuclear field between the Soviet Union and the US during the '70s has had far-reaching consequences. The United States has ceased to be the only military super-power with global capability and US policy has had to reckon increasingly with the objective limiting conditions of nuclear parity and global Soviet military presence or manoeuvre ability.

During the '70s the years of détente in East-West conflicts it became evident that through the strategic balance of forces the regional crises could no longer be controlled in favour of US interests.

The strategic balance of forces has increased the role of regional disequilibriums changing dynamically to such an extent that from the military, security and economic points of view they have had a great influence on the global strategic situation. This has been shown e.g. by the increasing role of the Gulf region in military and economic security or the deployment of nuclear missiles in Western Europe. The latter is controlled by the United States and poses a direct threat to the Soviet Union.

In a characteristic way the process of differentiation and disintegration changing the balance of forces in the developing world has created and is creating more and more "self-inducing" sub-conflicts and "sub-crises" independent from the main system. Numerous conflicts of this kind can no longer be mechanically interpreted in the mutually exclusive ambivalence of the "zero sum" conflict-strategies of the cold war. /Such regional conflict is e.g. the war between Iraq and Iran, etc./.

At the beginning of the '80s the United States took decisive steps to reject the policy based on nuclear strategic parity and reasses Soviet-US relations. This process promoted the remilitarization of East-West security, i.e. the depoliticization of the East-West conflict. The Reagan strategy set as a goal to stop the weakening of US hegemony, to achieve US rule over globalization and to limit /de-globalize/ the global military ability of the Soviet Union. This

process revalued and at the same time rendered difficult the maintenance of the institutional framework of the CSCE process.

The deterioration of the Soviet-US relations, on the one hand, further hampered the establishment of an international institutional system to settle global questions. Moreover, US foreign policy together with the re-ideologization of Soviet-US relations changed the relations of the United States with the international organizations /e.g. UNESCO/, and also in the US participation in the multilateral aid policy directed at the developing countries although, it is obvious that global questions cannot be settled without a certain grade of stability in the relations of the two global powers.

Furthermore, there is an increasing danger of Western Europe becoming a mere tool of the US in its confrontation against the Soviet Union and of "coupling" of Atlantic and Western European security thus making the Western Europeans hostages of US global objectives.<sup>3</sup> This danger is well expressed in the US strategy of "horizontal escalation" indicating that Western Europe is merely a sub-system of the US global strategy. On the other hand, from Washington's point of view East-West economic relations depend on its strategic relations to the Soviet-Union while the majority of the Western European states, due to the accumulated elements of tension in Soviet-US relations, place emphasis on the politically practicable stabilizing function of long-term economic relations. In Europe the elimination of a considerable part of the political obstacles has greatly contributed to the "economization" of East-West economic relations while the cold war "neo-containment" policy is aimed at the direct re-politicization /instrumentalization/ of economic relations, the alteration of Soviet internal policy.<sup>4</sup>

Due to the deterioration of the given global conditions the CSCE process has become extremely difficult, but the value of the institutional elements of East-West relations inherent in it has increased as they express a specific "European" interest despite having characteristic contradictions. At the beginning of the '80s the increasing Soviet-US contradictions put the CSCE process to the test as the "test case" of a regional security and cooperation system. It has become evident that self-dynamics in the CSCE process can contribute to the continuity of East-West relations and the coordination or institutionalization of conflicting, parallel or identical interests.

Furthermore, it should be pointed out that European security is not merely a compilation of the security needs, interests and perceptions of 31 countries. The Helsinki process means a qualitatively new stage of the efforts to achieve common, cooperative security. The countries participating in this process have recognized the need to go beyond the unilateral maximization of national security interests and to create an independent structure of cooperative security through building sets of East-West commitments and relations. In this sense the Helsinki process means the demilitarization of East-West conflicts to a certain degree and its most important general principles are the non-use of force and the realization that an active policy of East-West coexistence based on the recognition of the territorial status quo may establish the foundations for increasing a shared security.

The global relevance and substance of the Helsinki process are also manifest in its special complementary nature. Though the guiding principles of the Final Act have no force of international law, many of them form an integral part, with an international legal effect, of the United Nations Charter, the Soviet-American Accord of 1972 and the treaties of the Federal Republic of Germany with East-European countries. Moreover, the Helsinki process is linked up in many respects with the West-German Ostpolitik, with the settlement of the conflict around West Berlin, with the Vienna negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe, and with the strategic arms limitation talks. In its substance and international implications, the CSCE process links the military, political and economic factors of the uni-, bilateral and multilateral, global and regional and cooperative security. Its "binding" character, both in a political and a moral sense, is expressed in its special self-dynamics, in the institutionalized continuity of follow-up review conferences and special meetings.

Nevertheless, the complementary nature of the Helsinki process is not to be confounded with a politically motivated interlocking of European and global security which is intended to make the development of European cooperative security contingent on some specific extra-European issues. Naturally, in the long run, a "deterioration" in the external environmental conditions for European security is inevitably bound to pose a threat to security in Europe, to bring about changes in its substance. The Maltese attitude at the Madrid follow-up meeting testifies to the existence of special interregional requirements of sub-regional security on the one hand but, on the other, even a tangential inclusion of Mideast conflict areas as non-European regions would jeopardize the frail principle of consensus necessary for the survival of the Helsinki process.

The global implications of the Helsinki process, particularly in certain analogous projections of the North-South problem, are also manifest in the inequalities of the economic division of labour between the East and the West and in the existence of a "gap" in development that is of relevance to security politics as well. Efforts to turn Eastern Europe into an economic periphery may generate regional instability, thus questioning the stability of cooperative security as a whole. The global relevance of the Helsinki process is indicated, even on the institutional plane, by the role played by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe in promoting East-West economic relations.

The Helsinki Final Act is given great importance by the fact that it has established rules for regional security and cooperation in the continent where the political division of the world and, that notwithstanding, the possibilities for cooperation are most graphically shown by the presence of countries and systems of alliance belonging to different social systems and by the greatest concentration of weapons ever seen in world history. On the other hand, the CSCE process has increased individual political weight chiefly of small- and medium-sized countries and, on the basis of recognition of the postwar terri-

torial status quo, it has contributed to widening their scope of action and reducing their role as mere objects. In addition, the Helsinki process as a model of cooperative security and a peaceful way of regulating East-West conflicts contains both substantive and methodological elements - a consensus of all participants and the tripartite arrangement of the Final Act /the guiding principles of inter-state conduct and the confidence-building measures, the improvement of economic relations, and humanitarian questions/ - which are well illustrative of the major problem areas affecting the quality of inter-system relations. At the same time, irrespective of external or extra-European environmental conditions, the Helsinki process is accumulating, in its course of development, specific conflict elements of a new type which did not exist previously in several respects. However, with cooperation expanding, the Helsinki process has changed the nature of territorial frontiers by having confirmed their present status. The Helsinki document contains not only the static elements of the recognition of post-war territorial realities, but also the dynamic rules for regional cooperation. Thus the Helsinki Conference was no repetition of some sort of a last century Vienna Congress, but a multilaterally sanctioned start of an active and competitive policy of peaceful coexistence. Yet, while the growing cooperative structures of East-West relations, namely the increasing multiplicity of interdependence, have reduced the tension of basic antagonisms ensuing from the difference in social systems, the increased cooperation has generated in practice specific secondary tensions /interpretation of human rights, the effects of East-West relations on domestic policies, etc./, which, in turn, affect on the basic inter-system antagonism and create additional security needs. In other words, the Helsinki process as an approach to East-West conflict settlement gives rise to sui genesis conflicts of its own. In a peculiar way, the emergent incidents of interdependence bear both a symmetrical and an asymmetrical character. What is more, the Helsinki process came under the pressure of the world economy precisely at a time when the structures of East-West interdependence had not yet crossed the quality threshold "irreversible" from the standpoint of European security.

On the other hand, the Helsinki process was started at the inter-governmental level, but was continued on a wider plane. The West laid stress on the limitation of the political sovereignty of nations and regarded Helsinki as a legitimate ground on which to judge the domestic practices of socialist countries and to demand "parallel pluralist" changes in respect to political structures. This peculiar development as a "conflict" of the Helsinki process has rightly raised the question of how to cooperate without jeopardizing the identity and thereby the stability of systems.

Of course, the shift in the general international conditions of the Helsinki process inevitably had repercussions on the regional development of cooperative security. The CSCE process itself was put into jeopardy by the failure of the Soviet-American arms limitation talks to produce the desired results and by the ensuing "gap of distrust". At the same time the crisis in Poland called into question the entire stability of Europe by the destabilization of that country as a key state in the postwar fabric of peace in Europe. It was discernible that with the change in the general external conditions the

Helsinki process itself became, even if transitorily, a tool of increasing conflict /human rights, Afghanistan, arms build-up, etc./, but, in conjunction with it, the specific self-dynamics of the CSCE process and the existing system of multiple intra-European bilateral relations appeared to have a comparatively great capacity of resistance to "external" strains. In this context, a particularly heavy burden is imposed by the United States' abandonment of the policy of nuclear parity, implying a dwindling of American foreign policy options, and by the instrumentalization in American thinking of Europe as a sub-system in the global strategy of the United States. The success of the Helsinki process lies in the fact that the process has survived all difficulties and the dangers of new blocs being formed and that, for all that, it has, as such, been able to remain an important "building stone" of the future system of international security.

The CSCE process has shown, on the one hand, the internal contradictions it can reproduce although it is clear that there is only one sole European security and there is no Eastern or Western European security. On the other hand, being the regional institutionalization of cooperative security the CSCE process has shown its interaction with the political, military and economic processes outside Europe. It has also shown that during the deterioration of global Soviet- Us relations it can temporarily contribute to the continuity of stability in East-West relations, although not making up for the lack of cooperation between the main systems in the long run. The stability of international security can have a firm basis if interactions among regional, inter-regional and global inter-relations can be institutionalized and thus controlled. In the latter case, despite all difficulties and contradictions reproduced, the existing system of European security has useful experiences.

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## ASYMMETRIES AND INEQUALITIES IN THE ARAB WORLD

by Zsolt Rostoványi, researcher, Karl Marx  
University of Economics, Budapest

Asymmetries and inequalities characterize not only the world economy and the "third world" as a whole but within these, also the various regions and groups of countries. The well known world political and economic events of the seventies affected the Arab world in a rather ambiguous way; on the one hand they upgraded the importance of the role of the whole region, while on the other they reinforced the process of differentiation and polarization among the Arab countries and groups of countries, making the discrepancies among them more pronounced. In the final analysis these asymmetries and inequalities have not diminished during the last one and a half decade. On the contrary, in many areas they have either increased or shifted over to other spheres. Their manifestations are extremely manifold. These asymmetries and inequalities also characterized the relations between the Arab world and the developed countries /i.e., between the developed "center" and the Arab "periphery"/, besides being manifest in other ways, such as in the divergence of certain groups of Arab countries owing to their different facilities and possibilities, and indeed also within the individual countries themselves. In the following, we wish to show - with no claim for full detail but with a few random, yet typical examples that, despite the favourable changes and influences, the countries of the Arab world have still to overcome countless problems before they will be able to proceed on the route of eliminating their "backwardness".

By the beginning of the eighties, the total participation of the Arab countries as compared to the gross domestic products /GDP/ in the world, rose to 2,5 % and to 17% as compared to production in the developing countries. Their combined weight in the world's /and the "third world's"/ industrial production also increase. However, this can be attributed to the rapid growth of merely a few Arab countries, above all those exporting oil. In the seventies, a high-scale concentration took place in the Arab world in the production of gross domestic products and within this in the production of the various economic branches to the benefit of the oil-exporting countries.

The total production of GDP in 1970 in the greatest Arab oil-producing countries, Saudi-Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Lybia and Algeria was 51.4 % compared to the Arab world as a whole and it rose as much as 75 % a decade later; Saudi-Arabia alone produces one third of the GDP produced in the Arab world. The situation is similar, if not more monopolized, for industrial production. The weight of the above 6 countries in the production of the total Arab extractive industry was almost 90 % in 1970 and 92 % ten years later; 38 % rising to 54 % in the manufacturing industry and 60 % rising to 83 % in the



construction industry. In the pan-Arab production of all the major branches of industry, Saudi-Arabia plays the role in 1980 it had a monopoly of 43 % in the extractive, 18 % in the manufacturing, and 47 % in the construction industry.<sup>1</sup>

In these countries, industrial production expanded at quite a fast pace from the beginning of the seventies; for example, Saudi-Arabia industrial production increases a yearly average of 10.2 %, in Iraq by also more than 10 % and by 8 % in Algeria. It is worthwhile to note the speed with which these countries, which - with the exception of Algeria and Iraq - had almost no manufacturing industry, began to develop their industrial production under the effect of the "oil boom". According to World Bank data, the yearly average growth-rate of the manufacturing industry in the seventies was one of the highest in the world in Lybia: 19 %, surpassing even the newly industrializing South-East-Asian and Latin-American countries. We may speak of a high average yearly growth rate - 7-12 % - in the case of the other countries mentioned as well.<sup>2</sup>

The opposite extreme is represented by the least developed Arab countries. In the seventies, their situation deteriorated in every aspect, although most of them received substantial aid and loans from the oil-exporting countries. The total GDP production of the two Yemens, Somalia, Mauritania and Djibouti against the total Arab GDP diminished from the 2.4 % of 1970 to 1.6 % in 1980. The proportion of their industrial production in the Arab world also decreased: to 0.2 % in the extractive industry, to 1.6 % in the manufacturing industry, and again to 1.6 % in the construction industry. The yearly average rate of expansion of industrial production in the seventies was 3 % in Sudan, 0 % in Mauritania and 2.6 % in Somalia. The situation looks much the same if we examine the various branches of industry separately. As a result of the rapidly accelerated process of differentiation and polarization, the Arab world shows the greatest divergence in the respect of income per capita in the "third world". In the oil-exporting countries with a superfluity of capital, the GNP per capita is over 20000 \$ US /in the United Arab Emirate, Kuwait and Qatar it is around 25000 \$ US/, while in the least developed Arab countries it is 200-500 \$ US.

#### 1. Inequalities in the provision for basic needs

These vast differences in income do not exist only between the Arab countries but also within their various social classes. Not even in the great oil-exporting states, referred to as the so called rentier societies<sup>3</sup> by the authorities, do all strata of society partake equally in the oil revenues, despite the fact that the majority of the population does enjoy an extremely high quality standard of living and wide ranging social benefits. Obviously, the situation is much worse among those living rural areas, especially for those who have to face nomadic conditions, than it is in the cities. Furthermore, we must not forget, that the population of the greatest oil exporting countries consists of 50-70 % of visiting workers from other Arab countries or from South-East-Asia /Bangladesh, Pakistan, the Philippines, India, etc./, who do not enjoy the social benefit that the nationals do.

The situation is much worse in the highly populated North-African countries /Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Sudan/. Marginalization, the increase in the number of those forced to the edges of society is becoming ever greater, particularly among the urban population swollen as a result of the rapid urbanization. Many of these are unemployed or make their living merely from odd jobs, just sufficient to ensure a level of subsistence for themselves and their families. In these countries, it is not only the majority of the rural population, which is still a significant proportion of the total population, that does not benefit from the advantages of "modernization" and development, but also the marginalized strata of urban populations.

Financial differences are increasing in these societies and there has evolved a higher, privileged and relatively narrow stratum of society, that, after acquiring power, has become a "military-bureaucratic and parasitic bourgeoisie" holding the key positions of the national sector, a "mercenary intelligentsia" in control of political power, behaving, in many respects, like a new ruling class.<sup>4</sup> This so called parasitic bourgeoisie follows more and more the "western" model concerned more with the life style of its upper ten thousand, than with that of its people in need. This policy<sup>5</sup> is one of the definitive phenomena of Arab societies. The economic foundations of the ruling power are constituted in corrupt bureaucracy, profiteering, real-estate speculating, trafficking and importing of luxuries. The majority of the profits flows into the hands of this higher stratum, while an increasing proportion of the population is forced to live in poverty.

"Poverty", with the exception of the high-income oil-exporting countries, directly affects some part of society in all Arab countries. The extremely high growth-rate of population, increasing urbanization, lack of satisfactory employment and social marginalization cause an increasing proportion of the Arab population to live on a level of bare existence.

The highly populated Arab countries are in the worst situation, especially Egypt, presently with a population of 45 million. According to an IMF survey, in Egypt 57 % of the urban, and 35 % of the rural families live on a minimum level of subsistence. Although the state greatly subsidises the prices of basic foodstuffs, this does not solve the problem, since a wide strata of the society cannot obtain some of these most basic foods /eg. meat/. The purchasing power of many people diminished by more than half in the seventies. Not only the fully or partially unemployed, but increasingly more of those with permanent employment reach the minimum level of existence. Even the average wage is only sufficient to provide for the most basic needs /food, clothing, housing/.

A significant part of the Arab world's population suffers from a lack of basic provisions, especially in the areas of nutrition, public health, housing and education. In Egypt, Algeria, Syria and Tunisia 40-60 % of the population is illiterate, and in some countries /Sudan, North-Yemen, Mauritania/ the number of illiterates is close to 80 % of the adult population. Despite the rapid development of education, the situation is just as bad in some of the great oil exporting countries too /e.g. Saudi-Arabia/. Out of the total population of 170-180 million

Arabs 80-90 million are illiterate or are only able to write the simplest of things.<sup>6</sup>

The high figures of illiteracy in the Arab world can be ascribed to the peculiarities of development and the deficiencies of the educational system. The fact, that the ratio of illiterates is higher among women may be attributed to the well-known traditions of Islam.

The percentage of children registered in primary education is the lowest in the least developed countries, being 50 % or less of the relevant population and only around 20 % among girls. The situation is not much better in Saudi-Arabia, one of the major oil exporting countries in the Gulf. In the heavily populated countries, Egypt and Morocco, the ratio is around 75 %, while in the other countries it is above the 95 % that may be termed good. However, the real situation paints a picture much worse than this. Many children, although registered, leave their studies a few years later, while others receive education only occasionally. All this is closely connected with the great role played by child-labour in the Arab world, in that, especially in the larger families of 8-10 members - children are set to work at a very early age. Primary education is in most countries obligatory, but this cannot be effected, especially among the rural population.

Serious problems characterize the situation of primary education. The number of schools and classrooms is few, especially in the country, and they are poorly equipped. The proportion of teachers lacking satisfactory training is high. The level of education in government educational institutions is in most places lower than in private schools. The latter, however, are considerably more expensive.

The percentage of children registered in secondary school is considerably lower than in the developed countries; it is 60-75 % in Kuwait, Lybia, Jordania and Iraq, about 50 % in Egypt, Syria and Lebanon, and even less elsewhere /4-7 % in North-Yemen, Mauritania and Somalia/. The percentage registered for further education in Lebanon, Syria and Egypt, however, approaches the corresponding figure of developed countries.

In the last few years, most governments began a campaign against illiteracy; a host of schools, training and educational centers were built. Nevertheless, as a result of the high population growth and the intensifying social polarization and marginalization, the number of children receiving no, or only a short period of training, and thus remaining practically illiterate, is still rather high. These come from the poorest strata of society. Naturally, all this countries to the reproduction of backwardness.

The improvement of the situation is by no means aided by the high scale migration of workers - the inter-Arab flow of labour. Another obstructing factor is the perpetual tension in the Near-East and the frequent wars /enough to mention only the Lebanese situation or the war between Iran and Iraq lasting now for several years/. Illiteracy has extremely wide-ranging social consequences and to find a solution to this problem is of paramount importance to all countries.

A significant proportion of the population suffers from malnutrition since the low incomes can only provide for an unbalanced diet. The consumption of calories per capita per day meets only 85 %- 95 % of the minimal requirements in the least developed Arab countries, the two Yemens, Mauritania and Sudan, and the situation is not much better in the highly populated countries, Algeria, Egypt and Morocco, or even in some of the great oil exporting countries, for example Saudi-Arabia. These figures are averages only and this means that there lie extreme antagonisms, as wide strata of the population are receiving much less calories. In the least developed Arab countries, a mere 25-50 % of the population is provided with good quality, drinkable water and this percentage does not surpass 75 % in most of the Arab countries.

These and various other factors result in the majority of the population being in a physically weakened condition, and it is not surprising that outbreaks of infectious diseases are frequent. For instance, according to certain estimates, more than 60 % of Egypt's population is infected with bilharzia. The unsatisfactory state of public health-care due to the small number of hospitals, clinics, sanitary institutions and qualified medical staff adds to the problem. In Somalia, Mauritania, North-Yemen and Sudan, there are 10-15000 people per doctor, and 2-5000 in Syria, Tunisia, Iraq and Algeria. As a result of the heavy investments during this last period, the most favourable situation is in the great oil-exporting countries of the Arab Gulf with a low number of inhabitants, and in Egypt where the number of citizens per doctor is under 1000.

The food supply is a question of crucial importance in all Arab countries. Self-sufficiency in foodstuffs, safety-levels in nutrition for the whole population, reduction of the import of foodstuffs were all included in the Arab countries developmental and political objectives. Although agricultural and food production has increased at a fast pace in the last few years as a result of the intensive development of agriculture, this increase has not kept pace with the growth-rate of the population. Taking the 1970 figures as hundred, the size of food production per capita was 157 in Syria, 139 in Lybia, 120 in Tunisia, 102 in Sudan, 94 in North-Yemen, 93 in Egypt, 87 in Morocco, 84 in Somalia, 80 in Algeria, 76 in Mauritania and 69 in Saudi-Arabia.<sup>7</sup> Even in those countries where food production surpasses the population's growth rate, it still falls short of the demand for foodstuffs. For instance, in Egypt food-production has increased by 3,4 % on an average annual basis in the last ten years, while its demand has increased yearly by 3,8 %, 0,4 % more than the rate of increase of food-production. Similar data in other countries are: Iraq 2,8 % and 5,2 %, leaving a deficiency of 2,4 %; Saudi Arabia 2,9 % and 5,0 %, leaving a deficiency of 2,1 %, Syria 1,8 % and 4,6 %, leaving a deficiency of 2,8 % and Morocco 2,8 % and 3,3 %, leaving a deficiency of 0,5 %.

Foodstuffs are one of the most major import items to the Arab countries. On average import foodstuffs to each Arab country, - depending on the results of local production - represent 15-20 % of the total import and even more in times of crop failure. Cereals account for the

largest import of foodstuffs, and may be as high as 1015 % of the total import for some countries; these figures are high even when compared to those of the "third world".

Each Arab state, and in particular the great oil exporting states invest vast sums in agricultural development. However, the result - up to now, at least - falls short of expectations, or is rather misleading. In Saudi-Arabia, for example, the quantity of wheat produced was 150 thousand tonnes, barely meeting one tenth of the yearly consumption. The country compensated for the difference by importing 1,4 million tonnes. In the first few years of the eighties, Saudi-Arabia achieved almost unprecedented results in its promotion of wheat production. As a result of intense government measures /for example state purchase prices of wheat were six times of those on the world market/, the size of the 1984 wheat yield was 1,3 million tonnes, almost enough to meet internal demands /the import being a mere 150 thousand tonnes/. While in 1980 wheat was grown on only 12% of the total cultivable land, by 1983 this had increased to 60 %. But at what price? Because of the amount of cultivable land needed for wheat, other crop-production had to be sacrificed and these crops have now to be imported. The price of the total import of foodstuffs in 1984 was 6 milliard dollars, the highest ever among the countries of the "third world". Moreover, storing capacities are unsatisfactory and water reserves are being depleted. Following increased irrigation, the underground water level has sunk by 12 metres since 1970.<sup>8</sup>

All in all, although the substitution of the import of wheat by domestic products has been almost totally successful, this has not put an end to the country's dependence on the import of foodstuffs. The situation is similar in the other oil exporting countries.

According to various prognoses, in the case of a continuation of present trends, the gap between supply and demand of foodstuffs will increase in the entire Arab world. By the end of the century, the worst situation can be expected in the relation of cereals. To merely stop the widening of this gap would cost twice the present amount of money invested in agriculture, and three times the present amount of jobs. Besides this, the generally unfavourable natural conditions pose a serious problem. In the great oil exporting countries, the domestic production of some foodstuffs requires investments far exceeding the cost of their import. An example is the Lybian oasis of Kufra, equipped with a fully automatic irrigation-system where, in addition, the yields fall short even of those which are held to be economical.

A general problem is that though a number of the agricultural establishments are supplied with modern instruments for mechanized farming, the major part of agricultural production is carried out with a very low level of technology using primitive tools. In addition, many of the machines are standing idle, as a result of the lack of spare parts, improper use and so on. The different types of landownership, the partitioning of the land and the formation of "shoelace-patches" also make effective production more difficult. The chemical processing and utilization of artificial fertilizers are not satisfactory either and the

success of agricultural production is dependent to a great extent on the weather conditions. In the majority of Arab countries self-sustaining natural farming and extensive nomad stock-breeding play an important role in agriculture even today, thereby hindering the introduction of up to date methods, the increase in agricultural productivity.

The economy's and parallelly the social infrastructure's rapid pace of development cannot look back on a long past in most Arab countries. One and a half decades ago even the great oil exporting countries of the Gulf belonged to the category of the least developed nations and in many respects even the progress that went on from the beginning of the seventies was not able to eliminate all the aspects of these facts. The terrible circumstances that a significant number of the population find themselves in the malnutrition, the unsatisfactory hygienic conditions, the inadequate development of the public-healths network all together result in the life expectancy of the new-born in even the most favourably-disposed Arab countries being lower than in the developed countries. According to statistics only, Kuwait approaches the standards of developed countries where the life expectancy is 70 years. The situation of Lebanon, Syria, Tunisia, Jordan and the Emirates may be termed relatively good /60-65 years/. In Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, Iraq, Libya and Saudi-Arabia the life-expectancy is 55-60 years, while in the least developed countries with the worst social situation /Sudan, Somalia, Mauritania and the two Yemens/ it is only 40-45 years which is low, even compared with the "third world".

In most of the Arab countries the death-rate has decreased spectacularly as compared with the beginning of the sixties. Within two decades these Arab countries have showed the biggest decrease in death-rate on the world-scale; the death-rate fell by 62 % in the United Arab Emirates, by 50-56 % in Kuwait, Tunisia, Syria and Jordan, by 35-45 % in Egypt, Morocco, Iraq, Algeria and Libya but by no more than 20-30 % in Sudan, Somalia, Mauritania and North-Yemen. The number of deaths per 1000 inhabitant in the Arab world-apart from the least developed states- is on much the same level, as in the developed countries. /In Kuwait it is outstandingly low, merely 5; 7 in the Emirates; 8 in Syria and Lebanon, 9 in Tunisia; 10 in Jordan, 12 in Iraq, Libya and Egypt, 13 in Algeria and Morocco, but 20 in Somalia and South-Yemen, and 23 in Mauritania and North-Yemen.<sup>9</sup>

The decrease is just as dramatic with respect to infant /1-4 years/ mortality - with the exception of the poorest states - falling by between 20-30 %. However, interestingly enough Kuwait still has a much higher rate of infant mortality in the developed countries, where there is one death for every 1000 infants. In comparison there are 2 deaths in Lebanon per 1000 infants, 3 in the Emirates, 5-7 in Syria, Jordan and Iraq, 10-15 in Tunisia, Lebanon, Egypt and Morocco, but 30 in Somalia, the People's Republic of Yemen and Mauritania and 50 in North-Yemen. Concerning infant mortality below the age of one year the decrease within the last 20 years has not been so rapid and even the most favourably disposed Arab countries fall far short of the 10-11 % average of the developed Western countries. In Kuwait, Lebanon and the Emirates it

is 35-55 %, 60-80 % in Syria, Jordania and Iraq, 100-200 % in Lybia, Algeria, Saudi-Arabia, Morocco and Egypt while the two Yemens, Somalia and Mauritania it is 140-190 %. Needless to say the situation is the worst in the case of countries belonging to the lowest income category.

## 2. Man-power and urbanization

One of the most serious problems of the man-power situation in the Arab world is unemployment and under-employment especially in the highly populated Arab states. At the same time the lack of skilled workers poses a further problem.

A rapid process of urbanization has been taking in the Arab countries since the last one or two decades. It is important to redise that urbanization has unique traditions in Arabic history as a medieval Arab civilization was of a pronounced urbanized character. At their height, Baghdad and Damascus, distinguished cities with populations of several hundreds of thousands for surpassed the great settlements of Europe at that time.

Urbanization gained its impetus under the effect of colonisation and then greatly accelerated during the last couple of decades. Its causes are manifold. First of all, the high population growth rate and the deteriorating conditions of rural life may be mentioned, coupled with the break-down of the traditional sector, and its replacement by the modern sector concentrated mainly in the large cities. Many expecting a substantial improvement in their life-circumstances and living-conditions flocked to the cities.

From the beginning of the seventies the growth-rate of the urban population in the Arab world greatly accelerated in comparison with that of the sixties. The average growth-rate now stands at 4-6 % per year and in the great oil-exporting countries and the least developed and poorest Arab states it is even higher namely 7-8 %, which is very high even in comparison with the average figures the "third world". The ration of the urban population to the total population is the highest 70-80 %, in the oil exporting countries of the Arabian Gulf, 40-60 % of the population lives in cities in the countries belonging to the medium income category, while the urban population is the lowest in the least developed countries: about 30 % of the total population.

As a consequence of the rapid urbanization, countless problems have to be solved. The cities, swollen suddenly by the great influx of people are not able to provide everyone with employment or satisfactory living-standards. In most cities there is a considerable contrast in life-style between the modern, European-type parts and the poorer Arabic-type parts. The old, Arabic quarters, now the slum areas, lack all comforts and furthermore they have no plumbing or drainage system. Perhaps the best example that illustrates this is Cairo, the population of which is at present almost 15 million. Many people construct shacks for themselves from planks and cardboard and set up homes on the roofs of apartment houses or in the parks. According to various estimates

half of Cairo's population has no permanent employment, but those who are unemployed sustain themselves and their families by doing odd jobs.

The situation is different in the oil-exporting countries which have a wealth of capital, since the monetary resources make it possible to demolish the old quarters and replace them with up to date, modern apartments with full comforts.

Together with the contrast within the city itself the contrast between city and village is also considerable. The policies for development in most Arab countries up until the last few years had concentrated basically on the cities, more or less neglecting the development of rural areas /another factor contributing to urbanization/. However, as a result of "over-urbanization", living standards began deteriorating in most cities as well. On account of this, the development of the countryside and the smaller towns played a far more important role in the developmental policies of later years.

One of the main causes of unemployment is this rapid urbanization. The swelling cities are unable to provide those migrating into them with satisfactory employment. Another reason is the very high population growth-rate. In most of the Arab states, the proportion of the young compared with the total population is rather high; in those countries having most inhabitants, 40-50 % of the population belongs to the age-group under 15. However, those wishing to enter full-time employment for the first time find it increasingly difficult to find jobs.

Within the Arab world, the number of people with an income constitutes some one quarter of the total population. Somewhat more than half of the total work-force is employed in agriculture, not quite 20% in the various branches of industry, and 30 % in services. The number of fully employed is extremely low, a mere 25 % of the total work-force. Not much more than half of the labour-force has more or less steady employment. The number of unemployed at the beginning of the eighties was estimated at about 15 million and of those under-employed at 33 million.

Under-employment is the term given to the doing of odd jobs that are insufficient to ensure even basic sustenance /for example shoe-shining, collecting rubbish, selling matches, etc./. Seasonal work is especially common in agriculture and this obviously does not mean permanent employment either. All in all the income of the wide masses is barely enough to meet their and their families' needs, increasing the number of the one living on a minimal level of existence. Problems are further worsened by the fact that in most cases, it is the poorest who have greatest families.

Ironically, the problem with labour in the Arab world are also corrected with certain geographical regions: for example while the main problem in the highly populated North-African countries is unemployment, the countries in the Arabic Gulf have to cope with a shortage of manpower, and they compensate for this only partially via the inter-Arab flow of labour, preferring the cheaper and less selective visiting



workers from South-East Asia. Entering employment in the capital-rich countries of the Gulf is the dream of many inhabitants of other Arab countries. A lot of Egyptians, Yemenese, Sudanese, Algerians and other nationals of different Arab countries are employed as visiting workers in the Gulfstates and Lybia.

Clearly, owing to the important roles that Islam and tradition play, employment extremely low among women: in Lebanon, which has the greatest number of women workers in the Arab world, not much more than 15 % of the total labour force is female. The traditions, religious rules /eg. fasting at Ramaddan/, and the particular mentality derived from Islam all leave their mark on work performance too. On the local scale of values, for instance, non-productive jobs are considered more worthy than productive jobs, therefore a majority of people refer employment in non-productive branches; for example commerce, state administration or the army. The high proportion of those employed in the non-productive sphere can be attributed to this fact. In the greatest oil-exporting countries the major part of productive work is done by guest workers. In Kuwait, for example, 60 % of the guest workers are employed in this area, 88 % of the Kuwaitean labour-force is employed in the non-productive side.

Workers flow from the heavily populated North-African countries to the oil producing states which have to cope with a shortage of labour, but to Europe as well. The number of Algerians and Moroccans working in France can be estimated several hundreds of thousands. In their programmes for development the Arab countries attribute great importance to the creation of new jobs. In Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria far-reaching, largescale plans were drawn up; but, however, they have not been able to solve the employment problem up to now. The only conceivable way of solving this problem would seem to be through structural changes in the economies, the development of educational-training systems and the furthering of inter-Arabic regional-cooperation.

### 3. Asymmetries in the center-periphery relation

Many hold to the view concerning the question of "dependency" and the "center-periphery relation", that the capital-rich oil-exporting countries' unilateral dependence on the developed countries has ceased, moreover, many people consider that these countries no longer belong to the countries of the "third world", as the Arab countries' interests are basically identical with those of the developed countries and furthermore, they are actually forcing the developed countries themselves into a state of dependence.<sup>10</sup> The incomes of the countries as compared with those of the developing countries certainly put them into the category of the "rich". The steps taken by OPEC in the seventies did give a very clear glimpse of the possibility of the "transfer of economic power"<sup>11</sup> however, this transfer has not yet taken place.

The capital-rich oil-exporting states have not become actual economic powers, though they do have two regional and global scale factors of influence: oil and the immense revenues that come from it.

These factors, however, are the results of external, exogenous effects while the necessary implement for ensuring economic power, the advanced internal economic structure is lacking. The world-economical positions of these countries were fortified essentially under the influence of these external factors, independent of their own internal economic development; consequently, the Arab states are themselves strongly dependent on external circumstances.

Although modified to a great extent, the bilateral dependencies of the great oil-exporting countries with a superfluity of capital on the developed center states had not changed substantially by the beginning of the eighties. The direct colonial dependency had ceased, /just as in the case of other developing countries/ but the effects of indirect economic dependency had become prominent. The oil exporting countries are heavily reliant and to a great extent dependent on the international division of labour because of the monocultural character of their productive and external trade /export/ structure. The percentage of their export compared to the GDP is usually 75-95 % and 90-95 % of their export is oil. Conversely, their import is stringly deversified: they import a wide scale of goods from machines and mechanical equipment to various consumer goods. The structure of external trade is almost exactly the same as to it was in the case of colonialism.

The technological dependency of these countries has become more pronounced. Not only are they heavily dependent on imports in the case of investment goods, techniques, but they have also become heavily dependent on the "human factor" that is qualified labour. 40-50 % of the total cost of the imports of the greatest oil-exporting countries is accounted for by machines and technical equipment and tens of thousands of experts from developed countries who come to work in the Arab states in managerial posts.

No doubt, the Arab countries immediate financial dependence has ceased, but indirectly they have remained dependent on the fluctuations of the international financial market, for they keep a significant part of their oil revenues in the developed countries /most of it in dollars, deposited in banks/. Saudi-Arabia's external capital was over 140 milliard dollars and Kuwait's was over 60 milliard dollars at the beginning of 1984. The yearly interest revenues from these are of the magnitudes of several milliard dollars. It is obvious that disturbances on the financial market and the weakening of the dollar would cause serious problems.

A step forward of great importance in connection with dependence was, however, that basically each great oil-exporting country was successful in actions against international monopolies, and that today, either by the method of nationalization or by that of gradual participation, each Arab state controls the oil production of its own country. Of course, this step forward is also relative, as the major part of manufacturing, the marketing-system and the marketing is still under the control of the international oilmonopolies.

The manner and mode of this financial dependency have changed in many respects; for example the dependency on certain "mother countries" no longer exists, but having been "internationalized", the Arab countries are now dependent on the developed countries and the world economy as a whole. Just how heavily dependent they still are, was made apparent in the global oil-market at the beginning of the eighties which turning unfavourably for us immediately made its affects felt on the internal economic situation of even the greatest oil-exporting countries and resulted in a toughening of conditions and a restraint on the producing trends.

Even the greatest oil-exporting countries belong to the "third world's" export, their economies - despite the fast and spectacular development from the beginning of the seventies-, are still characterized by the "backwardness", the elimination of which is a priority of the first degree. The same can be said about dependency, as along with the cessation of at least moderation of the intensify of unilateral dependency in certain areas, its other features became prominent and profound, which it will take a long time yet to eliminate. However, it is a fact that these countries on account of their financial resources have reached a situation more favourable than that which most of the developing countries are in. The dependence of those Arab countries which have no oil on the developed countries has only increased during the last few years.

A new development from the beginning of the eighties is that the balace of payments of not only those Arab countries not exporting oil, but also that of most of the oil-exporting countries has deteriorated. The only exceptions from among the major Arab oil exporting countries are Saudi-Arabia, the United Arab Emirated and Kuwait. Quite without precedent, even Lybia has to cope with financial difficulties. Its backlof of liabilities, already reaching 12 milliard dollars in 1982, has been increasing ever since. After the 8.8 million dollar-surplus of 1980, its balace of payments closed in 1982 with a deficit of 2.4 milliard dollars.<sup>12</sup>

In the background a point which has to be taken into consideration is the demanu for oil on the world market and the periodic oversupply of oil. The majority of great oil exporting countries have had to restrain oil production and the subsequent decrease of oil export has resulted in a sudden decrease of revenues. Saudi-Arabia's oil revenues fell from the 113 milliard dollar mark of 1981 to 76 milliard dollars in 1982. In the case of Kuwait they fell from 15 milliard to 10 milliard dollars.<sup>13</sup> Although their international resources also fell, this caused no serious payment problems, since their resources were still sufficient to meet expenditures.

Iraq's financial situation - mainly due to the effect of the war with Iran - deteriorated a great deal, its international resources had diminished from 35 milliard dollars to below 2 milliard dollars by 1984. The war alone costs 1 milliard dollars monthly. Iran's debts are rapidly increasing. The more highly populated oil producers' financial situation, such as Algeria's has always been worse. Algeria's debts exceed 15 milliard dollars.

The financial situation of the non-oil producing Arab countries is worse still. Their debts run as high as 30-50 % of the GNP. Their balance of payments are without exception deficient and this deficit is continuously increasing. They generally have not adequate sources of income, with the exception of a few rawmaterials /such as phosphate, cotton, etc./ but the prices of these raw materials on the world market have been turning unfavourably during the last few years. The rate of service liabilities is generally 3-10 % of the GNP and 10-25 % of the export revenues. Estimates of the liabilities of the Arab world countries now stand at a sum-total of 60-70 million dollars.

#### 4. Development in the cultural dimensions

Within the Arab world, more and more people are starting to recognize the importance of the development of the cultural sphere of society as something that goes hand in hand with progress. It is beyond doubt, that in many aspects development shares the same features in all regions of the world and it is only the national-cultural aspect that portrays the individual characteristics based on local past history and tradition. Ignorance of this cultural factor may result in very serious conflicts.

Colonialism brought along great shocks throughout the Arab world. The colonizing powers of Europe forced the Arab countries into a unilateral dependency not only in the social and political spheres but on an ideological and cultural basis too. The colonizing powers promoted Europe's superiority, opposing the "inferior" Arab-Islamic culture and replacing it with the "superior" European culture. The fact that these powers tried to make the region or tried to force the region to adopt their own customs, language and life style resulted not only in a dis-ordering of the old life-style and norms, but also produced a feeling of resentment for the new-and alien elements. The Arabic people felt a threat to their identity and own culture. Teh society held together by Islam, found itself face to face with a completely different society, one that praised Man's power over nature with the leading role played by science and technology. This is one of the reasons for the certain degree of antagonism between the Arab-Islam and the "Western" culture.

More and more of the Arabic people voted for "traditionalism" as opposed to "modernization" /which meant, in some extreme cases, the utter rejection of any new achievement. Islam is integrated into all spheres of Arabic society. Islam, besides its religious side, is a way of life, a civilization, and at the same time, a historic tradition. The "Islamic renaissance" of our times indicates well the increasing desire that some Arab states have to root their societies in local historical and cultural traditions.

In most countries of the Arab world today, "modernization" is being peculiarly mixed with "traditionalism"<sup>15</sup> producing some kind of "modernized traditionalism" or "traditionalizing modernization". An increasing number of Arabic people support the so-called "middle of the road" development, which means separation from both capitalism and Marxism, the

realization of the slogan: "neither East nor West" and the tracing of an independent route of progress. Sometimes this return to the cultural values of the past can go as far as trying to apply literally certain principles held to several centuries ago. In the Arab-Islamic world more and more emphasis is being laid on the need to diverge from western cultures, i.e., the Arab-Islamic culture's characteristics should be solely influenced by the spiritual factor, where moral and ethical codes play the major part, while materialism and secularization belong to the "Western" culture, in which the moral and spiritual element is subordinate to materialistic objectives, and the advancement of technology. In spite of over-simplification this statement is to a large scale extent well founded.

In the social relations of the Arab world, "traditional" and religious bonds, and the resulting unity<sup>16</sup> play a role of much greater importance than in Europe. Islam itself faithfully reflects this. In our day, the countries of the Arab world too strive to find their own identity, to take a route of development.

### Conclusion

The problems discussed above show that despite the fast and spectacular development in many areas of the Arab world most of these countries - including the greatest oil producing and exporting states - have not yet managed to eliminate their "economic backwardness". We could list many other examples for proof besides those mentioned, and the achievements that have been gained so far from development do not affect equally all strata of society, nor the respective Arab countries: Differences and inequalities have not only diminished but they have become even more pronounced. Nevertheless, it is a fact, that the greatest oil exporting countries having two important "force factors", oil and the financial resources coming from its marketing have reached a position more favourable than that of the other countries. Further progress, however, depends firstly on the extent to which they manage to utilize these advantages to build a firm, developed economic structure and lastly on the extent to which external, exogenous factors are able to effectuate the mobilization of internal resources. For this will be the only conceivable way of decreasing and finally eliminating these asymmetries and inequalities. The extent to which the differences between the respective countries in the Arab world can be decreased, and the extent to which those countries with unfavourable assets /especially the least developed ones/ are able to participate in the accompanying positive effects of the oil boom, depends not least on the success of the strategies of the "collective Arab self-support" and the "collective Arab economic-action".

NOTES AND REFERENCES

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15. Undoubtedly, a "modernization crisis" has evolved in the Arab world, which reflects, besides the crises of numerous development-model experiments, the crisis of the search for identity.
16. "Group solidarity" /Casabiya/ directly takes a central place in the Muqaddima of Ibn Khaldun.

PROBLEM OF CRISES AND OF "STRUCTURAL  
CRISIS" ON THE EXEMPLE OF LATIN AMERICA

by Zoltán Kollár, assistant professor  
Karl Marx University of Economics,  
Budapest

At the beginning of 1984, high-level delegations of 26 Latin American countries evaluated the situation in this region in dramatic tones: "Latin America and the Caribbean region are facing the gravest and deepest economic and social crisis of this century and this crisis is characterized by specific and unprecedented features".<sup>1</sup> The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America evaluated the economic crisis of the early 80s as the gravest situation of "only" the last 50 years.<sup>2</sup> It would be possible to go on citing the different evaluations which all arrive at the conclusion that the economies of Latin America are living through very critical years. This extremely grave situation undermined even the optimism about economic development. The fact that since the beginning of the 50s Latin America has been one of the most quickly developing regions of the world - even if this development was sometimes stopped by recessions - made it a general tendency that evaluations concerning Latin America do not lay enough stress upon the contradictions of the economies but take into account only the favourable signs. But the actual situation made it clear - and most people are of the same opinion in this respect - that Latin America has come to the point where radical changes should take place in the economy, otherwise there is no real chance of getting out of the crisis. Of course, as to the nature, the way, the tendency and the pace of these changes there is no such a perfect agreement than as to the formulation of the requirement itself. Lack of space does not permit us to sum up the whole range of evaluations and we do not aim at analyzing the different views about how to find a way out of the crisis or at proposing a theoretical formulation of a strategy of development, but only at outlining the nature of the economic processes in Latin America in the 80s and the factors which determine the economic crisis. In our opinion this seems to be important because the crisis is the objective basis which - as a function of the class relations, the internal and international relation and the nature of power - determines the nature of the strategy of development. Therefore we have to analyze first of all the nature of the crisis so that we can find the way out of it. By way of introduction let us say only that some of the factors of the economic crisis of the 80s result from the contradictions of the capitalist world economy. All analyses make this clear. And several essays disclose that this very critical period results not only from the business cycles, and especially from the changes in the world market, but from internal structural factors as well.

The worsening of the economic difficulties of Latin America is the result of the last 15-20 years but several new factors have also cont-



ries, the Latin American countries were mostly affected by the world economic crisis. The crisis rocked primarily the most developed countries /i.e. Brazil, Mexico and Argentina/ of this continent.

The contradictions of the countries suffering balance upsets were aggravated by the partial structural crisis of different sectors. In Latin America too this crisis was based on the balance of payments deficit on the prices explosion.<sup>6</sup> Thus, the inflation, which was incidentally permanent, accelerated. In most Latin American countries, the inflation rate reached its /highest level/ in 1975, with the exception of those countries where the inflation rate was usually high. By the way, in Latin America the annual inflation rate was 20.9 % between 1970 and 1973, 40.7 % in 1974, 60.1 % in 1975, 64 % in 1976, 48 % in 1977 and 39.9 % in 1978.<sup>7</sup> It can be attributed to the fact that in 1975 and 1976 the number of currency devaluations went up, e.g. there were 29 devaluations in Chile in 1975, 14 devaluations in Brazil in 1975 and 16 in 1976, 20 devaluations in Uruguay in 1976. Even Mexico, which had not had recourse to this means for 22 years, was also forced to devalue its currency /by 52.8 %/.

The balance of payments deficits obviously brought about the increasing indebtedness of the Latin American countries. The gross debts of Latin America amounted to "only" 21 billion U.S. dollars in 1970, to 45,4 billion in 1974, to 70 billion in 1976 and to 78 billion in 1977 /Brazil: 22 billion, Mexico 18 billion, Argentina: 7 billion, Chile: 5 billion/ while the ratio of loans expiring within 10 years became higher and higher /68% in 1970, 79% in 1974 and 1976/,<sup>8</sup> and even the ratio of loans expiring within 5 years was rising quickly /48,2% in 1966, 45% in 1970, 56.1% in 1976/. According to this economic situation, the debt service capacity of Latin American countries deteriorated: 14,4% in 1960/61, 13.7% in 1970/71 and 20.1 % in 1977. Several countries reached the "level of tolerance": 25,8% in Brazil, 32,6% in Chile, 48.5% in Mexico, 30.5 % in Peru and 27.9% in Uruguay. The foreign economic balance of these countries became critical.<sup>9</sup>

In spite of all this /i.e. the balance upsets and particularly the worsening foreign economic conditions/, the Latin American countries maintained the in relatively quick growth rate, though at a lower level. And as economic growth is very susceptible to imports with regard to both the structure and the growth itself, this flexibility of the economic policy led infallibly to the fact that in consequence of the effects exerted by the world market and of the internal contradictions, and as a result of the interaction between internal and external factors, Latin America found itself in a very critical economic situation in the new decade.

#### Some characteristics of the crisis of the 1980s

The growth rate of the Latin American economy was relatively high in the second half of the 1970s /though, in comparison with the previous growth rate, which could be impressive anywhere in the world, there was a certain decline/. The GDP grew on the average at an annual

ributed to this crisis. The crisis is mainly rooted in the more and more intensive industrialization of the Latin America economies and especially in the expansion of transnational companies. Industry in particular passed under the rule of the transnational companies and by the beginning of the 80s investment in the manufacturing industries had reached the level of 30-32 billion US dollars, which is ten times as much as in 1960 and foreign companies thus came to control 40 % of the industrial production and their participation in the dynamic sectors /chemical industry, electrotechnics, motor-car industry/ varies between 80 and 100 %. The expansion of foreign capital heightened the dependence of the Latin American economies on imports and technology while the plans to expand exports were realized only in part and only added a new element to the dependence of this region on the United States. In consequence of this Latin America became more and more dependent on external financial resources while at the same time it suffered considerable losses owing to the outflow of interest and profits and, as is well known, several Latin American countries were forced to suspend their payments.

In addition to the above mentioned factors, other factors also contributed to the crisis of the 80s: e.g. the level of Latin American export prices fell on the world market while the level of import prices went up, i.e. the terms of trade deteriorated; the protectionism of the advanced capitalist countries restrained the volume of exports and the increasing interest rates as well as other monetary manipulations also inflicted grave losses on Latin America. In consequence of all this the level of input fell in this region and the impact exerted by the crisis of the developed countries restricted economic development in Latin America on the whole. Klochkovski and Sheremétier point also to the fact that the leading circles in Latin American countries try to shift the burdens ensuing from the economic difficulties on to the backs of the workers and the poor /e.g. by means of inflation/.

That briefly cited point of view indicates that the authors put the critical economic situation of Latin America down to a structural - i.e. long term - factor which is dependence, as well as to some other factors related to the business cycles. If we consider the Latin American societies as capitalism in a state of dependence, we can, of course, determine an important element of this crisis, but we feel that by means of the previous method we can reveal also other structural factors related to the production relations and which determine the nature of the crisis. We have to point to these facts, too so that we can understand the very contradictory nature of the present situation in this region.

We also feel that the current grave economic situation in Latin America can be attributed in the first place to the contradictory economic development that has been going on and passing through crises since the 1960s, in the second place to the world economic situation, and in the third place to the system of production relations.

In this paper we will try to determine the nature of the crises of this period and to prove that apart from the business cycles the system of production relations is also a major determinant of the contradictory economic situation the region. Therefore we will not deal

with the results of economic growth but rather with its unfavourable consequences as the inevitable concomitants of economic growth.

1. Economic crises and recessions in Latin America in  
in the last 25 years

Economic development in Latin America seems to have been characterized by ever-increasing balance upsets and tensions since the world economic crisis of 1929-1933. The symptoms of these economic troubles are e.g. the inflation, under-utilization of the means of production, shortages /e.g. of food/, unemployment, budget deficit, and external indebtedness of the countries, etc. Of course, these symptoms are interdependent and become critical from time to time. Such an economic crisis took place at the beginning of the 1950s

then in the period from 1958 to 1962, next in 1974 and 1975 in consequence of the world economic crisis and, last but not least, at the beginning of the 1980s. The period between 1958 and 1962 is of a great importance because it opened a new stage of development by making some socioeconomic reforms inevitable and necessary. The crisis of the 80s seems to be of a similarly great importance though it has so far been described as the need for change related only to the business cycles. Let us examine first the events of the late 50s and the early 60s.

Crisis at the end of the 50s and the beginning of the 60s

Between 1958 and 1962 not only the above-mentioned balance upsets became graver and graver but a production crisis also set in owing,, last but not least, to the recessions in the United States in 1957-58 and 1960-61 because of the close interdependence of the process of reproduction.

This crisis manifested itself first of all in the foreign trade of Latin America: the terms of trade deteriorated significantly and the balance of trade was so much in the red that it recalled the crisis of 1929-1933.

Due to this trade gap, the equilibrium of the internal market was upset. The owners wanted to offset the reduction in export incomes by increasing the volume of exports, but at the same time they reduced the output of the manufacturing industry and of agriculture. So naturally there were fewer domestic products on the internal market. This imposed an increasing burden on imports too; there was a great demand especially for imported agricultural products. The agricultural crisis was therefore the result of two factors: in the sectors producing for export there was a crisis of over-production while the output of the sectors producing for internal markets was not sufficient. In the manufacturing industry there was no such a "dichotomy": there was only a decline in production.

The crisis of these two sectors /manufacturing industry, agriculture/ can be considered as secondary crises because they ensued from the American recession, but their final cause was the international aggravation of the conflict between social production and private appropriation.

Not only the primary sector was in crisis but in some countries /e.g. Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay/ there were troubles in the manufacturing industry too in the early 60's. But this was already the result of the slow-down of the industrialization aimed at counterbalancing the reduction in imports. The slow-down of industrialization substituting for imports cannot be attributed to the foreign trade deficit, but it is evident that there is a connection between them: the world economic relations exerted their influence mainly through the market that was becoming more and more constricted because of the agricultural crisis. In the main sectors of industry substituting for imports /and especially in the textile industry/ there was not so much a recession as a stagnation, but the other sectors were not affected directly by the critical situation of the economy. Hence it followed that the industrial development was very disproportionate, more disproportionate than in the ordinary course of things and thus it led to market troubles.

The crisis of the sectors substituting for imports or their quasi crisis/stagnation/ ensued from the fact that the possibilities of development of these sectors were limited by the market. Capital reacted directly by under-utilizing the capacities and reducing the workforce. This first reaction of capital aggravated the equilibrium disturbances of the economy which have characterized Latin America since almost the 1929-1933 crisis and especially since the 50s. Though this was a logical step from the point of view of economic efficiency, the system of production relations did not permit the flow of capital needed for overcoming the organizational crisis /as a partial crisis/. To support this opinion let us mention that both the agricultural and the industrial monopolies /though of different nature/ impeded the flow of capital and consequently made it difficult to find a way out of the crisis. Therefore, it became more and more evident that it was not possible to get out of the crisis only by economic means. Of course, this fact became known owing not only to economic processes but also to social processes that accelerated throughout the continent by the late 50s and the early 60s. The victory of the Cuban revolution in 1959 contributed significantly to the understanding of the need for change.

#### An attempt to eliminate socio-economic contradictions

The Latin American ruling classes, in cooperation with international monopoly capital and especially with that of the United States, could not avoid social reforms. The aim of these reforms was not only to ease social tensions but also to create the conditions for a better efficiency of capital. For this purpose, the ruling classes also had to invoke the help of the state as a collective capitalist institution for it turned out that private capital did not have enough strength and possibilities to solve the problems.

The state began to apply more intensively the traditional means of intervention /etatism had been widespread in Latin America for a long time/ but they did not prove effective enough and as the new planning endeavours weren't a success either, it became inevitable to announce certain socio-economic reforms. These reforms were aimed finally at enlarging the market. Therefore, some elements of the reforms brought about changes in the production relations and some others modified or brought in new means of economic policy.

Of course we can't present here in details the measures taken by the Latin American ruling classes to overcome the acute social, economic and political crisis between 1958 and 1962, so we will just touch on the nature of these measures. In any case it should be noted that these reforms /measures/ were in line with the "Alliance for Development" program adopted in 1961 or in some cases were actually a part of that program. The most significant measures were the following:

1. Bourgeois-reformist agricultural reforms.

In the 1960s, most Latin American states announced agricultural reforms which were aimed /admittedly or not/ at strengthening capitalist relations in the agricultural sector too without launching a radical attack on agricultural monopolies though they imposed certain restrictions on latifundia. But these reforms did not solve the problems of the poor; they were favourable to landowners running - in a more and more capitalistic way - farms of about 5-20 hectares, as well as to big estate-owners because only those lands were redistributed which were not cultivated, moreover, the big estate-owners got additional capital too because the redistribution of land was carried out with compensation. As they gave preference to capitalistic farms, these agrarian reforms ended up by increasing the demand for means of production.

2. International economic integrations.

The Latin American countries established international organizations which were primarily destined to abolish administrative and other restrictions, but did not deal, or only in a very restricted area, with those problems of production and of development that could be solved by means of integration. The fundamental contradiction of these organizations was that they tried to develop integration while the national economies involved in the integration were internally disintegrated. And as the international integrations could mostly be made use of by the /international/ companies whose activities also contributed to the internal disintegration of the Latin American countries, these international organizations further aggravated the internal inequalities of the national economies. This may also be the reason why the Latin American integrations cannot work efficiently. The predomination of foreign companies in the integration was in reality the result of the fact that trade between the Latin American countries was not limited by administrative /i.e. non-economic/ restrictions. In the final analysis, these international organizations contributed to a certain extent to the development of the trade in means of production.

### 3. Modification of the regulators of foreign trade.

Until the 1960s, Latin America was committed to strict protectionism. This economic policy included among other things various means of foreign exchange control, the customs system and other administrative restrictions on imports. Naturally, all this was in close connection with these countries' views on economic development and particularly on industrialization substituting for imports. But in the second half of the 1960s, the deepening contradictions of the industrialization substituting for imports, the uneven development of the different sectors of industry and, last but not least, the growing deficit of the balance of payments, forced the Latin American countries to relax the strict restrictions, or, to be more exact, to introduce new measures. These new measures were aimed at promoting the exportation of non-traditional goods. World economic tendencies from the second half of the 1960s also helped Latin American countries to find an external market /an important part of which was the Latin American countries own regional market for a growing number of their products. In consequence of this it seemed as if the economy of the Latin American countries had entered a state directed to ward exportation, but in fact these countries had already been exporters of traditional goods for a long time and this feature was and continues to be a major source of many of their economic problems. In reality, the Latin American countries continue to impose restrictions on imports in those fields which have not yet become export-oriented. The relatively good exportation possibilities of the late 60s and early 70s were immediately undermined by the economic crisis in the western world and the advanced capitalist countries reaction: restrictions and contractual preferences discriminating against Latin America.

### 4. Control of the influx of foreign capital

Since the 60s, the Latin American countries have taken separately or collectively a number of measures to control directly or indirectly foreign investments in the region. Some of these measure granted preferences or imposed restrictions in certain sectors, some regulated the transfer of profits and the tax system, others prescribed the ratio of workers of different nationality. These measures did not lock out foreign capital from Latin America, then purpose was merely to reconcile the interests of foreign and domestic capitalists with of course preference to the latter and to ease the oppressive predominance of capital coming in from North America. In short, the Latin American countries tried to get as much foreign capital as possible within regulated bounds so that - as they put it, they could more from a state of unilateral dependence to one of interdependence. And as the political atmosphere became more favourable /i.e. the immediate danger of revolution was over though, in some cases, only by means of a ruthless fascist dictatorship/, the investments of foreign companies accelerated in the second half of the 70s especially in the field of manufacture of means of production, though they were concentrated only on certain vertical stages. In the last vertical stage, investments were made only in the field of durable consumer goods.

## 5. Other social reforms

The first thing to mention here are the educational reforms and especially the wider and wider spread of training in different skills. Also it seemed there was a start to checking or ending the over-concentration on classical studies in the field of education and research

### Quick economic growth after 1968 and the crisis in the middle of the 1970s

The economic reforms undoubtedly released lots of energy for development, and this had an impact for quite a long time. In addition the favourable effects of the world economy also contributed to quick economic growth in Latin America. This double effect changed the face of economic growth in Latin America after 1968 and on this basis we could speak about a new stage of development in Latin America.

Major differences from the previous stage were as follows:

- the GDP growth rate accelerated;
- heavy industry became the main profile of the manufacturing industry;
- the consumption /and perhaps even the production/ of the products of sector I accelerated and exceeded that of sector II;
- the pace of fixed capital investments accelerated;
- the influx of imperialista loan- and productive capital into the Latin American economy became more intensive and its sectoral structure was modified /with an increasing trend toward the manufacturing industry/;
- the growth rate of fixed capital investments by foreign companies was higher than that of all fixed capital investments;
- imports not only accelerated but even grew at a higher rate than exports and GDP;
- the purchasing power of exports of import capacity increased;
- the volume and ratio of state investments and purchases grew quickly;
- after a long period, the level of machinery investments was higher for the first time than that of construction investments;
- the exportation of manufacturing industry goods accelerated and the share of the traditional one-crop products in exports decreased;
- but on the other hand, agriculture hardly developed, having been marked rather by stagnation.

These facts show that the Latin American economy entered into a stage of dynamic and expansive growth. But the above points do not indicate what were the sources and contradictions of this new stage of development. Therefore, we have to put the causes into groups.

Some of the factors bringing about this quick growth were related to the business cycles, though in the last analysis these factors were also connected with the deepening contradictions in the structure of

the capitalist world economy. Due to the favourable conditions of foreign trade, Latin America acquired for a short time additional financial means and use-values.<sup>4</sup> It acquired additional financial means owing also to the intensifying influx of capital which, by the way, materializes /international/ production relations and causes dependence. In the early 70s, the level of the influx of capital exceeded that of the outflow. These additional resources coming from abroad together with the absolute and relative growth of internal saving /which resulted from a more and more unequal distribution of national income/ contributed to an almost unprecedented expansion of investments which was all but a "boom".

The other factors can be considered as exerting their influence for a relatively long time. They resulted from the contradictions in the special, capitalist development in a state of dependence of the Latin American countries, or to be more exact, from the new form of motion of these contradictions. In the preceding pages we pointed to the new elements which brought about the expansion of the market in Latin America. Both the agrarian reforms and the integrations increased the demand primarily for means of production but, in the last analysis, they also contributed to an increase of demand for durable consumer goods. Naturally, the state interventions did not only bring about some changes in the production relations but also encouraged advantage to be taken of the factors related to business cycles, e.g. by modifying the regulators of foreign trade and of the influx of foreign capital, the state promoted the favourable business cycles.

In ensues from these two groups of factors bringing about quick economic growth that this stage of development took its energy from the relative expansion of the internal and regional markets, and at the same time, the improving conditions of foreign trade and the new investment policy of the international monopolies enabled the new stage of capitalist development to benefit from the expansion of the market. Therefore, the quick economic growth was promoted not only by exogenous factors related to business cycles but also by the reaction of the western world to the deepening social and economic contradictions of the late 50s and early 60s.

This stage of quick economic growth was seriously undermined by the economic crisis of the capitalist world in 1974-1975; this crisis did not only slow down the economic growth but also aggravated the contradictions which had previously characterized the Latin American economies.

Among the processes of the capitalist world economy, it was the explosion of world market prices that exerted the main influence on the economic development of Latin American countries in the 1970s. Naturally, the explosion of the world market prices had a different effect from one country to another. The international situation of the oil-producing countries improved considerably, but neither these countries could obviate the internal equilibrium disturbances of their economies. The non-oil-producing countries were even more affected by the world economic crisis. Some people say<sup>5</sup> that among the developing count-



ries, the Latin American countries were mostly affected by the world economic crisis. The crisis rocked primarily the most developed countries /i.e. Brazil, Mexico and Argentina/ of this continent.

The contradictions of the countries suffering balance upsets were aggravated by the partial structural crisis of different sectors. In Latin America too this crisis was based on the balance of payments deficit and on the prices explosion.<sup>6</sup> Thus, the inflation, which was incidentally permanent, accelerated. In most Latin American countries, the inflation rate reached its highest level in 1975, with the exception of those countries where the inflation rate was usually high. By the way, in Latin America the annual inflation rate was 20.9% between 1970 and 1973, 40.7% in 1974, 60.1% in 1975, 64% in 1976, 48% in 1977 and 39.9% in 1978.<sup>7</sup> It can be attributed to the fact that in 1975 and 1976 the number of currency devaluations went up, e.g. there were 29 devaluations in Chile in 1975, 14 devaluations in Brazil in 1975 and 16 in 1976, 20 devaluations in Uruguay in 1976. Even Mexico, which had not had recourse to this means for 22 years, was also forced to devalue its currency /by 52.8%/.

The deficits balance of payments obviously brought about the increasing indebtedness of the Latin American countries. The gross debts of Latin America amounted to "only" 21 billion U.S. dollars in 1970, to 45,4 billion in 1974, to 70 billion in 1976 and to 78 billion in 1977 /Brazil: 22 billion, Mexico: 18 billion, Argentina: 7 billion, Chile: 5 billion/ while the ratio of loans expiring within 10 years became higher and higher /68% in 1970, 79% in 1974 and 1976/<sup>8</sup>, and even the ratio of loans expiring within 5 years was rising quickly /48,2% in 1966, 45% in 1970, 56,1% in 1976/. According to this economic situation, the debt service capacity of Latin American countries deteriorated: 14,4% in 1960/61, 13.7% in 1970/71 and 20.1% in 1977. Several countries reached the "level of tolerance": 25.8% in Brazil, 32.6% in Chile, 48.5% in Mexico, 30.5% in Peru and 27.9% in Uruguay. The foreign economic balance of these countries became critical.<sup>9</sup>

In spite of all this /i.e. the balance upsets and particularly the worsening foreign economic conditions/, the Latin American countries maintained their relatively quick growth rate, though at a lower level. And as economic growth is very susceptible to imports with regard to both the structure and the growth itself, this flexibility of the economic policy led infallibly to the fact that in consequence of the effects exerted by the world market and of the internal contradictions, and as a result of the interaction between internal and external factors, Latin America found itself in a very critical economic situation in the new decade.

#### Some characteristics of the crisis of the 1980s

The growth rate of the Latin American economy was relatively high in the second half of the 1970s /though, in comparison with the previous growth rate, which could be impressive anywhere in the world, there was a certain decline/. The GDP grew on the average at an annual

rate of 7.1 % between 1970 and 1974, and at a rate of 6.2 % in 1979 and 1980. The economic development slowed down suddenly in 1981 /1.5 %/, and then there was a recession in 1982 and 1983 /-1.0 % and - 3.3 %/. As a result of this, there was a recession of 2.8 % in the Latin American economy as a whole between 1981 and 1983.<sup>10</sup> The per capita value of the GDP fell even more quickly: compared with the 1,007 U.S. dollars in 1980, it was only 911 U.S. dollars, i.e. it dropped by 9.5 %.<sup>11</sup> With the exception of Panama and the Dominican Republic,<sup>12</sup> there was at least one year in the 80s for each Latin American country when the GDP decreased; the gravest decline was in Bolivia /the accumulated growth rate of the 80s was -15.7 %/, in El Salvador /-15.4 %/, in Uruguay /-13.9 %/, in Costa Rica /-13.4 %/, in Chile /-9.9 %/ and in Argentina /-9 %/.

But if we analyze the evolution of the per capita value of the GDP in the 1980s, we get more critical results because there was at least one year for each country when the growth rate was negative, moreover, in the majority of these countries there was no year when the growth rate was positive. There are five countries /Bolivia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Peru, Uruguay/ where the accumulated growth rate was less than -15 %.<sup>13</sup>

But the economy of the Latin American countries became well known to international public opinion not so much because of the decrease of the GDP as because of their international indebtedness. It is well known that the Latin American continent on the whole and almost each particular country it became very indebted in recent years, moreover, some countries had to ask for a rescheduling of their debts.

The external debt of the continent amounted "only" to 89 thousand million U.S. dollars in 1975 /it was the equivalent of 33.8 % of the GDP and of 254 % of the volume of export/, and in 1983 it amounted already to 310 thousand million U.S. dollars /i.e. 93 % of the GDP and 354 % of the volume of exports/.<sup>34</sup> Although these two dimensions can hardly be compared, it is justified to say that this grave indebtedness is the consequence and, at the same time, even the cause of the economic crisis of the Latin American countries. But we must also remember that the inclination to indebtedness is almost a historical determinant of the economy of the Latin American countries, but it is true that these economies were rarely in such a grave situation.

To start with, we will analyze only numerically the financial situation of the Latin American countries, but we have to point out that not only the degree of indebtedness is important, but the conditions of repayment of the debts as well. As it imposes heavy burdens on the economy, the repayment of interest considerably limited the importation possibilities of this continent which depends so much on imports with regard to both structure and growth. The ratio of the repaid interest alone to the income resulting from exports is very high and is growing quickly: instead of 12.4 % in 1977, it was 35 % in 1983.<sup>15</sup> The structure of the debts was also unfavourable because in 1975 the portion of the loans expiring within 10 years was only 11 %, while in 1982 it was already 34 %.<sup>16</sup> But it appears from the data about indebtedness and debt services that Latin America is in a difficult economic situation.

The figures also show that there was a qualitative change in the indebtedness of Latin America. This qualitative change is even more evident if we point out that Latin America has for some years been in a situation where the credits granted do not serve the economic growth of the region any longer /as they served it previously within certain limits/, but are mainly used to counterbalance the losses resulting from the unfavourable evolution of international prices<sup>17</sup>, to repay the previous loans, to import consumer goods and not to modernize the economy and to carry out certain tasks related to the development of the economy.

The internal equilibrium disturbances of the Latin American countries are expressed by an internationally infamous index. Inflation been inseparable from their economies for a very long time, but there is hardly a precedent for a higher interest rate than in the 1980s /the price-index of consumer goods was 54,1 % in 1979, 52,8 % in 1980, 60,8 % in 1981, 103.4 % in 1983, and 85,6 % in 1982/.<sup>18</sup> We can also say that the high inflation rate is in close connection with both the international economic tendencies and the internal structural problems of the Latin American countries, and that it was and continues to be inseparable from the economic crises of the Latin American countries.

## 2. The socio-economic structure and its contradictions

It appears from the foregoing that the critical situation of the economy of Latin America cannot be explained only by factors related to the business cycles. This conclusion is supported by the insufficient reactivity of Latin America's economic policy as well as by its subordination and structural distortion. The contradictions and equilibrium disturbances resulting from these facts proved to be lasting, so we can use the term "structural crisis" for this region. This term means in the first approach a prolonged crisis of the production relations.

Of course, we have to justify the use of the term "structural crisis" for the very reason that it is often utilized in the literature, but with very different contents and validities in time and space. In order to justify the grounds of the term "structural crisis", it is necessary to make a short review of the system of production relations in Latin America and of their contradictions.

### 2.1. Major features of the production relations

The socio-economic conditions of the Latin American countries are characterized by the existence of several sectors, and in a double sense. The countries of Latin America have multisectorial economies, i.e. several production relations exist at the same time on the one hand, and each sector is heterogeneous on the other hand. In order to illustrate this point, we should point out the coexistence of capitalist and non-capitalist forms /semi-feudal, communal, etc./ and the heterogeneity of the capitalist sector itself /not only the monopoly

capital and the state capital sectors should be distinguished but also the developed and the less developed capitalist forms such as manufactures and handicraft industries/; the non-capitalist sector is also diverse /e.g. the Indian "comunidades" can be divided into at least 3 characteristic groups, and the "traditional" agricultural relations also have several types/. But not only the horizontal system of the social forms of production and the coexistence of these forms should be mentioned. In order to describe the whole socio-economic system of Latin America, we have to examine whether there are subordinations between these heterogeneous forms, whether there is a dominant socio-economic form which determines all the others, i.e. we have to find the vertical system in the economic structure of the countries of Latin America.

As a matter of fact, it follows already from the horizontal system of the production relations in Latin America that capital is the most important element of this system. This statement can be supported by the historical process of the development of the capitalist system in Latin America, i.e. by colonization. The simplest way to demonstrate this process which, after all, is in connection with the development of the capitalist world economy and with the expansion of capital, is by the historical development of the different national economies.

In the development of the capitalist world economy, agriculture was subordinated to capital in Latin America. This subordination manifested itself first of all in the evolution of a modern form of landed property corresponding to the nature of capital. Agriculture became in general a producer of commodities. In this respect, the most typical process was the development of the latifundia producing for the world market, and this process took place in a way similar to the colonial economies. But the farms of the relatively considerable patriarchal sectors also were more and more involved in the exchange of commodities which is based on the social division of labour, and thus the traditional non-capitalist social forms of production broke up in this sector too.

The features of the capitalist transformation of agriculture in Latin America can be summarized as follows: the traditional forms came or are coming to an end, but these disappearing /pre-capitalist/ relations often reproduce themselves and become part of the more advanced capitalist relations. These more advanced capitalist relations also include the traditional pre-capitalist relations in their systems of exploitation.

Thus, capital subordinated to itself agriculture, or more exactly the majority of the producers. But this subordination has different levels. It includes many different forms from formal subordination to commercial and usury capital to the real subordination of labour in the capitalist production. This rule of capital is, however, interoven by a net of open or disguised pre-capitalist relations. Many small farms depend on the its estate owners of latifundia not only in a personal but also in an economic respect /e.g. as on buyers or owners of money/. In the latter case, the owners of latifundia can generally rep-

resent/ the commercial and usury capital also, i.e. the owners of money in general. Consequently, this dependence is not only of a precapitalistic character, but it manifests also capitalist dependence. On the other hand, the reproduction of the precapitalist relations is connected with the development which is based on the monopoly of the land in private ownership, i.e. with the Prussian way of capitalization. The preservation of the monopoly of landed private property means already in itself the survival of the pre-capitalist conditions which hinder the capitalist development of the forces of production through the absolute rent.

It follows from this that the agricultural development is the joint result of several contradictions. The agriculture is characterized by the competition of the farms, the concentration and centralization of the land, the concentration of the production in the hands of a minority, the dissolution of the peasantry, the pushing of the majority into the proletariat and their exploitation by a minority directly or through the commercial or usury capital; this means that the contradictions characterizing first of all the capitalist economic system, and the commodity production can also be found in the agriculture of Latin America, but in addition to these conditions, the traditional conditions also survive. Consequently the smallscale producers and these who have to cover their costs from their own production are forced to follow a "capitalist way" of farming.

The development of the industrial capital had and continues to have two typical ways. The first is the natural way of the development of industry and of the social division of labour, the second is the inorganic way, i.e. the direct creation of highly concentrated industrial plants. The most elementary sign of the natural development is the separation of the agricultural and the industrial production. In villages areas, the separation of the peasant-craftsmen /kustars/ goes on more and more intensively. They are important in those places where the dissolution of the natural farms has not yet found itself face to face with the competition of the big industries. The local peasant industry is particularly important in the countries inhabited by Indians. It is worth mentioning the local peasant industries of spinning and weaving in Mexico, Guatemala and Peru, the traditional pottery, basketweaving, leather and metal crafts in Bolivia, Paraguay, Costa Rica and Honduras /spinning-weaving, leather industry, manufacture of ceramics/ and the "sideline" industrial activity<sup>20</sup> of the peasant communities.

As to the factories developing in the cities in a natural way, they had to face a competition due to the conflict of the natural and inorganic ways of development, as well as to the imported products. Some of these factories could not stand the competition and got ruined. The others, however, were driven to the peripheries and produce for a small market. Their possibilities of accumulation are very limited, therefore, if they want to survive /in spite of a very intensive exploitation of the labour force and of the means of production they live on a very low level/, they are forced to pursue a ruthless exploitation, but their chance to develop remains minimal.

The medium and large-scale industrial factories are characterized by developed capitalist relations. But the small-scale industries are also compelled to follow a "capitalist way" because they have to face the economic contradictions determined by the rule of capital. The impoverishment, decline and sinking of the small-scale manufactures shows that neither these manufactures could avoid the impact of the capitalist relations. The majority of the factories owned by national capitalists depend on international capital.

It is well-known that the development and generalization of the social rule of monopoly capital had two fundamental historic ways. The first way is the natural development of capital /i.e. development by accumulation/, and the second, inorganic, way is the penetration of the functioning monopoly capital into the small-scale industry from outside. In the latter case, the functioning monopoly capital maintains the existing relations and bases its rule on them.

The natural development shows a historical analogy with the development and spread of capital itself. This process is of little interest to us, as it is of secondary importance in the underdeveloped countries /such as those of Latin America/.

The inorganic development also has its historical analogy. The developed monopoly capital extends its influence on the nonmonopolized activity just as capital, or to be more precise, the commercial capital penetrated into the non-capitalist sector of the social production from outside, and extended its influence on the handicraft industry too. It is well known that Marx did not consider this penetration of the commercial capital into the production as a really revolutionary way, even if this form was the most general one.<sup>21</sup>

By penetrating into the backward economies, capital, and especially monopoly capital was in a position, owing to its monopoly, to extend its influence to these economies without a radical change in the situation of the forces of production, although it broke up the traditional, pre-capitalist relations, at least to the extent required by its interests. Capital drew the economic units into its system of exploitation without creating possibilities for the forces of production to develop and hindered even by force the formation of the special conditions of capitalist transformation. Capital was able to build the pre-capitalist labour relations into its own relations of exploitation, and thus obtained the source of surplus value, but did not promote, or at least restrained, the polarization of the market, i.e. the separation of producers and the means of production, which is an indispensable condition of the capitalist economy. This is, however, only one aspect of the inorganic way of development.

This penetration of capital is much greater than can be seen from the unchanged legal forms of ownership relations. The production relations of the enterprises being in a state of dependence undergo really deep changes because the owners of these enterprises are only formally the exclusive owners of the means of production, the exclusive beneficiaries of the surplus-value produced by the workers and the

exclusive commanders of the activities of the enterprise. In reality, a great part of the property rights are exercised by the concern.<sup>22</sup> Consequently, the economy can be almost totally monopolized with a relatively small investment of capital. This is also a characteristic of the economies of Latin America because, as we have seen, foreign capital constitutes only 10-15 % of all capital, and in spite of this, the foreign capital keeps the key positions, therefore, the dependence on foreign capital is one of the gravest burdens on the economies of Latin America.

Another consequence of the penetration of capital is that it hinders the accumulation of finance capital. As the proprietor of the means of production, capital disposes freely of the surplus-value on the basis of the inviolability of private property. In the stage of the modern exportation of capital, the capital invested in the colonies, generally as a subsidiary of a monopoly /monopolist group/ situated in the mother country, did not capitalize the surplus value in the country where it was produced, but generally in the mother country. Owing to this fact, the trend of capital accumulation manifests itself as a special polarization of the capitalist world economy: the capitalists of the "colonizer countries" soon became rich, and the producers in the colonies soon became poor. This contradiction manifests itself in the dualism of the capitalist world economy, i.e. in the conflict of development and "backwardness".<sup>23</sup> In the background of this contradiction we can find the international contradiction between capital and labour, which is the fundamental contradiction of our time.

The socio-economic structure of Latin America presents, therefore, the following features:

1. There are hierarchic relations between the heterogeneous relations of production: capitalist production became predominant in Latin America, and capitalist relations determine the socio-economic relations on the whole. This definition has, however, a double character: labour has been both really /this is the most important thing/ and formally subordinated. This last aspect means that the small farms which depend on the traditional latifundia are in a special double dependence: they depend on the owner of the capital and on the market of their own products, but they depend also on the landowner. In most cases, however, neither the latifundias are independent, they depend on the finance capital, and especially on foreign capital. The small farms, peasant communities undergo a transformation of a capitalist character, although in a very contradictory way, as we have seen. The manufacturing worksteps established on the big estates indicate also the progress of capitalist development. The dependence of the industry manifests itself in the special system of dependence on foreign industrial and finance capital. As finance capitalists, the local oligarchy, who are linked with the foreign capital, also contribute to this, and stand at the top of the pyramid. In the final analysis, the economy of Latin America depends on monopoly capital.

2. Naturally, the above-mentioned double subordination also hides a special hierarchy because the formal subordination means that the capitalist development is not sufficient and is based on the fact that the economies of the countries of Latin America are not yet totally ruled by the relations of the exchange of goods of a developed national market. In most cases, this is due to the underdeveloped forms of capital. Some farms sell products on the international market independently from the national market, i.e. this disintegrated system also is characterized by the contradiction of the external and internal markets. The above-mentioned hierarchy of the production relations and the special historical process of its evolution means that the socio-economic relations in Latin America fulfil the criteria of "economic backwardness" or those of a "peripheral capitalism".

Consequently : it is proved both historically and structurally that the countries of Latin America depend unilaterally on foreign imperialist monopoly capital, and that this dependence is direct because the key positions of the Latin American economies are in the hands of foreign capital. The socio-economic structure of the countries of Latin America is also characterized by a special duality: capital subordinated to itself the economic sectors in a double /formal and real/ way. Consequently, this dualism manifests itself in the dualism of the capitalist and precapitalist sectors, in that of the economic functions, in the great differences between the level of development of the forces of production, in the insufficiency of the sectorial links, i.e. in the disintegration of the economy. This duality does not exclude, however, the heterogeneity of the production relations, as there are various sectors in double subordination, but we have also seen that the rule of capital can be found in almost all sectors in one form or another. Consequently, it is the capitalist relations that determine the economic structure of the countries of Latin America as a whole, and the parts /the different sectors/ depend on these relations and are transformed according to the interests of capital /e.g. they become producers of goods/. This transformation can be carried out only because of the fact that all elements of the society and of the economy are subordinated to capital. At the same time, capital did not only integrate, but also disintegrated the countries of Latin America, and involved them in the imperialist system as dependent economies. That is why the relations of these economies form an organic whole in a special way which characterizes the "backward dependent" economies under the rule of capital.

## 2.2 Contradictions of the socio-economic structure: "structural" crisis in Latin America

Because of these features, the economic system of Latin America is characterized by several economic contradictions which are in correlation and interaction: the first is the fundamental contradiction of capitalism; two further contradictions of imperialism are: that of the social production and capitalist appropriation and that of the economic units in and out of cartels; further contradictions are: the contradiction between the operations of finance capital and of free competition, and the contradiction between the social and individual character of labour,



which is the fundamental contradiction of the simple productions of commodities.

Because of their hierarchical structure, these contradictions are interlinked in the following connection: the /capitalist/ development is hindered most of all by two characteristic factors: by the monopoly of the private landed ownership and by the rule of foreign monopoly capital. As we have seen, the owners of latifundia become monopoly capitalists, or more precisely, finance capitalists, while the primitive forms of capital /e.g. usury capital/ keep the small farms in dependence. It is a characteristic feature that the foreign capital and the oligarchy are economically linked together, and, therefore, the unsatisfactory development of the capitalist relations and the aggravation of the capitalist contradictions result, in reality, from the rule of monopoly capital and of the latifundia.

These socio-economic contradictions manifest themselves in lasting imbalances, therefore, the economic structure of Latin America is characterized by grave contradictions. The long-lasting imbalances manifest themselves in the chronic under-utilization of the capacities and in unemployment, or they contribute to the aggravation of these phenomena. There is a relative surplus of capital and a relative surplus of population /but at the same time there is also a lack of capital and labour shortage/, i.e. the factors of production, or means of production cannot become capital, and the workers cannot sell their labour. This indicates that, as a determinant relation of the production relations, capital is unable to operate to a certain extent, i.e. the socio-economic structure of Latin America is characterized by a "structural" crisis. By the turn of the 1950s and 1960s, these contradictions became so deep that they could be characterized as "structural crisis", so much the more that by this time the general consequence of the social crisis was recognized and formulated all over the continent. The "structural crisis" means at the same time that the development of the forces of production is limited by the socio-economic structure through the market conditions which reflect the contradictions of the antagonistic relations of production and of distribution. These are the following:

1. The accumulation of capital provoked a contradiction between the rich and the poor /capital and labour/ in Latin America too. The very extreme distribution of the national income is also bound up with this contradiction. This extreme distribution restrains in itself the market: it makes it difficult to increase production because it is an obstacle to mass production.

2. Because of the special dual and also insufficient rule of capital, the miserable situation and under-consumption of the small agricultural producers /the self-supporting elements of the system/ do not allow the agriculture to develop and impede the small producers in becoming mass consumers of industrial products. It results from this system that the full polarization of the social conditions in the villages will also be slowed down, thus modern economic relations cannot develop in satisfactory manner.

3. The backward agricultural conditions lead to permanent crises in the majority of the Latin American economies because in these economies which are characterized by capitalist exchange relations the very slow and limited development of one branch causes a lasting disequilibrium and leads, therefore to a worsening of the circumstances of life. The agricultural crisis in Latin America is the consequence of several contradictions. These are the following: the periodic crisis of over-production of the sectors producing for exportation and the crisis of under-production of the sectors producing for the home market.

4. The survival of the monopoly of the private ownership of the land also contributes to the restriction of the market by means of the rent, and hampers the development of the agricultural forces of production. In the latifundia also, there are under-utilized capacities which enables the "pre-capitalist" forms to resuscitate. Of course, this is an additional cause of the restriction of the home market.

5. The high degree of concentration of capital also restrains the market. The monopoly capital restricted the market not only by withdrawing a part of the national income from the country /in forms of profits of interests/, but also by modifying the distribution system of the surplus value in its favour through the above-mentioned internal system of dependence, and thus deprives the non-monopolized capital from its sources of accumulation.

6. The market is also restricted by the hidden draining of the incomes by foreign capital, which results from the inequalities of the international economic relations.

All these contradictions lead to long-lasting balance upsets /such as inflation, deficit in the balance of foreign trade, indebtedness, etc./, which go together with the economic development of the countries of Latin America not only in periods of crisis, but also in periods of prosperity. All this leads to market restrictions which limit the realization of capital on the one hand, and result from the capital relations themselves on the other hand.

The special characteristic of this "structural crisis" is that it reflects the limits of the mechanism which result from the special dualism of the rule of capital. These limits, or more precisely, these contradictions manifest themselves so much the more as the dualistic structure of Latin America /and that of the developing countries in general/ is not a real dualistic structure because the two poles do not necessarily presuppose each other either socially or economically, but the dualism of the economic relations is the sign of a special social contradiction: the contradiction of the national and international /foreign/ imperialism is the result of a special and inevitable historical development. Otherwise, the contradictions between the developed and primitive forms of capital, between the dependence on and exploitation by the imperialist finance capital, and the contradictions related to the fundamental contradiction of capitalism contribute together to the chronic "structural crisis" or the social form of production /structure of production/ in Latin America. A further

feature of this "structural crisis" is that its historical frames and conditions are given by the general crisis of capitalism /this feature manifests itself in a number of measures - e.g. in the agrarian reform- of the bourgeoisie, which led to heterogeneous results because the bourgeoisie was afraid of losing its power/.

The deepening contradictions of the socio-economic system of Latin America undermine this system as a whole. The development of the forces of production is hindered first of all by foreign monopoly capital and by the archaic agrarian relations. These socio-economic contradictions manifested themselves in the social battles of Latin America as well. Consequently, it follows not only from the socio-economic structure, but also from the major trend of the social battles that the solution of democratic tasks /democratic revolution/ is today a topical question in Latin America. This fight can turn into a socialist revolution in case of appropriate internal and external conditions. Of course, this conclusion does not mean that the absolute limits of the activity of capital should have already been created in Latin America, as the fundamental contradiction of capitalist production also promotes the development of the sources of production, therefore the "production of crisis" can be interpreted correctly only as a process, particularly, if capital is able to create a new form of motion for the contradictions which hamper its operation. We can find some examples in the development of Latin America in the last two decades.

To sum up the disharmony between the forces of production and the production relations could not be eliminated either by the structural changes of the 60s, or by the fast economic boom of the 60s and 70s. This disharmony is well illustrated by the fact that the main social contradictions of the Latin American economy did not disappear in the period of prosperity either. An obvious sign of this is that the unemployment and the under-utilization of capacities are increasing, i.e. the subjective and objective conditions of the production are linked together in the process of production only to a limited extent, otherwise, the social aspect of a part of these conditions cannot manifest itself due to the system of production relations. This indicates without doubt that the given form of social production in Latin America is in a longlasting "structural crisis". This situation makes it necessary for society to eliminate the structural relations, to limit the development of the forces of production and social progress. Simplifying the question: society can choose either the democratic, revolutionary, or the reformist, reactionary way of development imposed by the ruling classes.

### 3. Instead of a conclusion

The strategic concepts of the countries of Latin America on the "elimination of the crisis", both the Quito Declaration and the plans of action formulated in that Declaration consider the crisis as a result of factors related to the business cycles, to the situation of the world economy and of the world market.<sup>24</sup> For this reason, these documents consider first of all the change of the international finan-

cial and commercial situation as the key to the solution. Although they were aimed at giving an effective reply to this challenge. Production is mentioned only in connection with assuring a satisfactory supply of agricultural products and increasing the production of energy, and with a more intensive industrialization aimed at making better use of the regional demand and supply, but these documents do not give a real strategy of development of production in this case either, and concentrate on a regional commercial cooperation /balance of the demand and supply, etc./. These documents do not examine and do not analyze the structural factors which must have contributed to the outbreak and the aggravation of the crisis. They failed to do so even in the international context, although they see the main cause of the crisis in Latin America in the unfavourable evolution of international economic relations. As to these relations, the documents refer at least to some qualitative factors, but as to the internal relations, they do not.

It is hoped that this analysis will have pointed out clearly that the countries of Latin America cannot give an effective reply to the challenge if they do not search the major components of the strategy of development in the domain of production and in the system of social production relations /including international production relations/. Naturally, we have to admit that the claims and requirements formulated in these two documents /such as the reform of the international commercial and monetary system/ are justified, but they cannot be considered sufficient, especially with respect to the long-term development.

The strategy of development formulated in these documents is also a step backward as compared to the previous conceptions of development for the 1980s.<sup>25</sup> Naturally, this attitude is understandable from a certain point of view: the countries of Latin America expect these conceptions to solve their vital financial and commercial problems as soon as possible. It seems, therefore, that the issues of short-term development push into the background those of the long-term strategy of development which are expected to create more stable and efficient conceptions because they would be able to change the structural conditions of the economic development which hamper economic progress even now. A change in the structural conditions would however be, indispensable because Latin America needs a solution not only to problems related to the business cycles, but also to the "structural crisis" which aggravates the crisis related to the business cycles.

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2. Balance preliminar de la Economía latinoamericana durante 1983. Published in: El Mercado de Valores, Año XLIV.2. January 9, 1984. p.33
3. P. Boyko follows a similar method in his work entitled: América Latina: expansión del imperialismo y crisis de la vía capitalista de desarrollo /Editorial Progreso, Moscú, 1977./
4. As we have already mentioned: the nature of Latin America's participation in the international division of labour has not changed essentially, this continent can be considered as the raw material supplier of the centre, in the future too, although the export structure of several more developed Latin American countries has undergone relatively important changes, The share of the manufactured products in the exports of Latin America amounted to 10 % in 1965 and it was no more than 18 % even in 1973. In the meantime, their share did not become more important. In the period between 1976-1979 it amounted on the average to 19,7 %/. The more developed countries /Argentina, Brazil, Mexico/ supplied 80 % of the export of manufactured goods from the Latin American region. /Source: UN and BID statistics/.
5. M.Bunegina: Ekonomicheskie problemy latino-amerikanskogo kontinenta /MEIMO 1977. No. 6. pp. 40-52./.
6. Principles and methodological points of view on the basis of Tibor Erdős study: Prices explosion and economic crisis /Külgazdaság, 1977. No. 6./.
7. Notas sobre la economía y el desarrollo de América Latina No. 286/287, CEPAL, January 1979. p.8. It is typical that the majority of Latin American countries belonged to the group of countries with a relatively stable price level until 1970 /rate of inflation below 5 %/, but in the 70s 7-15 countries of this region fell into the group with the highest rate of inflation /over 15 %/. /BID: Annual report, 1978 Washington D.C. p.93./

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11. Ibidem p.68. /Data in U.S. dollars, value 1970./
12. Although our study does not include the economic development of Cuba, it should be mentioned that this country can be considered as an exception too, as its accumulated growth rate amounted to 22,6 % in the 80s. /Ibidem/.
13. Ibidem, p.68.
14. La crisis económica de America Latina y sus causas. El Mercado de Valores, Año XLIV. Num. 25. June 18 1984. p.627.
15. Enrique V. Iglesias: La evolución económica de América Latina en 1983. Comercio Exterior, Vol. 34. Num.2. Mexico, February, 1984. pp. 185-200.
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17. In 1983, the level of the terms of trade amounted to 98 % compared with 1970, and to 77 % in 1977. /Source: as note No.5./. After 1980, the terms of trade decreased yearly by about 7 % /Source: as note No. 14/.
18. The rate of inflation was especially high in some countries known by the literature as countries with a traditionally high rate of inflation /e.g. 209,7 % in Argentina in 1982, 401,6 % in 1983, the corresponding rates for Bolivia: 296,5 % and 249 %, for Brazil: 101,8 % and 175,2 % for Mexico: 98,8 % and 91,9 % for Peru: 72,9 % and 124,7 %/. Source: as note No. 15/
19. Imre Marton considers this double heterogeneity as a general feature of the so-called peripheral economies. See in details by Marton: Features of the evolution of classes in the multisectorial societies of the so-called third world. Magyar Filozófiai Szemle, 1976/1 pp. 60-62.
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21. Marx: Capital 3rd volume, MEM 25th volume, Kossuth Publishers, Budapest, p.315.

22. Szabó Katalin: The Challenge of Big Enterprises. New Ways in the Concentration of Capital, Kossuth Publishers, Budapest, 1974.pp. 185-189.
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According to this conception, the creation of the conditions of an "equitable, dynamic and autonomous development" can ensure the maintenance of a quick economic growth in Latin America.





REGIONAL POWER CENTRES IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD  
- OF REPUBLIC SOUTH AFRICA AS A SPECIAL CASE

by Erika Fodor, researcher, Institute for  
International Relations, Budapest

Numerous theoretical writings deal with the present phenomenon in the developing world, namely that after gaining some economic or political ground for a longer or shorter time certain developing countries start to play an important role in a given region i.e. analyzing a given period it can be said that they rise to the status of middle power while others, even those which used to be middle powers, disappear or fall behind.

Naturally, this is not a new phenomenon, it's a consequence of the uneven development of world history. We regard the gaining of ground by the regional and sub-regional powers in the developing world as a new phenomenon for several reasons. It can be explained by the fact that the countries which have won their independence in colonial territories developing on the periphery of world capitalism define their so-called own "national interests" more and more firmly. Furthermore, there has been and is a considerable differentiation among the liberated countries as a consequence of which the various developing countries start to play different roles in the international economic and political division of labour. It is obvious at the same time that the historically determined structural backwardness, underdevelopment cannot be eliminated in a short time, i.e. even developing countries being in the most favourable economic position do not have a chance to join the "super grand" of world politics and world economy, at best they can become "petit super grand".

There are, however, regional powers with a longer past of 100-200 years which constituted sub-link in the centre-periphery chain structure of the capitalist world economy already at the beginning of world capitalism or joined it and remaining stuck in that system developed and became a dominating state in a given region /e.g. Republic of South Africa, Brazil/. The question is how the formation and differentiation of the group of developing countries modified the system of relations, the relation of dependency of the previous regional powers, i.e. what are the common and different features of the previous - what I call - "traditional" regional powers and the developing middle powers gaining ground or regional middle powers.

In one of his writings Johan Galtung defines the relation of dependency I interpret as traditional regional in the following way. He calls dependency in world economy, world politics a bridgehead or sub-centre when the middle power holds the "function of a sub-imperialist system" and depends on the centre but the periphery of peripheries also depend

on it, and this means that this link is in a so-called privileged relation of dependency. Due to this relation it seems as if there were a looser relation between the centre and the periphery in this chain of dependency although the intermediary privileged sub-sectres "enmesh" the periphery thus making the relation of dependency even stronger.<sup>1</sup> Such a country holding the function of a sub-imperialist system is also the Republic of South Africa, the main objective of which is consequently to hold onto its regional hegemony and thus continuously represent and guarantee imperialist interests in the region.

From the mid-seventies this traditional function has, however, encountered numerous difficulties and as is known, as a result of developments in the region of southern Africa the balance of forces has changed considerably. Despite all these changes the Republic of South Africa has kept its regional power character although its previous external-regional, global and internal conditions have obviously changed. As to the traditional regional middle power status of the Republic of South Africa and its survival there is a dual tendency of change and continuity. This dual tendency shows on the one hand that the Republic of South Africa can restabilize its hegemonistic role even under these changing regional circumstances and that it is forced to adjust to a certain extent on the other.

Numerous studies deal with the "missed opportunity" Republic of South Africa, namely the fact that after the collapse of the Portuguese empire in Southern Africa the gap made by the withdrawal of the Portuguese should have been filled in by the Republic of South Africa because from the economic point of view Angola and Mozambique were strongly linked to the South African economy and it was the presence of the Portuguese themselves who prevented Republic of South Africa from gaining control over the economies of these two territories.<sup>2</sup> Today, a few years after the access of the two countries to independence, there is again a necessity to settle regional economic relations but there are many obstacles to it. The main one is the increased military expansionism of the Republic of South Africa which in the interest of holding the function of a sub-imperialist system has in recent years added to obstacles hindering economic expansionism. In the meantime it could destabilize the two countries hostile to it by nature of their ideology and policy, i.e. with its policy of confrontation has rendered it difficult to make up for the break in the economic relations.

Today not only Angola and Mozambique would need a normal economic relation with the Republic of South Africa, but South African interests also demand that the country strengthen its existing economic relations and that it think over this policy in order to keep economic control over the countries of socialist orientation in the region. South African economic reviews consider it a pressing matter, stressing that steps should be taken urgently before the US and Western Europe get their clutches on all good business in the two countries.<sup>3</sup> Consequently, these years have been characterized by military expansionism, but recently the Republic of South Africa has set itself the goal of extending economic expansionism also to areas where previously it had considered military intervention and the use of constant military threat sufficient.

What changes in the region and the modification of which regional conditions have forced the Republic of South Africa to introduce an internal "social reform" and initiate a dialogue with the countries of socialist orientation in the region despite its anticommunist ideology?

The hegemony of capitalist interests in the region has ceased and a new alternative has risen before the development of the society. The direct military and economic presence of the socialist world in the region has to be considered a fact. The Republic of South Africa has to reckon not only with the presence of the states of socialist orientation, but also their permanent indirect effect on internal politics. This external and internal movement has made the South African government set about the reform of its apartheid policy. Internal transformation at the same time has an effect also on the ability of the Republic of South Africa as a sub-imperialist power to represent imperialist interests. This explains the great efforts US diplomacy has made to help the South African government.

In South Africa the protection of Western interests is based mainly on economic interests, the although asymmetric mutual dependency which means the need of the West for South African mineral resources, but of course with a great degree of simplification as the complex strategic /geopolitical, military, etc./ system of interests strengthening economic interests could be enumerated here. With the development of socialist orientation appearing in Southern Africa and the military presence of the world system the West saw this system of interests threatened. This is why the southern African crisis as a regional crisis has so quickly become one of the global problems and also a factor in Soviet-US relations.<sup>4</sup>

Today it can be said also that the change in the South Africa policy of the US has been followed, although not totally and in the same way, by the policy of the Western European governments. The Carter administration criticized South African apartheid from the point of view of human rights, while dinging to its economic and military interests. The Reagan administration has given its explicit support to the present South African regime and present US policy is characterized by this also today.

A new phenomenon is that the Western European governments, although very carefully and in a moderate way, follow the US with the aim to put an end to South Africa's isolation. In summer 1984 this conditional and moderate but existing support was well proved by Botha's visit to eight Western European countries. Not only regional conditions have changed but also global interests have articulated and they have a direct or indirect effect on the function held by South Africa as a sub-imperialist system, on its operation and conditions. The definition of western interests strengthens the maintenance of the chain of dependency, consequently the Republic of South Africa is under pressure as it is not allowed to further risk western interests by maintaining the apartheid system beyond the period that is absolutely essential.

To hold the function of the South African sub-imperialist system it is not absolutely necessary to maintain the apartheid political system. Apartheid is a product of South Africa's specific historical development to be conceived mainly in economic dimensions. Putting it into very short and simplified terms it can be explained by the contradiction of the meeting point of the feudal and capitalist modes of production, specific to the region and its "settlement".<sup>8</sup> Today the apartheid political-economic system is based on an economic, exploitation mechanism which would reproduce the previous exploitation mechanism even if racial discrimination were legally abolished, but disproportions within the Republic of South Africa, e.g. the differing level of development in the various regions, the differences in the living standard in urban and rural areas, etc. would also become obvious. These imbalances have always existed but the policy of apartheid and the repressive system have prevented their contradictions from becoming obvious. Consequently, the abolition of South African apartheid would need a long preparatory stage when a more proportionately developed economy should be established, e.g. through the structural change of the black labour force, the differentiated improvement of the living standard of the black, etc. This change would need not only a long time but also a heavy expenditure. Although the internal resources are considerable, without foreign assistance the Republic of South Africa could not maintain its position of military strength and continue its policy striving for closer cooperation with NATO and also the above change in the economy, as to do it alone would mean an extremely heavy burden. Foreign assistance is, however, limited due to apartheid itself. With the change in its South Africa policy the intention of the US has been to break this "vicious circle". "The aim of the United States is to put an end to South Africa's pariah status in the world and assign to it an important, legitimate role corresponding to its "regional power position",<sup>5</sup> pointed out Chester A. Crocker after stating that the United State was determined to "gain absolute priority and prevent all forms of Soviet penetration",<sup>6</sup> and ready to guarantee foreign assistance necessary or a slow transformation if South Africa accepts the US plan.

According to US plans through the gradual abolition of apartheid, racial discrimination, South Africa's role to transmit sub-imperialist interests would be strengthened. If we analyze this expected process from the point of view of dependency a slight change can be seen.

Earlier the Republic of South Africa represented imperialist interests in the region in conformity with British and its own interests. Today the bonds of dependency have changed, it is tied up most strongly with the United States since the guarantees to help to maintain the previous regional power position during the period of the dismantling of apartheid. This change in dependency, however, has not changed considerably the economic inter-dependency between the West and the Republic of South Africa. Naturally, it has to be added, that this inter-dependency is to be seen as a function of the existing sub-imperialist power chain, i.e. it is asymmetrical from the outset. Nevertheless, it can be said that this economic inter-dependency changes in favour of the Republic of South Africa because present technological development needs mineral resources the monopoly supplier of which in western re-

lations is the Republic of South Africa.<sup>7</sup> What can be expected in the future, how will the regional power position of the Republic of South Africa be modified?

The centre-sub-centre relation will be tighter so that the sub-centre can again "enmesh" the peripheries. This would be, however, a simplified model without adding that the evolution of relations within the model does not take place in a homogeneous environment, i.e. this evolution can be hindered by numerous factors.

One factor is that the US policy itself is not clearcut as it is affected and forced to be modified by several elements. A reason for US political tactics can be e.g. that the important group of black representatives is firmly against and attacks the Reagan administrations's South Africa policy and mainly its stating that the time has not yet come to establish a black majority government in the Republic of South Africa, and that until that time the US gives help merely to create a so-called "multi-racial democracy" under white control.

Also the centres, i.e. the western powers have different opinions about how to settle the South African crisis. In recent years, however, these differences have seemed to be smaller. Here we have in mind Botha's 1984 Europe tour. We think that the overwhelming US influence and the increased intermediary role have promoted a change also in the South Africa policy of Western Europe. Naturally, it has been welcomed by the Republic of South Africa because South African whites would need a multilateral guarantee. Summing it all up, the imperialist powers seem to have created a better coordination of the South African matter and it seems to be sufficient to bring about the changes in South Africa absolutely necessary to retain the country's regional power status under the given circumstances. A more distant goal, namely to convert the Republic of South Africa into a full member of the world economy, is a bit contradictory. According to the interests of the imperialist great powers full membership is nothings other than to keep the regional power position and continue to hold the function of a sub-imperialist system. In our view, however, the Republic of South Africa whose relations will be exempt from international isolation due to apartheid, after a certain while will wish to free itself of this role.

#### The dependency of the capitalist world on South African raw materials

It is well known that South Africa is rich in raw materials and its geopolitical value became even more important in the light of the events of the '70s. Very often a parallel is drawn between the issue of the southern African region and the Gulf region or the Middle East crisis area itself. In its 1980 report the Bureau of Mines of the US Congress e.g. calls South Africa the "Gulf region of mineral resources", the unstable position of which is more dangerous for the US than the energy crisis."<sup>8</sup>

According to US estimates the dependency of the western world on raw material imports in 1980 was shown the following figures: USA 21 per cent, Western Europe 80 per cent. Although US dependency on raw material imports is smaller than that of other western regions US strategists pay great attention to regions from which the western world imports the necessary sources of energy and mineral resources.

In view of the fact that the change in the relations with the Republic of South Africa /USA, Western Europe/ has been due mainly to the US interest in having free access to South African strategic raw materials, we shall take a look at this question.

The capitalist world depends on South African strategic raw materials to such an extent that their reserves accumulated over 1-3 years would not be sufficient as alternative sources should e.g. a political change take place in the Republic of South Africa or the international trade embargo demanded by the UN really be imposed. The Reagan administration proclaimed the policy of so-called "constructive commitment" which at that time was not coordinated with its western allies. The essence of this is that the United States commits itself to prevent the economic and political life of South Africa from encountering great difficulties during the slow process of abolishing apartheid. It does so because the smooth industrial-technological development of the western world needs South African minerals. The largest part of the world reserves of the most important raw materials necessary for industrial-technological development can be found in the southern African region, i.e. in the Republic of South Africa. According to the report of the Bureau of Mines in 1979 the import consumption rate of the United States was over 50 per cent in the case of 19 minerals and over 90 per cent in the case of other 10. As to the latter the following figures are to be underlined /dependency on import in per cent/: strontium, titanium, columbium, mica slate 100-110 per cent; manganese 98 per cent; tantalum 96 per cent; cobalt 94 per cent; bauxite 93 per cent; chrome 90 per cent, etc.<sup>9</sup>

The following table shows the dependency of the western world on the most important raw materials:<sup>10</sup>

Raw material	Total consumption		Percentage of import
	EEC	Japan	US
copper	96	83	15
lead	70	70	15
zinc	60	68	59
tin	99	93	85
aluminium	60	100	87
iron ore	59	99	27
nickel	100	100	71
wolfram	100	100	59
phosphate	100	100	-

Date of survey: 1978

The raw materials vital to the western world can be found in other regions, mainly in the Middle East; the Gulf; southern part of Africa, from Zaire to the Cape of Good Hope; Latin America; the Far East and Australia, in countries with a political system friendly or hostile to the West. US politicians have drawn the conclusion that in the future the security guaranteed by the need of these countries in receipts from exports will not be satisfactory as far as the conflicts with these regions are concerned.

In seeing the US well supplied with raw materials the Republic of South Africa plays an extremely important role. And the alternative supplier of these mineral resources could be the Soviet Union. If southern Africa were controlled by the Soviet Union, western experts claim, the Soviet Union would be in a completely monopolistic position as far as some important mineral resources are concerned because together with its own resources it would own the following ratio of the world's raw material reserves: 95 per cent of platinum, 70 per cent of gold, 90 per cent of vanadium, 83 per cent of chrome, 90 per cent of manganese and this would place the West in a situation of absolute dependency.

According to the 1980 survey of the Bureau of Mines the following considerable ratio of raw materials was imported by the US from Republic of South Africa.<sup>11</sup>

Raw material	Domestic production	Import	South Africa's ratio in imports
chrome	8 %	92 %	48 %
platinum	9	91	82
manganese	2	98	87
gold	46	54	67
vanadium	3	97	73

In the following table a comparison is made between the South African and Soviet reserves and production of the 5 most important strategic natural resources: /in % of the world production/.<sup>12</sup>

	Republic of South Africa		Soviet Union		Total	
	reserves	production	reserves	production	reserves	production
chrome	68	34	1	32	69 <sup>x</sup>	66
manganese	37	23	50	43	87	66
vanadium	19	39	74	31	93	70
platinum group	79	46	25	47	98	93
gold	48	58	22	21	70	79

<sup>x</sup>Note: one third of the additional chrome reserves can be found in Zimbabwe

Consequently, it can be said that the US considers free access to the above mineral resources a fundamental question in shaping its future South Africa policy. If adding to this the dependency of other developed capitalist regions /the EEC, Japan/ on South African mineral resources a situation is created in which the capitalist industrial powers help the South African regime to relax apartheid and emerge from international isolation. But it has to be stressed that it is not enough to analyze the dependency on raw materials if we need a global explanation.

The "ice has been broken" in official relations between the capitalist countries and Republic of South Africa. This undoubtedly encourages international relations and this is favourable for the Republic of South Africa, which is not worried even by the fact that the "open western countries", which received Botha in summer 1984 have won the rejection of the majority of developing countries.



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## II. Natural resources

### ALTERNATIVES OF THE ENERGY SECURITY POLICY

by Tibor Palánkai, professor, Karl Marx University  
of Economics, Budapest

The sphere of energy was one of the first fields where the state heavily intervened. This can be explained by the characteristics and the socio-economic and politico-strategic importance of this section of the economy. The energy policies of various countries have always in history been submitted to two basic priorities.

1. To provide production and consumption with energy as cheap as possible in required quantities. An adequate quantity of relatively cheap energy is a precondition for general economic development, for rapid and balanced economic growth, for the population's supply and its standard of living. Energy that is cheap by international standards can play a decisive role in preserving and increasing competitiveness on the world market.

2. The stability of resources and particularly the security of supply have always been emphasized in energy policy. This has equally served the smooth functioning and development of the economy, the supply and the "freedom of choice" of the consumer and military-security interests as well. The importance of a secure supply has especially been increased by the fact that the role of imports in the internal supply has significantly grown in the past decades. This was mainly connected with the switch-over to oil economy.

Inexpensiveness and security of supply have always appeared together in the economic policies and governments have been seeking after an optimum of the two priorities. Naturally the stress laid upon them could periodically change, but one has never been permanently subordinated to the other. It is easy to see that a country is not likely to secure cheap energy for itself without continuous and secure supply. On the other hand security requires relatively cheap energy supply. Economic security and political stability in the broad sense presuppose balanced economic development and growth of the living standards which, in the final analysis, can basically be determined by the cost level of energy supply. Under these circumstances a cheap-energy policy thus means a security policy, and the security of supply forms an integral part of the economic policy stabilizing and optimizing the economic and social development. Non-recognition or violation of the dialectics of priorities in the economic policy of a country can bring about serious distortions and losses.

By the 1970s the conditions for the energy policy had radically changed. The socialist countries, and the CMEA /Comecon/ among them, are in a special position in the world economy from the point of view of energy policy. The CMEA is capable of even long-range self-suf-

iciency in all sources of energy, moreover, in different degrees it has its own export capacities of certain sources. Contrary to the EEC, the CMEA can be regarded as one unit in the field of energy policy and economy and the question of the security of its supply is solved on the community level. With the disintegration of the colonial system and particularly with the aspiration of the developing countries for political and economic independence the security of the developed capitalist countries' supply has become considerably vulnerable. In the previous decades these countries had achieved their strategic-security aims through the expansion of their big oil companies and through their control over the exploitation of oil. Since the 1970s this has become impossible and these countries have been forced to reassess and fundamentally reshape their policy of secure supply because of their heavy dependence on oil import. Other new developments of the 1970s were the significant rise in the costs of energy production and its shift to more expensive sources. This process has equally manifested itself in all regions of the world economy and the so-called energy crisis has become one of the main factors of the world economy's global problems. However, it is important to stress that the cheap-energy policy has not lost its sense, on the contrary, under the altered circumstances greater importance has been attached to it. Naturally the meaning of cheap energy is necessarily different today from what it was 15 years ago, it can be defined in a significantly changed cost and price zone. The dialectic unity of inexpensiveness and security became tighter in the 1970s and that could be achieved only through a conscious and active economic policy that was working with various means.

Shifts of emphasis and change of instruments have become necessary in many fields of energy policies. We will examine the new developments and processes on the different levels of energy policies. The following levels of energy policies and of accommodation to the new situation must be distinguished:

1. Micro-economic sphere
  - a/ producer or enterprise level
  - b/ consumer sphere
2. Macro-economic level
  - a/ energy policy on the national economy level
  - b/ international energy policy

The micro-economic level is the fundamental sphere of energy economy, every energy policy aspiration and move has ultimately its effect here and is realized here. The attainment of the goals of production and saving depends after all on the interest and behaviour of the producer and the consumer. Recent years have shown that it has not always succeeded sufficiently. In several countries the inadequate application of the national economic policies /e.g. excessive and unjustified protection of the consumer from rises in prices/ has ultimately led to the aggravation of difficulties, thus making the realization of the intended goals of energy policy impossible. In recent years the energy policy became effective where and when the interest of the microsphere and the macropolitical ambitions were successfully brought

into harmony. The results attained in the last couple of years in the field of energy saving in various countries of the world originated from a more rational utilization of energy in the plants and enterprises, the introduction of energy-saving technologies and the changed and more economical consumer behaviour. The efforts and the behaviour of the microsphere, sometimes in a positive way have not followed the central policy. Several examples could be quoted for the inventive utilization of local and special energy sources on self-reliant initiative /the utilization of solar energy or biogas in agriculture/ or for the search for specific economical solutions.

In the following we shall deal in detail with the macro-level policies.

#### 1. New ambitions and tendencies of national energy policies

Since the 1970s the national energy policy has been facing new tasks and requirements. The most important new feature of the national energy policies is the considerable broadening of ambitions, areas and instruments of conscious and active behaviour at the central state level, mainly at government level. This relates particularly to capitalist countries. Centralized management and far-reaching regulation of the energy policy had already been characteristic of the socialist countries earlier.

The capitalist state has for long intervened in the power economy. However, in spite of the extensive nationalizations the spontaneous market mechanisms continuously had wide free scope in numerous fields in the majority of the West European countries. The first draft of the common energy policy of the EEC still regarded the free flow of energy products in the Common Market as the most important goal. This policy emphasized the role of market competition and unrestricted flow in securing cheap energy. Whereas in the United States state intervention was traditionally narrow and big private monopolies were entrusted with the tasks of energy supply besides production. Since the mid-1970s, particularly during Carter's presidency the intervention and regulation by the capitalist state have significantly been broadened, and the energy policy has become an important field of the American state. It is necessary to emphasize that the market mechanisms and effects have by no means been pushed into the background but they have undoubtedly become objects and instruments of the conscious intervention in a greater degree. This relates to the experiences of the socialist countries as well. From the point of view of the effectiveness of the energy policies it has been an important element in several countries in recent years that the consumer has been exposed to a greater extent to the effects of the international market through the direct enforcement of the world market price effects. In the successes of the Hungarian energy saving during recent years the compelling force of the world market prices played an undeniable role, which we strove to utilize particularly after 1980. The deregulation of the oil prices in the United States served the assertion of market forces.

In the 1970s the activization of national energy policies and adjustment could be observed in several directions.

1. Efforts for exploration and increased exploitation of domestic energy sources. The vulnerability of the security of the capitalist countries' supply was demonstrated dramatically by the oil dependence and the danger of a wider oil embargo, and one of the logical steps was the search for possibilities of increased self-sufficiency. At the end of 1974 the "new energy policy strategy" of the European Community recommended to its member countries the stabilization /in certain countries even increase/ of coal production and a considerable increase of investments in the sector of nuclear energy.

According to the resolution the share of nuclear power plants in the production of electric energy was expected to grow from 7 to nearly 45 per cent by 1985 /the total capacity of the European Community's nuclear power plants had to grow to 160 gigawatts/.<sup>1</sup> Similarly, the so-called Project Independence released in the United States in 1974 was aimed at reliance on domestic resources. In spite of their self-reliance on the community level, the socialist countries' own stocks were revalorized on the basis of higher prices, and because of the Soviet production's need for growing investments /"investment contributions"/ several countries have been striving to utilize domestic resources.

The plans that were elaborated under the conditions of panic triggered by the oil price explosion were realized in a contradictory way. The earlier loss of ground of coal in the fuel balances slowed down but the remarkable increase of coal production fell through, in fact in many countries the production even decreased because of the lack of adequate demand or investment capital. With the changed price conditions /coal is 35-65 per cent cheaper than oil in energy equivalent/ coal has become the substituting alternative of oil in certain fields. Nevertheless coal can be used primarily for electric energy and heat production, the other alternatives /dissolution/ are for the time being costly. At present the share of electric energy production is nearly 2/3 of the total coal consumption in the IEA countries. The infrastructural demands connected with coal /storage, transportation, etc./ are extremely costly and the increased efforts for environmental protection counteracted the spread of coal /among the sources of energy it is coal that in every respect damages the environment the most/. The ambitious nuclear power plant projects have not been accomplished either. A radical cost reduction in the field of nuclear energy has invariably failed and the investment conditions of recent years /rise in prices of equipment, restrictions, recession, high interest rates, etc./ have not favoured the fulfilment of these projects. In many countries the nuclear power plant projects have been set back by the increasingly hostile political psychosis and the more rigorous environmental legislation. The dependence on oil imports within the decreasing oil consumption has successfully been moderated to a large extent. But the complete cutback of oil imports by 1980 came to nothing. In Western

Europe particularly the role of North Sea oil /Great Britain and Norway/ should be mentioned, and the oil production of the United States has grown as well. In many respects natural gas has taken the place of oil. Today the supply from domestic resources seems more favourable all over the world.

As a result of the so-called oil shock some views have appeared on the scene according to which the security of supply must be given absolute priority and it has to be accomplished through the increase of even the expensive and uneconomical domestic production. Sue Lerner, leading economist of the Edison Electric Institute, said in a lecture: "Nearly regardless of expense, the United States for political reasons must build on the domestic sources of energy." In reality this one-sided subordination did not take place as is demonstrated by the developments of the past decade. It is undeniable that security is of high priority on the level of big countries or economic-political groupings /European Community, NATO, CMEA, etc./ that play a leading role in world politics. Nevertheless in the strained world economic situation /including the requirements of successful competition on the world market/ it has been impossible to push economic considerations into the background because it would have had disastrous consequences for that country or group of countries. Hence there existed no other possibility in the new situation other than optimization of the requirements of security and relative cheapness. It is certainly not by chance that this was possible only with relatively high world market prices of energy. Those speculations according to which the United States ultimately contributed towards the high prices of energy that have evolved, seem to rest by all means upon a realistic basis in the above context.

The security of supply of small countries is a different question. They of course have much bigger possibilities for manoeuvre. The security of supply can be treated by them rather as fundamentally an economic matter and the political aspects have smaller significance. Especially those countries are in this situation where the supply can presumably be solved within the alliance system or in other friendly relations. In spite of that an excessive push for relying on domestic resources can be observed in the energy policy of several small countries. It can be attributed to factors like over-estimation of the political significance of the security of supply or spasmodic efforts to reduce the import at whatever cost. But economic realities and alternatives have broken their way through.

The necessary extent of the security of supply and self-sufficiency is under wide theoretical discussion. Some hold that the increase of energy self-sufficiency enhances security and reduces the possibility of conflicts and of the use of energy supply as a weapon. According to others total autarky is far from being a guarantee for international security, in fact, should the occasion arise, independence from the supply can even reduce the risks of increasing the tension for the aggressor.

## 2. Development and utilization of new, so-called alternative energy sources.

With the exhaustion of the traditional energy sources these will sooner or later become part of the fuel balance. This process is accelerated by the fact that one part of the utilization possibilities has become profitable already with the present oil prices. The majority of the alternative energy sources are too expensive yet and require considerable investments with a high rate of return. Therefore within the next 10-20 years we cannot expect them to enter into the fuel balance to any great extent. Estimates concerning the developed countries predict that their share in the fuel balance will probably exceed 4-5 per cent by the year 2000. However, radical transformation of the production and consumption structure, the technologies and the infrastructure is assumed and in the long run.

In the development of the so-called alternative energy sources it is necessary to distinguish between the possibilities and the desirable economic strategy of the big and the small countries. Because of the high costs it is the big and relatively developed countries /or group of countries/ who can probably play in the future a pioneering role in the development of alternative energy sources. For the small countries it is a wiser thing to elaborate an adequate follower policy. The caution is justified by the fact that reasonably presumable alternatives have not been outlined yet /solar energy or the utilization of hydrogen/ and the premature tying up of the resources of the national economy in certain directions can bring about heavy losses for the national economy. For the majority of countries the monopoly of the present sources of supply can be replaced in the future by the technological monopoly of some big and developed countries connected with the alternative sources.

To participate in research and development related to alternative sources and to join in due time in cooperation in research and production can be justifiable for a small country for many reasons. It can be favourably endowed with certain alternative sources /e.g. geothermal energy/. In connection with the different alternatives early participation in the development of branches of the energy industry is an essential requirement. In the past decades in many countries of the world nuclear energy programs with uncertain economic outlooks have been started, beyond political considerations simply for the reason that the given country wanted to have a group of experts, and industrial tradition and experience just in case the mass utilization of nuclear energy really becomes profitable. It is necessary to join early in the structural changes of production and consumption related to the alternative sources because a lead in each field can bring considerable foreign trade advantages.

Developmental projects related to the alternative sources have considerably declined in recent years. The fall in oil prices, the above-mentioned investment conditions and in several countries difficulties connected with the budget deficit had their part in it. In the United States many alternative energy projects have been sacrificed on the altar of austerity measures precisely on this basis. Fears that such

narrow-mindedness could easily backfire again in the future are not baseless.

3. Increase of energy-saving. In most countries great efforts have been made for ending wasteful energy consumption in the present production and consumption structure. Besides prices proper information and publicity have proved good means for achieving this.

Transformation of the production and consumption structures and the introduction of so-called energy-saving technologies are important sources of energy-saving. This requires considerable investments and can be implemented only in the long run. The process has been promoted by the above-mentioned world economic changes, particularly the rise in prices and the world market competition intensified by the recession. At the same time the negative effects of recent years have manifested themselves even in this respect. The declining oil prices reduce the pressure on the consumer to economize and many saving programs have fallen victim to the abovementioned investment difficulties.

There is a widespread concurrence of opinion over the question and the practice of the past years has shown that a wide range of economic means must be mobilized in the interest of energy saving. Market price effects or price policy regulations are only one of these possible means. It is obvious that beyond a given point, the coercive effects of prices might backfire, since the high price might drain off the very income that is needed for technological or structural transformation. The situation may be similar in the case of the energy-saving investments of the private consumer. Consequently, in addition to prices, the differentiated application of the credit and tax policy has come to the foreground, as illustrated by a large number of examples in different countries. There are several such energy-saving programmes, which are perhaps best to be financed by central budgetary means. An energy policy might entail undesirable social consequences and might increase socio-political tensions. Rational energy policy must, in certain spheres, be supplemented by a just social policy.

Energy-saving is one of the most important "domestic energy sources". Energy-saving policy forms an integral part of the supply security policy and it might serve well the economic efficiency of the economy.

4. The elaboration of a complex energy import policy. In this context there are several possibilities to reduce one-sided dependence on imports and to increase security of supply. Differentiating the import supply sources is one such method. In 1973, the energy import of the West European countries /chiefly the oil import/ was characterized by a concentration on certain sources of supply 97 per cent of the West European crude oil imports came from the Middle East and Africa and within this, 3/4 of the deliveries had been shared by five Arab countries /Libya, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait and Algeria./<sup>2</sup> Today, this proportion is divided among more than a dozen countries, and the European Community has made efforts to "spread" the regional political risk too. There were similar efforts in the oil import policy of the USA and Japan.



Several countries have made efforts to stabilize energy supplies on the basis of bilateral and multilateral contracts. Such contracts were concluded between the United States and Mexico, France and several Arab countries. In addition to the security of supply, these contracts also guaranteed a certain price stability for both sides involved. In the framework of these contracts, the developed importer country often reciprocated the energy supply security with trade policy preferences technical or other aids or food deliveries. For the energy importer country, these latter represent the "tap", which in case of necessity, can be turned off as a counter-measure, thereby creating trouble. In the field of external economic policy, there appeared efforts to counterbalance security, which have been accompanied by endeavours to cover the control of the external relations in a complex way.

A complex energy import policy can only be created by confronting the country's export possibilities with the development of domestic energy resources, energy saving at the cost of expensive investments and, energy imports. Energy policy must form an integral part of the country's overall development policy and, within this, it must fit into rational export development. Many developed countries succeeded in warding off the energy price explosions of the 1970s because their industrial export structure, helped to put a brake on the deterioration of the terms of trade and even to turn the process to their own advantage. Obviously those countries whose energy consumption is principally based on import, but whose manufacturing industry is a net energy exporter /the energy contents of their manufacturing industry export is bigger than that of the import - GFR, Japan, Sweden/, can do this because with the national labour they add, they are able in the world market to upvalue the energy built into their export products. Thus, long-term investment decisions call for careful consideration, since, in the end, such decisions might greatly influence the dynamism of the economy, efficiency and the possibilities of raising the living standards.

Consequently, in the new situation created by the 1970s, the significance of the energy policy has been upgraded. Both the efficiency and the success of the energy policy depended on the extent the given country had been able to harmonize the main priorities /mainly security and low prices/ and on the extent it had been able to utilize, in a complex way, the possibilities inherent in the main energy policy directions /domestic production, energy saving, import policy/ and, also on the extent it was able to support these with appropriate economic policy measures.

In the past years, the energy policy of the different countries has shown a highly controversial and many-coloured picture. The evaluation is made difficult by the fact that several "positive developments", /e.g. reduction of consumption/ had been linked to the recession alone instead of being the consequence of structural adjustments in a longer run. The picture is confused also by the fact that recession hit hardest some of the highly energy-consuming branches /metallurgy, chemical industry, etc./. The economic policy measures cannot be unambiguously

analysed either. In the course of the past years, for different reasons, several countries had been forced to pursue a restrictive economic policy, /e.g. in order to create balance/. Restrictive moves had been symptomatic treatment only and not only did they fail to solve the tasks of structural adjustment but in many regards, they actually impeded the process of this adjustment /investments, hindering modernization/. The restrictions had negatively affected the energy strategy development /e.g. domestic energy production, energy-saving technologies, etc./.

### Energy policies on an international level

In the course of the past decades, with the acceleration of internationalization, state interventions and regulation increased internationally. This, in part, happened on the national state level, but, on the other hand, several such international institutions had been established where there had been collective interventions. International regulations did not leave intact the energy sphere either. Some of the institutions have a definite energy profile /Montanunion, OPEC or IEA/. On the other hand, several other international organizations are dealing with energy issues /IMF, World Bank, etc./ or are making efforts to create their own energy policy /EEC or CMEA/. During the 1970s, the institutions played an increasing role in the energy policy, the functions being strengthened and modified. The chief priorities and aims of the international energy policy concurred with those already discussed above. Under increasing interdependency they showed the limitations of the national policies and expressed the new requirements of these policies.

The main directions of an international energy policy are as follows:

1. Cooperation in energy production and the realization of joint energy programmes. Production cooperation or joint production in the energy sphere can be considered as the most developed and closest form of international relations. This kind of relations are chiefly characteristic for the cooperation between the socialist countries, of which several examples can be quoted. CMEA devoted a separate target programme to cooperation in energetics and there were several joint investments. The June 1984 summit of the CMEA countries gave prominence to cooperation in this field. "They consider it expedient to modify the structure of the energy production and to widen cooperation in the field for the primary development of atomic energetics; in the field of a more complete use of all energy resources, including the so-called non-traditional energy resources as well. The CMEA countries will jointly work out a construction programme for atomic power plants and atomic heating plants up to 2000."<sup>3</sup>

Among the capitalist countries, there are relatively few examples of such deep and large-scale cooperation in the energy sector. The leading capitalist countries consider energy production a strategic question and are making efforts to maintain their independence and

ability of manoeuvre even with their closest allies. Great Britain, for instance, has so far not shown much willingness to "share" the North Sea oil with its Common Market partners in any aspect of the economic policy. /This, of course, does not mean that it is not exporting oil to the European Community/. Production cooperation is realized chiefly at the level of big transnational oil companies; moreover, these latter had been given a big share in North Sea oil production /chiefly the Americans/.

## 2. Collective or coordinated steps by producers or consumers.

An example of the rallying of forces and of collective steps by the producers was the activization of the role of OPEC that started in the 1970s. While, formally, OPEC is nothing else but a cartel, its actual role in international politics and in the world economy /e.g. from the point of view of the flow of oil revenues/ exceeds by far the traditional monopoly market agreements.

As early as in the second half of the 1960s, the EEC made efforts to work out a joint energy policy. This energy policy formulated such aims as the security of energy sources, the guaranteeing of favourable price relations, and rational consumption and environmental protection. The need for joint action to secure supply had been formulated as early as in 1972, when it was stated that the economic and social interests of the supplier developing countries must be taken into consideration. "Among the energy importer countries mutual relations have already been established to a certain extent, and these relations will further strengthen in the future with energy supply problems assuming increasingly global dimensions. Improving the supply conditions also demands economic and social cooperation with the supplier countries in all fields of common interest, based on mutual advantages, which might assist the industrial and economic development of the energy supplier territories and might help create the desirable stability in relations among partners with equal rights."<sup>4</sup>

Following the crisis of 1973, the joint steps, the so-called "common voice", did not yield much success within the EEC. The search for "global solutions" increasingly came into the forefront, mainly under American pressure, which had been well-illustrated by the energy conference held in Washington in February 1974. France did not attend the conference, and this demonstrated the contrasting interests of the participants. The conference had been followed by the establishment of the International Energy Agency /IEA/ in November 1974, in the framework of OECD, which, although France did not join it, embodied the EEC as a unity. IEA worked out an "International Energy Programme", with the aim of sharing the oil reserves in danger situations, increasing the oil reserves, holding exchanges of information and consultations over national energy policies and creating long-term cooperation in searching for and developing alternative sources. IEA is a consumer's cartel of the leading capitalist countries. Coordination of the energy policy has been a regular item on the agenda of the capitalist summit meetings where several important decisions have been made. Although at the IEA level, certain efforts have been made in the interest of cooperation with the producer countries, the clashes of

interests have so far overshadowed these efforts.

3. The coordinated creation of emergency stocks and emergency oil sharing. The creation of emergency stocks directly serves the increase of the security of supply. In the capitalist countries this kind of coordination has been realized in several institutions and at several forums. In the framework of a joint energy policy, the EEC Council of Ministers issued a directive as early as on December 20, 1968. In accordance with this directive, the member states must create emergency reserves of crude oil and oil products, which cover the needs of at least 65 days of consumption. In December 1972, after having consulted the joining states this directive was changed, and with consideration to an eventual stop in energy imports, they increased the amount of the minimum emergency reserves 90 days of consumption. Later on, they reinforced this decision several times and, IEA too, committed itself to the 90-day emergency reserves.

According to expert opinions, 90-100-day reserves would be necessary, in order to avert any unexpected troubles in the international oil market. But, in spite of the decision, they failed to reach the 90-day level in the long run. Between 1973 and 1979, the oil reserves of the EEC ranged between 70-80 days and at the beginning of 1979, when the regime of the Shah of Iran collapsed, the emergency reserves of the advanced capitalist countries /IEA/ had been on the 70-day level. According to many, the second oil shock was, among other things, also due to the insufficient reserve policy of the consumer countries. Consequently, in 1979, the panic purchases in the free market resulted in another big price increase.

In April 1984, the emergency oil reserves of the OECD member states was 412 million tons, a 93-day level as compared to the anticipated consumption of the member countries.<sup>5</sup> More recently, the record level of the reserves was reached in the middle of 1984, with a 104-day consumption level. Within the Economic Community, the reserves reached their record level in 1980 /120 days/.

It is a weakness of the reservation policy that while it is based on consiliated propositions made by the governments, the actual reservation is entrusted to private companies. This fails to guarantee the sharing of the reserves and makes the sharing dependent on the interests of big companies. As a new development in recent years, they increased the governments' emergency reserves and their level increased from 1-day consumption in 1978 to 17-day consumption in 1984.<sup>6</sup> The majority of this is shared by the USA, Japan and the FRG. The sharing of the so-called strategic oil reserves in case of danger, is urged especially by the United States. An expert report to the EEC Commission proposes the creation of a 5-day "supranational extra buffer reserve" which, in case of danger, could be mobilized immediately and effectively. There are wide spread views, according to which, in case of a crisis, despite the "satisfactory level" of the emergency reserves, these reserves would not guarantee the prevention of troubles in the supply and would not be able to avert a bigger increase of prices.

4. Collective propositions for the reduction of energy consumption and for energy saving. The increase of the energy prices induced consumers throughout the world to save energy. There were government measures to help this process. Energy saving and a cutback in consumption were given a prominent role in the policy of various international organizations and forums. The various energy programmes of the EEC and IEA, had, from the start, included many proposals for energy saving. Between 1960 and 1973, the ratio of economic growth and energy consumption within the EEC had been 1:1. In accordance with decisions made after 1974, they wanted by 1990, to reduce this proportion to 1:0.7. This lagged behind similar American plans, where the above change of proportions had been achieved as early as in the 1970s. The 2nd National Energy Plan of the Carter administration set a 1:0,55-0,65 ratio as the aim for the coming decades and the Americans tried to persuade their allies to make similar radical energy-saving measures.<sup>7</sup> The EEC summit held in Venice, in June 1980 in the spirit of vigorous energy saving, committed itself to the 1:0,6 proportion, to be achieved by 1990. The EEC decisions outlined the tasks of the member states in a highly concrete and elaborate manner. Mention must be made of the adjustment of the consumer prices to the world market prices, as well as of various economic policy incentives /aids, tax allowances, the support of research work, the definition of the standards, etc./. Similar measures were taken at IEA level as well.

The proposals made by the international organizations, in general, did not mean anything more than a summarization of the tasks to which the national governments had already committed themselves. The proposals, without exception, concurred with the national interests of the individual countries. Still, the significance of these proposals cannot be dismissed at a wave of the hand, since these are such obligations where non-compliance might provoke disapproval and rebuke by the partners.<sup>7</sup>

Although their value is of moral-political character, and not more, the individual governments, if they want to maintain good cooperation relations with their partners, cannot ignore these without any consequences.

5. Collective proposals and efforts to cut back imports. The regulation and reduction of the import level is closely connected with those efforts that aim at supply security and energy saving. Import limitations came to the fore especially in the wake of the 1979 oil crisis. In September 1979, nine member states of the EEC decided to fix their oil import ceiling at 472 million tons. In December 1979, 20 member states of the International Energy Agency decided to fix their oil imports total for 1980 at the 1979 level of 23.1 million barrels /day and to reduce, by 1985, the earlier accepted import ceiling of 26 million to 24.6 million barrels/ day.<sup>8</sup>

Within IEA, the following import ceilings have been set for the leading capitalist countries /in million tons/.

	1980	1985
United States	437.2	436
Japan	265.3	308.6
FRG	143	141
Italy	103.5	124
United Kingdom	12	25

The individual countries significantly "overfulfilled" the import reduction plans. In this, however, the recession between 1980-1983 did play a significant role. It is sufficient to refer only to the fact that up to 1985, the European Community reckoned with a 3.8 per cent annual average increase of the total GNP. /They underestimated the British oil production as well as the necessary net import, since Great Britain has become a net exporter in recent years/. This gratly "de-values" the success achieved.

The import ceilings are propositions, thus the facts mentioned in connection with energy saving are valid here too.

6. Joint research in the energy sphere. In the energy sphere, joint research can look back upon a long history. In the case of CMEA, mention could be made of Dubna, while in the case of the EEC, such research works have been connected partly with Montan-Union /mainly in coal/ and Euratom. The joint research work was concentrated on those fields of joint interest, where research work is expensive and returns only on the long run. It is not expedient, to scatter it nationally either strategically or economically, /e.g. possibilities of obtaining external market advantages/. There are certain fields where, in addition to a concentration of the financial resources, success can be hoped for only by pooling intellectual capacities. Moreover, this is the only way for smaller countries "to participate". For example, amalgamated research work belongs to this field, where, in addition to the Soviet Union and the United States, the EEC and JET /Joint European Tours/ also rank high. Another territory of joint research is in alternative energy resources. Similar is the case with the joint research at IEA level.

In joint and coordinated research the energy sector is given a prominent role. In recent years, some 70 per cent of the joint EEC researches have been in the energy sector, although their significance was not too big. The amount of joint budgetary expenditures did not exceed a few hundred million dollars annually and this covered only a fragment of the demands.

In connection with the energy sphere, it is important to refer to the joint economic research,

which is chiefly related to the analyser functions of the EEC Commission. The Commission annually compiles an expert report on the energy situation of the community, - on tendencies in the energy market, price changes and the outlook for the next year. The Commission makes regular forecasts about possible changes in demand on the energy market. Similar kinds of analyses are prepared by other institutions as well

/IEA, World Bank, etc./ and play an important role in orienting government policy and the individual companies.

7. The creation of international financial resources and their mobilization. Starting with the 1970s, an increasing number of international funds have been created in connection with energy problems, while the existing ones had been regrouped. After the oil price explosion, requests for financing came, in part, in connection with the balance of payments deficits. In April 1975, within OECD a 22 billion dollar "emergency fund" had been created at American initiative /Kissinger plan/ with the aim of counterbalancing the balance of payment deficits caused by the oil price hikes and with the aim of granting credits. In 1975, the International Monetary Fund created a special "oil facility", about 10 million dollars, a considerable part of which was used by some advanced industrial countries like Great Britain, Spain and Italy. Most of the balance of payment deficits were covered by private credits of the given countries. These credits had been rather "cheap" until 1979. Later, during the deepening debt crisis, the significance of those international sources that provided more favourable conditions increased. In 1979, within the IMF another fund - 10 million dollars - was created. At the same time, the organization sold gold reserves in value of 25 million dollars to make it available for the developing countries as well to receive international aid on a greater scale than before. Naturally, the role and weight of the IMF in financing oil deficits cannot be exactly defined, but as reflected by increases in the shares, it was not insignificant. The oil price increases played role in the international indebtedness of the socialist countries, partly in the direction of the capitalist credit markets and partly among each other, in bilateral relations /mainly with the Soviet Union/.

On the other hand, efforts were made to increasingly mobilize international resources to finance investment programmes that in the meantime had become expensive. We have already mentioned the joint researches. In addition to these, significant sums were spent on energy production /exploration, development, extraction, transportation, distribution, etc./. Within CMEA, investment contributions served such aims and a great part of the joint undertakings of the organization has been concentrated on the energy sphere. In the recent period, the World Bank has been paying increased attention to the development of the energy sector. Between 1981 and 1985, the World Bank envisaged some 13 billion dollars for support to energy programmes, the total value of which is around 60 billion dollars. A great part of this support was directed toward increasing electric energy production as well as that of oil and natural gas. Between 1977 and 1981, the World Bank financed 25 oil and natural gas projects in 20 developing countries with a 1,36 billion dollars credit. In 1983, an additional 1.2 billion dollars were spent on supporting 40 projects. Naturally, these sums cover only a fraction of the needs. In the period between 1981 and 1985, the World Bank would consider it desirable to take part in programmes of over 90 billion dollars, for which an additional 12 billion dollars support would be necessary /in addition to the 13 billion dollars/. According to the World Bank, in the next 10 years, and "enlarged energy programme" would be needed in the oil importing developing countries and this would entail some 450-500 billion

dollars of investment.<sup>9</sup> Although the international investment sources can, of course, only play a limited role in solving international investment problems, they do have power to ease tensions at the critical points. The significance of international initiatives and financing has been upvalued, especially in recent years, when due to short-term price tendencies and recession, several private and state investment projects were halted or limited, though these would meet important demands in the long run.



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### III. Peace and arms race

#### DANGERS OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN THE 1980's

by László Molnár, researcher Karl Marx  
University of Economics, Budapest

For quite some time, the people of the world have had to live together with the arms race and the impending spectre of war, which basically endanger and destroy the quality of human life without cease.

It is a general view today, that the nuclear weapons form the greatest danger to peace within the enormous arsenal on our planet. At the same time, we shouldn't forget that there are other kinds of weapons of mass destruction embodying the same catastrophic destructive potential.

The position and feeling of being endangered is only worsened by the fact that in addition - besides or despite of the already existing international agreements and negotiation processes related to them, there are even more increased efforts in the research and development of more and more up-to-date and perfect weapons, that is weapons with bigger and safer destructive power.

The purpose of this study concentrating on the nuclear, chemical and biological weapons is to give a short summary of the main dangers and consequences a possible use and the activity in military research and development create in these fields, at present and probably in the near future. In our opinion the detailed and just then complete survey of the effects and probable consequences of the use of these weapons is practically an insoluble task, and here we cannot undertake it. At the same time, for the sake of supporting the fact that the present activity of military research and development, its intensity actually ensures a real basis for the creation of even more up-to-date weapons with even more formidable destructive potential, it seems necessary to give a short summary of the main tendencies of this field concentrating primarily on the highly developed capitalist countries. The limited extent of the study and in several cases the lack or scarcity of proper data do not make it possible for us to study the concrete directions of military research and development, mentioning in advance the fact that these activities are aimed mostly at perfecting the already existing empirical weapons of mass destruction and/or creating new ones.

#### 1. About the irremediable consequences of a potential nuclear conflict

Simultaneously with the appearance of the first nuclear weapons there scientists who spoke up for warning humanity of the implied dangers of the new destructive weapons. Since then, in a few decades an enormous nuclear arsenal has been accumulated on our planet. Practically,

as a counterpole of the increased potential of the nuclear weapons the existence of danger is realized by wide masses of people all over the world on the basis of newer data and facts coming to light.

One who attempts to make a survey of the exact effects of a potential nuclear war, finds himself face to face with a rather complex problem. Speaking about a war of this nature, we must say that its exact consequences in their totality are incalculable. At the same time a statement that these consequences, considering their resultant, can be judged very simply, seems to be appropriate, since in the possession of the already existing knowledge it can be declared that a general nuclear war with the given nuclear arsenal would mean practically with full certainty the end of civilisation. In fact "it would be the very last catastrophe of mankind and nature".<sup>1</sup>

There would be extremely diverse and spreading effects of the use of nuclear weapons. Some of them can be characterized with great exactness. On the basis of several tests, wideranging research activities and above all the tragic examples of Hiroshima and Nagasaki many physical and biological effects of nuclear war can be identified.

At the same time when judging any kind of hypothetical future situations, it cannot be left out of account that among the present nuclear weapons there are thousand times more powerful ones than the two bombs used against the two Japanese cities. /The explosive yield of the two bombs was between  $12,5 \pm 1$  and  $22 \pm 2$  kt./. But there are smaller and even specialized weapons too.

It is a well-based fact, that independently of the power of a nuclear weapon, its explosion causes damage through various effects and in several forms.<sup>2</sup>

1. In the time of the explosion, the first noticeable effect is a blinding flash of intense white light. Simultaneously and even after the disappearance of the flash, about one third of the total energy is released in the form of intensive thermal radiation.

At this time within and close to the epicentre of the explosion everything evaporates or melts. Farther, within a distance depending on the destructive power of the given nuclear weapon /in the case of the Japanese cities it was about 3 kms/ the people suffer second- or third- degree burns; materials, that are easily ignited catch fire and thus in a few moments a fire storm can occur which causes additional casualties.

2. About half of the energy released at the time of the explosion is carried by the blast wave which expands slower than the other forms of radiation. It arrives as a sudden and shattering blow, followed by a hurricane - force wind. Therefore, after the explosion of a weapon with a yield of 15 kt everything will be demolished and everybody will be killed just due to the air blast.

3. Even before any visible phenomena occur the explosive device starts to emit extremely strong neutron and gamma rays. At the same time a small part of the gamma ray energy /about 1 per cent/, colliding with the atoms of the air molecules, disjoins electrons and creates the so-called electro-magnetic impulse, which, spreading from the site of the explosion damage the electric and especially the electronic and systems within a given zone devices. In addition, some of the neutrons give rise to nuclear reactions by which radioactive atoms are created. A mushroom-shaped radioactive nuclear cloud develops from a column of dust and smoke which includes the majority of these atoms. In the case of the explosion on the surface of the earth or close to it several thousand tons of soil-fragments which have become radioactive cover the surroundings of the explosion /in the case of 10-20 kt this may be pur at about 50-100 km<sup>2</sup>/.

At high dose levels, the radiation will render the victim unconscious after a few minutes and cause death within a few days. For lower but still directly lethal doses, death possibly follows only a few weeks later. In the case of directly non-lethal doses acute radiation sickness occurs, which is a specifically characteristic effect of the nuclear weapons. Those surviving an acute radiation injury will stand a large risk of different diseases - such as certain forms of cancer, genetic defects or hereditary effects which could remain latent for long years.

In the case of the neutron weapon which belongs to the nuclear weapons too the greatest part of the released energy /about 80 per cent/ is carried in the form of neutron - radiation. As an effect of neutron radiation physical and chemical processes take place in living organisms which are pathological from biological point of view. Through the damage of the medulla, the alteration of the nervous system respectively the damage of the gastrointestinal system the so-called radiation disease develops.

Thus the forms of material damage are rather diversified. With respect to the degree of destruction, the extent of the affected territory there are numerous other important factors yet besides the destructive power of the particular weapon. Such as, for example, at what altitude the weapon is exploded, what the actual weather conditions are, how strong the wind is, what the nature of the target itself is etc.

At the same time, the total effect of the use of nuclear weapons is more complex and combined with respect to its nature than the already mentioned physical consequences. It is true to a greater extent even if we focus our attention not only to the examination of the repercussions of an explosion but on the basis of the present situation assume that the potential future use of nuclear weapons - with respect at least to the great powers that possess those almost exclusively - would result in an all-out nuclear war.

Besides the direct physical annihilation in this case, in contrast to earlier we have only a less chance of exactly characterizing the basis effects and changes in numerous other fields resulting from nuc-

lear war. It is primarily due to the fact that these effects are formed as a resultant of different accumulating effects, we can conclude just from logical considerations.

Thus, basic environmental effects would result which effect the vital conditions of the whole mankind. Besides that, for a long term following a great nuclear war, with the spreading of the nuclear waste, nuclear cloud, the radioactive radiation would already effect the whole world and the physical damage of the environment would also be of extraordinary degree. In this way, for example substantial quantities of nitrogen-oxides would reach and destroy the ozone layer in the atmosphere within a few months. As a consequence, there would be a damaging increase of ultra-violet radiation at the surface of the earth. The following radical climatic changes would involve incalculable consequences, concerning the whole ecological system at the surface and in the stratosphere as well. /For example it is likely that the temperature would turn very cold./ The newly revealed data of the hygienic and physical consequences of a nuclear war show that the earlier predictions should be corrected because they underestimated the seriousness of reality.<sup>3</sup>

A general food shortage would result, causing insolvable problems in the economic sphere itself with several additional effects. Besides the striking problem of medical treatment, destruction of some of the basic industrial sectors, ceasing of transportation, water-, gas- and current supply would cause an incalculable difficult situation. The assessment of the different psychological, social and political consequences which would also be extraordinary, seems to be a hopeless task.

If there were any survivors of a nuclear war, than in all certainty the prediction of the US. Office of Technology Assessment would prove to be appropriate, that is a total war would not only involve the destruction of several millions, but it would also set back the society of the survivors into the dark Middle Ages.<sup>4</sup>

## 2. About the dangers of chemical and biological weapons in 1985

A protocol was signed on June 17th of 1925 in Geneva in accordance with the common will of the countries which were concerned, in order common to prevent universally the military use of two types of weapons of mass destruction, that is the chemical and biological weapons.<sup>5</sup>

A recent convention - signed on April 10th of 1972 which entered into force on March 26th of 1975 in order to prevent a microbiological war - prohibits the development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons and orders the liquidation of the already existing munition.

Studying the text of these international agreements on the mentioned types of weapons of mass destruction, one might think that - in con-

trast with other destructive weapons - the chemical and biological weapons on the basis of wide-range international concensus, already do not jeopardize seriously mankind.

Although the ratification of these agreements means an important step on the road towards a really peaceful world - which is unfortunately more and more thorny at present-, even in the moment of their coming into effect there were unambiguous signs, that the mentioned concensus in reality does not mean perfect guarantee against the possible use of neither the chemical nor the biological weapons in the future. The facts of reality must make us realize that the spectre of war fought by these potentially world-destructive weapons has not vanished yet in the haze forever.

The unpredictable events of the scientific-technological progress, its occasionally completely new and unexpected results used in the service of mankind can serve and have to serve as an impetus - opening new perspectives in its development. At the same time it derives exactly from the substance of this progress, that independently of time the relevant and complete foresight and assessment and thus the overall written regulation and condification of the possible negative effects of its results on the basis of common will become almost impossible. Despite of the most careful juristic work, even in the case of the mentioned agreements there are some "gaps", which make possible their misinterpretation or - using a more polite expression - their interpretation in another way. Taking advantage of these gaps, there is an opportunity to evade the agreements. In the case when the maintenance of the original common will does not coincide with the particular interests of the contracting parties for some reason or when it is set into the background by a new intention or by the preferency and existence of a new goal, the evading of the given agreement results almost necessarily.

Let us have a look at the mentioned "agreement-gaps" on the basis of the 1972 convention.

1. The convention allows the development and production of different biological and microbial agents or toxins and also their stockpiling when they are used for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes. Naturally, it should be like this. At the same time it is a fact that the agents produced for these purposes can be used also as biological warfare /BW/ agents.

2. Concerning the BW agents /toxins/ the convention has prohibitive dispositions for those, that are produced by biotechnological processes. But the prohibitions in these dispositions should not be necessarily applied for toxins produced by chemical synthesis since the definition covering the recent agents of the poisonous weapons has not been formulated even in 1972, in the lack of the mentioned predictability.

However, numerous historical examples can be cited to prove that certain signatories did not even strive to wriggle out of the prohibitions of a contract by keeping up the appearances of legality, but due to the lack of an effective international disregard retaliatory force, they simply their obligations.

Besides the evasion and occasional open violation of the agreements, the fact that numerous countries have not participated even up to this day in the agreements or joined them only far more later than their entering into force, causes further anxiety.<sup>6</sup>

The fact that it is extremely difficult to verify /good concealment, secrecy/ the activities related to the production of chemical and biological weapons represents a great attraction to those countries that strive for increasing their military force and weapon arsenal. At the same time, since the signing of the 1972 contract, great knowledge has been accumulated by the aid of different biological and biotechnological processes about the objects and organisms chosen as targets in the case of the potential use of chemical and biological weapons. On the other hand, in order to defend its armed forces and civil population, the possible user of these weapons has got more effective means. All these are increasing the attractive force of the desired benefits by the use of these weapons, mostly when the effective defense against retaliation can be considered given or presumed.

In connection with this, we must not lose sight of the fact, that while the destructive potential of these weapons can be enormous, their certain varieties can be used /some biological weapons/ as the so-called "silent weapon", or in other words, only long after their use does the attacked realize the evidence of being attacked - only after the postponement of an effective defense-step or counter-measure and suffering already irremediable damages.

Taking all this into consideration, we can note that within the enormous arsenal accumulated in the world, the already existing chemical and biological weapons still embody an extraordinarily serious danger. At the same time, the continuation of military research and development projects and directions in this field imply the possibility of an even greater danger.

### 1. Chemical weapons

The agents of the chemical weapons can be defined as devastating, poisonous substances which can be of liquid or solid state or volatile and corrosive gases. They might be employed because of their direct toxic effects on man, animal and plants. In the last two years the talks continued in the ad hoc working group of the Disarmament Committee in Geneva even after the breakdown had occurred at the talks on nuclear arms held also in Geneva and in the Vienna MBFR talks. Hardly is it necessary to place a special emphasis on the potential positive impact of the partial results of these talks on the whole issue of arms control and on their role played in the maintenance of this process of extra-

ordinary significance, under the present circumstances.

On the other hand the R and D projects that have recently been given more emphasis also in the field of these kind of weapons could be judged as a strongly negative counterpole. One bears record to the employment of chemical weapons in the course of World War II and the Vietnam War. In the years following those events there have been several cases when certain countries were suspected of using these kind of weapons against their adversaries.<sup>7</sup>

It is an unambiguous fact however that with the help of funds allocated appropriately a multitude of highly trained experts work on programmes aimed at the development of these weapons in a large number of well equipped research centres.

It is also a fact that besides the modernization of intermediate range nuclear weapons, the long term programme for development of military forces accepted in 1978 appropriated for the NATO's rapid improvement of chemical deterrent posture too. These new principles laid down in the American Manual FN-100-5, - published in August of 1982, - and the strategic concept/, known as the US "Air-Land Battle" doctrine imply "deep attacks" by the employment of conventional weapons coupled with nuclear and chemical strikes. This is the first strategic concept which draws together the conventional, the nuclear and the chemical weapons with respect of their employment.

The statement made by General Bernard Rogers, NATO Supreme Commander before the American Senate on March 1st, 1982 well demonstrates the role which is intended for the chemical weapons within the NATO's strategic conceptions: "... for me the possession of a modern, adequate chemical deterrent is more important than that of the neutron weapon." The present NATO Secretary-general, Lord Carrington's view does not contradict this statement, because in accordance with the new Rogers-plan he thinks that for the sake of raising the worryingly low nuclear threshold,<sup>9</sup> NATO countries must make the non-nuclear defense even more stronger and they must improve the application of the most up-to-date technologies in the field of conventional forces.<sup>10</sup>

In the part ten to fifteen years amongst the results of widerange research activity aimed at these modern technologies, the elaboration of the so-called binary chemical weapons is outstanding. General Rogers pointed out in his aforementioned speech, that although not officially, but the NATO's top-level officials support the American decision that steps must be made in the field of these types of weapons. In 1983, following the shooting of the Korean jumbo jet, US Congress authorized full scale production of binary nerve-gas munitions, although later the legislation denied funding for that purpose during the 1984 fiscal year.

Among the goals of the new 5 year defense plan announced by the US Department of Defense in March of 1983, however the plan of producing the 155 mm GB2 projectiles as well as the so-called Bigeye bomb is also included.



In the case of other countries - because of the already mentioned difficulties of verification - there is not any credible, concrete information available concerning the experimentation and production of these weapons. In any case, it is a fact that the technological as well as material conditions of production in the case of some countries are given, that is to say there aren't any obstacles of this nature in those countries before the starting and the accumulation of the new binary chemical weapons.

Let us examine more closely what we really mean by binary chemical weapons.

The experimentations of these weapons started already in the beginning of the 1960's with the primary objective of making possible the elimination of the apparent dangers which result from the greatly corrosive effect of these toxins' chemical decomposition - resulting from the possible leakage of the poisonous warfare agent - of the already extraordinarily poisonous warfare agents' storage and transport. This is the way the elaboration of the so-called "binary" principle has come to be worked out. The essential of this principle is that instead of filling the already poisonous chemical agent into the ammunitions and into other applicable, storable equipments, a semi-processed agent is filled which, with the addition of a reaction-component in the presence of a catalyst forms the already poisonous substance. This principle has an especially great importance in the case of highly toxic warfare agents. This type of warfare agents are, for example the binary sarin /GB-2/ and the binary VX/VX-2/.

Artillery binary nerve-gas shells and aircraft bombs are already existing in large quantities in certain countries. There are certain varieties of these warfare agents which exert their devastating effect through inhalation and there are those which penetrate through the skin.

Intensive experimentations are in progress besides the binary chemical weapons in the fields of other different poisonous munitions. There is great interest shown in the production and stockpiling in many countries of the new types of nerve-gases, and also of the CS and CR irritant agents which can be produced at a relatively cheap rate. Similar to the chemical weapons, the research in connection with the poisonous agents of natural origin, - like the toxins of animal origin or that of plants and fungi - is first of all aimed at the processes, by which there would be a possibility to produce these poisons by a synthetic process in great quantity and this way, to use them as the effective munition of chemical weapons. At the same time, the question of poisonous agents of natural origin is already connected with the questions concerning the biological weapons.

## 2. Biological weapons

BW agents or biological weapons can be defined as living organisms, whatever their nature or infective material derived from them, which are intended to cause disease or death in man, animal and plants, and which depend for their effects on their ability to multiply in person,

Besides the chemical weapons a huge munition of biological weapons has been stockpiled in several countries of the world during the few decades between the signature and the entering into force of the 1924 protocol and the 1972 convention which prohibits the use of biological warfare agents.

Despite the ban in 1925, at the time of the Second World War the use of these weapons was attempted. Especially Japan was very active in this field.

In these years in the Nazi Germany preparations were going on already to fight a biological war by the experimentation of very different infective materials. At the same time, besides these two countries, the experimentations concerning the possibility of the use of biological weapons began or accelerated in other countries too.

The prohibiting provisions of the Geneva Protocol neither proved to be of universal force even after the Second World War. This way, for example, biological weapons were used by the US during the Korean War.

It has been mentioned earlier, that the convention in 1972 prohibited the development, production and use of different biological weapons and toxical materials. At the same time, if we examine the effectiveness of the prohibitive force of the previous protocol, we must be skeptical from the start concerning the question of whether we actually and completely succeeded in eliminating this type of weapons of mass destruction.

The biological weapons have numerous characteristics which are important from a military point of view.

On the basis of numerous calculations, it seems that, for example, the relative extent of the territory affected by these weapons exceeds that of the nuclear weapons with high destructive power. In the case of development of these weapons, the ratio of disability concerning people out of shelters can be very high; these weapons do not destroy buildings and equipments; with the application of appropriate defense instruments the attacked territory can be seized immediately, etc.

The research activity since the Second World War has led to increased use by the selection of the already existing agents. Newer and newer possibilities have emerged. The infectiousness and also the resistance of pathogens against the different antibiotics and chemo-therapeutic processes could be increased with the introduction and the use of the different areas of microbiological genetics and molecular biology.

The plague, hepatitis, smallpox, botulism, anthrax, encephalitis, typhus, cholera or erythrocytotoxicosis are such terrible diseases which can be caused by the different pathogens with increased infectiousness on the level of epidemic.

At the same time with the maturing of the necessity of the 1972 convention may be put the development of interest toward the implication of genetic engineering, a new discovery having a revolutionary

effect. In comparison with the earlier used genetical process which may be called classical, the genetic engineering or in terms of professional terminology, the DNA recombinant technology has opened a new era, with practically vast perspectives not only in the fields of medical treatment and of rendering mankind more noble and perfect but as the counter-pole of this in the field of increasing the destructive power of the biological weapons.

The essence of genetic engineering is that a piece of DNA, carrying one or more genes can be planted into the nuclein acid of a completely alien structure. This does not mean less than the fact that new characteristics can be given to an organism. Hereby transfer of already existing characteristics and synthesis of newer ones are made possible.

Although today most of the biologists are basically optimistic concerning this new genetical technology, the statement of the Nobel-prize-winner professor, Salvador Luria does not reassure us, whereas he does not feel optimism, but rather has a terrible fear from the possible dangers which can originate from genetic engineering, to the extent of its misuse. A 'negative genetic engineering' can come into existence, by which for example, viruses can be produced which make people insensible towards certain materials.

Anyone who would spread such a terrible agent would obtain absolute power over the human race and with this he would keep under his control the life and death of the masses.<sup>12</sup>

The potential danger implied by the negative genetic engineering allows us to draw a parallel between the following two paradoxes taking shape by the particular development of physics and biology. Analogous to the case when the possibility of the use of nuclear energy represented the great surprise of physics for the world of our age, in the field of biology it is the genetic engineering which can be perceived as a similar surprise. Today the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes can be kept in evidence as a pledge of the future and further development of mankind. But at the same time it is just the use of nuclear energy for not peaceful purposes which mainly threatens the survival of human race. The duality of the positive and negative possibilities lying in the genetic engineering in an inherent way is ghostly similar to this paradox. In the field it can give a cause for relative optimism, that the development of the negative side of the genetic engineering - even so far-has not yet reached the phase which in the case of the nuclear energy this negative side did reach at the time of the Second World War by the fact, that it took up a materialized form in nuclear weapons which were soon capable of causing a world-wide destruction. At the same time, referring to the aforementioned, the 1972 convention already included the prohibition of the military use of microbiological agents of any origin or any production. In the case of nuclear energy, this possibility of use has not succeeded to be excluded in the form of an agreement even up to this day.

### 3. About the military research and development expenditures in the 1980's

In the part, many examples could be listed concerning the essence of those official American statements, arguments which state the Soviet Union's unambiguous military superiority, for the justification that the US and its allies have to continue the armement. At the same time, we can near American opinions that are more sophisticated and have a tone different from this. Let us examine the basis on which the undersecretary of Defense in charge of research and development tasks could have stated in front of one of the committees of the American Legislation that in respect to advanced military technology, the US has an advantage over the Soviet Union.<sup>13</sup>

The data of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institution /SIPRI/ Yearbook 1984 show that, considering the average of ten years prior to 1984, the rate of growth in world military spending is 2,9% per year. Within this, in the past years compared to the average, the rate of growth has strongly accelerated, in 1982 it was 6% and in 1983 it was also well above the long term trend for the past 10 years. At the same time, on the basis of the published data it can be ascertained also that besides the outstanding position of the US in the past years - the US alone took its share of the world expenditures aimed at military purposes with 30% - it can be generally claimed about the world's other areas also, that the rate of growth of military expenditures has accelerated.<sup>14</sup>

The usual degree of spending within the military sphere absorbs a considerable part of the world's total financial sources on investments, development programmes which, instead of solving or at least easing the global problems - which are becoming more and more serious and with which mankind is faced with, - constantly give impetus to the arms race.

The developed industrial countries, respectively their military groups, play a great and definite role in the field of military expenditures within this research and development activity /R+D/. The data of Table 1. show that the USA, compared to the Soviet Union, respectively the NATO countries compared to the countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization have spent considerably more in the past years on armament amongst the above mentioned countries.<sup>16</sup> The data stated by the International Institute of Strategic Studies /IISS/ in London, although do not correspond exactly to the data given by SIPRI, in their tendencies do not contradict the earlier statements. This way, for example, according to IISS, the military expenditures of the NATO in 1981 exceeded that of the Warsaw Treaty Organization by 76 billion dollars<sup>17</sup>, and probably military spending of the USA in 1984 was 41 billion dollars more than that of the Soviet Union.<sup>18</sup>

Looking back at the 1970's, the situation was not different. At this time, according to the estimates of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the difference between the expenditures of the NATO and the WTO is 161,6 billion dollars, naturally, to the advantage of the NATO.<sup>19</sup>

A part of the enormous and ever increasing military expenditures is devoted to serve as a financial basis not for the further expansion of the existing military arsenals but for the production of partly of completely new constructions of warfighting means that are better in terms of quality, higher in terms of standard than the existing ones and bear also other advantageous qualities. Similar to the industrial sphere a qualitative step forward in the military industry can not be imagined in the lack of an efficient research and development activity of appropriate level. The results of scientific research in this field mean a unique and dangerous factor of uncertainty as they can not be calculated exactly in advance. Besides the endeavours for military superiority one of the main elements that generate the arms race is represented by the fact that the opposing parties - due to fear from technological-technical surprise and to a position of being endangered furthermore in favour of securing their own defence at an appropriate level - do not renounce the level of military R and D they claim to be necessary and do not give up the idea of engaging an intellectual capital - embodied by a large number of prominent scholars and professional expert - to this field owing to the lack of an international agreement that would provide appropriate security guarantees.

The different newer and newer discoveries, the results of innovation, the technological changes within the military sphere and even outside this sphere mean a constant pressure in the field of the appropriation of the different material sources, since the results of a qualitative development give the desired "output" outside the research institutes, through practical utilization and not in themselves.

The fact is evident from the data of Table 2., that from among the advanced capitalist countries, the ones having the greatest economic and military potential are concentrated in groups, which are strongly differing from each other in size, in the field of military R+D expenditures. Similar to the total military expenditures, the US spends several times more also in this field, than Great Britain, which is second in order and the rate of growth of the annually allocated sums by the US is also uniquely high. In the lack of appropriate data, the assumption seems evident that the situation regarding the conditions of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries in this field has to be similar.

For the continuation of the existing race in the field of the qualitative development of different weapons, weapon systems, even stagnating or directly decreasing R+D expenditures are sufficient, since technological changes can be achieved even in such circumstances. So the importance of the military R+D much greater than what its plain proportion suggests within the total military expenditures. /See data of Table 4./ At the same time, it is important that the mentioned proportions are the largest in the case of those countries which spend the most on armament in an absolute sense.

According to the calculations of the SIPRI, the military R+D of the world is one tenth of the total military expenditures on a yearly level.<sup>20</sup> In the case of the US-on the basis of Tables 1. and 2. the ratio is higher than this from year to year, even, if to a smaller

degree in the examined period, it is increasing steadily /in course from 1980 to 1983; 10,9 %, 11,1 %, 11,6 % and 11,8 %/. In the field of the already steady increase of the over-average ratio, the US is also outstanding among the examined countries.

The data of Table 3. prove perceptibly the evidence of the already mentioned concentration. The USA, regarding the percentage of the military R+D financed by governments has kept its leading position.

Thus in the field of military R+D expenditures, the USA takes its share out of the world's total military R+D expenditures even a greater degree, than is which it contributes to the whole armament expenditures.

Annex

Table 1.

World military expenditure summary, in constant price figures. Figures are in US \$ million, at 1980 prices and exchange-rates. /Estimates on USSR and WTO are with a high degree of uncertainty/.

	1980	1981	1982	1983
USA	143 981	153 884	167 673	186 544
USSR	131 500	133 700	135 500	137 600
Total NATO	256 278	267 118	283 826	307 171
Total WTO	143 900	146 250	148 635	151 130
World total	563 542	577 978	613 500	636 790

Table 2.

Military R+D in 10 countries, constant prices, 1980-1983 calendar years, US \$ million. 1980 prices and exchange-rates.

	1980	1981	1982	1983
USA	15 767	17 125	19 473	22 041+
Great Britain	3 598	3 475	3 450+	3 472+
France	2 686	3 109 <sup>b</sup>	3 322+	/3 091/+
FRG	952	813	827	863
Sweden	229	211	246+	xx
Japan	126	/131/	xx	xx
Italy	49	167 <sup>c+</sup>	143	/160/+
Canada	81	81	/86/+	/98/a+
Netherlands	49+	46+	46+	46+
Norway	21	29	35+	44+

Table 3.

Percentage share of military R+D in total government R+D for 10 countries

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
USA	47,6	49,1	60,8	64,1	69,4+
Great Britain	51,8	49,6	50,2+	50,0+	xx
France	36,5	36,5	37,7+	/33,0/+	xx
FRG	10,1	8,8	8,7+	/9,4/+	xx
Sweden	15,6	16,0	19,2+	xx	xx
Japan	2,3	/2,4/	xx	xx	xx
Italy	2,7	6,5	5,6+	/6,1/+	xx
Canada	5,3	5,1	/5,3/+	/5,7/+	xx
Netherlands	2,9+	2,8+	3,0+	3,1+	3,1+
Norway	4,6	6,5	7,7	9,6+	xx

Table 4.

Percentage share of military R+D in military expenditure for 10 countries.

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
USA	10,95	11,13	11,62	11,82 <sup>+</sup>	
Great Britain	13,45	13,78	13,02 <sup>+</sup>	11,79 <sup>+</sup>	
France	10,16	11,49	12,03 <sup>+</sup>	/11,02/ <sup>+</sup>	
FRG	3,57	3,00	3,09 <sup>+</sup>	/3,16/ <sup>+</sup>	
Sweden	5,71	5,25	6,22 <sup>+</sup>	xx	
Japan	1,29	/1,31/	xx	xx	
Italy	0,51	1,70 <sup>+</sup>	1,37 <sup>+</sup>	/1,47/ <sup>+</sup>	
Canada	1,73	1,69	/1,64/ <sup>+</sup>	/1,80/ <sup>+</sup>	
Netherlands	0,93 <sup>+</sup>	0,87 <sup>+</sup>	0,87 <sup>+</sup>	0,87 <sup>+</sup>	
Norway	1,23	1,71	2,01 <sup>+</sup>	2,45 <sup>+</sup>	

Sources:

Table 1.: SIPRI; World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1984/Taylor and Francis, London, 1984/, p.117

Tables 2.-4.: ibid. pp. 168-172./

Notes for tables 2,3 and 4./ a Excludes unscheduled new programmes  
b Revised upwards: not comparable with previous years  
c Not comparable with previous years  
+ Provisional figures;/ SIPRI estimate;  
xx Information not available or not applicable



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THE UNCONTROLLABLE ARMS RACE: THEORETICAL  
PERSPECTIVES, PRACTICAL REALITIES

by Géza Mezei, researcher, Karl Marx University  
of Economics, Budapest

It is hardly doubtful that efforts aimed at reducing or limiting the military potential the individual countries can only bring success if, as a first step, they take into account the reasons prompting a perpetual build-up in military equipment. On the other hand, arguments for disarmament which declare that the use of force in interstate relations is caused by the fact that they possess arms is utterly untenable. According to this reasoning the simple reason for tensions is the existence of arms, and the solution of the problem would be to deprive the protagonists of international relations of the means of destruction.

Actually, the question to be answered is why these means are being stockpiled. The more so it is as there exists amidst the anarchic order of power in the international scene no central authority with the monopoly of possessing a "lawful force" by which it could enforce the 'surrender' of military goods - the sovereign states themselves must be ready to do so.

One of the most wide-spread theories dealing with the causes of the arms race is what one may call the 'action - /over/reaction' model. The protagonist in the international system, striving to acquire the 'meagre resources' available in international relations /territory, raw materials, power, prestige, security/, need weapons to assert their claims or to resist those of others.

At the same time, this arms build-up is seen as a threat to the other /state/, compelling it to take similar action. In addition, if their relations are strained by lack of confidence and mutual mistrust rooted, for example, in traumatic historical experiences, then nothing can stem the escalation of false perceptions and misunderstandings any more.

The probability of the realization of these 'self-fulfilling prophecies' is multiplied under the conditions of nuclear deterrence in today's political context, where one is witness to ceaseless nuclear threats despite the evident futility of a nuclear war.

The irrational logic of nuclear arms race can be best described with the category of the 'prisoner's dilemma': both parties would enjoy maximum 'gain' by choosing a strategy of cooperation /disarmament/. However, consequences would be irreparable for the party that opts for /unilateral/ disarmament, unless his partner chooses the same

strategy. Thus in an atmosphere of fear and threat the strategy of cooperation poses such unacceptable risks that both parties are 'compelled' to decide on continued armament.

Instead of the above-mentioned factors the so-called critical peace research stresses the role of social and economic forces in the constant arms build-up. The focal point of research is the so-called military-industrial complex that presses for armament in order to increase its power and profit almost regardless of external circumstances. Further versions of this theory see the propelling force of armament in the structure and /distinct/ interests of state bureaucracies that make the major political and military decisions.

According to another approach the specific laws and dynamics of military technology have a decisive role in the arms race. An exact 'balancing' of forces in the field of arms is practically impossible due to the structural and geographical disproportions between the two great powers on the one hand, and the asymmetry of their strategic doctrines on the other. This gives rise to 'overcapacities' on both sides resulting in a constant erosion of the stable strategic balance /based on second-strike capability/, or in pushing the level of this balance ever higher.

#### 1. Search for a major technological breakthrough

Although the present crisis of international politics itself, especially the uncertainty emanating from the intensified East-West opposition and the different regional conflicts that always carry the danger of escalation, considerably heightens the probability of a nuclear world war, the development of military technology further increases this danger. Its major cause lies in the search for a 'technological breakthrough.' Military planners now aim at developing weapons that are suitable for fighting, rather than detering a nuclear war; they are developing highly reliable ballistic missiles of pinpoint accuracy whose warheads can be targeted on smaller - hence more sensitive - military spots. In other words the time will come when a country may safely hope to neutralize most or all of its adversary's second-strike capability by an accurate first strike.

First strike in this context does not mean a capability of completely destroying the strategic arsenal of the enemy by a surprise attack. It rather implies that the aggressor calculates to destroy 'sufficient' second-strike capability of the adversary by a surprise attack, thus limiting its losses from the enemy second strike to a seemingly 'acceptable' extent from the viewpoint of achieving certain political goals.

The conviction of big powers that nuclear arms qualitatively differ from earlier war equipment and that the value of conflicting interests does not measure up to the possible costs of a nuclear war has so far served as the cornerstone of the efforts to curb the arms race as well as of deterrence.

The 'war-winning' strategy outlined above diametrically opposes this conception by taking nuclear arms into account as means of increasing political influence. Clausewitz redivivus: military strength, although transformed, again becomes a direct "servant" of state interest.

The currents in favour of the 'war-winning' strategy are not new in the United States. This change in the conception of strategy is most markedly reflected in the Presidential Directive /PD/ N<sup>o</sup> 59 that calls for limited nuclear strikes on supersensitive military targets /C<sup>3</sup>: control, command, communication/ in order to bring the enemy to his knees. With the emergence of small-size nuclear arms of limited effect and high accuracy /cruise missiles, Pershings/ such a turnabout in military policy is becoming increasingly possible from technical stand-points as well.

Nuclear deterrence rests on the belief that the potential aggressor will not make a preemptive strike so long as he keeps in mind that a major part of his country's population and industrial capacity would fall victim to the ensuing second strike of the enemy. Cities are the hostages of deterrence, so to speak. If, however, the enemy is no longer faced with the possible losing of his cities, deterrence will not work any more. And this will happen when the highly accurate and reliable warheads become operational.

Deterrence is after all a psychological category: what the enemy thinks is what counts. Thus it is impossible to go on with the policy of deterrence by 'accurate' nuclear weapons, for nolens volens the enemy must start from the assumption that the opponent's warheads are targeted on military objects rather than on cities. In other words, high accuracy 'kills' deterrence, and the 'war-winning' strategy becomes the only credible and plausible policy.

Recently, ideas on limited, 'wageable' nuclear wars are encouraged by a whole lot of 'first-strike' technologies. Among them, those connected with anti-submarine warfare /ASW/ stand out as exceptionally dangerous. As ground-launched strategic missiles are becoming increasingly vulnerable by an enemy preemptive strike, deterrence depends almost exclusively upon the still-existing invulnerability of strategic submarines. If, however, either party should succeed in amputating the second-strike capability of its adversary either by developing so-called 'hunter-killer' submarines or by reliable surveillance of enemy submarine movement /e.g. with the help of reconnaissance satellites 'from above' or by highly sensitive underwater sonar equipment/, the temptation to carry out an all-destroying first strike would become almost irresistible.

Research into the possibilities of outer space armament also promises the emergence of similarly dangerous 'first-strike' technologies. At issue here is the further improvement of anti-satellite warfare as well as the development of a space-based comprehensive defense system that would neutralize enemy ballistic missiles to an 'absolute' extent, and give protection against both a possible enemy surprise attack and a retaliatory second strike.

When both parties commit themselves to the qualitative and quantitative development of their nuclear arms, mobilizing immense material and financial resources to this end, then sooner or later a need will emerge for the military investments to produce immediate political 'benefits' beyond the mere deterrence of the enemy. In the history of the Soviet Union by the historical experiences the military considerations have always had an important role in the field of foreign policy and striving for preponderance may almost seem a natural tendency. On the other hand, the United States has the firm conviction that the Soviets can only be forced to make concessions if they encounter massive and ambitious American armament programmes time and again.

The progress of arms race thus always brings to life new strategic doctrines that in turn 'justify' the necessity of new weapon systems. As a consequence of numerous military technological constraints and political pressures the opinions alleging that nuclear superiority carries considerable military and political advantages are increasingly gaining ground. The dominance of this idea can have but one consequence: a constant and endless competition in the field of nuclear arms between the opposing parties.

## 2. The limits of arms control: success and failures

For an appropriate evaluation of the disarmament and arms control objectives envisaged by the universal political organs of the United Nations, it is well worth examining the concrete results achieved in the domain of limiting nuclear arms, and specifying the major obstacles to this progress.

In the historical perspective, the first arms limitation treaties were agreed upon by the major nuclear powers in the 1960s. /Compared to the nuclear potential of the 'big two' the British nuclear arsenal was even then a 'quantity negligible'.

Changes in the military power balance, have prompted both great powers to make new political recognitions: the mutual fear from the effects of nuclear arms has resulted in a certain unity of interests enabling cooperation in order to stabilize the 'balance of terror' and to curb the pace of nuclear armament. The 'unity of interests in security policy' of the key powers based on the mutual capability of destruction is in any case limited: because of the conflicting ideas and the fundamentally different power interests a real disarmament could not be carried out. Instead, a 'canalization' of the arms race took place, namely agreements on loose upper limits, renouncing the development of certain sectors that for some reason have lost their appeal to the parties - but these have some about against the background of a ceaseless build-up of arms.

The prime practical significance of arms control talks apparently derives from their contribution to the improvement in the atmosphere of East-West political relations, and to the widening the range of cooperative action patterns.

Obviously, it is true the other way round as well: success at the talks is basically a function of political will, and the lack of political willingness for agreement crucially determines the outcome of the negotiations.

The first agreement between the nuclear powers was reached in 1963 in Moscow where a treaty was signed on a ban on nuclear arms tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water.<sup>1</sup> In its single article of substance the treaty prohibits nuclear tests in the atmosphere and beyond that in outer space as well as under water. Compliance with the provisions of the treaty did not demand substantial sacrifices of the signatories /USSR, USA, Great Britain/ as they had concluded their nuclear tests in the air and on the sea anyway. They already possessed thermonuclear warheads of such destructive force that further increasing their yield would have made them to continue the technological miniaturization so vital for them, i.e. the development of vehicles with smaller yields but higher accuracy, and their experimentation by underground tests.

Although the agreement has been concluded outside the auspices of the World Organization, the signatories have called on the other states to join. Those nations however that wished to leave open the possibility of nuclear armament in their policy of security /especially concerned were China and France/ have branded the Treaty discriminative, i.e. they agreed that it was designed to confirm the already existing advantages of the original signatories in the field of nuclear arms

The Outer Space Treaty, concluded in 1967, contains the principles governing the activities of nations in the exploration and use of outer space. The Treaty does not merely declare outer space as 'res omnium communis': Article 1 allows all countries to explore and use it without discrimination. Article 2 rules out the exclusive use of outer space, the Moon or other celestial bodies by any one country. In Article 4 the signatory parties declare that they will refrain from placing arms of mass destruction into earth orbit, or deploying them in outer space. They also pledge to use the Moon and other celestial bodies exclusively for peaceful purposes. Considering the difficulties of verification and the countless practical possibilities of evading the legal formulate, the obligations of the signatories concerning the deployment of nuclear arms in outer space are not too decisive.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty signed in July 1968 reises similar problems. In the first article the signatories that possess nuclear weapons pledge not to transfer these weapons, either directly or indirectly, to other states and not to assist or encourage non-nuclear weapon states in the manufacture of these weapons. In Article 2 non-nuclear weapon states refrain from the manufacture or acquisition of these weapons, and according to Article 3 submit themselves to the safeguard mechanisms of the International Atomic Energy Agency in order to prevent that the nuclear energy from peaceful uses and technology transfers be diverted to nuclear weapons.

The Treaty's basic problem pertinent to international law lies in the fact that the obligations and restrictions it stipulates are unequally shared by the different countries. It is hardly surprising that among non-nuclear weapon states considered the burden of obligations undertaken by nuclear powers insufficient. Consequently they saw the Treaty as discriminative against them and refused to abide by its provisions.

Although Article 6 calls on the nuclear powers to conduct negotiations for the prevention of vertical proliferation, i.e. for the effective limitation and reduction of nuclear arms, but it does not oblige them to take concrete political steps. Also, the representatives of Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States made a solemn Declaration before the UN Security Council undertaking not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states, and if they suffered an aggression their case would be brought before the Security Council without delay.

The treaty declaring the sea-bed a nuclear-free zone, which was signed simultaneously at Moscow, London and Washington in February 1970, prohibits the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and in the subsoil thereof beyond a 12-mile outer limit of signatories' coastal territorial waters. The fly in the ointment, and big one too, is that the Treaty does not make provisions for the deployment of mobile weapon systems, first of all those of anti-submarine warfare, leaving open the very option most intriguing for the signatory parties.

Pre-eminent among the arms control agreements are the SALT treaties. The SALT I agreement on measures with respect to the limitation of strategic arms was signed by Leonid Brezhnev and R. Nixon in Moscow in May 1972. In fact, the Moscow Agreement comprises two parts: under the ABM Treaty the signatories renounce deploying antiballistic missile systems /except for one fixed ABM system each, an exigency due to the already existing defense systems/. Relinquishing the ABM option implies the recognition that it is impossible to achieve absolute efficiency imperative for ABM defense systems, and that the development of these systems would cost astronomical sums of money.

The principal value of the ABM Treaty lies in the fact that it has stabilized the strategic balance prevailing between the two great powers. For the technological breakthrough of either party through the development of a highly effective antiballistic shield would shake the structure of MAD to its foundations. What is paradoxical about nuclear strategy is that the potential aggressor must have an effective defense system to begin with, in order to be able to ward off the second strike of the opponent. Thus by foregoing these defense systems, the signatories actually codified their mutual vulnerability.

The second agreement signed in Moscow provides for a five-year freeze of the aggregate number of strategic offensive weapons, limiting the number of land-based and submarine-based launchers. As a matter of fact, by the time of signing the agreement, the main object of the arms



between the two superpowers had already shifted away from quantitative, to wards qualitative categories. The parties were already striving to achieve qualitative superiority demonstrable in higher accuracy, better penetration capacity and larger throw-weight, rather than numerical excellence.

At the third summit meeting of the USA and the USSR the Threshold Test Ban Treaty prohibiting underground nuclear weapon tests having a yield in excess of 150 kt was signed. /It hardly needs to be emphasized that tests with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles /MIRV/ were already limited to below this mark./

The SALT II Treaty signed at Vienna in June 1979 comprised three basic parts: an agreement in force until the end of 1985, a protocol that expired at the end of 1981, and a Memorandum of Understanding designed to summarize the basic principles of nuclear arms control. Added to these is a written statement by Leonid Brezhnev to president Carter guaranteeing the American party that the Soviet 'Backfire' bomber was not to be equipped with weapons that might enable it to strike target on US territory, and that its production rate would not be altered /c. 30 per year/.

The number of launchers for strategic offensive weapons was limited to 2 400 for both parties; this ceiling was to be lowered to 2 250 by the end of 1981. Within this ceiling, several sublimits were specified for diverse types of launchers. It was during the SALT talks that the numerical parity of weapon systems had been codified for the first time.

The agreement set certain limits to the modernization of vectors. It prohibited the production of 'heavy' strategic missiles, and permitted each party to develop one new ground-launched strategic missile /ICBM/. /Submarine-launched ballistic missile /ALBM/ could be developed unrestrained./

The agreement also put a limit on the number of warheads carried by the vectors. The signatories agreed to freeze the number of warheads /MIRV/ on the existing vectors and to set a ceiling for prospective vectors /10 for ICBMs, 14 for SLBMs/.

The agreement also made provisions for its verification: the signatories agreed on exchange of information, and that they would not disturb the operation of the 'national technical means' of control, namely the reconnaissance satellites.

By the 1970s the signs of an imminent crisis in arms control had become abundant: the arms control agreements had failed to effect a reduction in defense spendings. Quite the contrary, the advancement of war technology gave a new impetus to the qualitative phase of the arms race. Arms control had remained the 'ancilla' of strategic planning. In other words, enhanced efforts were being made to boost the arms race in areas not sanctioned by the agreements, an unmistakable sign of the irreconcilable hegemonic and ideological conflict between the two global powers.

The prime object of the arms control talks has been to reduce the risk of a nuclear war, first of all by stabilizing the strategic balance. Underlying the aspirations after arms control agreements is the conviction that nuclear weapons are fundamentally different from other weapons, and that the only use they have is to deter the others from using them. As against this, a new concept is gaining ground which advocates the possession of these weapons with an eye to increasing political influence by stressing their limited use. According to this concept, the principal aim is no longer the achievement of balance but the pursuit of strategic superiority which entails both military and additional political advantages. However, drives for unilateral advantages challenges the very essence of the idea of arms control.

The above-mentioned limitations of the arms control talks became quite apparent during the Geneva negotiations on eurostrategic arms. In response to the upgrading of the Soviet intermediate-range arsenal by the deployment of SS-20 missiles, the American party - on the plea of the 'increased Soviet threat' and in defense of its European allies - made uncompromising efforts to deploy new intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe.

In addition to reinforcing the European 'nuclear umbrella', the USA's vested interests in the emplacements are of strategic nature, as the Pershing appears to be the 'ideal' weapon to help implement the above-quoted 'war-winning' conception.

It was with good reason that the European partners emphasized the necessity of an agreement at the Geneva talks. The earlier possibility of West Europe becoming the theater of war in the event of a nuclear confrontation between the two great powers had become a certainty with the deployment of new missiles.

Under the banner of 'peace by strength', the American negotiator rigidly stuck by the 'zero-option' which meant that the USA would forego the NATO twotrack decision of 1979 to deploy 464 cruise missiles and 108 Pershing II intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe, if - and only if - the USSR was prepared to dismantle its entire arsenal of SS-4, SS-5 and SS-20 missiles. The USSR repeatedly expressed its willingness to achieve an agreement but emphasized that when assessing the military balance in Europe, one must take account of the American forward-based systems /FBS/, the French 'force de frappe' as well as the British nuclear capability, for they also constitute a threat to the security of the Soviet Union.

Similar contradictions characterized the strategic arms reduction talks /START/ as well. The big powers resumed the arms control dialogue in June 1982 in the hope of coming to an agreement concerning the establishment of a global strategic balance at the lowest possible level of strategic nuclear arms. Progress, however, was impeded by the diametrically opposed bargaining positions in this area as well.

The breakdown of the Geneva talks further deepened the crisis jeopardizing arms control as such. Furthermore, the incredibly dynamic

progress of war technologies, e.g. the advent of the 'star wars', is completely upsetting the strategic balance and begins to question, to an ever increasing extent, the current inventory of arms control talks.

### 3. The dangers of the nuclear arms race

As it is well known, five countries /USA, USSR, Great Britain, France and China/ are currently in possession of nuclear arms /though since the peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974, India can also be numbered among the nuclear powers/. There are suppositions that other nations /Israel, South Africa, perhaps Pakistan/ also have such arms, but they have not been confirmed so far. Compared to the immense nuclear capabilities of the USA and the USSR, the nuclear arsenal of the rest of the nuclear weapon states appears negligible: while the great powers have several tens of thousands of nuclear warheads, the corresponding figure for Britain, France and China is a total of some 1 000. Although each of these 'lesser' nuclear powers alone could cause incredible destruction, the below discussion highlights the Soviet and American nuclear forces for the simple reason that by their mere size they fundamentally determine any change in the world's total stock of nuclear arms.

The American strategic nuclear arms carry about 9 800 nuclear warheads with a total yield tantamount to c. 9 800 million tons of TNT. The Soviet strategic nuclear force is capable of launching about 7 000 warheads with a total yield of some 4 200 million tons of TNT.<sup>3</sup>

As regards tactical /theater/ warfare, a total of some 35 000 warheads are to be reckoned with /c. 20 000 American and 15 000 Soviet/, each of them having a yield several times large than that of the Hiroshima bomb. The total explosive yield of the theater nuclear warheads is equivalent to about 4 500 million tons of TNT.

The total destructive force of nuclear weapons amassed in the world amounts to some 12 000 million tons of TNT, or one million Hiroshima bombs. In other words, each inhabitant of the earth has a 'share' of the yield of about 3 tons of conventional explosives.

The strategic nuclear weapons are carried by intercontinental missiles /ICBM/, submarine-launched ballistic missiles /SLBM/ and strategic bombers. The range of the Soviet and American ICBMs is about 11 000 km, those of the up-to-date SLBMs and the strategic bombers are 7 000- 8 000 km and 12 000 km respectively. /Range is the major criterion to go by when differentiating strategic and theater nuclear weapons, the former having larger ranges, often encompassing whole continents./ Some ballistic missiles are suitable for launching several warheads at a time, and some warheads can be programmed at targets several hundred km away /MIRV/. Strategic bombers carry free-falling nuclear bombs, or air-to-surface missiles with nuclear warheads. One of the most up-to-date specimens of the latter is the USA's air-launched cruise missile or robot-aircraft /ALCM/ with a range of some 2 500 km.

At present the USA has 1 653 ballistic missiles /1053 ICBMs, 600 SLBMs/, 1070 of which are MIRV-ed /550 ICBMs, 520 SLBMs/. Apart from this, some 340 B-52 bombers are 'on the ready'. The USSR - after the Western data - possesses 2 348 ballistic missiles /1 398 ICBMs, 950 SLBMs/, about 1000 of them MIRV-ed /818 ICBMs, 192 SLBMs/. Of the long-range bombers about 150 are suitable for strategic missions.

The tactical /theater/ nuclear weapons are carried by a variety of systems: artillery shells, ballistic surface-to surface missiles, free-falling bombs, air-to-surface missiles, anti-aircraft missiles, so-called nuclear mines, submarine-launched cruise missiles /SLCM/, torpedoes, sea mines, anti-submarine missiles. The range of continental systems is between 12 km /artillery shells/ and several thousand km /ballistic intermediate-range missiles/; the yield of warheads ranges from 100 tons to 1 Mt /TNT/. The United States has theater nuclear weapons deployed in West Europe, Asia, and the Atlantic and Pacific fleets. The USSR has them in deployment in East Europe, the western borders of the USSR and east of the Ural.

Though current military projects envisage a substantial rise in both the American and Soviet arsenals, with special emphasis on the deployment of MIRV-ed ICBMs, SLBMs and cruise missiles, the major advance to be achieved in the near future is expected in the quality of nuclear weapons. This progress means the improvement of accuracy and reliability of the weapon systems.

The target-hitting accuracy of nuclear warheads is measured by the so-called circular error probability /CEP/, i.e. by the radius of the circle drawn around the target within which half of the warheads directed at the target make a hit. Both the USA and the USSR are constantly reducing the CEP of their ICBMs and SLBMs. This index for the USA's Minuteman III will probably be whittled down to 200 m from 350 m with a highly sophisticated new computer.

The improved technical parameters of land-based ICBMs will considerably enhance the American firststrike capability. A further improvement on this capability will be the deployment of the MX missile system currently under development. The MX system combines an advanced type of ICBM and a mobile system of deployment. The aim of the system is to achieve a CEP of 100 m. After the American specialists the most dangerous Soviet ICBM is the SS-18, which is supposed to have a CEP of 500 m now, but its accuracy is expected to be cut down to 250 m in a few years. Each SS-18 warhead has a yield of 500 kt /TNT/. Another significant instrument in the Soviet nuclear arsenal is the ICBM SS-19 which is alleged to have higher accuracy. So far 668 SS-18s and SS-19s are operational. Even when these weapons are MIRV-ed a pace spelled out by the SALT II Treaty, they will be capable of 4 500 warheads. Another Soviet ICBM equipped with multiple warheads is the SS-17 tested for four warheads, of which 150 have been installed so far.

Perfecting the strategic submarines and the ballistic missiles they carry is another question permanently in the forefront. The American fleet of Polaris and Poseidon submarines is gradually being

superseded by TRIDENT nuclear-powered submarines. The first Trident-type strategic submarine of the Ohio Class was completed in 1981, and another 8 are planned to be installed during the '80s. Each Trident submarine is able to carry 24 SLBMs. The SLBM of a Trident-I has a range of 7 400 km /as against a max. 4 600 km of the Poseidon's/ if it launches 8 MIRV warheads of 100 kt each. These long-range SLBMs enable the American strategic submarines to be based closer to the coastal waters of the USA, thus being better protected from Soviet anti-submarine warfare.

The most advanced Soviet SLBM is the SS-N-18, which has a range of 7 400 km and launches three MIRV warheads of 200 kt each. 192 of this type have been put to sea so far on board nine strategic submarines of the Delta Class /each designed to house up to 16 SLBMs/. Another important SLBM of the Soviets is the SS-N-8 with a range of 8 000 km with a single warhead of 1 Mt. At present 290 SS-N-8s are operational aboard 22 strategic submarines of the Delta Class. The USSR is in possession of a total of 950 SLBM launchers, 192 of them MIRV-ed.

The current American ballistic missiles are capable of launching 7 033 independently targetable warheads. 4 880 of these can be launched from the sea. The submarine-launched nuclear force of the USA thus amounts to some 70 % of the whole American missile arsenal. If the warheads carried by strategic bombers are also considered, the sea-launched warheads come up to 50 %.

The majority of Soviet warheads have been installed on ballistic missiles. The USSR has a mere 150 strategic bombers. At present the Soviet ballistic missiles are capable of carrying 7 140 independently targetable nuclear warheads. Of them about 1 300, i.e. 20 %, can be launched from the sea. In addition to that, only one-seventh /10 units/ of the Soviet strategic fleet is normally at sea at the same time, the American sources claim. The land-based ICBM force is far and away the most significant single component of the Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal.

The third constituent of the American strategic triad, the strategic bomber force is being streamlined by the deployment of air-launched cruise missiles /ALCM/. By the end of the bomber programme in 1990 all the /151 B-52 G bombers will have been equipped with 20 ALCMs each. /The ALCM is a small-size subsonic nuclear weapon with a relatively large range /2 500 km/ and very high accuracy./

The bulk of the tactical /theater/ nuclear weapons currently in deployment in West European NATO countries were fielded in the late '50s and early '60s. In the meantime more sophisticated nuclear weapons have been developed including the Pershing-II missile and the ground-launched cruise missile /GLCM/. Their accuracy is so high that they can justly be regarded as first-strike weapons to be reckoned with in view of the possible implementation of the 'warwinning' conception, i.e. waging a limited nuclear war. The Pershing-II is NATO's only ballistic missile that can deeply penetrate into Soviet territory: its range is 1 700 km and CEP is c. 45 m.

The GLCMs to be deployed in Europe can launch 'light' nuclear warheads of 200 kt each, their range is 2 500 km, and are not only highly accurate /CEP: 40 m/ but also have good stealth characteristics which render them comparatively invulnerable.

As the Geneva arms limitation talks focusing on these weapon systems broke down in November 1983, 108 Pershing-II missiles and 464 GLCMs are to be emplaced in the territories of European NATO states under NATO's two-track decision of December 1979.

The USSR's new tactical /theater/ nuclear weapon is the SS-20 ballistic missile fitted with three warheads. It has a range of some 5 000 km and a CEP of 400 m. The deployment of this missile system began in 1977, with some 378 being operational by the end of 1983. 243 of these are targeted on West Europe, the rest /135/ is deployed east of Lake Baikal along the Mongolian border.

As a reprisal after the breakdown of the Geneva talks, Soviet SS-22 and SS-23 theater nuclear weapons began to be deployed in the GDR and Czechoslovakia. With a maximum range of 900 km comes within striking distance of GLCM launchers in Great Britain. The SS-23 with a range of about 500 km can virtually cover all the GLCM launchers in FR Germany from Czechoslovakia.

#### 4. The arms race and the Third World:

##### Principal characteristics of conventional arms trade

Any attempt to bridle the international trade in conventional weapons must take into consideration the factors that propel this trade. The single prime incentive for arms trade is the ever growing number of local and regional conflicts in the Third World. Critics of international trade often argue that instead of buying peace and security, arms transfers aggravate the economic and social insecurity of these countries by draining the already limited natural resources from basic needs. Nevertheless, the pressure for the procurement of arms is effected by the regional arms race in which the keyword is the 'enhancement of national security.' This ill-defined proposition is often used to legitimize concealed drives at hegemony or the preparation of a counterattack as well as the acquisition of huge weapon arsenals for /internal/ repression. Other factors increasing the demand for arms include prestige reasons and the proposition that an import of nuclear weapons and weapon technology is beneficial from the point of view of industrialization and development. Last but not least, the military elite in these countries play a dominant role with their vested interests in, and major influence on arms procurement decision.

Factors inciting the arms exports can be grouped into two basic categories: political and economic factors, with both working for the enhancement of the trend of international arms transfers.

Paramount among political factors is the worldwide East-West conflict: one instrument in this hegemonic struggle is arms transfers.

Arms sales have become the major means of diplomacy towards Third World countries: a means to establish or maintain influence in a region or a country, or to prevent the rivals from becoming influential. Buying a modern weapon system is normally a long-term commitment, involving supply of spare part, technical assistance and training, and a network of advisers.

Suppliers other than the two superpowers /e.g. France, Italy or Sweden/ keep emphasizing that their arms sales free of any political ulterior motive.

One outstanding trend in the arms trade is the intensification of competition in arms supply. The factors that may account for this are mainly economic: the earnings from arms exports help to improve the balance of payment, defense industry increases employment, etc. Also, arms exports are highly lucrative: even if the weapons are sold on favourable terms for the recipient, the export earnings are normally guaranteed by the supplier's government.

About 65 % of the total arms flow during 1979-83 consists of imports by the Third World. The below table shows the major Third World weapon-importing countries.

Table: The largest Third World weapon-importing countries, 1979-83<sup>4</sup>  
/Values are expressed in US \$ million/.

Country	Percentage of total Third World imports	Country	Percentage of total Third World imports
1. Syria	11.8	11. Algeria	2.2
2. Libya	9.2	12. Morocco	2.2
3. Iraq	8.9	13. Viet Nam	2.0
4. Egypt	7.7	14. Korea, South	1.8
5. Saudi Arabia	7.0	15. Peru	1.8
6. India	5.5	16. Taiwan	1.8
7. Israel	4.7	17. Indonesia	1.7
8. Cuba	2.8	18. Jordan	1.5
9. Argentina	2.8	19. Pakistan	1.3
10. Yemen, South	2.2	20. Kuwait	1.2
		Others	19.9
		Total	100.0

The total value of Third World arms imports for 1979-83 was about US \$ 47.1 billion.

It is noteworthy that the highest-ranking Third World arms importing countries - Syria, Libya, Iraq, Egypt and Saudi Arabia - alone account for about 45 % of all the Third World arms imports.

The need for the control of conventional arms transfer is ever more pressing for the below reasons:

- The transfer of arms is often a political act, and with the present tensions between the USA and the USSR there is a danger that a conflict between their respective arms clients could escalate into a major power confrontation.
- The arms market is today a buyer's market due to the global overcapacity of arms production, and the proliferation of arms production capabilities. Hence, the world becomes less stable than before, conflicts become more frequent, and the disposition to solve them peacefully decreases.
- The imports of arms and military technology in general are an economic burden for all countries, but especially for those with limited foreign exchange earnings. The current extreme indebtedness of many countries in the Third World is aggravated by arms imports.

At the same time it is to be pointed out that the efforts to limit the global arms trade have come to a virtual halt. Major initiatives were the unilateral restrictions adopted by the Carter-Administration; the bilateral Conventional Arms Transfer Talks by US and Soviet delegations in 1977 and 1978; the United Nation's suggestion to publish international arms trade and arms production statistics; the proposal the Brandt commission to impose a tax on arms transfers, etc.

Most arms importing countries, however, are firmly opposed to the arms transfer limitations. They are afraid that their security interests would not be fully appreciated. On the other hand, the economic implications of arms exports seem to be so significant for the suppliers that they will hardly submit themselves to restrictions. Even though afraid of the possible consequences of their arms sales, the leading arms suppliers keep reiterating the slogan of 19th-century slave trade: "If we do not do it, somebody else will."



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MILITARIZATION AND ARMS RACE WITHIN THE ASSOCIATION  
OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS; MOTIVATION AND REASONS

by B. Barbi, politologist

Military-security factors have been playing an important role in Southeast Asia since the decline of colonies and the beginning of simultaneously waged independence struggles. By the 1980s the predominant thinking of militarism in official and public sectors, in the economic policies and in the society as a whole, has assumed proportions never seen before. In this study we intend to discuss the process of militarisation and its components. First of all, we would like to examine the political behaviour that over the last few years, has helped to strengthen the militarist concept within the alliance and which has attempted to make the process of militarization publicly accepted by inducing a national and regional feeling of fear and being threatened. Besides this, we shall touch upon three important elements of militarization the strengthening of the military-bureaucratic character of the governments /central power/; the arms race and the build-up of the armed forces which have resulted in the military playing a more significant political role; and the questions connected with the setting up of the various branches of the war-industry.

The purpose of our study is to try and unveil the present situation, outline the standpoint of the ASEAN member states and reveal the real processes or real interests and ideologies behind certain steps of the Southeast Asian region.

We shall direct our attention towards the nations that belong to the alliance although we realize that the developments and events in Southeast Asia today, apart from a very few exceptions are affected directly or indirectly by the ASEAN-Indochinese system of relations. And, this system of relations has an influence on the political-military and economic situation and development in both sub-regions. The attitude of the nations cannot be understood or studied without a consideration of the region as a whole. Furthermore, we are aware of the fact that in the modern history of Indo-China, military problems are just as important as they are for ASEAN. However, we feel justified in making a sharp distinction between the two sub-regions. In the case of the Indo-Chinese nations, the priority of military-defence issues is not the result of a "voluntarily-undertaken" or self-initiated process of development. In the interest of defence of their existence or independence, these countries have been forced, mainly by external factors, to treat military- and national-defence issues in a special way.

In addition to the facts mentioned above, we would like to justify our point of view by referring to the policy pursued by Vietnam. Follow-

ing the termination of foreign aggression, Vietnam gave top priority to the tasks of restoring the economy, reunifying the country and strengthening the social-economic situation.<sup>1</sup> National defence and military considerations were of secondary importance and attention was given to them only to the extent in which they were necessary and inevitable from the point of view of the country's stability and security. We could mention the further example of the three Indochinese nations giving priority to the solution of their economic-social problems following the downfall of the Pol Pot regime. Here, we do not wish to imply - since it would be contrary to known facts and the necessary demands of the situation Indochina is in - that the Indochinese states do not turn a good deal of attention towards military issues. Threat and military pressure from China and on the Thai border have forced them to re-emphasize military policies and to divert a large amount of their financial resources into the military sector. They were compelled to do this, though it was neither an easy nor a desirable decision for them. The Indochinese states view the present situation as one determined by external factors and something which in itself is unfavourable for them. For them the Southeast Asian situation that has developed by these days - and here their concept and attitude sharply differ from that of ASEAN's - is not means to seek and find reasons for the development of military strategic areas and/or to realise open or hidden military /political, economic, etc./ aims.

While the Indochinese states try to put as little emphasis as possible on military issues and try to decrease the impact of military issues on external and domestic policy, the member countries of ASEAN hold to the contrary view. The military factor is not only integrated into the general policy of a few ASEAN member-states /which, in itself, can be considered as quite natural/, but military issues dominate many components of their external and domestic policies.

While the three Indochinese countries, in reality, keep aloof from external military groupings, four of the six member-states of ASEAN are, or at least, were members of multilateral and inter-regional /that is non-regional/ military alliances.<sup>2</sup>

On that basis, we consider ourselves justified to study the organization of ASEAN separately in itself.

#### 1. Starting Point: Changes in the Indochinese situation

In examining the increase of the military trend in Southeast Asia, special attention should be paid to the fact that the ASEAN governments started out from the position in which the events in the region -- at least up until 1975.. had been influenced by unfavourable external factors beyond their control.

In the mid-70s, according to the judgement of the member states of the alliance -- when the Americans retreated from Indochina, the guarantee that had provided a useful and effective barrier in facing the spread of hostile /understand as communist and revolutionary/ ideas,

ceased to exist. This perceived withdrawal signified a dividing line. As it was presumed or manifested by the organization, ASEAN had been developing under peaceful conditions, amid relative economic and political stability and then, a group of countries with hostile ideologies emerged which were ready to extend their political influence. This rather negative evaluation seems to be justified by another factor, the fall of the Khmer Rouge regime. The so-called "Kampuchean case" - once again according to ASEAN terminology - gave further proof that Indochina and above all Vietnam did not accept the status quo of the 70s and endeavoured to spread their influence into new areas. In order to reach her aims Vietnam was willing to use military power.

It would be a mistake to talk about a definite war psychology, on the other hand, it cannot be denied that within ASEAN /although differing in intensity and form for each member-country/ the governments exerted a great deal of influence on the legislative and executive apparatus as well as on the public, in order to make the idea of threat accepted.

They claimed that this danger came from the leading power of Indochina - Vietnam, as well as from the most important ally of the Vietnamese government, the Soviet Union. They saw a factual "proof" of this threat in the assistance the Vietnamese troops were giving to Kampuchea as well as in the "increased" presence of the Soviet navy in the Pacific and the Indian Ocean. This was complemented with the supposition that following the year 1975, with the decrease of American presence, the regional military power balance was disrupted and the new power relations forced the, then, five countries into an unfavourable but by no means defenceless position against Indochina.

Our aim is not to give a detailed analysis of the changes that occurred as the consequences of these factors which are more complex in nature than outlined above. We want rather to emphasize the fact that the member-states of the organization have attempted, and continue to attempt, to make use of the changes, that resulted in an unbalanced military situation, to arouse a regional /and national/ feeling of insecurity in order to follow a policy that ensures a greater priority to be given to military factors.

In other words, the member-states voiced the opinion either directly or indirectly that ASEAN /or some of the member-states/ were threatened by external aggression. A threat directed against any one of the member-states, concerned the alliance as a whole and all the member-states had to prepare for averting the danger. We shall see later the situation of Indochina and the question of threat. At this point, we would like to call attention to two important considerations: the "external" character of the threat, and the fact that this threat can be averted. The stressing of both these factors has been especially important for the ASEAN governments. The emphasis on the "external" character of threat, that is the threat coming from outside the frontiers of the region, was an indispensable condition for making the process of militarization accepted by the public within the alliance. It would not have been easier for the military to have made their aims

accepted by the public by branding internal resistance as "internal" aggression or insitigation; on the contrary, it would have hindered them. /Not to a small extent because through the implementation of the military elements, the leaders of the ASEAN countries wanted rather to strengthen their position against internal opposition, and this could be best realized only through an injection of fear from external danger using nationalist slogans. That is how the idea of fear and of being threatened can be eventually made accepted. It is only from such a position, that the amendment of a previously balanced, more peaceful and less military and power-minded policy can be justified. For it is only in this way such a policy which did not envisage any hope for victory could count on acceptance. The possibility of success, that is, the possibility of overcoming the threat was made necessary furthermore by the fact that the ASEAN alliance did not represent a unified standpoint concerning the role the big powers were playing in the region. The voicing of a completely subordinated role or beliefs in the weakness of the organization might have lead to growing external interference, and in general, to increasing role by external powers /the US, Japan, the Soviet Union and ultimately, China./

Returning to the subject of linking the feeling of threat and the situation in Indochina, it can be considered a fact that the whole position and external attitude of the organization, including the justification for militarization and its regional strategy, has been built on the Indochina issue. In linking the feeling of threat with the situation in Indochina we need to ask the question whether the changes in Indochina, its trends in political and strategic development that have already determined the attitude of the ASEAN, were the real prime motives behind the new policy of the member states. Can the "feeling of threat" of the danger of external aggression justify increased endeavours for security and thus the "accusations" of militarization be refused as fasely grounded? Or a more complex assesement of the situation calling for a deeper insight would explain the position of the ASEAN and prove that we are witnessing an unjustified overestimation of the military elements and militarization in Southeast Asia.

Undoubtedly, several factors would seem to justify the view according to which "if there were no Indochina, there would be no ASEAN militarization." With the end of the American aggression against Vietnam and Kampuchea, these nations, that had been united in their struggles for independence were relieved of a serious burden. This in itself can be evaluated as a significant improvement in their position. We can complement this with another factor, namely that in 1975 the war had not just simply ended, but Indochina had won a victory over the world's leading military power, both on the political and military field. Consequently, the United States had been forced to withdraw from any of its positions in Southeast Asia, and this meant that Vietnam and its neighbouring countries could significantly strengthen their positions vis-a-vis ASEAN, /relatively, compared to previous power relations./ Now, disregarding the years of the Khmer Rouge regime a politically and militarily unified Indochina has emerged which stands up against the organization. Thus Indochina has not only been unified but it enjoys a military superiority -- as is frequently stated by the member states.

Figures on the number of Indochina's armaments and her amount of weaponry, as well as the readiness, experience, military fitness, discipline and so on of her armed forces certainly support this last statement.<sup>3</sup> However, this approach is too simplified and as such it paints a false picture of the situation, for it conceals the reasons as to why the three Indochinese nations have been forced to set up and maintain such advanced armed forces. It also disregards the fact that over recent years the Indochinese armed forces have not been strengthened, apart from the short period when China intruded into Vietnamese territory. / So, on the whole, we can only talk about keeping the armed forces at the existing level. A deeper analysis could also show that following the unification of the country, Vietnam diverted a significant part of her army into productive work thus decreasing the number of army personnel directly involved in the military sphere.

Taking into consideration the changes in Indochina, the increase of the significance of military issues, the increase of the number of troops cannot, in itself, be totally condemned. When relations become tense between ideological opponents, e.g. American-Soviet or even ASEAN-Indochinese relations, the demand for strengthening military positions is not always politically justifiable but it is at least understandable. That is not to say however that we accept the use of force or the threat of using force. The settlement of problems can only be considered justified by way of negotiations -- but we are speaking about the right to security. However, the procedures taken by ASEAN cannot be accepted in the face of the fact that the Indochinese nations have no plans to endanger the security of the member-states of ASEAN, nor do they wish to direct hostilities against the alliance.

The procedures of ASEAN cannot be justified either, because, under the pretext of opposition to Indochina, the ASEAN governments endeavour not only to strengthen their internal military security but, hiding behind this explanation, try to reach several other objectives as well. Before we call attention to these hidden aims, we need to point out the fact that ASEAN, by founding militarization upon a single aspect, may be making the situation dangerous for both sides. This is because the militarization may accentuate the tension between the two sub-regions and so lead to a further deterioration in relations making direct military conflicts more of a possibility.

The next question that needs to be examined is whether ASEAN can answer the reasons for its militarization more satisfactorily. Beyond the obvious negative answer, one has to point to those internal and external political aims, reasons which play a role in the development of militarism. Returning to the issue of Indochina, we have to emphasize again that the three Indochinese states -- and here we exclusively deal with the possibility of a military strategic threat, despite the more favourable political and military conditions, -- are not in any position to threaten ASEAN either as a whole or any one of its member-states. The numerical comparison between the armed forces and armaments paints a unilaterally threatening picture only if looked at in a simplified way. If we make a detailed study of the two sub-regions, taking into consideration political, social and economic factors, then it becomes

clear that Indochina lacks the power for any external action /even if ASEAN or a few Western states fo presume this ability/. Thus, besides the fact that the Indochinese nations themselves have always observed the principles of peaceful coexistence and have refrained from efforts directed towards changing the status quo and violating ASEAN interests, their internal social and political situation would not make it possible for them to do otherwise and realize unfounded aims.

On the basis of the well-known conditions in Southeast Asia, observers generally do not consider seriously the statement of the ASEAN governments either today or in the forthcoming years that the possibility of "aggression" will come from Indochina.

Among the external factors, there are more serious elements than the "threat" from Vietnam. We have to consider that ASEAN itself attempts to fill the vacuum which -- the alliance presumes -- had been created by the partial American withdrawal. So, the governments believe that following the withdrawd of the American troops, a military -and political - power vacuum, appeared, and this space was open to be filled! by any one of several powers: the Soviets, the Chinese, the Japanese or ASEAN itself at least, or by some of its member-states. Of the external powers, the first two were obviously out of the question for the six countries developing in a capitalist way. Japan, because of reasons to be looked at in detail later on, was not a desirable military power either. So, there remained ASEAN alone to claim the "right" to fill the vacuum through adequate and fast military development. Since ASEAN is not a military but a political organization, the member-states are not willing to talk about military developments, moreover, they try to keep quiet on the subject. That is again why it is comfortable for them to refer to an external force when trying to justify militarization.

Ironically, the military power and influence of one or other of the six nations belonging to ASEAN is a delicate subject even among the member-states. There is still much distrust and concern among the partners that one or maybe two fo the member-states might develop or dominate the military sphere within the alliance. Conditions are acceptable for the ASEAN countries only in the case where each member-state can adequately develop its military readiness and have a proportional share in the common military task of deterring potential opponents even if they come from within the organization itself. These conditions result in a more dynamic pace of militarization on the one hand, while on the other, owing to the distrust within the alliance, it leads to a failure in coordinating developments in each member-state. This latter becomes the initiator of an intra-regional arms-race which is difficult to control.

The situation of Japan is singular in the sense that ASEAN would like to see her role increased in the political and economic field, but refuses and, moreoever, is somewhat concerned over the expansion and strengthening of the military undertakings on behalf of Japan and her armed forces Indonesian military leaders clearly voiced the opinion of the member-states -- a rare occurrance -- when they emphasized that

a parallel has to be drawn between the development of Japan's defense potentials and the expansion of ASEAN's own forces. "Japan's military potentials must not develop without an adequate size of increase of the military potentials of ASEAN."<sup>4</sup>

Among the internal reasons for giving priority to military measures, one has to mention primarily the problems arising from the social and economic situation of the member states. The reference to "external threat" could justify the security-orientated approach regarding both the foreign and domestic political issues. Through this kind of approach, a favourable position could be worked out that would eliminate national legal and illegal opposition and, following on nationalist propaganda, strengthen the internal social security.

This concept of "security above all" justifies the adjustment of the social structure, the transformation of the political and administrative sphere according to the demands of the armed forces. As a natural reaction, to this will facilitate the acceptance and expansion of the military concept.

## 2. The Strengthening of the Military-Bureaucratic Character

In two of the six member-states of ASEAN, in Indonesia and Thailand, the power is in the hands of the representatives of the army. In the Philippines, President Marcos' personal power directly depends on the support of the armed forces backing him.

In Malaysia and Singapore, the armed forces have, until quite recently, played a limited political role, at least superficially. In both states, the power is in the hands of the civilian parties and with the exception of portfolios belonging to the national defence, the army is not represented in the administration. However, in practice, the internal legal systems ensure extensive authority for the military-police units and their leaders. On the other hand, the political leadership in both countries forces political activities into very strict and rigid frames.

In the three former states the representatives of the armed forces not only possess and influence top level leadership but exercise a wide-ranging control over the whole socio-political structure and, even within the economic sphere they play a significant role in the highest and middle levels. The situation is well reflected by the fact that nearly one third of the Indonesian military staff hold civilian and administrative posts. The case concerning the Thai armed forces is similar as well.<sup>5</sup> The influence of the civilian forces in decision-making is limited; measures of any importance are, without exception, taken with the approval of the military.

The share and role of the armed forces in the leadership is usually explained by two factors within ASEAN /but in other developing countries as well/: on the one hand reference is made to the incompetence,



lack of knowledge or corruption of the civilian politicians and staff of experts, while on the other, by the fact that the army -- as in most of the third world nations -- is the forerunner of modernization; it is an important guarantee for it. It establishes and makes accepted new value systems in the field of discipline, organization efficiency, and technological knowledge, even in countries which are closely bound to the traditional values and order.<sup>6</sup> In some places this role is accepted quietly, while in countries, such as Indonesia /here, through the concept of "double function- dwi fungsi"/ it is sanctioned in the Constitution.

The fact that the armed forces are accepted as the vanguard of modernization and they are recognized as "a large strata of the elite", having an impact on the cultural, political and economic super-structure of the society",<sup>7</sup> can easily result in the militarization of the society as a whole. It is often noted that the strongly military-oriented leadership of the Third World lays a too great and ever growing emphasis on eventual aggression, from within and outside, and, by giving the military field a priority, they refuse to support and accept any social and economic strategy or policy which does not follow this line or way of thinking. The idea of a possible aggression provides a basis for militarism.<sup>8</sup>

The danger of militarization is intensified and the process is accelerated by the fact that within the system of alliance the leading powers, Indonesia as well as Thailand which enjoys the title of "front-line state", themselves can be considered as militarized states and thus take the lead. A further negative feature is that external partners, being outside the region, also stimulate and/or support the realization of such trends.

We think that in the majority of the developing countries, thus in the capitalist countries in Southeast Asia too, the lack of a strong and relatively wide-ranging bourgeoisie that would be able to meet the demands of a number of capitalist and social tasks play a major role in the development of military bureaucracy. As set against the lack of civilian bureaucracy, an officer strata emerges on a wide scale, with more definite political-ideological aims and plans, possessing the most important means to implement their aims: the force of arms. This is the strata that fills the vacuum. However, the characteristic feature of this social strata /because of its size, we believe, we can talk about strata as set against social "group"/, is that it cannot go beyond its own limits. So, in certain fields, it actually contributes to the building of the nation and the society. It tries to form society as a whole in its own image. However, this layer does not adapt to the social surroundings, but tries to "adjust" to the prevailing conditions. At the same time, it considers itself as omnipotent, infallible and indispensable even in the political economic and administrative spheres. So it insists on its power even at a time when there emerged a bourgeois class capable of taking over the capitalist value systems. And, in order to keep its power and to justify it -- in addition to overestimating itself as a capable and effective social and economic force -- the military applies the idea of threat, as discussed earlier.

Despite certain positive characteristics, this military-bureaucratic power plays a negative role, on the one hand because it hinders the free, democratic development of the society; it tries to oust from the political sphere those who deviate from the determined political line shared or represented by the military /either to the right or to the left/. Naturally, it considers primarily the left wing as a danger to itself and to the incumbent social order, but experience has shown that it refuses to accept criticism even if it comes from the right/. On the other hand, it plays a negative role because this layer, no matter how much they try to figure as a guarantee of modernization, is basically rigid, incapable of flexibly adjusting to the changing circumstances. It is the sphere of economy where this rigidity is least apparent since a relatively larger amount of intervention /but not decision-making/ is ensured here for the so-called technocrats. However, the political, ideological, cultural, etc. fields well justify our statements.

### 3. A Wave of Arms Race within ASEAN

The increase of financial funds and provisions for the armed forces, and the growing number of military troops represent an organic part of the process of militarization and the expansion of military bureaucracy. Military expenditures, where the increase of the arms race is the most perceptible, are obvious signs of militarization, especially when this process of military development cannot be basically justified.

ASEAN has doubled its military expenditures over the past five years and in comparison to earlier periods, it extended the scale of obtainable armaments. According to figures by IISS /London/, all the members of ASEAN at least doubled their military expenditures between 1975 and 1980, but Malaysia, for instance, has increased its purchases and the value of military investments over six times.<sup>9</sup> A major amount of the resources are intended to be spent on new bases, training centres, and the establishment of new weapon systems.<sup>10</sup> One part of the arms purchases is used for the purchase of offensive weapons systems. An increasing size of Western /mainly American/ military aid packages, and advantageous credits complement ASEAN's domestic military expenditures.

The modernization of the armed forces and military arsenal is not an isolated area of military policy, and in this way its influence can be detected in the field of the whole of defence. Its implementation and realization is not limited to the increase in the number of troops, and the rapid growth in costs linked with arms purchases influences the existing or planned strategies of the individual ASEAN countries and their military plans. This explains that over the past few years, the majority of the alliance's member states have basically modified their former strategic and tactical principles and ideas of "national defence". In Malaysia, for example, as a result of reorganization /and increases in personnel/, the armed forces, earlier almost exclusively used for containing internal subversion and guerrilla movements; is now faced with a new system of demands and tasks. Action against "outside threat", - formerly of a secondary nature, - has become a primary factor. The previously purely defensive Malaysian army has been reorganized ac-

According to this idea. Indonesia can also be cited, where the national strategic-military concepts and mobilization plans were modified in the late 1970s. The idea behind it is that the armed forces should be better prepared for a war with outside forces, waged with conventional weapons.

The increased military development is explained by the alleged outside external threat. However, we think it is only one, and not even the most important, of the factors which could be mentioned among the real causes. We think that the author of the formerly quoted article in FEER is right in saying that "the Five are preparing to fill the vacuum themselves /left after the American withdrawal - B.B./" The author adds that in the forthcoming years, ASEAN can become capable of deploying their joint military force beyond their national borders, to defend the vitally important sea routes, to follow military movements within the region and to airlift their troops beyond the borders.<sup>14</sup>

In addition we could mention that the military development within ASEAN is of communal and organizational nature on the one hand, and serves national interests, on the other. It is of an organization character in the sense that each of the members voice their trust in the cooperation within the alliance and the need of unity. /Although, officially the elaboration of military cooperation based on treaties is not on the agenda/. On the other hand, weapons naturally strengthen the country where the most modern types and means are used. Thus, the individual member countries also compete with one another for a tastier part of the military cake. The differences between the individual countries cannot be analysed here due to lack of space, but it is important to direct attention to the fact that the increasing military defence potential has an important role to play in their relations with one another. And this is especially evident in the case of the smallest member state, Singapore toward its two big neighbours, Malaysia and Indonesia.<sup>12</sup>

And finally, the remark of the noted peace researcher, Mary Kaldor concerning ASEAN seems to be valid. Mary Kaldor writes that there is a widespread belief that military power originates in the higher military technology which can be expressed in quantitative and qualitative data and, that the political power derives from the military power.<sup>13</sup> Although she did not elaborate her thoughts, she probably meant that the political and military power and strength is more than a simple qualitative and quantitative entirety of the armed forces and armaments. It is much more than that. The social-political-military conditions of a nation or an alliance depend on their totality and unity in which at best the military factor has a subordinate role. And in this sense, the development of the armed forces and weaponry in ASEAN, at least as long as the social-political differences within the alliance are not resolved, cannot mean anything else but the pure mathematical-theoretical calculation of the military potential and only very moderately increase the joint strength of the alliance.

#### 4. Plans and aims of the military industry

An important factor in the emergence of militarism is the effort to establish a military-industrial complex within the country's own territory. This is closely linked with the growth in the military expenditure, and generally with the revaluation of the military-security questions, or the issue of the military groups' adherence to power.

Within the ASEAN, there is a trend to increasingly meet the demands for military equipment from domestic production. We can hardly speak of a well-established military industrial basis and capacities of a broad spectrum as yet. However, it is clear that each of the five member states tried to develop the military industry in accordance with its own national conditions. And here, the national conditions are an important factor because they determine the given country's possibilities. In this way, Indonesia, which has an economy with the widest structure -- although it is far from being the most highly developed -- tries to build the basis of domestic arms manufacturing in a very broad section. The Indonesian attempts range between simple guns and the more modern, though not the most up-to-date, missile production. At the same time, Singapore which can be regarded as the technologically most advanced country in the region, does not aim at expanding its production structure horizontally but rather at introducing higher level, better quality and more complex production and exports of these goods.

With the exception of the leading, most modern products /missile systems, air- and navy units, etc./, practically the entire military arsenal is produced in the region. But it should be added that the number of products developed and produced with these countries' own resources is not high as yet; assembling and production based on licences are decisive.

The six countries explain the development of their military industries with in the first place the importance of the security of supplies; selfreliance in the region takes the second place, while efforts to have patents, the third. Last but not least, they refer to the possibility of using the technical and technological knowledge gained here in other spheres of the economy: i.e. to the expected positive effects of the military industry.

None of these arguments can be considered as sufficient or well founded, or would justify the additional burdens the laying of the foundations of the military industries involve. Neither self-reliance, nor the security of the supplies can be regarded as feasible to ASEAN for a long time to come. Knowing the circle of goods involved in the production, one has to note that in the field of the most important strategic weapons, each member state will continue to rely on the leading foreign arms manufacturers and arms dealers. The issue of standardisation, recurring for several years, still needs to be implemented.<sup>14</sup> The beneficial influence of the modern military industries on other sectors of the economy could not be proved, and the implementation of the higher than average technological knowledge in other fields of the economy rarely happens.

Many arguments could be quoted against the introduction of military industries, starting from the distraction of development resources, up to the expensive civilian industry production and uneconomic raw material consumption, and the drawing away of the qualified skilled workers from the other sectors of production.<sup>15</sup> In most of the cases, the creation of military industries in the developing countries is not a good "business". However, in their realization -- and that holds true of ASEAN as well -- not necessarily the economic viewpoints, but rather the political /and military/ considerations are given a priority. But to what extents these correspond to the given country's national interests, - well, that is another question.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. The fact that, following 1975, Vietnam - focussing on internal affairs - concentrated its efforts and attention on the restoration of the national economy, has been acknowledged by most Western observers as well.
2. Thailand and the Philippines were members of the already defunct SEATO and even today, bilateral agreements ensure the legal basis for American military interference. Malaysia and Singapore are contracting partners of the still valid Five Power Defence Agreement.
3. According to the publication of the "International Institute for Strategic Studies" /London/, the Indochinese states have a military force of 1.1 million, while ASEAN has only 770.000 troops. The Military Balance, 1981-1982.
4. A Doctrine of Suspicion. "Far Eastern Economic Review" /FEER/. September 11, 1981. p.36.
5. Five Fingers on the Trigger, FEER, 1980 October 24th, p.33
6. The Men of White Horses Now Ride a Tiger, FEER, 1980 April 11th, p.34
7. Ibid.
8. Peter Lock and Herbert Wulf: "The Economic Consequences of the Transfer of Military-Orientated Technology". In Mary Kaldor and Asbjorn Eide /eds./. "The World Military Order", "The Impact of Military Technology on the Third World." Praeger Special Studies, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1979, P.227
9. See "The Military Balance" 1981-1982 IISS /London/ Figures on the charter of p.113
10. László B. Horányi: "Military Roles in Asia", Zrinyi Publishers, Budapest, 1982, p.216 /In Hungarian/

11. FEER, 1980 October 24th, p.32
12. The question is touched upon by Richard Tanter: "The Militarization of ASEAN": Global Context and Local Dynamics, Alternatives, 1982, Vol. 7, No.4.
13. Introduction. In Ulrich Albrech-Mary Kaldor /eds./: "The World of Military Order", Praeger Publishers, New York, 1979, p.7
14. In detail, see Balázs Barbi: "ASEAN", Kossuth Publishers, Budapest 1982, p.50 /In Hungarian/
15. Peter Lock and Herbert Wulf: op. cit, pp 219-220

#### IV. HUMAN RIGHTS

##### THE CHANGING CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS

by Hanna Bokor-Szegő, professor, doctor  
of Juridical Science, Budapest

A large amount of literature has been accumulated in social sciences dealing with the concept and origin of human rights as well as their scope of exercise. This study by no means undertakes the pretentious and otherwise hopeless task of presenting some sort of a synthesis of related investigations. What it sets out to do, namely to attempt an analysis of the changing concept of human rights in connection with the activities of the United Nations family<sup>1</sup>, encompasses in any case an enormous complex of problems. Nor does it seek to offer an all-inclusive and exhaustive exposition and assessment, but is merely concerned to highlight the fundamental issues, primarily to analyze the historical circumstances which have, within the international organizations of the 20th century, germinated the idea of the protection of human rights on an international level and have, after World War II, led to the formulation of the promotion of respect for human rights as an objective of the United Nations /A/; to define the actual scope of action by the United Nations for the implementation of this objective /B/, to give a broad outline of the relevant role of the world organization /C/; and, finally, to present an outline of future prospects and emergent tendencies /D/.

##### A/ International organizations and human right issues

In examining the international aspects of human rights one should start from the fact that the right of every State to regulate by its own decision the status of the population of its territory clearly follows from the concept of state sovereignty. The state lays down, by its own legislation and sovereign act of will, the rights and duties that determine the status not only of its citizens and but those of the other inhabitants of its territory. Accordingly, the question of human rights, at the core of which is how to regulate the status of the population living in the territory of a State, is within the domestic jurisdiction of individual States.

Still, the 20th century has seen the question of human rights brought gradually into the forefront of attention at the international fora.

After the close of World War I, there occurred a qualitative change in the multilateral international cooperation of States. The League of Nations was established, which, though by its nature it primarily intended to promote political cooperation among States,



was virtually the first of the international organizations to develop permanent multilateral interstate cooperation in several other fields /health, culture, etc./.

The League Covenant did not yet make provision for the general protection of human rights, nor even did it use the term human rights, but the idea of international assurance of human rights was already present in some of its provisions, first of all in Art. 23, which expressed that the Members of the League "will endeavour to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labour for men, women and children...".

Certain international agreements concerning the protection of human rights, such as the Slavery Convention of 1926, came into being under the auspices of the League.

It was within the framework of the League of Nations that the question of human rights emerged in a more concrete form namely, first of all, the international protection of minorities in connection with the fundamental rights of the populations living in the territories annexed as a result of World War I /free use of their native tongue, etc./.<sup>3</sup>

The idea of securing the universality of the Covenant provisions for the protection of minorities was repeatedly raised, with no tangible result, at the fora of the League.<sup>4</sup> The atrocities committed by fascist Germany after 1933 prompted the League of Nations, under the pressure of progressive forces, to consider more seriously the idea of giving a more universal character to its provisions for the protection of minorities, namely to extend their application to the populations of all States, but a fateful mark was put upon the work of the League by the fact that the League, owing to the political views of some of its members, proved powerless in dealing with Hitlerite fascism: in the hope of cooperation with fascist Germany it failed to take action against the mass violation of human rights.

As regards the relationship between the question of human rights and the activity of international organizations, separate mention should be made of the International Labour Organization, which was established after World War I. and was directly concerned with the right to work as one of fundamental relevance to the material exercise of human rights. What were the factors leading to the creation of an autonomous international organization to regulate employment relations at a time when only the first germs of the idea of international protection of human rights existed?

In principle, under Art. 23 of the League Covenant, the League itself was to deal with questions of employment within the scope of its non-political functions. In that period, however, the victorious powers in World War I. had to take into account the impact which the radical changes brought about by the Russian revolution had exercised on the working-class movement which was already on the scene as an organized force. Moreover, the privations and war experiences only served to increase social contradictions in all countries.<sup>5</sup> "We can say - writes Scelle - that a new great power, Labour...,

made its appearance at the Peace Conference".<sup>6</sup> Therefore the victorious powers at the Peace Conference of Paris set up an autonomous international organization to deal with international labour relations, and the Constitution of ILO formed part of the peace treaties.

The establishment of ILO was justified by the peace treaties in these terms: Universal peace, the establishment of which is the objective of the League of Nations, can be achieved only if it is based on social justice; and whereas the existing conditions of labour involve injustice, hardship and privation for large numbers of people thus producing unrest so great as to imperil the peace and harmony of the world consequently an improvement of these conditions is urgently required.

In actual fact, the establishment and activity of ILO were influenced by an interesting intertwining of two divergent tendencies prevailing in the capitalist states. On the one hand, owing to the actions of the increasingly organized working-class movement, the capitalist countries were no longer in a position to reject any improvement of employment conditions. On the other hand, owing to the labour reforms gradually introduced, they themselves came to be interested in evolving the international uniformity of employment relations. By the conclusion of international labour conventions within the framework of ILO they wanted to lay down uniform standards for national regulations of employment conditions. In that way they thought to ensure that the ratio of production costs involved in the employment of labour remain at the same level in every country or in other words that, the capitalists of no country enjoy a more advantageous position in the international market by securing labour at a lower cost and thus reducing production costs through the application of lower labour standards. Analyzing the causes that led to the birth of ILO, Valticos, one of the most outstanding experts on the Organization, emphasized that the adoption of international labour standards had been necessitated by the service of "social justice" /"justice sociale"/, but he also conceded that an essential role in the creation of the Organization had likewise been played by considerations of "international competition". As he wrote, "The international conventions relating to labour standards offer a device for dissipating fears that national labour protection measures will put the countries concerned into an unfavourable position in the international market by burdening their products with greater costs than the rival states do".

At any rate, the International Labour Organization provided a possibility for the general employment conditions to be discussed at interstate level. In this way certain elements of the right to work became the concern of international legislation.

From 1935 onwards the League of Nations witnessed increasing efforts to widen the scope of the League's non-political activities. The reason was that the failure of the League's system of security had become more and more obvious /particularly when the sanctions voted against Italy after its attack on Abyssinia remained more paper and ink and when, afterwards, the League proved impotent in regard to the successive

aggressions by Germany/. Those efforts were intended to ensure that the League remained, at least a body for the promotion of economic and social cooperation.

The report of the committee set up to study the question /the Bruce Report/, which was adopted by the Assembly, suggested the creation of a new League body named "Central Commission for Economic and Social Questions" to "impart a fresh and strong impulse" to the economic and social activities of the League of Nations. The events of war prevented the new body from coming into being, but the adoption of the Bruce Reform was tantamount to formulating the demand that the permanent organized frameworks of interstate cooperation should serve not only as a means to meet the needs of political cooperation, but also to ensure cooperation in other fields /economic, social, etc./. There was also the initial recognition that such cooperation was not only a concomitant of, but a prerequisite to, unimpeded political cooperation. It was at the time when the United Nations was born that this idea and, more specifically, the need for the international protection of human rights emerged again in a more concrete form under a changed set of historical circumstances.

The United Nations was founded under a wholly different pattern of circumstances from those leading to the creation of the League of Nations. During World War II there was a growing recognition of the fact that unless the fundamental social problems were solved it was impossible for a set of conditions indispensable for the creation and maintenance of peaceful relations to emerge either at the national or interstate levels. The historic moment of recognition that led up to the formulation of the principles of the United Nations Charter and to the establishment of the world organization itself was determined by the interplay of several factors.

Fascism in numerous countries brought the most intense and cruel suffering ever upon millions of people. Whipped up to the extreme, the aggressiveness displayed by the reign of fascism within its national borders, professing the ideology of inferiority of certain peoples and races, was necessarily coupled with aggression against other states. The resultant outbreak of the world war and the devastations it caused with advanced means of warfare, combined with harmful economic and psychic effects, left practically no state and people of the world untouched. In the war against the fascist states a close cooperation developed between the Soviet Union and the leading capitalist big powers, which opened up the possibility of maintaining interstate relations guided by a new spirit.

Thus the post-World War II developments in the international protection of human rights are explained by historical circumstances. There was evidence to point to a close relationship between the respect of human rights in individual countries and the maintenance of international peace and security. The recognition of this interrelationship is reflected in the Charter of the United Nations, a world organization destined for the preservation of international peace and security.

B/ The role of the United Nations in the international protection of human rights

The idea of the protection of human rights on the international level became an integral part of the Charter. In the Preamble to the Charter the peoples of the United Nations reaffirm their faith "in fundamental human rights...". According to para. 3 of Art. 1, one of the purposes of the Organization is "to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all...". Under para. 1/b of Art. 13, the General Assembly may initiate studies and make recommendations in furtherance of these purposes. Among the provisions on international economic and social cooperation Art. 55 likewise expresses the endeavour of the United Nations to promote respect for, and observance of, human rights.

Under the Charter, responsibility for the discharge of this function is vested in the Economic and Social Council /ECOSOC/ as one of the principal United Nations bodies. Working under the authority of the General Assembly, ECOSOC is empowered to make recommendations for the purpose of promoting the observance of human rights. /para. 2 of Art. 62/. ECOSOC ensures regular economic and social cooperation among States partly through commissions established by it /e.g. the Commission on Human Rights or the Commission on the Status of Women/, partly through coordination of the activities of specialized agencies. The latter attend to significant international tasks in the economic, social, cultural, educational and health fields as well as in other special spheres of work. By way of indicating the powers of specialized agencies collaborating in the creation of material conditions for the enjoyment of human rights we shall refer to the aims and purposes formulated in their respective constitutions or statutes. Thus, for instance, the purpose of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization /UNESCO/, as defined in its Constitution, is "to contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture...". The objective of the World Health Organization /WHO/ is "the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health".

The establishment of ECOSOC satisfied the requirement for the United Nations to create an organizational framework for promoting interstate cooperation, in political as well as other fields, with a view to the maintenance of international peace and security. The idea the outlines of which had emerged in the last years of the League of Nations had thus been materialized and further developed.

The United Nations Charter, in defining the rights and duties of Member States as regards human rights goes far to take into account the sovereignty of States and the scope of activity of the international organization in relation to human rights issues as well. The debates at the San Francisco Conference, where the Charter was drafted clearly testify to the drafter's intention to fit the international protection of human rights into the well-considered and planned system

devised by the United Nations Charter for all fields of international cooperation on the basis of respect for the sovereignty of states. Such intention is expressed in Art. 2 of the Charter, which spells out the principle of the sovereign equality of all Member States, and, not least, in para. 7 of Art. 2, which rules out interference in internal affairs.

As is stated in one of the best known comments on the United Nations Charter, and as it logically follows from the principle of "sovereign equality", "it has become clear in the process of drafting the Charter that the United Nations is an organization which seeks to attain certain economic and social goals through international cooperation and that the organs of the United Nations are vested with appropriate powers solely for the purpose of facilitating such cooperation". Analyzing para. 7 of Art. 2, the commentary goes on to state that "confirmation of the Charter provisions relating to economic and social matters did not confer powers on the United Nations to compel States to take into consideration such questions as are still to be regarded as falling within the exclusive jurisdiction thereof".<sup>10</sup>

There is no doubt, however, that under Art. 56 of the Charter Member States are obliged to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization in economic and social matters.

It is therefore right to ask what constitutes the actual substance of the obligation laid down in Art. 56 of the Charter if a Member State may, by reference to para. 7 of Art. 2, refuse to cooperate with the United Nations in the protection of human rights. Where is the exact limit to which the organs of the United Nations may go to advance the goals set forth in Art. 55, without acting at variance with the prohibition contained in para. 7 of Art. 2? In what cases may Member States refuse cooperation with the organs of the United Nations by invoking the prohibition of para. 7 of Art. 2, without failing in their obligation under Art. 56?

In taking action for the protection of human rights the United Nations shall not violate the prohibition embodied in para. 7 of Art. 2. First of all, it must refrain from interference in individual cases involving the human rights of a natural person because it is not empowered to redress grievances of natural persons living in the territories of Member States. If, however, the entire legal system of a Member State fails to guarantee human rights for all /e.g. is based on the policy of apartheid/, it is obvious that the State involved not only fails to comply with its obligation undertaken in Art. 56 of the United Nations Charter, but its conduct is also contrary to the entire spirit of the Charter. If the organs of the United Nations deal with such cases and by using different methods, relying mainly on recommendations of the General Assembly, seek for a change in the conduct of a Member State, their action is not deemed to be interference in the internal affairs of that State. It should be added that in such cases there is even more the United Nations can do: apply coercive measures in principle. In the documents of the San Francisco Conference there is a statement to the effect that it is first and foremost the business of individual States

to observe and protect human rights. "If, however, these rights and freedoms are violated in such a grave manner as to endanger peace, the matter is no longer the concern of individual States."<sup>11</sup> In other words, if by consistent and constant violations of human rights a State brings about a situation jeopardizing international peace and security, the Security Council of the United Nations may adopt such measures against the State involved as it deems appropriate and necessary. In such cases the Member States of the United Nations shall participate in the coercive measures adopted by the Security Council. Whether in our days there is a real chance of deciding on and carrying out such measures is a different question, for if any of the great powers in the Security Council - of the five permanent members of the Security Council - uses its "veto", no coercive measure can be adopted. In our age when differences between great powers are aggravated and a considerable part of the Member States of the United Nations belong to opposing systems of alliance it is hardly conceivable for the great powers in the Security Council to reach unanimity on coercive measures to be adopted against a State consistently and constantly violating human rights. A typical example is the positions regarding the apartheid policy of the Republic of South Africa. While the General Assembly, where the Third World and the socialist countries are in the majority, has for years adopted /recommendatory/ resolutions calling upon the Security Council to apply effective coercive measures against the Republic of South Africa /such as complete isolation through severance of interstate relations/, such far-reaching measures have not been decided upon by the Security Council.

C/ The role of the United Nations in the promotion of respect for human rights

Let us now survey the results achieved by the United Nations in the promotion of respect for human rights over the past forty years.

1/ Establishment of legal frameworks for the international protection of human rights

Most important result achieved under the auspices of the United Nations has been the establishment of legal frameworks for the international protection of human rights.

The idea of the international protection of human rights, though part and parcel of the Charter, refers only in general terms to human rights, without listing them, so their determination is left to Member States. This approach stimulated efforts at the elaboration of conventions within the frameworks of the United Nations for the protection of human rights. The conclusion of such international conventions is a relatively new phenomenon in interstate relations. In the past, States assumed international obligations exclusively in matters which entailed rights and obligations solely and directly for themselves. As

against this, a characteristic feature of human rights conventions consists precisely in that States undertake obligations vis-à-vis each other to the effect that each State will, within its own boundaries, create conditions and enact national legislations generative of specific rights for the population of its territory.

As mentioned, the Charter does not enumerate human rights, does not contain a catalogue thereof. This fact presents two aspects, namely the problem of general regulation of the category of human rights and that of regulation of specific rights. Both spheres of regulation have been influenced by some essential features of the Charter.

Thus the Charter provisions helped extend the classical category of human rights /political rights and freedom fo the individual/ to include economic, social and cultural rights in spite of not specifying them. It is significant to note, however, that responsibility for the discharge of functions concerning the respect of human rights is vested in ECOSOC.

As regards the extension of the catalogue of human rights, Imre Szabó points out in a convincing manner that the character of human rights has undergone a substantive change in our time. The classical rights are relegated to the background by socio-economic human rights of a material nature, those which constitute the basic conditions for a life worthy of man and in the absence of which the classical rights cannot be enjoyed either. Concerning the international aspects of human rights - he argues -, the least one should come to realize is that without certain social reforms, without legal recognition and implementation of social rights it is hardly possible to ensure peace and order within the State; so international arrangements for the protection of human rights should also seek to ensure that a minimum of social standards is met in individual States, thereby creating a basis for the enjoyment of human rights."<sup>12</sup>

Otherwise the substantive change in the concept of human rights, namely the widening of the category of classical human rights with the inclusion of economic, social and cultural rights, is clearly reflected in the international conventions concluded under the auspices of the United Nations concerning the general regulation of human rights and the protection of specific rights.

Another special feature of the United Nations Charter which has influenced the substance of international conventions for the protection of human rights is the provision seeking the realization of human rights for all, with the exclusion of discrimination of any kind, namely according protection for these rights "without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion".<sup>13</sup> This peculiarity is explained by the set of conditions which prompted the drafters of the Charter to include the promotion of respect for human rights among the purposes of the United Nations. Here again reference should be made to the relationship existing between the enjoyment of human rights and the maintenance of international peace and security for evidently, any form of discrimination in the exercise of human rights may give rise to

discontent and tension in a State and may thus become the source of an international conflict as well.

/a/ General regulation of the international protection of human rights

The first benchmark event in drawing up the catalogue of human rights was the proclamation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the text of which was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 December 1948.

The Declaration sets forth certain economic, social and cultural rights along with the freedom of personal and political rights, recognizing the enjoyment of human rights without any discrimination.

In the subsequent period the Declaration served as a basis for the elaboration of general and special conventions concerning the complex question of human rights. Although the Declaration, which was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, is merely "recommendatory" in nature, it has exercised a great influence on the constitutions of States as well as on judicial practice, both national and international. The constitutions of a number of newly independent States, for instance, make express reference to the principles embodied in the Declaration.<sup>14</sup>

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Optional Protocol to the former were adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 19 December 1966.

Article 1 of each Covenant lays down the right of peoples to self-determination. This raises the intricate problem of relationship between the concepts of the right to self-determination and of human rights. As is known, the internal aspect of the right to self-determination implies the right of a people or nation freely to pursue its political, economic, social and cultural development, which ultimately determines the enjoyment of human rights.<sup>15</sup> In this context, however, we are faced with a complexity of questions that point far beyond the sphere of international legislation on human rights, even though human rights and the right to self-determination are linked together by the two Covenants. In dealing with this aspect one has to take into account the present-day realities of interstate relations, the fact of coexistence between States with different social and economic systems. Obviously enough, an international organization comprising States with different systems cannot set the aim of changing the internal order of Member States with a view to the full implementation of human rights. Nor do the Contracting States undertake any such obligation under the human rights covenants.

While the foregoing statement holds true in general, some additional remarks should be made as regards colonial peoples. No doubt that colonial oppression was the main obstacle to the exercise of human rights by peoples in colonial bondage. The United Nations has



played an important role in the process of decolonization. The liberation of colonial peoples from colonial oppression has afforded them a possibility to establish a state of their own, and thereby the external aspect of their right to self-determination, namely to decide freely not to live within the framework of another State against their will, has been fulfilled. Nevertheless, this important fact does not by itself mean the realization of the internal aspect of the right to self-determination in the newly independent States or the exercising of their human rights within the framework of another State. A discussion of those problems is far beyond the scope of this study despite the fact that the United Nations<sup>16</sup> has contributed actively to the disintegration of the colonial system.

At any rate, it may be stated that the reference of the covenants to the right to self-determination acquires particular significance in view of the situation of colonial peoples.

The catalogue of human rights<sup>17</sup> was drawn up in two international instruments after lengthy debates. At the same time there is an unquestionable relationship between the classical human rights /civil and political rights/ and economic, social and cultural rights. It is right to ask whether civil and political rights can be exercised at all without the enjoyment of the latter. Is anyone without a basic education capable of using his political rights in accordance with his interests? Does the inviolability of privacy mean anything to a jobless person who has no dwelling to live in? Is the secrecy of correspondence meaningful to an illiterate?

The two groups of human rights were regulated in separate international instruments with reference to the need for a universal regulation to have regard for the different stages and levels of economic development of States, namely for the fact that economic, social and cultural rights, as distinct from civil and political rights, can only be progressively implemented in the process of economic development. In discussing this subject Valticos accepts as a point of departure the argument that the adoption of separate covenants for the protection of human rights is justified by the fact that while a large part of civil and political rights can be assured at one stroke, the economic, social and cultural rights are only expressions of a long-term goal that can be realized by stages. "On the whole - he argues -, such differentiation is not inaccurate as the implementation of social, economic and cultural rights generally calls for more prolonged action. In this respect the first striking examples to cite are public education or social insurance and the creation of their general systems." He goes on to point out that "differentiation, on the other hand, cannot be said to be absolute as social rights might include some whose implementation, unless already achieved, would be immediately possible or desirable. Weekly rest, the oldest of social rights throughout the world, affords the most pertinent instance of this... And, by contrast, can all civil and political rights be claimed to find ready application in the majority of countries? Even if this is conceivable in respect to basic principles, do not there exist certain rules of relevance which require a definite level of economic, social and cultural development for actually striking root in a particular country?"<sup>18</sup>

Undoubtedly, in principle, the regulation of these two groups of rights by separate international covenants enabled States to become a party to only one of them, namely the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, without undertaking an obligation to guarantee economic, social and cultural rights. Still, it is a sign of fundamental socio-economic changes witnessed by our age that, contrary to expectations, the entry into force of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights had even preceded by a certain margin of time that of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the respective dates being 3 January 1976 and 23 March 1976, while the scope of States parties to both Covenants is almost entirely the same.

As regards the provisions of both covenants, the rights set forth in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are formulated in explicit terms<sup>19</sup>, the wording of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is essentially different. Thus, under para. 1 of Art. 2, each State Party to the Covenant undertakes only "to take steps, individually and through international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures". Again, under the other articles, elaborating further on specific right, States only "recognize" those rights, which is, however, not identical with an explicit obligation to guarantee them.

As regards the provisions of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, they go far to take into account the realities of our time, primarily the principle of state sovereignty, and accord absolute protection only to a certain class of rights, first and foremost to the right to life, liberty and security of person, equality before the courts and tribunals and the law, and the sphere of private life /the right to marry and to found a family, inviolability of privacy, secrecy of correspondence/ as well as the rights of minorities and special protection for children. Another group of rights - such as liberty of movement, the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, to freedom of expression, the right to assembly and the right to freedom of association - are subject to limitations by the State on grounds defined by law,<sup>20</sup> national security, public order, public health and morals, etc./.

Political rights are naturally guaranteed by every State for its own nationals only.

Both Covenants seek to promote human rights for all without any discrimination and make separate provisions for the equal rights of men and women.

Special mention should be made of the protection of minorities. The Charter of the United Nations provided no measures for the protection of minorities, since it changed over from the League Covenant's régime of minority protection to the general protection of human rights. As early as 1947, however, the Commission on Human Rights set up the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minori-

ties, while Art. 27 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights specifically provides that persons belonging to minorities shall not be denied the right to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.

All this is an expression, within the United Nations system, of the recognition that members of a group /minority/ who wish to preserve some of their distinctive features /language, religion, etc./ in the State where they live shall be accorded special protection, which is to say that it is not sufficient to recognize for them the enjoyment of human rights without discrimination, but they shall be granted a certain measure of additional rights.

/b/ International protection  
of specific human rights

The human rights provisions of the United Nations Charter not only entailed the need for a general regulation of these rights, but undoubtedly led, both before and after the adoption of general legislative instruments, to the elaboration, under the auspices of the United Nations family, of new international conventions for the protection of specific human rights. Only those of the greatest importance will be singled out for attention:

The endeavours to accord protection to human rights for all are expressed mainly in special conventions on the elimination of discrimination. Thus, for instance, the elimination of discrimination against women is a matter that is of personal concern to one half of mankind and also of direct concern to human society as a whole, for the society of no State can in our days hope to achieve real and lasting progress if it deprives itself of the potential inherent in the development of women's abilities. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1979. The Convention of 1952 on the Political Rights of Women and the Convention of 1957 on the Nationality of Married Women, among others, were elaborated and adopted to protect different aspects of women's equality.

The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted in 1965, seeks to prohibit the most dangerous form of discrimination as regards the maintenance of international peace and security.

Under the auspices of the specialized agencies of the United Nations two conventions were concluded the ILO Convention of 1958 Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation and the UNESCO Convention of 1960 against Discrimination in Education - which seek to eliminate and prohibit, not a specific form of discrimination, but all forms of discrimination in specific spheres of activity associated with the concept of economic, social and cultural rights.

The development of the international protection of human rights

has also been influenced by the activity of the International Labour Organization. The scope of the regulations adopted since World War II. by several ILO conventions is closely related to the enjoyment of specific human rights and the creation of conditions for their exercise. Such relationship is clearly manifest, for instance, between the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention of 1948 and the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention of 1949 as well as between the Workers' Representatives Convention of 1971. Also, the realization of specific human rights is expressly served by the Convention of 1957 concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour or the Employment Policy Convention of 1964.

## 2/ The Role of the United Nations in the implementation of human rights

The extent to which human rights are actually enjoyed is closely interrelated with the internal order of States, their socio-economic system and level of development. During the past four decades, within the frameworks established for the international protection of human rights, the United Nations itself has tried to contribute, by the use of different methods, to the actual enjoyment of human rights.

The organs of the United Nations have initiated numerous surveys and studies. Thus, for instance, a study, initiated in 1969 by the Commission on Human Rights and published in 1975, relates to the realization of economic, social and cultural rights. Another study, initiated by the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities and published in 1976, deals with racial discrimination in the political, economic, social and cultural spheres.

With a view to promoting the implementation of human rights, the United Nations has proclaimed the celebration of anniversaries /e.g. Human Rights Day on 10 December/ and the observance of international years /e.g. International Women's Year 1975/. The same goal is likewise advanced by different human rights publications /e.g. Human Rights Yearbook/ and educational programmes.

Under the Programme of Advisory Services seminars are held to discuss human rights questions /e.g. the seminar on participation in local administration as a means of promoting human rights, hosted by Hungary<sup>22</sup> in 1966/ and fellowships are awarded for the study of related matters.

The national and international effects of these procedures are evident, but the degree of their efficiency is hard to assess. The analysis of the methods and techniques used by the United Nations for promoting the effective implementation of international treaties /covenants and conventions/ adopted in the field of human rights offer more realistic possibilities of measurement since their effect on the legislation and legal practice of States lends itself to appraisal by more tangible criteria.

Examining these methods one should start from the premise that it is the sovereign right of each State to decide whether to accede or not to the international conventions elaborated within the framework of the

United Nations. This is of particular relevance to the protection of human rights, because in the case of accession to those conventions the States are bound to guarantee certain rights for the populations living within their boundaries.

What methods are used by the United Nations for influencing the decision of Member States? The General Assembly of the United Nations and the Economic and Social Council have, through numerous resolutions and decisions, urged Member States to participate in human rights conventions.<sup>23</sup> "Considering that on acceding to international conventions States do not make reference to such resolutions of the General Assembly, the impact of the relevant resolutions is hard to assess. Nevertheless, some resolutions seeking the promotion of certain conventions appear to have contributed to their adoption."<sup>24</sup> Thus, for instance, United Nations General Assembly resolution of 11 December 1969, which designated the year 1971 as International Year for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, produced tangible results as, according to the record of status at 1 September 1983, out of the 121 States Parties to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 55 adhered to it before 1971, while 76, constituting the majority, have done so since 1971. Let us now take a look at the table indicating the status of major conventions for the protection of human rights.<sup>25</sup>

Subject of Convention	Year of Adoption	Year of Entry into force	Number of States Parties /as at 1 September 1983/
1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights	1966	1976	76
1/a. Optional Protocol Thereto	1966	1976	30
2. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights	1966	1976	79
3. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide	1948	1951	92
4. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination	1965	1969	121
5. Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of <u>Apartheid</u>	1973	1976	73
6. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women	1979	1981	51
7. Convention on the Nationality of Married Women	1957	1958	54
8. Convention on the Political Rights of Women	1952	1954	91

The table offers some general conclusions without a separate analysis of the status of each convention.

The conventions adopted under the auspices of the United Nations for the protection of human rights are still a long way from being applied universally. /In 1984 the United Nations had 159 Member States, and there still are States that have not join the Organization./ The highest rate of participation can be observed in the conventions on the suppression of the crimes of genocide and apartheid /see items 3 and 4 of the table/; the decisions of States to adhere to them were evidently influenced by world public opinion, which condemns the two gravest crimes.

The status of the two covenants on human rights /see items 1 and 2/ requires a separate analysis as they cover the full list of human rights. Their elaboration took more than 15 years, and there was a span of another 10 years between their adoption by the United Nations General Assembly and their entry into force /which required the participation of 35 States/.

As can be seen, a considerable part of States have not yet adhered to the covenants, which means that they are wary of pledging to guarantee all of the human rights and are still less willing to see individuals living in their territories bring the violations of their rights to the attention of international fora. The States Parties to the Optional Protocol, which provides for the exercise of the right to complaint by individuals, number as little as 30 /see item 1/a/!

We are aware of the fact that international conventions may also be actually applied by a State which is not yet a party thereto and that, on the contrary, there may be cases of non-observance of human rights in a State party. Nevertheless, human rights are more likely to be observed by States parties to such conventions.

Certain procedures have been devised to promote the application in practice by States parties of conventions adopted under the auspices of the United Nations. Some human rights conventions place States parties under an obligation to submit reports on the application of conventions to international fora. Such obligation is prescribed by, among others, the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. More detailed provisions are contained in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has set up a separate committee to consider reports and to transmit its observations to the States parties. Under Article 41 of the Covenant, a State Party may recognize the competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications to the effect that another State Party is not fulfilling its obligations. The cautious attitude of the States is shown by the fact that up to 1 September 1983 only 14 States recognized the competence of the Committee to consider communications by one State against another. The Covenant has established a two-tier conciliation procedure for the consideration of such cases.

Of all conventions elaborated under the auspices of the United Na-

tions it is unquestionably the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination that contains the most far-reaching provisions in this respect. In addition to requiring States to submit reports, it provides for the wide-scale publication thereof and introduces a mandatory conciliation procedure for considering cases of violations of the Convention. None of the conventions provides, however, for collective sanctions against violations, so the only course open is moral condemnation. Moral sanction consists of the publication of critical observations concerning reports by States if the content of a report reveals non-compliance by a State Party with its obligations. The weight of moral sanction may increase in the case of conventions that provide for a conciliation procedure, since the statements and conclusions of the organ conducting the conciliation procedure focus attention more sharply on non-compliance by the State in question.<sup>26</sup>

Among the specialized agencies of the United Nations it is the International Labour Organization which has established the strongest frameworks for the verification of the application of ILO conventions. As mentioned earlier, the States founding ILO pursued the principal aim, by the elaboration of ILO conventions /of which more than 150 have adopted to date/, of laying down uniform standards for the national regulations of labour relations, with a view to averting the dangers arising out of international competition. This explains why the most advanced system of supervision has been framed by ILO, which has a superior supervisory mechanism for the consideration of reports by States. The leading organs of ILO may, in the last analysis, order theoretically effective sanctions against non-complying States.<sup>27</sup>

The conclusion may be drawn that the application of international conventions on the protection of human rights is, in effect, influenced by the United Nations only to the extent of giving wide publicity to information concerning the application of conventions. Under this procedure, cases of non-compliance, more or less serious, by States may become a matter of public record and thus invite moral condemnation of the State involved, which may ultimately be brought to change its attitude. Recourse to moral sanction is limited, however. Since the human rights conventions are far from universal, their provisions for application affect the States parties only. According to the experiences over the past four decades, cases of grave public condemnation of non-complying States are rare even in relations between Contracting States. For that matter, the covenants on human rights contain general provisions, which should be given effect by each State party, through national legislation, while legislation and legal practice are matters within the domestic jurisdiction of States. This is a difficult terrain as any State may at any time become the target of international fora, which may perhaps be prompted by unfounded political motives. This explains that while the United Nations plays a significant role in establishing legal frameworks for the international protection of human rights, it has a rather limited scope of action for the promotion of their effective enjoyment, and practically takes action in exceptional cases only. It cannot coerce States to adhere to the human rights conventions or to give full effect to them within their borders.

D/ Human rights and global problems

Before presenting future trends, let us draw an overall balance of the four decades of United Nations work in the field of human rights, with special attention to the changing concept of human rights.

The United Nations family has provided a permanent forum for the development of the tendency for human rights, for the creation of conditions for a life worthy of man to become the centre of attention, national as well as international. World public opinion today is generally convinced that assuring an appropriate standard of human rights in every State is indispensable for the maintenance of normal conditions, that no State can conduct undisturbed interstate relations unless it sustains balanced internal conditions. The relationship between the enjoyment of human rights and the preservation of international peace and security is clearly seen.

The measure of human rights enjoyed depends on the level of the development of the States, their socio-economic system, cultural traditions, and customs. There is no doubt, however, that the full implementation of human rights is in our days accepted by the community of States as a goal to be achieved. There have been adopted international conventions which, even if they are not yet of universal application, numerous States have recognized as binding and accepted as standards for national legislation. Undoubtedly, however, the United Nations could have lawfully resorted to coercive measures in cases of mass, consistent and constant violations of human rights, but it failed to live up to its task just like in any other issue that called for joint action based on unanimity among the great powers, permanent members of the Security Council.

The United Nations has witnessed a significant change in the concept of human rights, which is a true reflection of the alterations that have taken place in the world's political appearance, in the world economy and in the domains of science and technology, and which has put the whole complex of human rights questions into the context of realities.

In the first decade of the United Nations the interrelationship of classical human rights /civil and political rights/ with economic, social and cultural rights was still very much disputed. Over the past decades, however, several resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly have given expression to the conviction that the full exercise of political and civil rights is impossible without the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights.<sup>28</sup> In the course of this process a broader interpretation of some of these rights has developed and their relationship to other rights and to the pattern of economic and social conditions has revealed itself with increasing clarity.

In this way, among the classical rights, the right to life has received a marked emphasis. As Ramcharan writes, "The right to life is an imperative norm of international law which should inspire and influence all other human rights". In connection with the interpretation



of this right he stresses that "in its modern sense, the right to life encompasses not merely protection against intentional or arbitrary deprivation of life, but also places a duty on the part of each government to pursue policies which are designed to ensure access to the means of survival for every individual within its country".<sup>29</sup> At another point he underlines that "the right to peace is a corollary of the right to life".<sup>30</sup>

Outstanding among the economic, social and cultural rights is the right to food. Activities in and outside the United Nations, in scientific and non-governmental organizations, "include attempts to involve human rights organizations and associations into discussions on the strengthening of the legal basis of economic, social and cultural rights, with particular emphasis on the right to food".<sup>31</sup>

At the same time, the fundamental rights of man falling within the category of human rights are formulated as "rights of peoples", which include, according to the African Charter of Rights of Man and Peoples, certain collective rights such as the right of peoples to self-determination, permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources, the right to economic development, the right to peace and security, the right to appropriate environment.<sup>32</sup>

The decisive change in the concept of human rights is shown by endeavours to consider the realization of human rights in relation to the quest for solutions to the global problems of the world. The relevant United Nations General Assembly resolutions adopted in recent decades emphasize that international efforts for the promotion and protection of human rights should at the same time be directed towards the establishment of a new international economic order, because the continuing existence of an unjust international economic order constitutes a major obstacle to the realization of the economic, social and cultural rights in developing countries.<sup>33</sup>

The view is also expressed within the United Nations that the world organization should have regard not only for the human rights aspects of development, but also for the development aspects of human rights<sup>34</sup>, that is to say, the concept of human rights is changing and developing in a dialectical manner. Accordingly, a new class of human rights is formulated in the "right to development".<sup>34</sup> It is clearly manifest that the realization of human rights not only depends on the solution by States of their economic and social problems, but also calls for solutions to the global problems of the world.

The draft declaration prepared by the Working Group of Governmental Experts on the Right to Development is permeated with this idea. According to draft article 1, "The right to development is an inalienable human right of every person, individually or in entities established pursuant to the right of association, and of other groups including peoples... ..By virtue of the right to development, every human person, individually or collectively, has the right to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy a peaceful international and national political, social and economic order, in which all univervdally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized". And as stated in draft article 8, "For the purpose of the effective enjoyment of the

right to development and for the full realization of all human rights it is necessary to take, as a matter of priority, adequate measures towards the establishment of a new international economic order..."<sup>35</sup>

As can be seen, the statements of position by the United Nations family give a clear outline of certain tendencies, but the views expressed in them are not always, and on each aspect, consistent with the actual international correlation of forces. The implementation of resolutions calls for a fundamental change in the policies of the advanced capitalist countries as well, namely they should accept the fact that finding solutions for the global problems of the world, on which the universal implementation of human rights ultimately depends, represents a universal interest in the perspectives of the future, or, in other words, it is in their vital interest as well.

We can draw the final conclusion that the change in the concept of human rights reflects the realities of our time. The past decades have given clear evidence that the realization of human rights depends on the solution of the internal socio-economic problems of States and, primarily, on that of the global problems of the world.

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- 19/ Art. 2, para. 2, of the Covenant reads: "Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant."
- 20/ Here we do not deal with exceptional measures that may be taken in time of emergency. they are covered by Art. 4 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
- 21/ The Convention of 1948 on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide provides that genocide /the gravest consequence of certain kinds of discrimination, namely on national, ethnic, racial or religious grounds/ is a crime under international law, whereas the Convention of 1973 on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid has declared apartheid as the most extreme form of manifestation of racial discrimination to be a crime against humanity.
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V. Cultural identity

THE ROLES OF PAN-ISLAMISM, PAN-ARABISM AND PAN-AFRICANISM  
IN THE DECOLONIZATION OF THE AFRO-ASIAN REGION

by Erika Fodor, researcher, Institute for  
International Relations, Budapest

Several ideological and political factors influence the social development and trends of movement of the developing world. These factors come from coexistence with the developed world, from becoming aware of their dependent positions and express the collective reaction of a given area of the developing world - with defensive or offensive aims - against the challenges of the modern world.

The composition of the political movements established on a regional scale, mainly as communities of interests, is most complex and heterogeneous, similarly to the ideologies of the people involved, which are often even contradictory to each other, however the common aims /to achieve political independence by peoples of the same region, the strengthening of independence, and later a revision of economic-social dependence according to national interests, etc./, remain the basis for harmonizing regional interests for a long period before and after independence.

While studying two regional organisations of the developing world - the Organisation of African Unity and the Islam Conference Organisation - the external conditions leading to the establishment of these organisations, political consultations by the countries working on the establishment of these organisations, the decisive and influencing ideologies behind the political steps taken, etc. - we came across views and ideas which have encouraged us to try to investigate the simultaneous emergence of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Africanism as well as Pan-Arabism, which had an important role in the formation of the Arab League, their effect on each other in the Afro-Asian region.

Thus in the Afro-Asian area three regional organisations came into being the Arab League /1945/, the Organization of African Unity /1963/ and Islam Conference Organisation /1969/ the formation of which had been greatly assisted, the constitutions of which ideologically enriched by Pan-Arabism, Pan-Africanism and Pan-Islamism. Naturally we are aware of the fact that these three ideological systems have great sway in the region over and above the fact of their creation, however in our paper we intend to concentrate mainly on the mutual effects of the three ideological systems - also promoters of communities of interests - since 1969, that is since the time when all three came into existence.

We also intend to study their relations to the formation of national cultural identities in the nation-building period.

Let us first take a look at the historic background, then discuss how the "pan" ideologies strengthened or weakened each other in the various periods of decolonization, with special regard to the differentiation which has become significant in the developing world, as the interrelation of these three ideological systems is reflected in the differentiation in a peculiar way.

#### 1. Pan-Islamism - from its emergence until 1969

We begin the historic survey with Pan-Islamism. This ideological system differs in several aspects from Pan-Arabism and Pan-Africanism, especially in that Islam is a "pan" ideology without geographical, continental borders, based on a system of dogmas that are "of universal validity", and the circle of receptors may unconfinedly grow. It follows that Islam defines its norms to cover the whole of life - the spheres of society, economy, politics, religion- to become "socialpolicy".

At the same time it has to be acknowledged that Pan-Islamism was also the direct ideological harbinger and ammunition of Pan-Arabism<sup>2</sup>, and if the emergence of Pan-Islamism is regarded as a theoretical instrument encouraging cohesion for protection against European colonization, in an indirect way it also helped the emergence of Pan-Africanism /African/<sup>3</sup>.

Since its birth<sup>4</sup> in the seventh century Islam has continued to spread over vast territories of Africa and Asia during different periods /in Indonesia only in the 15th century/ from the shores of the Atlantic to the Philippines<sup>5</sup>, and having survived the centuries it has become a leading ideology of the peoples of Africa and Asia. Islam played a decisive role in the geographical position of the Arab peoples /conquests/, as well as in the development of Arab-African relations, in the course of which Islam spread in several waves from North Africa to the South, and from the coast of East Africa to the internal parts of the continent.<sup>6</sup> However this immense Islamic world has been very varied from several aspects /religious differences, ethnical Islam, etc./, and its development was also varied during the period of colonization, especially in its dependence with the colonial powers, thus the well-known proverb "it is as many-coloured as an Islamic prayer-rug"<sup>7</sup> is most valid for the Islamic world itself. The concept of belonging to the Islamic community /the Umma/ as a uniting force for all Muslims in the world could have emerged only against an outside danger which threatened both in the form of colonial oppression and rejection of Islamic values and culture. The peoples of the Muslim world had different interpretations for the Islam, and especially the Arabs claimed to be the real protectors of Islamic values, although it has to be noted that the need to unite the Muslim world against European oppression was realised not only as an Arabic idea.<sup>8</sup> Thus Pan-Islamism has aimed at creating supranational unity in a period when nations did not yet exist, when the process to form them had hardly yet begun.

Due to its opposition against colonialism Pan-Islamism however was transformed into ideologies, or joined ideologies which had independence

as their goal, thus it also became an ideological element of collective and local nationalism, which element at the same time due to the need to achieve independence within national boundaries, and as a result of the development of "secular" ideologies - has necessarily faded. However the idea of Pan-Islamism has since its emergence as an expression of Islamic solidarity retained its power up to these days to produce protective and opposition Muslim organisations and movements against ideologies which over-emphasize secular values suppressing Islamic ideas. These organisations and movements also took positions against the political practices of secular ideologies, thus they also emerged as political movements. In fact the need to rejuvenate the Islam, Islamic solidarity and Pan-Islamism have the same source. No matter how deep is the conviction of Muslims that Islam as a unifying force would serve as redemption, when according to practice the Islamic world is divided - even in the interpretation of religious dogmas - to such an extent that a rejuvenation is needed to protect the Islam itself.

Jemal ed-Din /al-Afghani/ /1939-1897/ - who is respected as the father of the Pan-Islamic idea<sup>9</sup> - himself was convinced that in order to protect the Muslim world from economic and cultural oppression by the Europeans Islam had to be rejuvenated. He argued: "The Islamic religion gave to the earlier dispersed Arab tribes strong solidarity and community ideas which enabled them to conquer territories and create an empire. That empire later deteriorated and disappeared. This was not due to a decrease in the number of Muslims, just the opposite was true, namely their number was largest when they lost their power. The fall of the empire could rather be explained by a diminishing influence of religion. Thus solidarity is the most important demand for human society, and it can be said about religion that it is the number one effective mechanism to create such a solidarity..." However he too noticed the ambiguity behind his conception and the realities of the world and he put it into words as follows: "National solidarity is created by necessity.... real Islam is much more effective than national Islam. Should effectiveness be the criterion, and solidarities other than Islamic ones prove to be more effective, the more effective one has to be preferred."<sup>10</sup>

In the history of Islamic solidarity and Pan-Islamism Islamic revival has been a recurring motive with most different interpretations and explanations, acting in extremely varied ways within and outside the Islamic world. Islamic revival, reactivation or rebirth - several names have been attached to the idea - have been linked to several forms delineated from each other, with the process divided into sections based on different principles, moreover different dates have been given to its beginning- the 18th, 19th or the 20th centuries<sup>11</sup> depending on the goals of the considerations.

We believe we should not prefer any of the discussed views but - with regard to the present paper- form our views- which naturally will not aim at completeness - form our own ideas on the Islamic renaissance, as a process which in 1969 gave birth to the first interstate, international organisation of Islamic countries: the Islam Conference Organisation.



Let us first take a look at some extreme and different views on Islamic renaissance and on the periods of the historic process.

According to Hrair Dekmejian, for example, Islamic renaissance and its "ability" are given facts to be explained by the relationship between the three monotheistic religions /Judaism, Christianity and Islam/: "Islamic renaissance itself is the product of a process of cumulative revelations, as Islamic ideology is also the product of a major dialectic process... using Hegel's terminology Judaism as thesis coexists in it with antithesis-Christianity, and this leads to Islam, as synthesis, to Islam, which is the highest stage of divine revelation."<sup>12</sup> We feel there is some partiality in this statement. However it has to be remarked that other authors also regard Islamic renaissance as a "natural feature" of Islam,<sup>13</sup> a characteristic brought about by the permanent need to comply with the demands of the world, and creates political movements of various kinds. Other views argue that the hidden essence of "Islam renaissance" can best be explained when comparing it to the basic forms of contemporary Muslim ideologies, such as orthodoxy, modernism and reform. Two criteria help to find the adequate types. One of these is formal namely it depends on the relations of a given trend to Muslim dogmas. In the meanwhile, as the interpretation of religious dogmas provides the direction into which the Muslim world would further develop, - the main criterion of classification is to assess what the tendency of Muslim dogmatism is in relation to society and classes.<sup>14</sup> This assessment -idea is a better tool to explain the phenomenon that the same process is being divided by individuals in different ways depending on this preference in the development tendencies. The content of the names thus varies, and it happens that identical names are given to opposing processes. Typical examples are the renaissance of Islam, which may mean fundamentalism, or traditionalism, even reformism, while modernism is often identical with reformism, or perhaps reforming.<sup>15</sup>

We have to regard the emergence of Pan-Islamism, its "disappearance", its recurring rebirths, the phases of Islamic renaissance as periods of political activation not only as tools for investigation, but also as the recognition of its links in various dimensions with the political activation of Islam. A good example of this division<sup>16</sup> is that according to which the first wave of Islamic renaissance spread parallel with the emergence of liberation movements, and later in a very long process /according to the author it started in 1918 and lasted until 1967/ in various places and naturally at different times - the partner relationship between the national and Islamic movements came to an end, and, hoping for a rapid development, the national political movements moved away from the Islam, however the dead-ends of the roads of progress pushed Islam onto the offensive.

## 2. Pan-Arabism - theory and reality

Most scholars engaged in the study of Arab nationalism, Pan-Arabism and Arabism investigate the relationship between the state of belonging to the Arab world, Arab consciousness and the idea of Arab unity,

or the aim of a uniform Arab nation based on their common historic past, the Arabic language and Islamic culture. Yet due to different social and economic developments this can only be expressed in manifestations of political aims with differing contexts.<sup>17</sup>

Let us first consider the main features of Arabism before 1945, and up to the eve of the emergence of the Arab League. It has to be accepted as a historic fact that Britain served as "midwife" at the birth of the Arab League, although its role may have been much more important than this expression would suggest.

In his book "The Arabs" Maxime Rodinson himself<sup>18</sup> discusses this question at great length to show the great differences between the various phases of development of Arab nationalism, Arabism. The third chapter of his book evaluates the development phases separately under the title "Arabism" to conclude that, in his opinion - without underestimating all the debated external factors - the creation, the emergence of the Arab League was a significant act for the development of Arabism.

The phasing by Rodinson can be briefly summed up as follows: according to him the first phase lasted "from Muslim protectionism up to the birth of the ideology of Arabism", the second was the period of "Arabic awakening" and the formation of the first organisations /1908-1920/, the third was the period of independence struggle /1920-1945/, the fourth started with the establishment of the Arab League to last up to the formation of the United Arab Republic /1946-1958/, the fifth was defined as the "dominance of Nasserism" /1958-1970/, in which however the struggle between the Arabist left- and right-wing intensified. Rodinson defines the seventies as the period of the build up of Arab power, marked by the pressure of the ruling layers of despotic Arab states.

Let us take a brief look at the above mentioned second and third phases. The first Arabistic organisations were formed in the Arabic provinces of the Ottoman Empire, demanding for the Arabs equal rights within the empire and the use of the Arab language as the official language in the regions inhabited by Arabs. These were the demands the Ottoman Party, formed for the decentralization of administration, voiced and these were also the demands put forward by the Arabic Congress which met in Paris in 1912/. The congress was attended both by Christian and Muslim delegates/.

Parallel to this secret societies were also organised with more radical programs. These included for example Qahtaniya, which favoured an Arabic-Turkish Monarchy similar to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The organisation was formed in 1909/ or the organisation called Fatat, which demanded Arab independence /1911/.<sup>19</sup> When on November 2, 1914 the Ottoman Empire entered the war on the side of Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the external conditions became more favourable for the more radical organisations. We must not neglect the fact that several secret organisations started to establish good relations with Britain and France, and that - because of the Mecca ruler's dynast-

ic interests tried to contact Arab nationalists, while conducting secret negotiations with the British to enter the war against the Turks in the interests of his rule. However the contribution of Arab nationalists to Turkey's defeat only helped the ruling house of Mecca to put the sons of Mecca's ruler on the throne, as, based on the Sykes-Picot agreement, the Arab countries belonging to the Fertile Half-Moon were divided as mandate territories of the League of Nations between France and Great Britain, and the thrones in the British zone of influence were occupied mainly by the sons of the Mecca dynasty. The conclusions Arab nationalists could draw from the event were evident, namely that in the future they should take measures against Arabic and Islamic reactions collaborating with France and Britain also, realising that the British and the French had neglected the Arab independence demands, while accepting their help against the Turks, thus they had breached the promise they had made to the Arabs. According to Rodinson the trends "which give colour to Arab nationalism even today" had already been formed in the period between 1920 and 1945. Formal independences from the outset made it possible for those wavering between resistance and collaboration to delineate themselves from popular demands, and join Britain and France in suppressing popular revolts. This attitude increased the demand to strengthen the anti-imperialist character of the nationalist movements. Communist Marxism /to use Rodinson's term/ spread, and so did the anti-imperialist program and the struggle against the local allies of the imperialist powers.<sup>20</sup>

During the second world war Britain made several steps to retain its position, but seemingly in the interest of the Arabs. These included the Eden declaration in May 1941 on Britain's sympathy with Arab unity, and later assistance for Lebanon /1943/ and Syria /1945/ to achieve full independence from under French domination. The culmination of these steps was in fact the elaboration of the constitution for the Arab League, the establishment of the organisation with the aim of creating a supra-national political structure on the basis of Arab unity with British assistance. But the British intention launched a process it was partly unable to control, as it gave a background also to anti-imperialist independence struggle which had been formulated on the level of Arab unity too, even if only in the form of Pan-Arab support of "moderate" policy. Although the unifying force of the Pan-Arabic idea did not provide for it a realistic background, the emergence of the Arab League in 1945 represented a aspiration for unity full of all kinds of contradictions. It especially reflected the contradiction that Arab nationalism was linked by several ties to the British colonizers. The founding Arab states - speaking on behalf of the Arab countries which had already gained independence - volunteered to take charge of support for the fate of the Palestinian Arabs, as protection of an organic part of Arab unity, from the position of a type of independence the clear feature of which was that it was tied to the past by thousands of strands. The emergence of the Arab League presupposed the mediation of several external factors which were aware of the genuine and false values of Arabic internal cohesion. Thus the emergence of the Arab League did not reflect the essence of Arabism, not the relations between Arabic nationalisms, but the relationship between some Arab countries and Great Britain and the other colonial powers. Despite all the external help at

its disposal the Arab League had to form its ideology and activities itself as it went along. The Arab movements struggling for independence regarded the Arab League as an unambiguously reactionary organisation, while the efforts the Arab League made for Palestine overrode British interests. Thus during the first period of its existence the Arab League was unable to come up to expectations. This beginning also meant that although the Arab League had in principle the basic aim of achieving Arab unity, the idea of Arabism, it was unable to prove its political effectiveness within these frames, thus Arab aspirations for unity looked for forums outside this organisation.

As a point of interest it is worth mentioning that in his work "La nation arabe - Nationalisme et luttes de classes" published in 1976 Samir Amin presents a detailed analysis of the main international events yet fails to even mention the emergence, existence or effect of the Arab League.<sup>21</sup> This is some resolute argument against those who regard the creation of the Arab League as a most important step on the road leading to Arab unity.

### 3. The emergence of Pan-Africanism and decolonization

The emergence of Pan-Africanism has a significance beyond Africa, and has its roots in the political aspirations of the descendants of Negro slaves shipped from Africa to America. These aspirations aim at the rights of African peoples to freedom as individuals and as societies. However, starting out from the so-called "Negro problem" different - among them extremist - ideas existed and amalgamated with one another from the very beginning. Of these the ideas of two known personalities have to be dealt with here briefly, as it was through them, or rather between them, that the various trends of Pan-Africanism developed.

It was linked to the name of Marcus Aurelius Garvey /Garveyism/ that the "Back to Africa Movement" and the so-called "Black Zionism" developed as extremist black racist ideologies in America in the 1920s.<sup>22</sup> The Pan-Africanism of the also black American William Edward Burghard Du Bois had an opposing context by voicing cooperation instead of separation demanding the right to self rule /national/ in Africa for Africans, their right to personal freedom and for the development of democratic socialism - in the American context to fight against racial segregation with the slogan that every American citizen should have the door open to him to become a first-class citizen.

The idea of African cooperation was raised at the same time inside Africa, also, even if not on a continental scale, and came to the surface even before Du Bois, in different forms. Thus Pan-Africanism was not an alien idea in Africa, but one that started to develop along its own path.

However the name and personality of Du Bois have hallmarked Pan-Africanism since the idea of African cooperation was born up to its becoming an organisation, a process which continued with the works of

Pan-African congresses. These were first held in Europe and America. It is interesting to note that the first congress held in Paris and attended by 113 delegates included only 41 participants from Africa, with the rest coming from America and different parts of Europe. The problems and tasks to be solved varied from continent to continent. The second Pan-African congress was convened in London in 1919, the fifth in Manchester in 1945 not long after the end of the second world war. In the meantime several African black professionals and independence politicians joined the movement and enriched Du Bois' ideas. Smaller and larger organisations were formed on African territory, which more or less found their way to the Pan-African Congress. Of these organisations significant were the West African trade union movement, the Kikuyu movement represented by Jomo Kenyatta, the movement of the Friends of Abyssinians, and other. They showed that the Pan-Africanism of African Africans had become more and more distinct, and that the local "nationalist", independence movements had found their way to the earlier established international movements, broadened them by enriching them with the culture of the ancient land, with new aims, and so a new era had started in the history of Pan-Africanism. This interdependence manifested itself in the form of organisation also; the Pan-African Federation came into existence with the purpose of disseminating information on Africa among Pan-Africanists and outside their circle. As a consequence several papers were published on Africa between the two world wars. During the second world war most publications were issued in the English speaking colonies.<sup>23</sup>

Pan-Africanism also learned a great deal from the ideologies of anti-fascist movements, and this proved useful when investigating colonialism. Thus at the end of the war when the question of the colonies came to the surface there was parallel demand by Africans and African peoples for their right to decide their destinies. Consequently in the history of Pan-Africanism the fifth congress convened in 1945 was of significance for several reasons.

The victory of the European anti-fascist struggle contributed to the final defeat of so-called "Black Zionists", and the post-war Pan-Africanism under the influence of progressive ideologies redefined its principles, and aims, which necessarily were directed toward the termination of colonialism and to achieving national independence. The congress itself helped the leaders of the African movements - some of whom later became noted politicians and theoreticians - to learn European terminologies and concepts such as liberalism, socialism, communism, anarchism, imperialism, fascism, etc.

In his biography Kwame Nkrumah himself also discussed in details the effects the European anti-fascist movements had on the Pan-Africanists, and how these effects were manifested at the fifth Pan-African Congress in 1945. When writing about his personal ideological development he pointed out that "I read Hegel, Karl Marx, Engels, Lenin and Mazzini.

The writing of these men did much to influence me in my revolutionary ideas and activities, and Karl Marx and Lenin particularly impressed me as I felt sure that their philosophy was capable of solving these problems. But I think that all the literature that I studied the book that did more than any other to fire my enthusiasm was Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus Garvey published in 1923".<sup>24</sup>

The slogan "Africa for the Africans" linked to Garvey's name and the idea connected to it inspired a large number of Africans, and almost independently from Garvey, moreover marked off from him - launched the process leading to the slogan "Africa must unite".

After the congress of 1945 the Pan-Africanism which had its roots outside Africa started to develop in two distinct directions. One was the movement of blacks living outside Africa, stepping up their solidarity with the black Africans struggling for independence, the other was the Pan-Africanism which "has found its way back home" demanding concrete political actions, striving for unity linked to events on the African continent. Both processes were strengthened by the fact that while anti-imperialist liberation movements the world over had met with success, in the southern part of the continent a white racist regime started to evolve at the end of the forties. That regime was regarded by Africans - inside and outside Africa - as imperialist provocation directed against them, and this assessment strengthened the anti-imperialist character of their struggle, while increasing the attraction of exploitation-free, non-capitalist ways of development. The strengthening of the solidarity movement was manifested by the evolvment of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Movement /1955/, the activities of which became a significant factor in the successes of the liberation movements during the second half of the fifties.

In May, 1945, there were only three independent African countries: Ethiopia, Liberia - neither of which had ever been colonies in the classical sense of the world - and Egypt.

"When the United Nations Organisation was established in 1945", writes Nkrumah, "Afro-Asian nationalism was insignificant. Since the colonies became independent one after the other the countries of this region represent a significant unit... at the same time," continues Nkrumah, "the dramatic growth of the international significance of African independence, while at first sight suggesting an increase in African power in fact manifests its weakness, for the disintegration of these will be viable by themselves."<sup>25</sup>

On "home" ground Pan-Africanism became a protective-unifying element in the policies of the African movements fighting for political and economic independence, of the political parties and of the newly independent young states.

This is how George Padmore sums up in one of his books on Pan-Africanism the role of this movement in Africa at the end of the fifties:

OAU forums, then we see that through the channels of the three regional organisations geographical boundaries are shifted, and indirectly for example a non-Muslim African country has also to face the effects of Islamic reactivation within the OAU, or when Islamic plans are made to solve the conflict in the Middle East African countries are asked to mediate, etc.

We shall consider the interrelations from two aspects: in the relation between the Afro-Asian region and the international environment, and through the development of Arab-African relations.

a/ Conflicts and the struggle between ideologies

Let us survey the interrelations of international political and economic events in the Afro-Arab region, with special regard to the international situation following the oil price rise in 1973 closely linked to the war which started in the Middle East in 1973, then the 1975 victories in Angola and Mozambique, later the revolutionary swing in Ethiopia in 1978, the victory of the revolution in Iran, the events connected with the outbreak of war between Iraq and Iran and continue with the civil war in Lebanon followed by the war between Israel and Lebanon, and, parallel to all these, the permanent independence struggles in the southern part of Africa and the conflicts in North Africa /the conflict in Western-Sahara, the question of Chad, etc./. We do not intend to list the different conflicts in the world, yet we have to conclude that in the Afro-Asian region there is a dominance of international conflicts over local conflicts.

In the political developments of the Afro-Asian scene the feedback of ever revalued effects in international interrelations has become dominant. The so-called "Angolan lesson" brought about a significant and rapid change in the U.S. Africa policy, as Kissinger put it to the U.S. Senate in connection with his African tour in 1976: "We cannot allow changes to take place /in Africa/ which are not in harmony with western interests."<sup>28</sup>

The protection of western interests became the main angle in the USA's third world policy. This is especially true for relations with the Afro-Asian region, as the route to the Persian Gulf "the safety of the road to mineral wealth" was endangered by the victory of the revolutions in Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia, and later by that of the Iranian revolution.

This new American policy had its effects by the second half of the 1970s on the relations of the U.S. with Africa as a whole, as the so-called base-states of American policy, such as Morocco, Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, Zaire, the Republic of South Africa became mediators of pro-imperialist interests following the 1976 OAU consensus on the Angolan issue. The differences existing and growing between the countries of Africa brought to an end the former spirit of Pan-Africanism, and due to the diverging interest only very few unambiguously "African issues", such as the joint struggle against apartheid harmonize

"In our struggle for national freedom, human dignity and social redemption Pan-Africanism offers an ideological alternative to Communism on the one side and Tribalism on the other. It rejects both white racialism and black chauvinism. It stands for racial co-existence on the basis of absolute equality and respect for human personality.

Pan-Africanism looks above the narrow confines of class, race, tribe and religion. In other words, it wants equal opportunity for all. Talent to be rewarded on the basis of merit. Its vision stretches beyond the limited frontiers of the nation-state. Its perspective embraces the federation of regional self-governing countries and their ultimate amalgamation into a United States of Africa."<sup>26</sup>

The Pan-Africanism of the fifties and significantly changed by the beginning of the 1960s, when there already existed a number of liberated African countries to start organising independent statehoods. They already had their own ruling circles with spheres of interest.

"At that time the power of Pan-Africanist collective nationalism was strong enough to form a regional organisation the Organisation of African Unity - but it already lacked the strength - due to the differences of interests at the diverse starts - to elaborate a uniform Africa-decolonization policy."<sup>27</sup>

#### 4. Interrelation between Pan-Islamism, Pan-Arabism and Pan-Africanism in the 1970s

The need to compare these three pan-ideologies or conceptions is most evident if for nothing else but for the fact that in certain parts of the Afro-Asian region /in North Africa and sporadically in parts of Black Africa/ Arabic and Islamic presence on African territory postulate the presence and impact of all three ideological systems.

It would require a closer study to find out which of the three dominates the other two and where, and how this changes under the influence the given movement has on the role the region plays in international life. And if we also consider that almost half of the member countries of the Islam Conference Organisation are African countries, which are present when decisions are taken on broad Islamic issues, or that about a half of the members of the Organisation of African Unity are Arab countries, which want to assert their interests on Arab League forums just as on



African policies. Several wings were formed within the Organisation of African Unity there are at least two - moderates and radicals, and according to another view - three groups of countries, such as pro-imperialist, moderate and radical, the foreign political allies of which oppose each other in the field of the international political and ideological struggle. These wings have different models for the trends of their internal development also. Thus the concept of African collaboration brings about unity on an extremely small number of international and regional issues. Summing up briefly the stages of development of Pan-Africanism, we can say, that during the 1950s there were many illusions and enthusiastic expectations over the possibilities of African collaboration, but in the 1960s it became evident that independently of the roads for development internal contradictions continue to re-emerge in the African countries after independence also. Chronic internal integration crises, the role of tribalism in political life, the evolvment and actions of separatist, religious movements against the weak central state powers and similar factors continued to provide domestic sources for recurring conflicts.

The western models for development in the 1960s did not bring the much expected results either, they proved to be failures, and consequently new waves of nationalisation and Africanisation surged up, a sort of "neo-nationalism" was experienced. On the other hand, due to the fluctuations in the non-capitalist way of development there was a radicalization in the national liberation movements, which meant on the ideological level, that while certain groups of countries /see French-speaking countries/ retained their links with certain developed capitalist countries but over emphasized their efforts to safeguard their own values /natural wealth, national culture, etc./. In other words collective nationalism and Pan-Africanism were suppressed in their significance by local nationalism. The most radical trends of anti-imperialist nationalism came to accept scientific socialism. For these the continued acceptance of Pan-Africanism meant regarding it as a tool in the international class struggle, an idea serving a regional protection of interests to speed up economic decolonization. The pro-imperialist African countries regarded Pan-Africanism as a means for the local ruling elite to gain economic and political positions over foreigners, and used it as a tactic in their negotiations with western partners for favourable outcomes to business deals.

Thus these countries also still needed a forum to protect their interests, but it was already an imperfect forum, because the goal was no longer joint action to achieve full decolonization, but joint action or its semblance for the ruling elite to be able to demonstrate its influence at home or abroad. So the work of the OAU was characterised not by a strengthening of unity but by a weakening of cohesion. This can also be seen by the fact that several points of the OAU Constitution have not been put into effect. This failure helped outside forces to interfere in African affairs, and also influenced the outcome of inter-African conflicts. It is no use for the African countries to say that "the security of Africa is the responsibility of Africa" when the regional alliances stand opposed to each other inside Africa too. On this matter Samora Machel said: "There are al-

ready regional alliances in Africa, which are natural formations, yet the establishment of a unified defensive force is more unrealistic today than it has ever been."<sup>29</sup>

Pan-Africanism, the only "secular" movement of the three pan-ideologies, has survived several crises, and instead of becoming more powerful as its originators had expected it to be, it became weaker due to internal and external circumstances.

We have already spoken about solidarity between African and Arab countries. Pan-Africanism and Pan-Arabism are both collective nationalist ideologies, with the difference that while Pan-Africanism is clearly a "secular" concept, Pan-Arabism /despite protestations by some nationalist circles/ also carries Islam, a religious ideology, and as Arabism promulgates collaboration between Arabs aiming at attaining power in the world of Islam, this power includes rule over African Islam also.

Pan-Arabism, as an idea, a concept is -as already explained- not identical with the "background ideology" of the Arab League, an establishment set up to protect interests. Thus while the Organisation of African Unity as an organisation is more significant than what Pan-Africanism would suggest, Arab unity - in diversity-, Arab cohesion is stronger than what the activities of the Arab League suggest.

Three factors were behind the rebirth of Arab collaboration: the role the Arabs started to play in international economic life after 1973, the long duration of the Middle East conflict and its effect on international politics, as well as the reactivation of Islam, these also show the special possibilities of Arabic Islam. The three factors cannot be interpreted separately, as they have always had chain-like joint effects on Arab collaboration, in the definition of the growth of Arab unity. However Arab unity must not be overvalued, as oil wealth or the lack of it acts as a differentiating factor in itself. It should also not be forgotten that the Middle East conflict has a different significance for countries situated in its close vicinity than for Arab countries far from that region.

"Nationalism has always aimed at minimalizing the significance of class differentiations in society. "Under the effect of Muslim ideology", writes Rodinson, "Arab nationalism underlines this statement, as Muslim ideology proclaims the embodiment of the egalitarian idea."<sup>30</sup> "... In the Arab world at present Muslim ideology is the only ideology with definite theoretical and practical aspects..."<sup>31</sup>

It is evident that we have to return to the concepts presented in the introduction to detect, instead of unresolvable or apparent divergences between Arabism, Pan-Arabism and the belonging to the Islam, rather amalgamation, interaction, in the course of which movements can be observed, the rapprochement and deviation between Islam and right- and left-wing nationalism, accepting in the meanwhile "alien" ideologies, defining the scope of Islam's activities in politics to be used in the interests of the ruling elite.

Thus we have reached the stage of Islamic reactivation, its transnational emergence, Pan-Islamism. Pan-Islamism is transnational while remaining different from country to country, and while in permanent transformation /the transitory stage becoming permanent/ it is able to continue redefining its place, role and impact in a certain part of the third world, and the relationship of this region to the rest of the world. This adaptability /or capacity for self-accommodation/ has made it possible-and continues to do so- to bring us to the era of political activation, and while all political and economic efforts made in the interest of progress are being limited by national boundaries, pan-ideologies have been forced to withdraw by local nationalism, we can see that Islam has a scope for unfolding and developing in Asia and Africa, a large section of the developing world. "Islamic reactivation has increased Pan-Islamic aspirations. Experiments were made to elaborate specific, Islamic conceptions for social progress."<sup>32</sup> Thus the political reactivation of Islam is a clear response to the failures of the experienced ways of development, to the attempts made so far to create nations.

This is how Bassam Tibi summed up the reasons for the political re-emergence and reactivation of Islam: "In the history of Islam interpretation has always served the political power, politics and economy. Religious terms have been used to legalize political entities... The language of religion was the language of politics." The phenomenon of Islamic renaissance experienced since the 1970s is the result of the following process: "1/ Islamic renaissance as the product of resistance during the early period of colonization. 2/ During the colonial period western values were adapted by small circles very rapidly, with over-modernized concepts, and with attempts made after independence. 3/ As a response to these the reaction was cultural /political and religious/ revival, as an internal demand of Islamic societies, aspiring for an Islamic solution /al-Hal al-Islami/ for progress."<sup>33</sup>

We have to agree with Bassam Tibi that Islamic renaissance and reactivation are internal demands. However we have to raise the following question: could Islamic reactivation have continued to progress since the middle of the 1960s without the oil price rise achieved by Arabic Islam in the early 1970s and its international effects, which provided the Islamic world with a possibility to experiment with a new specific social-economic model of its own and present it as example to the developing world?

In the course of the 1970s the position of the Arab countries certainly changed on the international scene, and Islamic reactivation brought about a new shift, which can be summed up as follows: "to try and stand at an equal distance both from capitalism and socialism." This shift can also be experienced in the activities of the Islam Conference Organisation, where it can be clearly seen that people living on the peripheries want to redefine their place in the world with the help of Islam, and that by using the mobilizing power of Islam they want to return to their own system of values, their own culture while purifying them from the "western-eastern culture".

In 1969 the Islam Conference Organisation provided a forum for a pro-imperialist Islamic fundamentalism, which was created with foreign assistance. Ten years later - and especially after the Islamic revolution in Iran- Islamic reformism, and with it "moderates" have come to the tone, the organisation has shifted closer to the third world. It volunteered to be a forum to protect third world interests, calling for collaboration within the third world, as "The present chaos in the World is the result of manoeuvres by the great powers for regions of interest and hegemony"<sup>34</sup> Thus the third world has to rally together.

A small bokklet issued by the Islamic Foundation under the title "Islam and the Crisis of the Modern World" gives a straight answer to the question: why is there a need for Islam today? "The tragedy of socialism and its various variants is that they allocate absolute power to the state with the purpose of completely transforming the lives of individuals. Islam aims at achieving a certain balance between the two extremes, capitalism and socialism. Islam harmonizes the relationship between the individual and the state, so that the individual should not lose the freedom he needs to develop and human rights should not be violated, but is also enables social and economic conditions to be regulated and controlled by the adequate power of community and state, to protect and maintain the harmony of human life."<sup>35</sup> Capitalism and socialism have developed much later /than Islam/. The Islamic system of social reform preceded the contemporary social movements. For over thirteen centuries Islam has provided the basic needs of peoples - food, shelter, sexual gratification - thus it was a viable ideological system, and it ahs always advocated universal peace."<sup>36</sup>

#### b/ Afro-Arabic relations

Islam comes forward with the promise to solve all problems, offering social, political, economic and legal models, while regarding theoretical issues, the spheres of science and culture as its own territories. This attitude has helped Islam to become a spreading, growing religious-ideological system up to the present. The economic possibilities at the disposal of the majority of the oil producing Islamic countries since the oil weapon has been deployed naturally contributed to Islamic successes. These economic successes have encouraged the least developed countries to move closer - in ideology and politics also - to the rich Arabic-Islamic countries.

The relations between Black-African and Arab countries significantly changed during the 1970s and at the beginning of the present decade there are definite signs to suggest the increase of Islamic influence in Black Africa, Arabic problems have come into proinence in African affairs, these are being overemphasized. Arabism and Pan-Islamism have overshadowed Pan-Africanism. As about a half of OAU members are Arab countries, the momentum of Arab-African countries has increased within this organisation also, and the forum itself has become a platform for Arab interests.

Afro-Arab relations have been revalued not only regionally but globally as well. The conflict in the Middle East with the 1974-1978 events in the Horn of Africa have increased the significance of the security of the Red Sea, pushing into the background the conflict in South Africa. Among other things this has led to increased militarization in the Indian Ocean region /e.g. Diego Garcia, the "forgotten military base" was reassessed in American politics/, and African and Arab countries have speeded up military preparations. The redefinition of these regional problems as global issues has increased the dangers of many-sided confrontation, and with the deterioration of the world economy the developing countries have become even more graded into subordinate and superordinate countries within the group itself. Studying the history of Arab-African relations Ali A. Mazrui concluded that before colonization the relationship was asymmetrical with the Arab East acting as donor, Black Africa the recipient. In the struggle for decolonization that asymmetric relationship has turned into a balanced one.<sup>37</sup> However Mazrui studied these relations only up to 1975. We also agree with him that the upswing of Arab-African solidarity covered the period between 1973 and 1977 /especially after the African countries severed diplomatic relations with Israel/. We feel however that since the end of the 1970s the relationship has shifted towards asymmetry, and in this process the main factors were the deployment of the oil weapon and the reactivation of Islam. African collaboration within the Organisation of African Unity is being especially obstructed by divergence among Arab countries. Due to the many-sided differentiation which took place in the 1970s the possibilities for inter-African cooperation decreased, and became limited to some issues, such as for example the struggle against apartheid.

It has to be seen also that Afro-Asian solidarity, enhanced by the African liberation movements in the 1970s, due to the above described similarities of the two regional conflicts, is loaded - in its outside effects- with anti-imperialism. And it is even more important that due to the fact that in both conflicts the United States supports regional sub-imperialism against the third world, Afro-Asian solidarity also has an anti-American context. The anti-imperialism of the Afro-Asian region - here we have in mind mainly the ideological-political drive of Islam- is accompanied by efforts to retain a certain distance from the socialist countries also. This compels the countries in close foreign political alliance with socialist countries to accept assistance from rich, but conservative Islamic countries because of their economic difficulties, and in order to continue dialogue with the moderates /e.g. Guinea-Bissau, Guinea/, to participate in the Islam Conference Organisation, or to be extremely sensitive on Islamic issues as Islamic minorities in Black African countries became more active.

Nkrumah and Nasser were the fathers of Afro-Arabic solidarity. Several authors argue that that historic meeting during the anti-colonial struggle had already put its mark in the 1950s and 1960s on the outcome of Arabic-African relations, as in this "continuous region" the task for both Arabic and African countries after obtaining independence was, to use Nasser's words "self-reliance and the awakening of Arabic and African consciousness."<sup>38</sup>

The earlier cooperation between Pan-Africanism and Pan-Arabism has been several times "transformed" to play a secondary role to Pan-Islamism, which was strengthened by the revival of Islam. The political activization of Islam led to a renaissance of the "third road" concept, offering an answer to the challenges of our times.

To sum up we can conclude that speaking of the intereffects of the three pan-ideologies today it is Pan-Islamism that takes an offensive position, as an answer to the failures of the development models followed by third world countries in this region. Presently we witness a revival of the active period searching a road toward progress, and the efforts of the developing countries in this region to build nations have not met with significant success.

When in the post-independence years local nationalism strengthened it seemed the golden age of pan-ideologies and collective nationalism was over. Yet now we see that while national identities are being formed transnational consciousness continues to have its effects - and this is especially valid where Pan-Islamism is concerned -, it enriches national ideas and remains an element in national cultural consciousness and cultural identity. The fact that there was a need to return to Islamic values - or in a broader sense - to local values, to cultural identities also proves that no long-term national identities have yet been formed. The major part of the third world has not yet found the way to adapt itself to modern times, the ideologies and life styles linked to the traditional and contemporary sectors have not yet succeeded in finding ways to each other.

No matter whether external conditions are favourable or unfavourable, every nation wants to develop.

The development myth of the oil rich Islamic countries rich in capital is already on the wane. However Islamic assistance will remain an important factor for the poor African countries - see the Islamic development program elaborated to help the countries in the Sahelian belt<sup>39</sup> -, and this will continue to have an ideological effect.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

- 1/ See on this: József Benke: The development of social consciousness of the Arabs. Budapest, 1981. József Benke: Zionism and /Pan/ Arabism in Palestine. Budapest, 1980.
- 2/ Shown by several authors, e.g. Maxime Rodinson: The Arabs /Les Arabes, 1979. Presses Universitaires de France/, 1981. University of Chicago Press, pp 49-88
- 3/ The subject here is the formation of Pan-Africanism if Africa, as collective nationalism evolved on the African continent, which regarded Islamic cooperation as an example. Of this Rodinson op.cit. pp 76-85
- 4/ Róbert Simon: The Birth of Islam, Budapest, 1975.
- 5/ There are 800-1000 million Muslims in the world today every source gives different data/ most of them in Asia, and Africa, but if we also consider the "Diaspora" there are smaller or larger communities practically on every continent. Here we present a summary:

"Arabic Islam	/1/		140 million
- Mashrek	/2/	90	
- Maghreb		50	
African Islam /Islam Noire/			100 million
- Belonging to the majority	/3/	90	
- " " " minority	/4/	10	
European Islam			43 "
- Turkish	/5/	50	
- Balkan and others	/6/ 7		
Central Asian Islam			
- Iran	/7/	40	60 "
- Afghanistan	/8/	20	
Indian Islam			260 "
- Pakistan	/9/	85	
- Bangladesh	/10/	95	
- India	/11/	80	

Far-East Islam		160 million
- Indonesia /12/	145	
- Malaysia /13/	10	
- the Philippines/14/	5	
"Pheripheral" Islam		95
- Soviet Union /15/	50	
- China /16/	40	
- Elsewhere /17/	5	
"Diaspora" or Islam in emigration		15
- Western Europe/18/	7,5	
- America /19/	7,5	
Total:		880 /?/ million

Remarks to the table

- 1.- The countries of the Middle East: Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Palestine !!  
The Arab peninsula: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, the Emirates, Qatar, Oman, North Yemen, South Yemen  
African states: Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti
- 2.- Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania
- 3.- Sub-Saharan Africa
- 4.- East Africa
- 5.- Of the population of 45 million
- 6.- Islam linked to the Ottoman Empire: Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary !/, Poland, Romania, Greece
- 7.- Most of them Shiites
- 8.- Most of them Sunnits
- 9-10.- Certain sources give opposing data
- 11.- Of the population of 660 million
- 12.- The data are between 120 and 160 million
- 13.- Data vary between 8 and 14 million
- 14.- Of the population of 45 million
- 15.- Of the population of 260 million
- 16.- Of the population of 1.000 million
- 17.- Thailand, Burma and Sri Lanka /Ceylon/
- 18.- Over two million in France, being the second largest religious community
- 19.- The United States and Latin America



Published by Revue Tiers Monde, Oct-Dec No. 92, 1982. Special edition. It has to be noted here that we do not agree with several data in this table /e.g. in the case of "Islam Noire" the Islam majority of 90 million is too much, unrealistic, as rather the Islamic minority is in preponderance, or to list Hungary in this context/, but practically every table on this subject contains mistaken data.

- 6./ Rodinson op.cit. p. 76.
- 7./ B. Bouteiller: L'islam: réveil ou renouveau? Défense National Nov. 1979.p.85.
- 8./ Rodinson op.cit. p. 92 corrects the mistaken conception according to which the Pesian Jamal ad-Din was named al-Afghani due to the mistakenly used attribute "Afghani" attached to his name by scholars during his life and commonly used since.
- 9./ Accepting the correction made in the footnote above, as he has been often mistakenly mentioned in literature, for identification's sake we suggest to accept Rodinson's correction.
- 10./ Quoted by József Benke: The role of religion in the evolvement and development of Arabism. Manuscript, Hungarian Institute for Foreign Affairs, pp. 12-13.
- 11./ More by Erika Fodor: The Reactivation of Islam and the Islam Conference Organisation, Budapest, 1983. Manuscript, Hungarian Institute for Foreign Affairs.
- 12./ R. Hrair Dekmejian: The Anatomy of Islamic Revival: Legitimacy Crisis, Ethnic Conflict and the Search for Islamic Alternatives, The Middle East Journal 1980 /31/ p.1
- 13./ See footnote 11, pp.14-15.
- 14./ M.T. Stepanyants: Musulmanskoe voztozhdjenschestvo. Narodi Azii i Afriki, 1983. No 3. pp. 20-28.
- 15./ ibid
- 16./ Udo Steinbach: "Re-islamisierung" Forschrift in Goldene Zeitalter Orient /Opladen/ 1980. 3. pp. 331-334
- 17./ See footnote No.1.
- 18./ Rodinson op.cit.
- 19./ Rodinson op.cit. p.94. Fatat /in transcriptions also Fatah/
- 20./ Rodinson op.cit. Chapter 3.
- 21./ Samir Amin: La nation arabe- Nationalisme et luttes de classes. Les Éditions de minuit, 1976. Paris.
- 22./ George Padmore: Pan-Africanism, London, 1956. p. 105.
- 23./ ibid p.150.
- 24./ Kwame Nkrumah: The autobiography, Edinburgh, 1959. p. 37.
- 25./ Kwame Nkrumah: L'Afrique droit s'unir 1964. Par-s. Études et Documents Payot.
- 26./ Padmore op. cit. p. 379.

- 27./ More by Erika Fodor: The Decolonization of Africa- liberation policies and reality. Külpolitika, 1983. No.5.
- 28./ Essop Phad: On the new Africa policy of the United States. Béke és Szocialism /Budapest/, 1976 No. 11.
- 29./ Noticias, /central daily of FRELIMO/ July 24. 1979.
- 30./ Rodinson op. cit. p. 157, more in Abdallah Laroui: L'idéologie arabe contemporaine, Pairs, Maspero, 1977. pp. 11-167.
- 31./ ibid p. 160.
- 32./ E.M. Primakov: Islam i processi obtahestvennogo razvitija stran zarubeznogo Vostoka. Moscow Voprosi Filozofii, 1980.8.
- 33./ Bassam Tibi: The Renewed Role of Islam in the Political and Social Development of the Middle East. - The Middle East Journal /Washington/, 1983. No. 1. pp. 3-13.
- 34./ South. The Organization of the Islamic Conference, 1983. 30. pp. 19-26
- 35./ Muhammad Qutb: Islam and the Crisis of the Modern World, London, The Islamic Foundation, 1979/ 1399H p. 18.
- 36./ ibid p. 19.
- 37./ On this question see Ali A. Mazrui: Black Africa and Arabs, Foreign Affairs, 1975. No. 4.
- 38./ E.C. Chibwe: Afro-Arab Relations, St. Martin's Press. New York, 1977.p.19.
- 39./ See footnote No. 35.

## IMPLICATIONS

by Palánkai - Szalay - Fodor

In the studies in our volume we have tried to concentrate on the most serious world problems of the past decade, whilst we could not leave out of account regional problems developing into global ones, the regional appearance and effect of global problems, or global tendencies that can be experienced in the world.

Since the 1970s the problems of energy and food have become global economic problems of great importance. During the previous decades, the energy consumption of the world was increasing quickly and the emphasis shifted to oil and natural gas. In the 1970s, the energy supply was troubled by economic and political factors. It was more and more clear that the age of cheap energy was over in the long run and that it was necessary to exploit new sources of energy which were more expensive and more difficult to get at. The new tendencies appeared suddenly and violently, which was indicated best of all by the two price explosions of oil-products. The oil-price explosions led to recessions and troubles in the world economy. The socialist countries and Comecon are in a special situation as to energy supply. In the long run, Comecon can be self-sufficient in all kinds of energy and some sources of energy enable them even to export. Since the 1970s, the troubles of the world economy have affected the socialist countries as well.

The sphere of energy was one of the first fields of intensive state intervention in every group of countries. In the different countries, the energy policy was always subjected to two basic priorities: providing cheap energy in sufficient quantity for the production and consumption and assuring the appropriate supply. In the economic policy, the cheapness and the security of supply always appeared at the same time and the governments tried to optimize both priorities.

By the 1970s, the conditions of the energy policy changed radically. Cheap energy was no longer a nonsense, moreover, under the new conditions, it became of greater and greater importance. Today, the cheapness of energy is to be interpreted in a modified range of costs and prices. Under the current conditions of world politics, the security of supply has become more and more important. The dialectical unity of the cheapness and security became tighter in the 1970s and this could only be achieved by means of an active economic policy using a lot of means.

In many fields of the energy policy, it was necessary to shift emphasis and to change means. On a microeconomic level, the behaviour of the producers and consumers was decisive. In the different countries of the world, the results achieved in the last few years in the field of saving energy were due to the more and more rational utilization of energy by companies, to the introduction of energy-saving products and technologies as well as to the modification of the consumers' behaviour. On a macroeconomic level, we should mention the various fields and means of the national and international energy policies.

Since the 1970s, the central or state intervention, especially the conscious and active intervention of governments has become more and more intensive in the national energy policies and the means of energy policy have multiplied. The national energy policies have become active in several directions: 1/ efforts to discover, exploit and utilize more intensively the national sources of energy, 2/ efforts to develop and utilize new alternative sources of energy, 3/ efforts to increase the saving of energy in the consumption and to introduce energy-saving products and technologies, 4/ efforts to work out a complex policy of importation of energy /differentiation of the sources of supply, stabilization of the supply on the basis of bilateral or multilateral contracts, compensation of the importation of energy by means of profitable exports, etc./.

In the energy policy, the role and the functions of international organizations have multiplied, intensified and modified since the 1970s. The major priorities and objectives of the international energy policy coincided with the national efforts and in spite of the intensifying interdependence they expressed the limits and new requirements of the national policies. The main directions of the international energy policy are: 1/ cooperation in the production of energy and realization of common energy-programs, 2/ collective or coordinated action of producers and consumers on the world market, 3/ concerted establishment of safety stocks or sharing of collective safety stocks, 4/ collective recommendations to reduce the consumption of energy and to save energy, 5/ collective recommendations and efforts to reduce importation, 6/ common researches in the field of energy, 7/ creation and mobilization of international financial sources to finance programs of investment and balance of payments deficits /the common funds of the IMF, World Bank, OECD and the oil-exporting countries, etc./.

In spite of the hard conditions, the energy-supply of Hungary was well balanced in the last period. In the material branches of the national economy, the specific use of energy went down by 13% between 1980 and 1984. The energy consumption of the population increased only slightly. The structure of the consumption of energy was also modified, the proportion of oil and oil-products decreased while that of natural gas increased. When the atomic plant at Paks was put into action, atomic energy also became one of the sources of energy and its proportion was already 2.9% in 1984. The proportion of the domestic sources of energy in meeting the requirements went up from 48% in 1980 to 51% in 1984. The specific use of materials and energy decreased in most branches of industry.

Since the 1970s, the world food problem has become a very critical global problem. About 500 million people are starving around the world and according to estimates at least one billion people are underfed. In certain regions the production of food is far from being able to meet the requirements, which is due in part to technical, economic and social problems. Within the third world, the food problem is especially grave in the countries of South and South-East Asia and to an increasing extent in the countries of Africa. The production, the trade and the surplus that can be exported of food are concentrated

in a few developed countries while the number of countries forced to import food is growing. It is generally understood that in the following decades the food deficit and food problems of the third world will grow worse. At the same time, the self-sufficiency in agricultural products of the western region has increased.

The main problems of the third world are the quickly growing population, the narrow economic sources and the unsolved social problems /deferred agricultural reforms, disproportions in distribution, the polarization of properties/. In addition to the quick growth of population, the demand for food is also increased by the accelerating urbanization and the growth of the real income of certain strata. Realization of the radical social reforms goes generally with the quick increase of the demand for food. The food problem is becoming more and more a political problem.

World food problems can be solved first of all by the increase of production. The agricultural production of the developing countries has been growing more quickly than that of the developed capitalist countries but it has grown more slowly than the requirements. The possibilities to increase the production by extending the cultivable land are limited. The main means of increasing the production is the intensification of productivity, which can only be achieved through the development of technology. There are important internal reserves in the better organization of storing delivery and sale.

The world trade in agricultural and food products is growing at almost the same pace as the production itself. Agricultural products amount to about 15% of the world exports /1977/ and for the most part they meet prime necessities. The exportation is characterised by a high level of concentration, the main exporters being some developed capitalist countries /USA, Canada, New Zealand/. But a great number of third world countries are dependent on imports.

The world food problem should not be considered inevitable. The food crisis does not only result from the production or distribution but it is in close connection with other global problems as well. In addition to the insufficient agricultural production and to the demographic explosion, it can occasionally be the result of meteorological, climatic and geographical factors too. The traditional /colonialism/ and new distortions of the international division of labour also contribute to the food problems. In the past decade, the rise in the prices of energy and of fertilizers as well as in freight charges has also become an important factor. The rise in food prices was due to a great extent to the structure of consumption of the developed countries where the increase of the consumption of meat went together with the quick increase of the consumption of cereals /as fodder/. According to the experiences of the past decades, food-aids can be considered only as complementary sources. In order to solve the food crisis, it is crucial to utilize better the existing sources, to develop the technology and to realize structural social reforms.

In the food production and consumption of the world, the socialist countries play an important role. Food production and consumption in the socialist countries has increased quickly in the past period. From time to time, some socialist countries are compelled to import from capitalist countries, which influence the situation of the international trade in food. In most of the socialist countries, the reserves of the extensive development of agriculture have run out and the only way of further advancement is intensive development.

The various organizations of the United Nations play a more and more important role in connection with world food and demographic problems. The researches, the organizational and theoretical work as well as the advice service of the U.N. organizations can contribute to the solution of the problems.

The role of international forums has perhaps never been such an important factor of the solution of world problems as today. Appearing especially sharply is the need for international meetings on questions on military-type, security-policy topics. Indeed the solution of world problems cannot be expected by common efforts when the international atmosphere is strained, when the dialogue between the sides gets stuck.

In the past decade, and especially in the first half of the 1980s, we could witness that - though there is no direct danger of war - the arms race threatening world peace has speeded up again, first of all as a result of the worsening relations between the two super powers, but the developing countries have also taken a considerable part in the arms race.

The opposition between East and West and particularly the determinant Soviet-American relations began to worsen almost immediately after the signing of the Final Act of the Helsinki conference mainly because of the fact that both coalitions interpreted differently the meaning and the sphere of action of the Act. The United States and its allies would have liked to consider the agreement as of global validity while the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries insisted on considering it as of territorial validity. No positive results were achieved in the political sphere by the delegations because by pointing out arbitrarily some special obligations undertaken, they tried to discredit publicly the other party instead of solving the problems in a mutually acceptable way. In these circumstances, the military modernization problems undermined the confidence that had just emerged and on which the East-West process of arms limitation could have been based. In the deteriorated political atmosphere of the early 80s, the United States returned openly to the policy of force and began to realize a military program directed overtly at gaining predominance over the Soviet Union or at least at getting into a position which would force the Soviet Union to accept a different agreement in the field of arms reduction. The shift in the American political conception triggered almost automatically the revival of the arms race and put off the expectation - in which we believed both in the East and in the West in the period of détente - that by means of the cooperation of the two coalitions, it would be easier to settle peacefully the political and military conflicts emerging in other re-

gions of the world, that the international arms trade could be kept within "reasonable" bounds and that with the amounts saved in this field, the fight against the graver and graver global problems could be more successful.

Unfortunately, the new wave of the arms race could not be stemmed either by the fact that we have a clear view of the irreparable consequences of an eventual nuclear conflict. Nuclear war would not only result in the terrible death of millions of people but it would be fatal for the survivors as well because in consequence of such a war the ecological balance of the Earth would be upset, the structure of the world economy would collapse, there would be very severe shortage of food and the surviving world society would suffer a psychological shock which would throw mankind back into medieval con-  
ditional conditions.

Like all world-wide arms races, this one also goes with the increase of the proportion of military programs within the global research and development spending and with the quick innovation of the development results of military technology. All this influences the reassessment of the military-strategic conceptions and, under appropriate conditions, the political decision-making as well. That is why there emerged as a political decision the conception of surpassing the nuclear deterrence and the possibility of winning a central war by means of a defence shield in space /SDI program/ and of increasing at the same time first strike capacity.

In the field of global security, the strained East-West relations and the return to the policy of force do not only hamper advancement but some of their consequences represent regression on those questions which were already thought to have been solved. That is e.g. the case of chemical weapons. Although we know that the Geneva Convention of 1925 and its supplements did not settle completely this question - otherwise the U.N. Disarmament Commission in Geneva would not have to deal with it-, it is however shocking that the European commander-in-chief of NATO asserted, in connection with the Air-Land Battle strategic conceptions, the necessity of introducing, in addition to the traditional and nuclear forces, chemical weapons or the complex utilization of them too - and in this regard, the modernization of NATO's chemical weapons with binary weapons.

In the first run, the revival of the arms race slowed down the process of arms limitation and threatened from time to time with the complete failure of this process. It is understandable that the critics of arms limitation are right when they agree that the Moscow agreement of 1963 on the banning of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in space and under water, the Space Agreement of 1967, the Nuclear Test Ban Agreement of 1968, the 1970 Agreement on the denuclearization of the sea-beds, the SALT I and SALT II agreements of 1972

are not perfect agreements because they had occasionally discriminative elements and imposed retributions in such field which were not included in the directions of development. In connection with the two latter agreements, we should mention that they did not lead to a radical reduction in the nuclear strategic forces of the super powers. But in addition to their strict meaning, these agreements undoubtedly had great importance for the stabilization of international relations because the Soviet Union and the United States tried to stabilize the strategic balance and by this they served, intentionally or not intentionally, global security.

The strained relations between East and West and the intensification of their military rivalry exercised an unfavourable influence on armaments in the third world and on the local and regional conflicts as well. The main cause of armaments in the third world can be interpreted rather by regional arms races, by prestige-considerations and by the political dominance of the military elites than by East-West relations, But without the active role of the super powers /exportation of arms/ or without their indulgence the demands of the third world would in part not be met. In the case of the arms race, a new phenomena is that in the last decade certain developing states have become great exporters of arms which may further complicate in the future the active efforts to regulate the market of arms.

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Our team of editors are well aware that the experts of the South do not always willingly accept, the advice, the assessments of the experts, scholars of the so-called North for a solution of the different problems of the developing world. We understand their reservations, even though we sometimes enter into debate with counter-arguments. Our basic conception in a scientific approach to the problems is committed, anti-imperialist and directed toward the elimination of the backwardness of the developing world, i.e. we feel it has common feeling and common thought with the developing world.



In our essays we also try to analyze the different approaches to the world problems. The experience of the world problems and the proposals for their solution may differ according to the way in which the major problems as e.g. the energy crisis or the food problem is reflected in the life, in the conscience and in the scientific life of a nation with a given culture and living standard. Of course, the different approaches cannot be analyzed completely if - for lack of space - only some regions can be included in the investigation.

In this case we tried to analyze first of all a well determined region of the third world, the Afro-Asian region in which the utilization of the sources of energy - from the point of view of the producers or consumers - had a very great influence on the socio-economic life and on the everyday problems of the population in the past decade.

It is worth of attention e.g. that in the past two decades the process of urbanization has speeded up in the Arab world but in other parts of Africa as well. This process has many different causes. The growth rate of the urban population in the Arab world speeded up so much in the 70s compared to the 60s that the annual growth rate was between 4 and 6% and in the major oil-exporting countries it reached even 7-8.5%. The proportion of the urban population is the highest in the Persian Gulf /70-85%/. In the Arab countries with a mean income, this proportion is 45-60% while in the countries with the lowest income is only 30%.

The urbanization itself is a distorted process and raises many problems. Its general feature is "over-urbanization", i.e. the suddenly overpopulated towns are not able to provide enough possible of employment and appropriate conditions of life for the increased population. Most of the Afro-Asian towns have a double character: they are composed of new, European-like and of old oriental districts.

The process of urbanization goes together with the intensification of the conflict between town and countryside. Most of the oil-producing countries concentrate on developing the towns and they neglect the development of the countryside. By this, they contribute even more to the growth of the force of attraction of the towns and to the intensification of urbanization.

The intensification of urbanization contributes to the growth of unemployment in the towns, to the exodus of the rural population and to the shortage of labour in the countryside and thus it raises more and more new problems.

At the same time, we should not forget that in the social relations of the Afro-Asian region traditional family and tribal relations play an important role which causes many complicated problems.

All these problems appear in general as the concomitants of "modernism" and of the new world phenomena in consequence of which the aversions to modernization become more and more intensive and express themselves in the form of political movements. In many cases,

this reanimates the conservative traditions opposed to modernization. We can consider the sudden advance of the Islamic traditions and of the various kinds of conservatism as a result of this fact.

Of course, we can observe several tendencies that are gaining ground at the same time. We are thinking e.g. of the fact that the increased oil prices and oil incomes and the ensuing structural modifications of the world economy intensified, in most of the third world countries, anti-imperialism and the requirements for putting an end to the one-sided dependence. The solidarity and anti-imperialism of the Afro-Asian peoples have strengthened. These ideas raise again and again the question of national identity and of national interests, which has a great influence on the formation and development of the political objectives.

The interest-promoting fora of the third world reword in the same way the efforts to eliminate the causes and results of the underdevelopment that accumulated during the period of colonialism and the new challenges in the latest world situations. These challenges are directed against the present renewal of the tendencies of colonialism and to modify the current structure of the international division of labour which is very disadvantageous to the third world.

The decolonization of the third world is a long-lasting process. An important role is played in this process by those ideas which have strengthened in the last few decades and which are, in short, the ideological manifestations of the anti-imperialistic efforts. The national interests and identities expressed in them embody the ideal that the world problems which will be discussed largely in the essays of this volume can be solved locally. Such problems are e.g. the food problem, the possibilities of the development strategy of agriculture in the third world, the energy problem, the development of industry, the process of armament in the third world and the question of substituting for the sources utilized by armaments.

In the essays we also try to show that the solution of the local manifestations of world problems and of their special accumulation in the third world requires a special approach because it emphasizes the underdevelopment and the possible ways out of it as well.

The underdevelopment and its qualitative differentiation may remind us that the way out is motivated very much by the world problems that have appeared and intensified recently. The solution of these problems is in close connection with the previous factors of underdevelopment which should always be subjected to a complex analysis.

Our team thinks therefore that a concrete analysis of the facts cannot be made without a regional approach to the world problems and an analysis of the conditions of the solutions under the local conditions and in regard to the analysis of the global processes.

That is why the analysis of the asymmetries and disequilibriums has become a central - or we could also say-methodological question of this volume of essays. The analysis of these questions must not be simple and one-sided because they can be apprehended in all dimensions of the world problems.

The team of researchers interested in these essays will try in the future as well to follow the most complex possible method in analyzing the world problems and to apprehend them in subtle way by analyzing the particularities of the regions and looking for alternative solutions.