

Working Paper

**Learning from
the Literature on
Policy Implementation:
A Synthesis Perspective**

Adil Najam

WP-95-61
July 1995



International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis • A-2361 Laxenburg • Austria

Telephone: +43 2236 807 • Teletax: +43 2236 71313 • E-Mail: info@iiasa.ac.at

**Learning from
the Literature on
Policy Implementation:
A Synthesis Perspective**

Adil Najam

WP-95-61
July 1995

Working Papers are interim reports on work of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis and have received only limited review. Views or opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the Institute or of its National Member Organizations.



International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis • A-2361 Laxenburg • Austria

Telephone: +43 2236 807 • Telefax: +43 2236 71313 • E-Mail: info@iiasa.ac.at

Preface

What happens to international environmental agreements once they are signed, and how does the implementation of such agreements influence their effectiveness? These are the questions that motivate the IIASA project "Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments (IEC)."

Virtually all international environmental commitments must be "domesticated"--transformed into domestic rules before they can affect the individuals, firms and organizations that international environmental agreements ultimately aim to influence. The domestication of international commitments is a relatively new topic, but scholars will learn much from the extensive studies conducted over the last three decades on implementation of domestic policies and programs. In this paper, Adil Najam reviews the main works, trends and concepts in the policy implementation literature. He also reviews the distinct literature on policy implementation in developing countries. Finally, he synthesizes the reviewed literature into five clusters of critical variables that explain success and failure in policy implementation. That 5C protocol is an organizing framework for conducting and assessing research into policy implementation, including implementation of international environmental commitments.

This work was initiated during the summer of 1994 while Adil Najam visited the IEC project at IIASA. His visit was financed by IIASA's North-South Fund and is part of an effort by the IEC project to explore the potential development and application of theories to explain implementation in developing countries.

ABSTRACT

The principal concern that motivates this paper is the domestic implementation of international commitments. The task it sets itself, however, is not an understanding of how international environmental commitments come about, nor of how they are translated into national policies. Rather, it narrows its focus on what happens, or is likely to happen, in the implementation of policies at the domestic level. It seeks to learn, therefore, from the existing literature on domestic policy implementation.

This paper is built on the assumption that most, if not all, international commitments have to be 'domesticated' before they are actually implemented and the premise that scholars of international environmental affairs have not paid sufficient attention to the accumulated learning on domestic policy implementation. It sets out, therefore, to systematically review the literature on domestic implementation and synthesize from it the critical explanatory variables about implementation that students of international environmental policy may find useful.


The first, introductory, chapter sets out why it is important for students of international environmental policy to learn from the literature on domestic implementation and defines the task of the paper as reviewing the analytic literature on the implementation of domestic policies in a variety of issue areas and in different national settings, including industrialized and developing countries.

The second chapter provides a quick review of the development of the learning in the field by identifying three 'generations' of implementation research: the first ('classical') generation began with the assumption that implementation would happen 'automatically' once the appropriate policies had been authoritatively proclaimed; the second ('empirical') generation set out to challenge this assumption, to explain implementation 'failure' through detailed case studies, and to demonstrate that implementation, much like policy formulation, was a complex political process rather than a mechanical administrative one; the third ('analytic') generation, by contrast, has been less concerned with specific implementation failure and more with understanding how implementation works in general and how its prospects might be improved.

The third chapter argues that despite a multitude of stylized 'models', 'frameworks', 'approaches' and 'perspectives' on the subject, the field of implementation is still characterized by little cumulative, theoretical understanding of how policy implementation 'works'. This chapter reviews the most influential analytic scholarship on implementation and identifies the major debate on the subject as one between the so-called 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' schools. However, there is a growing feeling amongst scholars that elements of both perspectives may be correct and a resulting efforts to construct synthesis models that try to account for these strengths. In reviewing the analytic literature on policy implementation in developing countries, the chapter concludes that the models proposed and the explanatory variables identified as being important for developing countries are not unsimilar to those being suggested for industrialized countries, although implementation is likely to be even more complex and difficult in developing countries than it is elsewhere. Most importantly, this chapter concludes that despite lingering conceptual differences between bottom-up and top-down scholars, there are important and persistent commonalities in the explanatory variables identified by a multitude of scholars working on different issues, in different national settings and political systems, and adhering to different conceptual views of the field.

The remaining bulk of the paper, chapter #4, builds on the literature review of the previous two chapters to synthesize a set of five interlinked 'critical' variables which, it is argued, can explain implementation success or failure in a wide variety of policy issues (e.g., environment, education, population), types (e.g., distributive, regulatory), political systems (e.g., federal unitary, etc.), and levels of economic development (industrialized and developing countries):

- The Content of the policy itself—What it sets out to do (i.e. goals); how it problematizes the issue (i.e. causal theory); how it aims to solve the perceived problem (i.e. methods).
- The nature of the institutional Context—The corridor (often structured as operating procedures) through which policy must travel, and by whose boundaries it is limited, in the process of implementation.



- The Commitment of those entrusted with carrying out implementation at various levels to the goals, causal theory, and methods of the policy.
- The administrative Capacity of implementers to carry out the changes desired of them.
- The support of Clients and Coalitions whose interests are enhanced or threatened by the policy, and the strategies they employ in strengthening or deflecting its implementation.

The paper views *implementation as a dynamic process of negotiation between multiple actors, operating and multiple levels, within and between multiple organizations.* This call for understanding implementation in all its manifest complexity, however, is not an invitation to analytic anarchy. Rather, it is merely a recognition of a complexity which is, in fact, endemic to policy processes. In understanding implementation as a complex political process, rather than a mechanical administrative one, the study of implementation becomes an attempt to unravel the complexity—and, ultimately, to ‘manage’ it. It is suggested that the set of five critical variables (the 5C Protocol) identified in this paper can assist in the unraveling, and possibly in the management, of complex implementation processes.

§ § § § § § § § § §

READER’S GUIDE: At a minimum, this paper is designed to be a primer on research on domestic policy implementation. Chapters #2 and #3 can be read independently as a ‘state of the literature report’ while chapter #4 attempts a more interpretive contribution in synthesizing (as opposed to merely presenting) the learning thus far. Those already familiar with the literature on the subject can easily skip to chapter #4 directly.

By virtue of their very mandate chapters #2 and #3 attempt to cover a lot of material and ground in a fairly limited amount of space. The tussle to do justice to what is a broad and complex field while also attempting to keep the discussion concise but informed enough to be both manageable and intelligible for readers not familiar with the field has nowhere been easy. Two caveats are, therefore, important. First, that the selection of the material in these chapters is representative rather than exhaustive with a decided bias for general analytic rather than case oriented expositions. Second, that the presentation of the material aims at providing a flavor of the research and its direction rather than a detailed critique.

FIRST WORD

The Unicorn... stood for some time looking at her with an air of the deepest disgust.

"What—is—this?" he said at last.

"This is a child!" Haiagha replied eagerly, coming in front of Alice to introduce her, and spreading out both his hands towards her in an Anglo-Saxon attitude. "We only found it today. It's as large as life, and twice as natural!"

"I always thought they were fabulous monsters!" said the Unicorn. "Is it alive?"

"It can talk," said Haiagha solemnly.

The Unicorn looked dreamily at Alice, and said, "Talk, child."

Alice could not help her lips curling up into a smile as she began: "Do you know, I always thought Unicorns were fabulous monsters, too. I never saw one alive before!"

"Well, now that we have seen each other," said the Unicorn, "If you'll believe in me, I'll believe in you. Is that a bargain?"

"Yes, if you like," said Alice.

*— From *Through the Looking Glass*
By LEWIS CARROLL*

§ § § § § § § § § § §

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER #1 •

Introduction: Learning from the Literature on Implementation • 1

CHAPTER #2 •

Three Generations of Implementation Research • 6

Box 1: Defining Implementation • 7

Generation #1: A Cog in the Administrative Machine • 8

Generation #2: Implementation is Complex and 'Nothing Works' • 9

Generation #3: The Search for Implementation Theory • 11

Box 2: The Big Debate—Top-Down vs. Bottom-up • 13

CHAPTER #3 •

A Compendium of Models, Frameworks, Approaches, and Perspectives • 15

Two Early Models • 15

Top-Down Perspectives on Implementation • 17

The Challenge from the Bottom-Uppers • 18

Towards Synthesis • 22

The View from Developing Countries • 25

CHAPTER #4 •

The 5C Protocol: 'Critical' Variables for Studying Implementation • 30

Understanding Implementation in all its Complexity • 31

Making Sense of Complexity: The 5C Protocol • 35

Table 1: 'Critical' Explanatory Variables—Who is Proposing What • 37

Content • 38

Context • 41

Commitment • 45

Box 3: Understanding Street-Level Bureaucrats • 47

Capacity • 48

Clients and Coalitions • 51

A Few Last Words • 55

Explanatory Notes • 58

References Cited • 65

#1 • INTRODUCTION: Learning from the Literature on Implementation

*Before I built a wall
I'd ask to know
What I was walling in
Or walling out*
— ROBERT FROST

In a special issue of *Policy Analysis* on implementation, guest editor Walter Williams (1975: 458) observed that “there is a Kafkaesque aspect to the implementation area... It is a crucial area, yet people act as if it didn’t exist.” He was writing in the early years of what turned out to be a decade of intense focus on the subject by scholars of policy science. The results of this attention, however, have been mixed. A substantial volume of scholarship has been produced and the earlier view that implementation was merely an administrative chore which, once the policy had been legislated and the agencies mandated with administrative authority, would happen of and by itself has been debunked. However, while the complexity inherent in implementation processes has been amply demonstrated, we are still nowhere near a widely accepted causal theory with predictive or prescriptive powers.

More recently, a new wave of interest in implementation studies has emerged from students of international environmental regimes.¹ For most part, however, this new stream of scholarship has shown little interest in the accumulated learning of earlier research on domestic policy implementation.² Moreover, even though the incantations about the importance of accounting for and being sensitive to local factors are repeated and frequent, the focus of such research remains decidedly state-centric. Most importantly, assumptions about state behavior in the international arena are unquestioningly, and unjustifiably, transposed to state behavior in the domestic arena. Despite claims about the need to ‘open’ the so-called ‘black box’ of the state, there seems a marked hesitancy to do open it fully, lest it turns out to be a proverbial Pandora’s box.

In making their “plea for the semi-complex rational actor” Andresen, Skjærseth, and Wettestad (1995) go the farthest in challenging the sacrosanct concept of the state, developed for international affairs, as being the appropriate unit of analysis for studying implementation. It is the claim of this paper, however, that even they do not go far enough. Whatever we may want to believe at the international level, at the domestic level the state is never a unitary actor, nor necessarily rational. Even though they may provide a useful framework at the international level, concepts such as *state* willingness, *national* concern, or *governmental* capacity have limited, and only the most general, utility at the domestic, and especially the local, level by which time the state has already disintegrated into myriad organizations, agencies, and actors pursuing different, often conflicting, interests and strategies. It is in the space defined by the

complex web of interactions between the various subnational and societal actors, their contending interests, and their preferred strategies, that the ultimate effectiveness of any implementation process is defined. I submit that this space cannot be recognized, let alone be understood, until the 'black box' of the state is fully opened.³

Using the lens of the empirical and analytic research on domestic policy implementation in industrialized as well as developing countries, this paper is an attempt to understand domestic state action in all its manifest complexity. This paper assumes that international commitments have to be 'domesticated' before they can be implemented. That is, international commitments are—in most, if not all, cases—converted into domestic policies before they are implemented. Even programs that may emanate in international institutions will require some level of approval by national authorities and involvement of domestic agencies. The broader study of implementing international environmental commitments must obviously include the process by which international commitments are translated into national policies. This paper, however, focuses more narrowly on *what happens to international commitments after they become national policies and programs*. Our principal concern, then, is *the domestic implementation of international commitments*.⁴

The need to look at the implementation of international commitments at subnational levels is all the more important for students of environmental regimes, which often require changes in the behavior of individuals; in many cases of individuals residing at the periphery of state influence, or even beyond—e.g., a pastoralist in the African Sahel or a gatherer deep in the Amazon. Even in less dramatic cases—e.g., small firms dumping toxins in a nearby stream or illegally exporting them—there is a need to go beyond “the logic of two-level games” (Putnam, 1988) and to bring more than just “the second image (back) in” (Zürn, 1993), since the process of putting policy into action is more akin to “a Russian doll of implementation-within-implementation” (Berman, 1978: 176).⁵

Our belief that, like all politics, all implementation is ultimately local does not, in any way, belittle the importance of international factors. It merely implies that: a) international factors will influence the implementation process only in conjunction with domestic factors; b) the most important influence of the international factors is likely to be on how they impact, and potentially reshape, the domestic variables; and c) the general explanatory variables that may account for the domestic implementation of international commitments are likely to be the same as the variables that account for the domestic implementation of domestic policy.⁶

This line of argumentation leads to the realization that *any attempt to understand the implementation of international commitments must, at a very minimum, be true to (and potentially build upon) the accumulated learning on domestic implementation*. This paper,


then, proceeds to survey and synthesize this accumulated learning. Its target readers are students of international environmental regimes, but it consciously seeks the legitimacy of its arguments by invoking the literature on domestic implementation.⁷ Its examples and expositions, even where not directly environmental, are deliberately chosen to be relevant to students of environmental regimes and especial care has been taken to choose them from both industrialized and developing countries and on more complex policy issues. The argument is that any framework that claims to be general must be applicable to the potentially most difficult cases, and if it is, then it is likely to also be applicable to other cases.⁸

At the minimum, then, this paper is designed to be a primer on domestic implementation research. The next two chapters present a ‘state of the literature report.’ Imbedded in this literature review is a plea to the students of international environmental regimes to learn from this important stream of scholarship, lest they be condemned to repeat the same mistakes and reinvent the same wheels.

The fourth chapter sets for itself a much more ambitious goal. For Lester et al. (1987: 208), the most important task for implementation scholars is to identify the “critical” variables. This chapter attempts to do exactly that, heeding also to the advice from O’Toole (1986: 203) to “build systematically and cumulatively” on earlier empirical research. Chapters #2 and #3 show that although the literature on domestic implementation is exceptionally rich in empirical evidence, it is seriously fragmented in way of broadly accepted causal theories. More recently, attempts have been made to arrive at synthesis theories that accommodate various perspectives (e.g., Sabatier, 1986; Goggin et al., 1990). This paper does not pretend to construct a particular theory about how implementation ‘works’. In fact, implicit to our argument is the realization that any attempt to arrive at neat and precise grand theories about the process of implementation is an effort of dubious potential. This paper does, however, suggest a set of explanatory variables for the analytic study of implementation that is based on a synthesis of the, now abundant, literature on the subject.

Our survey of the literature shows that there is already a remarkable convergence on the critical explanatory variables identified by scholars of the two schools. Moreover, researchers working in a number of different issue areas (e.g. environment, population, health, crime prevention, etc.) have consistently identified the same, or similar, variables; as have scholars working in countries at various stages of economic development. We lower our sights, therefore, from the grandiose exercise of suggesting a unified causal theory, to identifying generally applicable critical explanatory variables. This paper identifies five such interlinked variables—or, ‘the 5C protocol’:

- The Content of the policy itself—What it sets out to do (i.e. goals); how it problematizes the issue (i.e. causal theory); how it aims to solve the perceived problem (i.e. methods).
- The nature of the institutional Context—The corridor (often structured as standard operating procedures) through which policy must travel, and by whose boundaries it is limited, in the process of implementation.
- The Commitment of those entrusted with carrying out the implementation at various levels to the goals, causal theory, and methods of the policy.
- The administrative Capacity of implementers to carry out the changes desired of them.
- The support of Clients and Coalitions whose interests are enhanced or threatened by the policy, and the strategies they employ in strengthening or deflecting its implementation.



There should be no surprises, *per se*, in the choice of these ‘critical’ variables for students of domestic public policy—or, for that matter, for students of international environmental regimes. What is important in this set of variables, however, is not their choice, but their exposition. Implicit in this exposition are three claims (each potentially controversial) that need to be made explicit.

The first two, more fundamental, of these relate to the larger scholarship on domestic policy implementation and derive from the synthesizing nature of this study:

- First, **a claim to general acceptability.** Although particular scholars, advocating particular theoretical perspectives (e.g., top-down or bottom-up), may place different priorities on the five explanatory factors identified here, it is suggested that, for most part, the overall importance of these factors within the implementation process would be acceptable to scholars from all schools.
- Second, **a claim to general applicability.** Although each specific episode of implementation will invariably have features specific to itself, it is suggested that the five broad variables identified in our synthesis of the scholarship provide a powerful framework for analyzing implementation in various issue areas (e.g. environment, population, health, crime prevention, etc.); at its various levels (e.g., international, domestic, local); under various governance systems (e.g., federal, unitary, centrally planned, locally controlled); and, most importantly, in both industrialized and developing countries.

This paper’s third claim pertains specifically those studying the implementation of international environmental commitments:

- Third, **a claim to specific relevance.** It is concluded that those interested in implementing international environmental commitments have much to learn from the literature on domestic policy implementation. Moreover, it is suggested that the five

critical variables identified here are directly, and especially, relevant to the study of the domestic implementation of international environmental commitments. At one level, it is encouraging that the variables that emerge from this survey of the literature on domestic implementation are strikingly similar to those being suggested by scholars of international environmental regimes.⁹ At another level, however, although the labels and broad intent are similar, important—even fundamental—differences are apparent in the richness of detail, the focus on local factors, and the level of interlinkages between various explanatory factors. In fact, many students of international regime still seem to be clinging to some long discredited assumptions about implementation, including the often implicit belief that the process is governmentally ‘controlled’ at the top and effective implementation may simply be a matter of getting the administrative levers right. Although international environmental treaties are *signed* by states, they are invariably *implemented* by substate and societal actors. It is, therefore, suggested that the clues to understanding the implementation puzzle will be found in understanding the interests, motivations, and strategies of these actors. Moreover, such an understanding is much better facilitated by learning from the accumulated wisdom of the scholarship on domestic policy implementation and using the variables that emerge from such learning.

#2 • Three Generations of Implementation Research

*Between the idea
And the reality
Between the motion
And the act
Falls the Shadow*
— T.S. ELIOT

In their seminal text, *Implementation*, Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) uncovered many surprises and unmasked many myths. One of these concerned the literature on the subject:

There is (or there must be) a large literature about implementation in the social sciences—or so we have been told by numerous people.... It must be there; it should be there; but in fact it is not. There is a kind of semantic illusion at work here because everything ever done in public policy or public administration must, in the nature of things, have some bearing on implementation.... Nevertheless, except for the few pieces mentioned in the body of this book, we have been unable to find any significant analytic work dealing with implementation.¹⁰ (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973: 166)

Writing five years later, however, Paul Berman (1978: 158) noted that “now implementation is ‘in.’ Everyone seems to be studying it, if not solving its problems.” Indeed, since Pressman and Wildavsky’s book—and, in some ways, because of it—the literature has burgeoned. So has the realization of the importance of the subject. So much so, that Goggin et al. (1990:9) believe that “the nineties are likely to be the implementation era.” However, they also point out that “scholars who study implementation... have yet to come up with an agreed-upon theory that adequately explains why those who implement public policies behave as they do... there is still no widespread agreement among those who do implementation research about what actually constitutes a case of implementation. There is still some confusion over when implementation begins, when it ends, and how many types of implementation there are.”

Indicative of the ‘state of the literature’ is the profusion of definitions of implementation used by scholars of the subject (*see* Box 1). Despite the fact that there is reasonable consensus on the general meaning of the term (Berman, 1978: 159), the nuances of stress and scope within the definitions suggested by leading scholars—plus the tendency to propose new ones rather than using ones already proposed—suggests a field still searching for its boundaries within the larger discipline of policy science. This sense is even more pronounced in other aspects of implementation scholarship—nowhere more so than on causal, predictive theory-building.

The tendency, among implementation scholars, to lament the absence of a theory is not new (Hargrove, 1975; Palumbo and Harder, 1981; Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1981; Alexander, 1982; O’Toole, 1986; Lester et al., 1987); nor are attempts to devise ‘conceptual frameworks’ and ‘theoretical perspectives’ that might serve as, or grow into, surrogate theories (Smith, 1973; Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975; Berman, 1978; Elmore, 1978; Rein and Rabinovitz,

1978; Scharpf, 1978; Edwards, 1980; Hjern and Porter, 1981; Hanf, 1982; Hjern and Hull, 1982; Ripley and Franklin, 1982; Hargrove, 1983; Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983; Mitnick and Backoff, 1984; Alexander, 1985; Sabatier, 1986; Linder and Peters, 1987; Goggin et al., 1990). However, despite the profusion of empirical case studies, competing ‘frameworks,’ and stylized ‘approaches,’ the literature on implementation remains “long on description and short on prescription” (Elmore, 1979: 601) and riddled with “proverbs” (O’Toole, 1986: 200).

BOX 1: Defining Implementation

Implementation, according to **Pressman and Wildavsky** (1973: xiii-xv), “means just what Webster [dictionary] and Roget [thesaurus] say it does: to carry out, accomplish, fulfill, produce, complete.” According to their seminal book on the subject: “Policies imply theories... Policies become programs when, by authoritative action, the initial conditions are created... Implementation, then, is the ability to forge subsequent links in the causal chain so as to obtain the desired result.”

A more specific definition is provided by **Van Meter and Van Horn** (1975: 447-8): “Policy implementation encompasses those actions by public or private individuals (or groups) that are directed at the achievement of objectives set forth in prior policy decisions.” They make a clear distinction between the interrelated concepts of implementation, performance, and impact and stress Dolbeare’s (1974) observation that impact studies typically ask “What happened?” whereas implementation studies ask “Why did it happen?”

Eugene Bardach (1977: 55-6) introduces the concept of ‘games’ as “classified according to the nature of their stakes” as a “master metaphor” to understand, what he calls, the “implementation problem.” Before going on to define implementation as the playing out of a number of loosely interrelated games,¹¹ he defends his metaphor by arguing that: “It directs us to look at the players, what they regard as the stakes, their strategies and tactics, their resources for playing, the rules of play (which stipulate the conditions for winning), the rules of ‘fair’ play (which stipulate the boundaries beyond which lie fraud or illegitimacy), the nature of the communications (or lack of them) among the players, and the degree of uncertainty surrounding possible outcomes. The game metaphor also directs our attention to who is not willing to play and for what reasons, and to who insists on changes in some of the game’s parameters as a condition for playing.”

In an influential paper **Rein and Rabinovitz** (1978: 308) describe implementation as “the point at which intent gets translated into action.” Their conceptual definition of implementation is “(1) a declaration of government preferences, (2) mediated by a number of actors who (3) create a circular process characterized by reciprocal power relations and negotiations.” They see the “politics of implementation” as being an attempt to resolve conflicts between three imperatives: “the legal imperative to do what is legally required; the rational-bureaucratic imperative to do what is rationally defensible; and the consensual imperative to do what can establish agreement among contending influential parties who have a stake in the outcome.”

In one of the few attempts to model implementation in developing countries **Merilee Grindle** (1980a: 5-6) provides a generic definition: “[It] is an ongoing process of decision making by a variety of actors, the ultimate outcome of which is determined by the content of the program being pursued and by the interaction of the decision makers within a given politico-administrative context.”

Paul Berman (1978) and **Nakamura and Smallwood** (1980) define implementation simply as the process of carrying out an authoritative decision—i.e. a policy choice. On a similar note, **Edwards** (1980: 1) defines it as “the stage of policymaking between the establishment of a policy—such as the passage of a legislative act, the issuing of an executive order, the handing down of a judicial decision, or the promulgation of a regulatory rule—and the consequences of the policy for the people whom it affects.”

Mazmanian and Sabatier’s (1983: 4) concept of policy implementation is “those events and activities that occur after the issuing of authoritative public policy directives, which include both the effort to administer and the substantive impacts on people and events.” The ‘working definition’ employed by **Hargrove** (1983: 281) includes two components: “(a) the actions required by law are carried out; and (b) those actions encompass both formal compliance with the law and organizational routines consistent with compliance.” **Goggin, Bowman, Lester, and O’Toole** (1990: 34) define implementation as a “*process*, a series of... decisions and actions directed toward putting an already-decided... mandate into effect.” They develop a ‘communications model’ to implementation where “messages, their senders, and the messages’ recipients are the critical ingredients” and “decoding these messages and absorbing them into agency routine is what implementation is all about” (p. 40).

A widely accepted model of the causal processes of implementation still remains, what Hargrove (1975) had called the “missing link” in social policy. As Lester et al. (1987: 208-9) point out:

Implementation research has been too restricted in time (i.e., an emphasis on cross-sectional versus longitudinal analysis), too restricted in number (i.e., an emphasis on case study versus comparative analyses), too restricted in policy type (i.e., an emphasis on single policy type versus multiple policy types), too restricted in defining the concept of implementation (i.e., limited to a single output measure versus multiple measures), and too restricted in approach (i.e., the utilization of either “top-down” or “bottom-up” approach versus both).

Having said that, the literature has, in fact, come a long way in highlighting the inevitable complexity of the implementation process and the saliency of trying to understand this complexity. This chapter will briefly review the evolution of implementation research over the last twenty years. Although any attempt to arrange the literature on implementation is bound to be arbitrary, we nonetheless try to classify it heuristically along three ‘generations’ of scholarly thinking on implementation questions.¹² In shorthand, the first (‘classical’) generation of thinking on the subject began with the assumption that implementation would happen ‘automatically’ once the appropriate policies had been authoritatively proclaimed. The second (‘empirical’) generation set out to challenge this assumption, to explain implementation ‘failure’ in specific cases, and to demonstrate that implementation was a political process no less complex (and often more so) than policy formulation. The third (‘analytic’) generation, by contrast, has been less concerned with specific implementation failure and more with understanding how implementation works in general and how its prospects might be improved. Although the three generations represent a continuum of increasing understanding about implementation, this is a not strict chronological arrangement.¹³

GENERATION #1: A cog in the administration machine¹⁴

Peter deLeon (1994: 77) points out that “the policy sciences may be characterized as having a long history (if they are defined in terms of advice to rulers) and a short past (if they are defined as a systematic, institutionalized approach to improved governance).” This general observation is all the more true for policy implementation. Hjern and Hull (1982: 107; *see also* Hjern 1982) trace the antecedents of the “classical” view of administration and implementation to early ‘constitutionalist’ theorists. Quoting Hume, they suggest that his and his successors’ political methodology could be labeled the ‘single-authority, top-down’ approach to political organization [and, thereby, to policy implementation]: “So great is the force of laws and of particular forms of government, and so little dependence have they on the humors and tempers of men, that consequences almost as general and certain may sometimes be deduced from them as any which the mathematical sciences afford us.”¹⁵

Administration was, therefore, conceived as being ‘scientific’, ‘rational’, ‘predictable’—and, ultimately, ‘machine-like’. Nakamura and Smallwood (1980: 7-10) suggest that this ‘classical’ model of policy administration was based on three basic concepts which helped make the ‘machine’ the metaphor and model for the study of administration—and helped foster the view that implementation was but an automatic cog within the rationalized administrative machine. The first was a Weberian framework of the ideal bureaucracy being a firmly ordered ‘system’ with highly rationalized, legalistic, authoritarian, and hierarchical structures, where a small group of decision makers at the top create policy and subordinates at the bottom dutifully carry it out.¹⁶ Second, Woodrow Wilson, in an influential 1887 paper on the subject, forwarded the thesis that policy formulation and policy implementation are—and should be—two separate and distinct activities; with the later being neutral, professionalized, and nonpolitical.¹⁷ Third, Frederick Taylor’s influential work, *The Principle of Scientific Management*, provided the rationale for adopting ‘efficiency’ as the basic criterion for evaluating administrative performance.¹⁸ The resulting ‘rational’ model was based on three concepts: organizational hierarchy, the separation of politics, and efficiency. For precisely these reasons, it minimized the significance of implementation.

As Smith (1973: 198) points out, the assumption was that “once [an ‘efficient’] policy has been ‘made’ by a government, the policy will be implemented and the desired results of the policy will be near those expected by the policymakers.” The ‘orthodoxy’ maintained that “politics (in the sense of making policy), and administration (in the sense of carrying out policy) are totally discrete realms or wholly separate stages in the policy process” (Burke, 1987: 217). Van Meter and Van Horn (1975: 450) add that under the classical model “the implementation process is assumed to be a series of mundane decisions and interactions unworthy of the attention of scholars seeking the heady stuff of politics... Most of the crucial policy issues are often seen to have been resolved in the prior decisions of executives, legislators, and judges.”

GENERATION #2: Implementation is complex and ‘nothing works’¹⁹

The limitations of the ‘classical’ model, however, began to be highlighted in the post World War-II period as it became apparent that public policy worked less as an efficient and orderly machine and more as a process of “muddling through” (Lindblom, 1959). Such limitations were brought into sharp relief as the scope and span of government dramatically enlarged in both the United States (largely because of President Johnson’s “Great Society” program) and in Western Europe (largely because of post-War reconstruction and social welfare programs).

A number of case studies in the U.S.—e.g., Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s (1970) *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding* and Martha Derthick’s (1972) *New Towns In-Town*—showed that the grand policies of the 1960s were not working the way they were ‘supposed’ to under the

classical model. At the same time, scholarship in public administration and organizational behavior (*e.g.*, Simon, 1947; Kaufman, 1960; Etozioni, 1964) was revealing that administration—and implementation—were far more complex, and political, than the classical assumptions had suggested them to be.

Theodore Lowi (1969), argued that the expansion of government was attempting to control the more universal aspects of human behavior—or “the environment of conduct”—and that democratic norms of accountability and responsibility were being undermined by the allocation of too much discretionary authority to implementers. The alternative was to return to the comfort of a more structured model of making and implementing policy. However, as Nakamura and Smallwood (1980: 12) point out, “once the Pandora’s box had been opened it was not easy to close it.”

The first generation of scholars were faulted for underestimating the complexity of implementation processes; the second generation set out to record the magnitude of this complexity through detailed empirical studies. Scholars of this generation meticulously documented specific case studies and showed how complex implementation really was and why it was a folly to assume that just because a policy had been proclaimed, it would be implemented. A large collection of carefully documented case studies pointed to a consistent pattern: “grand pretensions, faulty execution, puny results” (Elmore, 1978: 186). The predictions of this scholarship were decidedly pessimistic as the outpouring of case studies reiterated the familiar conclusion: “the best laid plans of social reform invariably go astray” (Berman, 1978: 158). Moreover, according to Linder and Peters (1987: 460) “most of this work... involved essentially a cataloging approach to the barriers to perfect administration, describing them and (in some instances) analyzing their characteristics, but really doing little else to aid in the development of effective policymaking systems.”

While Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) are the most prominent exemplar of this genre of research, the general mood of this generation is caught by Bardach in *The Implementation Game* (1977: 3):

It is hard enough to design public policies and programs that look good on paper. It is harder still to formulate them in words and slogans that resonate pleasingly in the ears of political leaders and the constituencies to which they are responsive. And it is excruciatingly hard to implement them in a way that pleases anyone at all, including the supposed beneficiaries or clients.

Stating at the outset that “this is not an optimistic book” (p. 6), Bardach concludes with the recommendation that it is “essential to become more modest in our demands on, and expectations of, the institutions of representative government” (p. 283).

Although criticized for being atheoretical, case-specific, noncumulative, and overly pessimistic, research in this generation served several important purposes—not the least of which was to

demonstrate that implementation could not be taken for granted as the classical model had implied. Goggin et al. (1990: 13-14) list some contributions: a) it shifted the focus from how a bill becomes a law to how a law becomes a program; b) it demonstrated the complex and dynamic nature of implementation; c) it emphasized the importance of policy subsystems; d) it identified a number of factors that seemed to account for programmatic results, especially failure; and e) it diagnosed several treatable pathologies that periodically plague implementing actors. To generalize very broadly, the methodology of choice for implementation scholars of this generation was detailed case-studies (Lester et al., 1987: 201); the purpose was to highlight the complexity of implementation processes, often taking a “horrors of war” approach (Linder and Peters, 1987: 460); and the mood was predominantly pessimistic (Goggin et al., 1990: 13).

GENERATION #3: The search for implementation theory²⁰

Writing in 1978, Paul Berman suggested (p. 179):

The battle for recognition of implementation as a critical element of policy-making has been won. But the analysis of implementation is just moving beyond the stages of isolated case studies and applied wisdom. It is time to design research so that knowledge from individual studies in different policy sectors can be cumulated and compared.

Others had already begun coming to, and were increasingly arriving at, similar conclusions. It was the realization of the absence of (and the need for) causal understanding, organizing frameworks, conceptual models, analytic approaches, and—ultimately—explanatory and predictive theories that ushered in the third generation of thinking on implementation. Whereas the second generation had invested its energies in empirically documenting *why* specific episodes of implementation ‘failed’, this generation set as its goal an analytic understanding of *how* implementation ‘worked’ generally.²¹ However, despite a frenzy of research in this area and a multitude of ‘theory building’ attempts, O’Toole’s (1986: 185) survey of over 300 published studies concludes that:

Researchers do not agree on the outlines of a theory of implementation nor even on the variables crucial to implementation success. Researchers, for most part implicitly, also disagree on what should constitute implementation success, especially in the multi-actor setting. But even among those who seem to share assumptions on this issue, for instance those who utilize an unambiguously top-down perspective and seek to execute the wishes of a central sovereign, there seems to be considerable diversity.

In all fairness, the task of this generation—building ‘implementation theory’—has been an ambitious one from the beginning. All the more so given the major findings of the previous generation of scholarship—i.e. that implementation is complex and prone to subverting the best laid-out plans—plus the added problems of a) too few truly comparative, longitudinal, and synthetic studies and b) ‘overdetermination,’ or too many variables and too few cases (Lester

et al., 1987; Goggin, et al., 1990; Andresen et al., 1995). Some might even argue that to arrive at precise predictive theories and foolproof prescriptions about the complex political and administrative phenomenon called policy implementation is itself an exercise in futility. In writing about public management [which includes implementation], Altshuler (1988: 644) argues that, although desirable, “such theories are unavailable and... such prescriptions represent quackery.” In an important paper on the subject, Robert Behn (1988) suggests that it is simply impossible to develop the perfect plan from the beginning and the very best that public managers can, and should, do is to “grope along.”

Having said all of the above, the contribution of this generation of implementation research must not go underappreciated. Despite the fact that there remains a lack of cumulation or convergence in the field and that predictive implementation theory remains elusive, this generation of scholarship has substantially enhanced our understanding of the important clusters of variables that can impact implementation (see next two chapters). As O’Toole (1986: 203) attests, and as this paper will argue, despite important normative disagreements between scholars there is a remarkable implicit convergence on the choice of major factors important within the larger implementation process.

The debate between scholars of this generation has yielded a number of increasingly more refined analytic models of the implementation process, an extended list of potential explanatory variables, and at least two major theoretical streams of thought: 1) a *top-down* approach which begins with the central decisionmaker and the authoritative policy statement and proceeds downwards through the hierarchical administrative structure to examine the extent to which the policy’s legally-mandated objectives were achieved and procedures followed; and 2) a *bottom-up* approach which starts with an analysis of the many actors who interact at the operational (local) level and works backwards to map the outcomes and impacts of the policy in terms of the strategies adopted by the relevant actors in response to the particular policy choice. A more extended sampler of the nuances of the debate between the two perspectives is presented in Box 2.

BOX 2: The Big Debate: Top-Down vs. Bottom-Up

The single most important faultline in the field has been that which divides a “top-down” view of implementation (e.g., Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975; Edwards, 1980; Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983; Linder and Peters, 1987) from a “bottom-up” view (e.g., Berman, 1978; Hanf, 1978; Scharpf, 1978; Elmore, 1979; Lipsky, 1978; Nakamura and Smallwood, 1980; Barrett and Fudge, 1981; Hjern and Porter, 1981).

A top-down view exemplified the earlier analytic models and has remained the more dominant genre. Typically, this perspective starts from the authoritative policy decision at the central (top) level of government and asks: a) to what extent were the actions of implementing officials and target groups consistent with (the objectives and procedures outlined in) that policy decision?; b) to what extent were the objectives attained over time?; c) what were the principal factors affecting policy outputs and impacts?; and d) how was the policy reformulated over time on the basis of experience? (Sabatier, 1986: 22).

The bottom-up approach was, largely, a reaction to this model: based on identifying weaknesses in it and suggesting alternatives to address those weaknesses. It was suggested that “the notion that policymakers exercise—or ought to exercise—some kind of direct and determinatory control over policy implementation might be called [a] ‘noble lie’” (Elmore, 1979: 603); that analysis should focus “on those who are charged with carrying out policy rather than those who formulate and convey it” (Lipsky, 1978: 398); because “subordinate compliance does not automatically follow upon the issuance of orders and instructions... when managers die and go to heaven, they may find themselves in charge of organizations in which subordinates invariably, cheerfully, and fully do as they are bid. Not here on earth” (Kaufman, 1973: 2). A few bottom-uppers even suggested that “discretion at lower levels is not only inevitable, but also desirable... [because] it is necessary for policies to be ‘reinvented’ so that they better fit local needs” (Palumbo and Harder, 1981: xi).

Moreover, it was argued that although “a legalistic perspective is necessary but an interorganizational structuring is indispensable in implementation analysis” (Hjern, 1982: 308); because “the relationship between policy and action could not be regarded as a simple transmission process but rather must be viewed as a complex assembly job involving the fitting together of different interests and priorities... [and that implementation] is mediated by actors who may be operating with different assumptive worlds from those formulating the policy, and, inevitably, it undergoes interpretation and modification and, in some cases, subversion” (Fudge and Barrett, 1981: 251). Therefore, it was proposed that the mapping should be “backwards” rather than “forwards” (Elmore, 1979); that the focus should be on “implementation structures” (Hjern and Porter, 1981) and on the negotiation process (Barrett and Fudge, 1981) amongst and within “networks” of implementers (Hanf, 1978); and that in realizing that “the implementation path of a project can thus be profoundly shaped by unforeseen and unforeseeable events” (Berman, 1978: 176), implementation should be designed to be “adaptive” rather than “programmed” (Berman, 1980).

Even in acknowledging the general validity of some of this criticism, top-downers have not accepted the intensity of the bottom-uppers claims. Sabatier (1986), for example, has faulted the bottom-up models for: a) overemphasizing the ability of the ‘bottom’ to frustrate the policy mandated by those at the ‘top’; b) taking the present set of actors as a given without examining how participation is affected by the policy itself; c) being a-theoretical; and d) being not primarily concerned with implementation (carrying out) of a policy *per se* but rather with understanding actor interactions and response strategies to that policy.

A particularly scathing critique of the bottom-up perspective comes from Linder and Peters (1987: 463-5) who accuse this literature of conflating empirical and normative statements: “If one accepts fully the *descriptive* generalization about implementation being determined largely by the lower echelons in organizations also as a *prescriptive* statement... then many ideas about policy control in democratic political systems must be questioned... The fundamental point remains: governance is not about negotiation, it is about the use of legitimate authority.... It is a truism that ‘street level bureaucrats’ have a great deal to do with the success or failure of public programs... However, to place goal definition in the hands of that element of the public sector (empirically, analytically or managerially) is to admit defeat and the inability of the policymaking hierarchies in government to function effectively to produce governance.”

Elmore (1979: 610; *original emphasis*) provides a possible rejoinder by arguing that “the dominant view that discretion is, at best, a necessary evil and, at worst, a threat to democratic government pushes implementation analysis toward... increased reliance on hierarchical controls to solve implementation problems.... Compliance with orders and procedures displaces competence, or becomes the equivalent of

competence.... Nowhere in this view is serious thought given to *how to capitalize on discretion as a device for improving the reliability and effectiveness of policies at the street level.*"

On a related note, Hanf (1982: 160) adds that: "Models emphasizing control and steering from above will inevitably discover 'implementation problems' in the form of goal displacement, uncontrolled discretion, inadequate coordination and other instances of 'sub-optimalization'. In an important sense, such implementation problems are a function of the organizational models employed in the analysis, which prevent us from coming to terms with the need for (and weighing the consequences of) a strong element of 'local presence'."

The sharp differences between the two approaches can lead to very divergent normative and prescriptive notions. Nowhere more so than on how they approach 'complexity' in the implementation process. As O'Toole (1986: 197) points out: "many top-downers would view the complexity and heterogeneity... in multi-actor implementation with discomfort, seeing in such apparent 'confusion' the signs of failure on the part of the state.... [On the other hand] many bottom-uppers do not merely catalog but also find considerable virtue in the diversity fostered through multi-actor systems."²²

Elmore (1979: 605) summarizes the prescriptive differences that emerge: "The analytic solutions offered by forward mapping stresses factors that tend to centralize control and that are easily manipulated by policymakers: funding formulas; formal organizational structures; authority relationships among administrative units; regulations; and administrative controls (budget, planning, and evaluation requirements). The analytic solutions offered by backward mapping stresses the dispersal of control and concentrates on factors that can only be indirectly influenced by policymakers: knowledge and problem-solving ability of lower level administrators; incentive structures that operate on the subjects of policy; bargaining relationships among political actors at various levels of the implementation process; and the strategic use of funds to affect discretionary choices."

Having said all of the above—and while stressing that the big debate between top-down and bottom-up perspectives on implementation is by no means yet concluded—it needs to be added that a consensus seems to be emerging around the proposition that "it is not a question of choosing 'top' or 'bottom' as though these were mutually exclusive alternatives"²³ (Hanf, 1982: 171). In fact, both perspectives provide useful insights into the implementation process; both demonstrate significant explanatory strengths as well as weaknesses; each may be more relevant to particular sets of cases than to others; in some cases both may be equally relevant, albeit, at different stages of the complex and dynamic implementation process; and, finally, there is a need to evolve new models of implementation which incorporate the strengths of both perspectives. (See Knoepfel and Weidner, 1982; Elmore, 1985; Sabatier and Hanf, 1985; Sabatier, 1986; Goggin, et al., 1990).

#3 • A Compendium of Models, Frameworks, Approaches, and Perspectives

GLENDOWER: *I can call spirits from the dusty deep.*
HOTSPUR: *Why so can I, or so can any man;*
But will they come when you do call for them?
— WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE (*Henry IV*)²⁴

Since the findings of, what we have called, the third generation of implementation research are the most relevant to our purpose this chapter will summarize some of its key works before we go on to suggest a set of explanatory variables which builds on the lessons of the scholarship thus far and seeks to synthesize the commonalities within it. The flavor of this chapter is representative rather than exhaustive.²⁵ The focus is specifically on key analytic works which develop (or challenges) explanatory ‘models,’ ‘frameworks,’ ‘approaches,’ or ‘perspectives’ on implementation.²⁶

Rather than adopt a strictly chronological approach, this chapter continues the discussion initiated earlier by using the debate between top-down and bottom-up scholarship as its organizing principle. It begins with a presentation of two early attempts and modeling policy implementation. It goes on, then, to discuss key influential models of the top-down and bottom-up varieties which is, then, followed by a review of some more recent attempts towards synthesizing the two approaches into more comprehensive frameworks. Finally, this chapter briefly reviews a few important contributions from the analytic literature on policy implementation in developing countries.²⁷

TWO EARLY MODELS

One of the first detailed, and still remarkably robust, model of the policy implementation was suggested by **Thomas B. Smith** (1973). Although Smith highlighted the complexity of implementation in a developing country context—implying that the problems of implementation may be less prevalent in industrialized societies—it is interesting to note that subsequent implementation research in North America and Western Europe resounded many of the concerns raised by Smith. Approaching implementation from a social and political change perspective, Smith begins with the recognition that by the implementation of any policy “old patterns of interaction and institutions are abolished or modified and new




FIGURE 1: Smith's (1973) model of the policy implementation process

patterns of action and institutions are created” (p. 200). His model, therefore, views *implementation as a tension generating force* in society. Although presented before the term became popular, this may well be called one of the earliest bottom-up models of implementation.

Viewing policy as a continuous process without a definite end or ‘end products,’ Smith argues that the tensions and conflicts experienced in implementation may, or may not, manifest themselves in the creation of new behavioral patterns and relationships (i.e. institutions). In either case, the transaction phase—where the tensions between the policy, its formulators, its implementers, and its targets, is articulated—will feed back into the implementation process as well as policy (re-) design. Smith’s “tension generating matrix” (see Figure 1) within the implementation process is the interaction between four components: a) the *idealized policy* and the patterns of interactions that the policy wants to induce; b) the *target group* which is called to change its behavior; c) *implementing organization’s structure*, leadership, and capacity; and d) *environmental factors* or the “constraining corridor through which the implementation of policy must be forced.”




FIGURE 2: Van Meter and Van Horn's (1975) model of the policy implementation process

A much more widely quoted early model comes from **Van Meter and Van Horn (1975)**, who—essentially viewing implementation as a top-down process—attempted to consolidate the emerging literature into one model. In particular, they use the three causes of non-implementation suggested by Kaufman (1973: 2): “subordinates don't know

what their superiors want, they can't do what their superiors want, or they refuse to do what their superiors want.” Van Meter and Van Horn label these as problems of *communication*, *capacity*, and *implementer disposition*.

Invoking Theodore Lowi's (1964) earlier work, they begin with the proposition that the nature of the policy itself is critical to the success, or otherwise, of its implementation.²⁸ They go on to suggest a model which posits six “clusters of variables” and the linkages between them which shapes policy and performance (see Figure 2). The variables are: a) the relevance of policy standards and objectives; b) policy resources; c) interorganizational communication and enforcement activities; d) the characteristics of the implementing agencies; e) the economic, social, and political environment affecting the implementing jurisdiction or organization; and f) the disposition of implementers for carrying out policy decisions.

TOP-DOWN PERSPECTIVES ON IMPLEMENTATION

Another model—very much in the top-down tradition and in many respects similar (though more parsimonious) than Van Meter and Van Horn’s—was proposed by **George C. Edwards III** (1980). In answering the questions “What are the preconditions for successful policy implementation?” and “What are the primary obstacles to successful policy implementation?” (p. 9), he identifies four interacting and simultaneously operating factors:




FIGURE 3: *Edwards's (1980) direct and indirect impacts on implementation*

a) communication; b) resources; c) dispositions; and d) bureaucratic structure. (See Figure 3).




FIGURE 4: *Mazmanian and Sabatier's (1983) variables involved in the implementation process*

Probably the most influential articulation of the top-down perspective, comes from **Daniel A. Mazmanian and Paul A. Sabatier** (1983). Their model of implementation begins with three critical observations: a) policymaking is an iterative process of *formulation, implementation, and reformulation* and the distinction between the three should be maintained; b) the focus should be on the attainment of the *stated policy goals*, although the *outputs* of the implementing agencies and the *outcomes* of the implementation process are both important; and c) implementation can be viewed from three quite different perspectives—the initial policymaker or the *center*, the field-level implementing officials or the *periphery*, and the actors at whom the program is directed or the *target group*—but a center-focused perspective to implementation is preferred.

In searching for the principal variables that affect implementation Mazmanian and Sabatier (pp. 20-39) list a total of sixteen factors, clustered into three broad categories (see Figure 4): a) tractability of the problems (i.e. “some social problems are simply much easier to deal with than others”); b) ability of policy decision to structure implementation (i.e. “original policymakers can substantially affect the attainment of legal objectives by utilizing the levers at

their disposal”); and c) nonstatutory variables affecting implementation (i.e. “implementation also has an inherent political dynamism of its own”).

Mazmanian and Sabatier (pp. 41-2) then go on to synthesize this large set of variables into a shorter list of six “sufficient and generally necessary” conditions for the effective implementation of legal objectives: a) clear and consistent objectives; b) adequate causal theory; c) legal structure to enhance compliance by implementing officials and target groups; d) committed and skillful implementing officials; e) support of interest groups and sovereigns; and f) changes in socio-economic conditions which do not substantially undermine political support or causal theory.

THE CHALLENGE FROM THE BOTTOM-UPPERS




FIGURE 5: Nakamura and Smallwood's (1980) environments influencing implementation

Concurrent to this refinement of the top-down model of implementation, a growing stream of scholarship had already begun to question some of the assumptions of these models and highlighting the importance of factors that had either been ignored or deemed less critical. Rein and Rabinovitz (1978) implicitly challenged the hierarchical assumptions of the top-down model by proposing the ‘principle of circularity’. Nakamura and Smallwood (1980) built on this principle to suggest their conception of the implementation process as a system on functional environments each of which contains a variety of actors and arenas and is connected to the others by various communications and compliance linkages (see Figure 5).

More importantly, Rein and Rabinovitz (1978) shifted the focus to the actual *practice* (and, thereby, the practitioner) of policy. This led them to suggest that “implementation involves drift from declared purposes” (p. 309) and that “the process is [often] less one of slow incremental change than of bureaucratic entrepreneurship” (p. 331). Their theoretical perspective argued that:

The politics of implementation is governed by at least three formal imperatives: (1) the respect for legal intent (legal rationality), which is (2) mediated by the concern for instrumental rationality as it is defined by civil servants yet (3) informed by the knowledge that action requires internal and external consensus. The politics of implementation may be best understood as an attempt to resolve conflicts among these imperatives. The way in which conflicts are resolved is a function of the purposes (their clarity, saliency, consistency), the resources (kind, level, and timing), and the complexity of the administrative process of implementation. (pp. 332-3).

The implication that the field practitioner is a key determinant of implementation success was brought into sharp, and more explicit, relief with Paul Berman's (1978) *distinction between macro- and micro-implementation*; Richard F. Elmore's conception of *backward mapping* (1979); Michael Lipsky's (1980) exposition of *street-level bureaucracies*; Barrett and Fudge's (1981) description of *implementation as a negotiation process*; and the *methodological development of an alternative bottom-up approach* in Europe by Benny Hjern, Kenneth Hanf and their colleagues.

The point of departure for **Paul Berman's** (1978) analysis is the generally accepted proposition that implementation 'success' depends on the complex interactions between the policy and its institutional setting. He proposes that the differences between the processes of macro- and micro-implementation arise from their distinct multiple-actor institutional settings. *Macro-implementation* is where the central/federal government must execute its policy to influence local delivery organizations, whereas *micro-implementation* is when, in response to the above actions, the local organizations have to devise and carry out their own internal policies. He portrays macro-implementation—where policies translate into project plans—as “taking place within a ‘marble cake’ of cooperative federalism, not the ideal ‘layer cake’ of coordinated federalism” (p. 165).

The effective power to determine a policy's outcome rests, therefore, not with the original policymakers but with local deliverers who operate at the micro-implementation level. Micro-implementation is itself “a Russian doll of implementation-within-implementation” with at least three phases: mobilization, deliverer implementation, and institutionalization (p. 176-7). He suggests that implementation can follow four possible paths: a) *nonimplementation*, no adaptation in the project plan or in deliverer behavior; a) *cooptation*, no adaptation in deliverer behavior, but adaptation in the project to accommodate existing routines; c) *technological learning*, no adaptation of the project plan but adaptation of routinized behavior to accommodate the plan; or d) *mutual adaptation*, adaptation of both the project and deliverer behavior. Reporting on his own earlier empirical research (Berman and McLaughlin, 1977), he points out that projects were either adapted to local conditions or not implemented at all and that the only projects that seemed to produce effective outcomes were those whose paths showed mutual adaptation.

One of Paul Berman's (1978: 179) conclusions was that, given the very nature of implementation, a single or simple retrospective theory of implementation was not likely—and if proposed should be treated with caution. **Richard F. Elmore's** (1978, 1979, 1985) work highlighted this view. In an important paper, Elmore (1978: 185-6) argued that understanding organizations is essential to the analysis of implementation and proposed four different models, each of which would give a distinctly different view of the implementation process:²⁹

The *systems management model* treats organizations as value-maximizing units and views implementation as an ordered, goal-directed activity. The *bureaucratic process model* emphasizes the roles of discretion and routine in organizational behavior and views implementation as a process of continually controlling discretion and changing routine. The *organizational development model* treats the needs of individuals for participation and commitment as paramount and views implementation as a process in which implementers shape policies and claim them as their own. The *conflict and bargaining model* treats organizations as arenas of conflict and views implementation as a bargaining process in which the participants converge on temporary solutions but no stable result is ever reached.

In a subsequent paper, Elmore (1979: 602-3) distilled these models into two “clearly distinguishable” approaches to implementation analysis: forward mapping and backward mapping. *Forward mapping* “begins with an objective, it elaborates an increasingly specific set of steps for achieving that objective, and it states an outcome against which success or failure can be measured.” His criticism of this approach was that it “reinforces the myth that implementation is controlled from the top” and implies unquestioningly that “policymakers control the organizational, political and technological processes that affect implementation.” To Elmore, forward mapping “reinforces the pathologies of hierarchy” (p. 608). He therefore proposes *backward mapping*, which assumes that “the closer one is to the source of the problem, the greater is one’s ability to influence it; and the problem-solving ability of complex systems depends not on hierarchical control but on maximizing discretion at the point where the problem is most immediate” (p. 605):

[Backward mapping] begins not at the top of the implementation process but at the last possible stage, the point at which administrative actions intersect private choice. It begins, not with a statement of intent, but with a statement of the specific behavior at the lowest level of the implementation process that generates the need for a policy. Only after that behavior is described does the analysis presume to state an objective; the objective is first stated as a set of organizational operations and then as a set of effects, or outcomes, that will result from these operations. Having established a relatively precise target at the lowest level of the system, the analysis backs up through the structure of implementing agencies, asking at each level two questions: What is the ability of this unit to affect the behavior that is the target of the policy? And what resources does this unit require in order to have that effect? In the final stage of analysis the analyst or policymaker describes a policy that directs resources at the organizational units likely to have the greatest effect. (p. 604).

Implementation scholars had always known that lower level *implementers enjoy discretionary powers*, and some had seen this as a principal cause of the ‘implementation problem’ (e.g. Lowi, 1969; Linder and Peters, 1987). However, the contribution of Rein and Rabinovitz (1978), Berman (1978), and Elmore (1978, 1979) was to stress just *how* central the role of these field practitioners was to implementation and, more importantly, to suggest that some of this discretion was, in effect, inevitable—i.e., it was not a ‘problem’ that could, or even should, be ‘fixed’ but rather a reality of the implementation process that had to be acknowledged and accommodated.

To **Michael Lipsky** (1978) this called for “standing the study of public policy implementation on its head.” He fundamentally questioned the hierarchy assumption (i.e. that greater influence over policy is exerted by those who formulate it than by those who carry it

out) and proposed that in many cases “the latitude of those charged with carrying out policy is so substantial that... policy is effectively ‘made’ by the people who implement it.”³⁰ What Wilson (1967) has called “front-line workers” and Berman (1978) labeled policy “deliverers”, is defined by Lipsky (1980: 3) as *street-level bureaucrats*: “public service workers who interact directly with citizens in the course of their jobs, and who have substantial discretion in the execution of their work.” It is these street-level bureaucrats that Lipsky (1978: 398) sees as central to the study of implementation with “others in the policy arena provid[ing] the context in which they make their discretionary judgments.”

Also focusing on policy in ‘action,’ **Barrett and Fudge** (1981) propose that implementation should be seen as a *political rather than a managerial process* that happens through the dynamic *negotiation* (and interactions) between and within a) the (socio-economic) environmental system, b) the political system, and c) the organizational (or administrative) system. To them, the policy itself—what it is, where it comes from, how it is used—is the ‘key’ to the whole debate about implementation. However, the three critical issues in understanding implementation processes in action are: a) multiplicity and complexity of linkages; b) questions of control and coordination; and c) issues of conflict and consensus. Based on this conceptualization, they suggest (p. 29):

The policy-action relationship needs to be considered in a political context and as an interactive and negotiative process taking place over time between those seeking to put policy into effect and those upon whom action depends. From this perspective, more emphasis is placed on issues of power and dependence, interests, motivations and behavior.

Some of the most robust methodological rigor, empirical application, and analytical development of the bottom-up approach has come from West European scholars, particularly **Benny Hjern** and **Kenneth Hanf**.³¹ Like Berman, Elmore, and Lipsky, these scholars have essentially attacked the hierarchy assumption of top-down models and faulted them for tending to “view things more from the perspective of central decision-makers than that of target group or the affected societal environment” (Hanf, 1982: 159; *also see* Hanf, 1978; Scharpf, 1978; Hjern and Porter, 1981; Hjern, 1982; Hjern and Hull, 1982; Knoepfel and Weidner, 1982; Downing and Hanf, 1983b).

Articulated variously as the ‘*organizational networks approach*’ (Hanf, 1978; Scharpf, 1978), the ‘*implementation structures approach*’ (Hjern and Porter, 1981; Hanf, 1982) or as ‘*empirical constitutionalism*’ (Hjern and Hull, 1982), they have stressed that “politics and administration are so thoroughly intertwined that implementation research should not assume them to be distinct in the first place... The ordering principle of implementation research is not policy problems as defined and addressed by the formal political system but as defined and addressed by relevant societal actors (who, of course, include those of the formal political system)” (Hjern and Hull, 1982: 114).

Downing and Hanf (1983: 333-4) point out that “we could view the initial legislative goal setting process as a first attempt at a bargain designed to resolve the [inevitable] conflicts [between relevant actors]. The interactive process by which the law is implemented can then be viewed as a way of refining that bargain by adapting to local conditions, constraints, and pressures.”

Arguing that “a focus on the formal organization of authority underestimates the influence and power that local decision makers can exert on the basis of their responsibility for middle range planning, their control over crucial information, their opportunity to ‘coordinate from below’ and their access to channels of political power” this set of scholarship suggests “the need for and the value of shifting the unit of analysis from the single organization or policy actor to the set of interrelationships that constitute the interorganizational network as such” (Hanf, 1978: 6, 11). The factors considered important in shaping the pattern of interaction in the field include (Hanf, 1982: 169): a) socio-economic conditions; b) the ‘pool’ of relevant actors; and c) the problem structure (including the objective situation of the problem and the political evaluation of its seriousness).

Empirically, their major question has been to explain—through detailed cross-country cases, including many on pollution policies—the observed “implementation deficit” (Scharpf and Hanf, 1978; Downing and Hanf, 1983a). The general conclusions match the list proposed by Hanf (1982: 169) for a subset of it, which suggests that often implementation of regulatory programs is:

[a] multi-actor interactions process, that the interactions involve significant elements of strategic behavior and especially bargaining among key actors, that the patterns of interactions are shaped by actors pursuing different interests and objectives under constraints of mutual dependence and limited resources, and that the output of these interaction processes is frequently ‘incomplete enforcement’ when judged against the objectives stated in regulatory policy and subsequent programmatic statements.

TOWARDS SYNTHESIS

Developed largely as a reaction to the prevalent top-down thinking on implementation (*see* Box 2)—especially its assumption of hierarchical control, its focus on legally-mandated aspects, and its underestimation of the politics of street-level actors and organizational interactions and bargaining—bottom-up implementation research has enriched the field both empirically and analytically. While not belittling the important differences that exist between scholars of the two traditions, there is also much that they have in common. As Berman (1978: 160) points out, “the article of faith that unites implementation analysts is a belief that the carrying out of a policy... is neither automatic nor assured.” One might also add that there is general agreement that implementation is a complex, dynamic, multi-level, multi-actor, process influenced both by the content and context of the policy being implemented. The difference, in many instances, is

not as much about constellation of variables they use as about the relative importance of specific variables within specific cases of implementation—for example, the difference is not as much about whether implementation is a multi-actor, multi-organization process, but on which actors and organizations are the *most* relevant; furthermore, it is not about whether street-level bureaucrats and organizational networks are important as explanatory variables, but *how* important.

One might argue that the ‘principle of circularity’ outlined by Rein and Rabinovitz (1978) implies that top-down and the bottom-up forces will often exist simultaneously in most implementation situations which are framed by pressures from both the top *and* the bottom. Also, depending on the particular features of particular implementation cases, one or the other approach may be more or less relevant. Finally, there is a growing consensus on the need to synthesize the major features of the two approaches and develop models that capture the strengths of both. (Knoepfel and Weidner, 1982; Elmore, 1985; Sabatier and Hanf, 1985; Sabatier, 1986; Goggin, et al., 1990).

Björn Wittrock and Peter deLeon (1986: 48) believe that “we are witnessing a convergence of views. Both schools appear willing to view the different perspectives as complimentary rather than mutually exclusive.... [And] in some respects, the reputed distinction between a bottom-up and a top-down perspective is not clear-cut.” While they do not propose a defined model of implementation, they do suggest that scholars should accept the “contextual” nature of policy and that “perhaps the one ‘constant’ in the policy process is change” (p. 55). They call, therefore, for “conceptual realism”—that is, for viewing *policy as a moving target*—which would shift the focus from attempting to understand policy either from a ‘top’ or ‘bottom’ perspective to understanding it from the perspective of “the changing contextuality in which problems exist” (p. 45).

More in the way of actually combining the top-down and bottom-up approaches is the work of **Richard Elmore** (1985) who introduces the concept of *reversible logic* in synthesizing his earlier work on ‘backward’ and ‘forward’ mapping. This approach argues that the policy practitioner must consider both the legally mandated policy instruments and resources (top-down) and the environment in which the target groups operate (bottom-up) because implementers are going to experience pressures from both sources and because success will depend on combining the two.

A more elaborate ‘theory-building’ attempt at synthesis is undertaken by **Paul Sabatier** (1986) who suggests an *advocacy coalition framework of policy change* (Figure 6). The focus of this model—and in some ways the ‘glue’ that binds the top-down and bottom-up approaches within it—is *advocacy coalitions* defined as “actors from various public and private

organizations who share a set of beliefs and who seek to realize their common goals over time” (p. 37):

The synthesis adopts the bottom-uppers’ unit of analysis—a whole variety of public and private actors involved with a policy problem—as well as their concerns with understanding the perspectives and strategies of all major categories of actors (not simply program proponents). It then combines this starting point with top-downers’ concern with the manner in which socio-economic conditions and legal instruments constrain behavior. It applies this synthesized perspective to the analysis of policy change over periods of a decade or more. This time frame is required to deal with the role of policy-oriented learning.

Another attempt at building a synthesized theory—one also geared to the practitioner—is proposed by **Goggin, Bowman, Lester, and O’Toole** (1990) who propose a *communications model of intergovernmental policy implementation* (see Figure 7).

An interesting element of this model is that it focuses on the governmental sub-unit—the State in the U.S. Federal system (not to be confused with the nation-state, even though applicable to it in the case of internationally mandated policy)—to which policy is passed from ‘above’ and which is responsible for implementing it ‘below’. The object is to understand three things (p. 34): a) the implementation *process*; b) the *outputs* of the implemented program; and c) the *outcomes* that are eventually produced.




FIGURE 6: Sabatier's (1986) advocacy coalition framework of policy change




FIGURE 7: Goggin et al.'s (1990) communication model of intergovernmental policy implementation

The model uses communication theory as a means of understanding intergovernmental relationships and is “predicated upon the notion that no single factor can explain differences in implementation” (p. 31). Instead, “three clusters of variables affect state implementation: inducements and constraints from the ‘top’ (the federal level), inducements and constraints from the ‘bottom’ (the state and local levels), and state decisional outcomes and capacity” (p. 32-3). By *inducements* they mean factors—conditions and actions—that stimulate implementation, while *constraints* have the opposite effect. They also point out that the State is not a unitary rational

actor and its choices are result of bargaining among internal and/or external actors.

Before going on to attempt synthesizing the lessons that may be learned from these seemingly divergent approaches on implementation research, and to map the commonalties that might emerge from them, let us briefly review some representative research on implementation in developing countries. More specifically, we want to see how, and if, models and approaches developed from empirical evidence from developing countries are substantively and substantially different from those developed from viewing implementation from an industrialized country context.

THE VIEW FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Like all policy literature in general, but much more so, the literature on implementation is extremely parochial. For example, in referring to West European research on implementation, O'Toole (1986: 199) points out that "much of the research in the United States is conducted largely in ignorance of these developments." However, scholars in both the U.S. and Europe have begun to acknowledge this gap in cumulation (Lester et al., 1987), have attempted to bridge it through joint research (Downing and Hanf, 1983; Hanf and Toonen, 1985) and have a legitimate excuse in language differences that make such aggregation difficult (O'Toole 1986: 183). In short, while major gaps persist, it is at least accepted that "there is much to be learned from European implementation scholars as well as from... American implementation scholars to advance this field of research" (Lester et al., 1987: 210).

However, even the possibility that this research may have something to learn from, contribute to, bear upon, or be relevant to implementation research and practice in developing countries is scarcely ever raised, let alone be debated. This is not because such research has not been done nor because it is not accessible to scholars in industrialized countries.³² It emanates, instead, from the always implied, often unstated, never actually tested, and practically unchallenged assumption that not only the local conditions but the very process by which implementation occurs is fundamentally different in developing and industrialized societies. This assumption is shared by both sets of scholars—partly because there is little interaction and even less overlap between scholars who study implementation in industrialized societies and those who do so in developing countries, and partly because local conditions in the two are, in fact, substantively different. Indeed, in a field as complex—and as dependent on local and issue realities—as implementation, any generalizations may be considered dubious; implying generalizations of a 'global' proportion, all the more so.

While accepting the validity of the above arguments, it is the claim of this paper that—even though there is likely to be important variance in how specific factors manifest themselves in

differing local (including social, cultural and political) and issue conditions, both within and between developing and industrialized societies—the broad clusters of factors that impact implementation of social policy are likely to be similar and that there is much to be gained from mutual interaction and learning amongst the two streams of research and scholarship.³³ On this point, which is otherwise conspicuous in the literature only by the silence maintained on it, this paper agrees with Van Meter and Van Horn (1975: 452) who point out that “the problems of implementation are profound in Western and non-Western nations alike: they are generic to complex organizations.”

Three cautionary points, however, need to be highlighted. First, the broadly defined literature on implementation in developing countries is based even more on case studies than that in the industrialized countries. For understandable reasons—given the greater diversity of local conditions and state-society politics—it is characterized by an even greater absence of generally accepted analytical frameworks. Second, it borrows much more from the literature on implementation in industrialized countries than the later does from it,³⁴ but is often characterized by a greater focus on field-level variables and, in that respect, is more firmly in the bottom-up tradition of implementation scholarship.³⁵ Finally, and most importantly, even where the broad factors identified as being important are similar, implementation problems encountered in developing countries are hypothesized to be greater by virtue of the political and social context in which implementation occurs—that is, in Migdal’s (1988) terms: “strong societies and weak states.”³⁶

Thomas Smith’s (1973) early model of the problems of policy implementation in developing countries (discussed above) highlights the striking similarities between the broad factors identified as being important for developing countries and those identified for industrialized countries in subsequent research. Here, we will briefly review a few more exemplars of influential attempts to conceptualize implementation in developing countries which further highlight this proposition.

Amongst the very few attempts to formally conceptualize a model that claims general validity for a wide range of policy areas, in most developing countries, **Merilee Grindle’s** (1980a) contribution is probably the most widely cited. Like Smith’s (1973) work before it, this model raises some of the same (bottom-up) concerns that have been articulated for implementation in industrialized countries and seems as applicable to them as to developing ones. Viewing implementation principally as a *political process* which involves interactions between a variety of actors at a variety of levels, her model considers the *content* and *context* of policy as the critical clusters of variables that influence implementation. As Figure 8 details, Grindle defines both content and context more broadly than others using the same terms.

In a companion study, empirically focusing on rural development policy in Mexico, Grindle (1980b) provides a detailed description of the criticality of the *administrator-as-implementer* to the success of implementation. She defines implementers as “a corps of




FIGURE 8: Grindle's (1980) implementation as a political and administrative process

middle-level officials who have responsibility for implementing programs in a specific, relatively constricted area... and who are held responsible for program results by their superiors.... [Who maintain] frequent contact with national or regional superiors, but also [have] occasion to interact with the clients of government agencies and with opponents of the programs at local levels... [and] may have considerable discretion in pursuing their tasks” (p. 197). The reader would note the striking similarity of this conception to that of the street-level bureaucrat proposed by Lipsky (1980; *also see* Box 3) in both her definition and her analysis of their role (Grindle, 1980b: 221):

Among a variety of factors that determine whether or not programs formulated at the national level will reach their intended beneficiaries is the performance of the field administrator-as-implementer. Whether or not he responds to the expectation that he execute programs depends upon the force of other demands made upon him as well as his own perceptions of how best to achieve his personal goals, whatever they may be.

Another extremely robust model of policy implementation that is equally applicable to developing and industrialized societies comes from **Donald P. Warwick** (1982). This work is especially interesting in that it documents the experience of eight developing countries in implementing population policies which were influenced by international initiatives and carried out with the assistance of international institutions.³⁷ In his analytic conclusions, Warwick first defines three main approaches to implementation (pp. 179-80): the *machine model* which “assume that a clearly formulated plan backed by legitimate decision-making authority contains the essential ingredients for its own implementation”; the *games model* which “swings from total rationality to virtual irrationality in implementation” and “plays down plans and policies and plays up the power of bargaining and exchange”; and the *evolutionary model* which implies that “policy is significant not because it sets the exact course of implementation but because it shapes the potential for action.”

He then goes on to suggest what he calls the *transaction model* of understanding implementation.³⁸ To Warwick (1982: 181), “the concept of transaction implies deliberate action to achieve a result, conscious dealings between implementers and program

environments, and, as a particularly critical kind of dealing, negotiation among parties with conflicting or otherwise diverging interests in implementation.” The model begins with seven assumptions (pp. 181-4): a) policy is important in establishing the parameters and directions of action, but it never determines the exact course of implementation; b) formal organization structures are significant but not deterministic; c) the program’s environment is a critical locus for transactions affecting implementation; d) the process of policy formulation and program design can be as important as the product; e) implementer discretion is universal and inevitable; f) clients greatly influence the outcomes of implementation; and g) implementation is inherently dynamic. Building on these, he concludes:

Implementation means transaction. To carry out a program, implementers must continually deal with tasks, environments, clients, and each other. The formalities of organization and the mechanics of administration are important as background, but the key to success is continual coping with contexts, personalities, alliances, and events. And crucial to such adaptation is the willingness to acknowledge and correct mistakes, to shift directions, and to learn from doing. Nothing is more vital to implementation than self-correction; nothing more lethal than blind perseverance. (Warwick, 1982: 190)

Although built (and tested) on evidence from developing countries, the models proposed by Grindle and Warwick are not suggested exclusively for them. Implicit to both is the view that the assumptions, variables, and relationships identified are applicable to social policy implementation in all societies, but most so in developing countries. An important subtext is that *implementation is likely to be more difficult in developing country situations* than in industrialized countries. For example, Grindle (1980a: 19) concludes that “given the concentration of political activity on the implementation process, it is likely that policies and programs will be even more difficult to manage and predict and even more subject to alteration in the Third World than elsewhere.”

That is, the complex variables that impact implementation tend to be all the more complex in developing countries. Why this is so is best understood in light of **Joel Migdal’s** (1988) conception of developing countries being *weak states with strong societies*: “In every state, there is bound to be... a ‘leakage of authority’ as policy moves through an agency.³⁹ Where accountability and control have been crippled and where the big shuffle or similar means have consumed leaders at the top... that leakage can turn into a massive hemorrhage” (p. 241).

Critical to Migdal’s conceptualization is, what he calls, *the Triangle of Accommodation* between implementers, politicians and local strongmen. Building on Grindle’s (1980b) earlier work he points out that “implementers have been strategically placed between the top policy-making elements of the state and most of the country’s population. They have been the key switchmen in moving state resources originating in the main stations, the capital city, along the tracks to the villages, towns, and cities all over the country” (p. 239). A major contribution of this work is to demonstrate that the influence of local conditions and actors is also likely to be

far greater in weak states (developing countries) than in strong ones. This is so because, on the one hand, the politics of survival diminishes accountability and control at the apex and, on the other, the powerless masses are often “frozen by fear” (p. 244). Migdal (1988: 248-9) argues, therefore, that:

Explicit or covert bargaining among organized interests, bureaucrats, and politicians is a hallmark of nearly every contemporary state.... [The] distortion of the intent of policy makers is limited, however, because of the scrutiny from superiors and the potential clamoring of clients who would stand to lose by any changes in adopted policy. In weak states, such constraints are far more feeble, and the bargaining can lead to major distortions in the use of state resources. Anemic supervision due to the politics of survival and the powerlessness of potential clients of reformist policies leave the bargaining among implementers, peer politicians, and strongmen much less encumbered by the power of state officials from above or by the demands of the mass of the population from below. The Triangle of Accommodation can [thus] become a set of institutionalized relationships with only occasional infringement from other forces.

#4 • THE 5C PROTOCOL: ‘Critical’ Variables for Studying Implementation

*Everything should be made as simple as possible,
but not simpler.*

— ALBERT EINSTEIN

The above—by no means exhaustive—survey of some of the major findings of representative analytical research on implementation demonstrates that the scholarship on the subject has been as diverse, complex, and broad as the subject itself. However, mapping the faultlines within this literature has also raised a number of common elements. This chapter will build on these to synthesize the learning thus far. The goal is not to build a theory—we are not convinced that a single universally acceptable predictive theory can be developed. The purpose is merely to identify the key clusters of explanatory variables that might allow a better understanding of implementation. The aim, then, is not as much to provide a road map which can define exactly where we will end up, as to frame a window to the terrain that might suggest what type of pitfalls to expect.

As earlier reviews of the literature on implementation have found, it is generally accepted that:

- There is a lack of “theoretical consensus” (Wittrock and deLeon, 1986: 46).
- The “field is complex, without much cumulation or convergence” (O’Toole, 1986: 181).
- The major faultline in the scholarship is between top-down and bottom-up approaches (Linder and Peters, 1987: 462).
- The “critical” variables have not been identified (Lester et al., 1987: 200).

Some have responded to this challenge by wanting to usher in a next generation of scholarship by trying to synthesize the dominant streams of implementation research into “explanatory and predictive implementation *theories* of the middle range” (Goggin et al., 1990: 15; *emphasis added*). The findings of this survey are similar; it responds to them, however, in a less ambitious manner:

- In surveying the literature this paper comes to the conclusion that consensus on a single causal theory is neither likely, nor necessarily desirable.
- This is because we accept complexity and diversity as defining features of implementation which must be built into any model purporting to explain implementation.
- While accepting the substantive difference between top-down and bottom-up approaches, it is suggested that it is not a question of choosing one over the other. Both provide important insights into the larger implementation process and both need to be incorporated.
- Most importantly, once complexity is accepted and incorporated, broad, general clusters of ‘critical’ variables can, and should, be identified which may explain implementation success or failure in a wide variety of policy issues (e.g., environment,

education, population, etc.), types (e.g., distributive, regulatory, etc.), political systems (e.g., federal, unitary, centrally planned, etc.), and national levels of economic development (e.g., industrialized and developing countries). This chapter will attempt to identify such variables.⁴⁰

Making the claim, as this paper has, that a grand unifying theory of implementation—or, for that matter, public policy—is not waiting around the corner, is not a call for analytic anarchy. Instead, it is a variant of what Wittrock and deLeon (1986) have called ‘conceptual realism.’ It is not an invitation to be atheoretical, but to be multi-theoretical. In that, this paper adheres to the seminal argument made by Graham Allison (1971), and applied to implementation by Elmore (1978), that in complex, multi-actor, multi-level, political processes—as we perceive implementation to be—multiple, and equally legitimate, analytical perspectives are likely to lead to different, sometimes contradictory, conclusions. Where we stand will invariably depend on where we sit. As Allison (1971: 2) puts it, “what we see and judge to be important and accept as adequate depends not only on the evidence but also on the ‘conceptual lenses’ through which we look at the evidence.”

The argument, then, is that the use of multiple ‘conceptual lenses’ is legitimate and the choice of a particular lens over the other can only be made in light of the particularities of the problem we are studying. Moreover, as Elmore (1978: 227) points out: a) applying different models to the same set of events can allow us to distinguish certain features of the implementation process from others; and b) certain kinds of problems may be more amenable to solutions when using one perspective than using another. This chapter will not propose a new set of models—or ‘conceptual lenses’—for studying implementation. A number of existing ones have already been discussed in the previous chapter for the reader to choose from. Instead, this chapter claims that even where the conceptual lenses have differed, there is a remarkable convergence of explanatory variables that they have focused upon. The goal is to identify and synthesize such critical variables.

UNDERSTANDING IMPLEMENTATION IN ALL ITS COMPLEXITY

Before we go on to identify the set of critical variables that are generally accepted by a multitude of implementation scholars it is important to spell out how this paper views implementation and what assumptions are made about it. This section will attempt to describe implementation in all its manifest complexity before we proceed to sift through the complexity to develop a framework of critical variables that affect implementation.

As Pressman and Wildavsky (1973: xiii-xvii) realized, implementation is not an easy concept to define.⁴¹ As a noun, implementation is the state of having achieved the goals of the policy. As a verb it is a process—everything that happens in trying to achieve that policy objective. Thus,

just because implementation (noun) is not achieved does not mean that implementation (verb) does not happen. Consider as an example a general policy to check deforestation. After x number of years one may find that deforestation is still rampant and therefore conclude that the implementation has not been achieved. This may be because the specific steps prescribed in the policy to achieve the said goal were never followed; were followed but did not produce the predicted result; were transformed; or, most likely, a combination of the above.⁴² However, the ‘process’ of implementation did happen in that the prescribed steps were either taken, ignored, or transformed. The subject of this paper, then, is implementation the verb: what happens after a policy is enacted. Whether this leads to the achievement of the desired objective is the subject of evaluation (or effectiveness) research. The two, however, are inextricably linked: to achieve implementation (*noun*), or to evaluate its effectiveness, we must first understand the process of implementation (*verb*) so that we might influence it.

Foremost to this paper’s understanding of implementation is the belief that implementation is not simply a managerial or administrative problem, it is *a political process*—it is concerned with who gets what, when, how, where, and from whom. By definition, then, there are *multiple actors*. Conceivably, there may be implementation problems which are not multi-actor; these, however, are likely to be exceptions. As Scharpf (1978: 347) points out, “it is unlikely, if not impossible, that public policy of any significance could result from the choice process of any single unified actor. Policy formation and policy implementation are inevitably the result of interactions among a plurality of separate actors with separate interests, goals, and strategies.”

Critical to this paper’s understanding of the implementation process is the notion—borrowed from Hanf (1982) but building on the work of others including Pressman and Wildavsky (1973), Bardach (1977), Elmore (1979), Warwick (1982), Sabatier (1986), and Goggin et al. (1990)—that *actors must be the unit of analysis*. This implies that “implementation involves processes in which different actors find it necessary to act within a given set of unavoidable (even if potentially changeable) constraints” (Hanf, 1982, 166). Although originally a bottom-up claim, this is increasingly being accepted by top-downers. Such a formulation necessitates, as Hjern and Hull (1982: 114) point out, that as the very first step we need to be “clear about who participates how and with what effect in policy processes.... All empirically relevant actors need to be incorporated on equal terms in implementation research’s reconstruction of policy systems. Thus the ordering principle of implementation research is not policy problems as defined and addressed by the formal political system but as defined and addressed by relevant societal actors (who, of course, include those of the formal political system).” The purpose of implementation research, then, is to “reconstruct the patterns of interaction and interrelationships among those actors through which information is communicated, co-operation established, and conflicts resolved” (Hanf, 1982: 160).

Not only is implementation influenced by multiple actors, it operates at *multiple levels*. For example, a national education policy may operate at the federal, state, and local levels; an internationally triggered population or environmental policy might, in addition, also be operating at the international level. In most cases the number of relevant ‘levels’ would be even greater once we include intra-organizational levels (e.g., within the field agency). The important point is not as much to catalog all the various levels at which implementation happens but to acknowledge that it may happen at multiple levels simultaneously and that the transmittal of policy from one level to the other is neither neat nor unidirectional. Consider, for example, a federal policy to limit the emissions of a certain pollutant. A partial list of the implementation activities associated with this policy would include: passage of federal and state enabling legislation, federal/state/local standard setting, capacity creation within relevant state and local agencies, formalization of agency operating procedures, allocation of resources within relevant agencies, the actual issuance of violations to offenders, etc. Note that a) implementation includes all the many activities that happen after the statement of a policy,⁴³ and b) these activities often happen at very different levels.

This brings us to a related and extremely important facet of this paper’s understanding of implementation: *implementation is dynamic*. This implies that we view implementation as a ‘living’ process which is not restricted only to translating a stated policy into action but may well transform the policy itself. Like all of the above, this is offered as a descriptive rather than a normative statement. What Majone and Wildavsky (1978) call ‘evolution’ and Berman (1980) describes as ‘adaptation’ can, in some cases, enhance the effectiveness of a particular policy in reaching its goal while in others it can act to subvert the same. The point is merely to expect such transformation of the policy itself in the process of its implementation. As Wildavsky (1979: 176) asserts, “implementation is no longer solely about getting what you once wanted but what you have since learned to prefer, until, of course, you change your mind again.” The same sentiment is expanded upon by Majone and Wildavsky (1978: 109-114) who point out:

Policies are continuously transformed by implementing actions that simultaneously alter resources and objectives... It is not policy design but redesign that goes on most of the time. Who is to say, then, whether implementation consists of altering objectives to correspond with available resources or of mobilizing new resources to accomplish old objectives?... Implementation is evolution... When we act to implement a policy, we change it.

Moreover, to borrow the words from Rein and Rabinovitz (1978: 322), “the process is not one of graceful, one-dimensional transition... instead it is circular or looping.” What this implies is that like policy implementation, policy transformation is also not unidirectional. Rather, it is a process of continuous to-and-fro between different actors, at different levels.⁴⁴ Just as implementation does not necessarily flow from top to bottom, transformation also does not necessarily flow from bottom to top. In fact, even the fundamental bottom-up view that

“policy does not exist in any concrete sense until implementers have shaped it and claimed it for their own,” is accompanied with the realization that “the result is a consensus reflecting the initial intent of policy-makers and the independent judgment of implementers” (Elmore, 1978: 216). In essence, then, the question is not whether those at the top or those at the bottom ‘control’ the implementation process, but how the *negotiation* between the two shapes it.

While this paper’s notion of ‘negotiation’ borrows much from the ‘bargaining’ models of implementation in the bottom-up tradition (Elmore, 1978; Barrett and Fudge, 1981), it also borrows from the ‘communication’ imperative identified with top-down scholarship (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975; Edwards, 1980). In a pure top-down world, implementation would depend upon how well those at the top communicated their intent to those at the bottom. From a fundamentalist bottom-up view, it would depend on how those at the bottom retaliated to that communication by reinterpreting (or misconstruing) it. By ‘negotiation’ we imply the growing realization amongst synthesis scholars (*see* Goggin et al., 1990) that the process of implementation is one where the interests (and realities) of the top, the bottom, and the in between are accommodated.⁴⁵ A particular strength of understanding implementation as negotiation between pressures from the top *and* from the bottom is that it rejects a false dichotomy between strict top-down and bottom-up conceptualizations and embraces the strengths of both perspectives. In essence, then, *this paper views implementation as a dynamic process of negotiation between multiple actors, operating at multiple levels, within and between multiple organizations.*

Such a view certainly introduces a new level of complexity to our understanding of implementation processes. However, the argument merely is that where complexity is an inherent characteristic of the process, ignoring it can create more problems than it solves. The case is best articulated by Wittrock and deLeon (1986: 55) who view policy as a ‘moving target’ and simply state that “the dynamics inherent in the implementation processes can no longer be neglected, however inconvenient that must be.” They realize that earlier “analysts were simply unable to treat a world in which multiple variables were permitted to change, sometimes independently, occasionally in unison” (p. 44). However, they point out that “the convenient assumption that implementation can be viewed against the background of a static set of circumstances... fundamentally misconstrues the realities of implementation” (p. 48). They, therefore, argue that “we should operate under the assumption that alterations in the policy environment are to be expected and, to a large extent, unpredictable, or at least not particularly susceptible to confident foresight.... The *ceteris paribus* clause, upon which so much policy design implicitly rests often does not hold” (p. 55-6). This paper seconds their call for ‘conceptual realism’—which is not to say that the study of implementation is doomed to complexity but merely to suggest that our understanding must be framed around a backdrop of complexity which cannot, and should not, be assumed away.

MAKING SENSE OF COMPLEXITY: THE 5C PROTOCOL

In understanding implementation as a complex political process, rather than a mechanical administrative one, the study of implementation becomes an attempt to unravel the complexity—of following policy as it travels through the complex, dynamic maze of implementation; to understand how it changes its surroundings and how it is changed itself in the process; and, most importantly, to see how it can be influenced to better accomplish the goals it set out of achieve. While the maze through which policy travels in the course of its implementation is unique to each situation, our synthesis of the accumulated scholarship on the subject suggests that critical variables which shape the directions that implementation might take are identifiable. From our survey of the literature five such variables emerge which are important causal factors for a multitude of scholars—adhering to otherwise divergent perspectives (top-down or bottom-up), working on differing issues (environment, education, etc.), in different political systems (federal, unitary, etc.), and in countries at various levels of economic development (industrialized or developing).




FIGURE 9: *The 5C Protocol*

- The Content of the policy itself—What it sets out to do (i.e. goals); how it problematizes the issue (i.e. causal theory); how it aims to solve the perceived problem (i.e. methods).
- The nature of the institutional Context—The corridor (often structured as operating procedures) through which policy must travel, and by whose boundaries it is limited, in the process of implementation.
- The Commitment of those entrusted with carrying out the implementation at various levels to the goals, causal theory, and methods of the policy.
- The administrative Capacity of implementers to carry out the changes desired of them.
- The support of Clients and Coalitions whose interests are enhanced or threatened by the policy, and the strategies they employ in strengthening or deflecting its implementation.

Each of these five variables is linked to, and influenced by, the others—though, to varying extents depending on the specific implementation situation. For example, implementation capacity is likely to be a function of all the remaining four variables: policy content may, or may not, provide for resources for capacity building; the institutional context of the relevant agencies may hinder or help such capacity enhancement; the commitment of implementers to the goals, causal theory, and methods of the policy may make up for the lack of such capacity—or vice versa; or the coalition of actors opposed to effective implementation may stymie the capacity which might otherwise have been sufficient—here, again, supportive clients and coalitions may in fact enhance capacity.

In each case, then, it is the web of interlinkages, rather than only the variables themselves, that we are interested in. In framing our understanding of implementation by this set of explanatory variables ('The 5C Pentagon,' *see* Figure 9), the task is to catalog the strength and influence of each variable on specific implementation efforts as well as to identify critical linkages between them on the basis of their strengths and weaknesses and, most importantly, their potential to enhance the effectiveness of the particular implementation process. The role of implementation analysis moves from the merely descriptive to the potentially prescriptive in mapping these linkages—and proceeding from there, to what Bardach (1977: 268) calls “fixing the game.”⁴⁶

For example, in studying the implementation of forestry policies in a developing country we may discover that lack of capacity is the prime reason for implementation ineffectiveness. However, the prescriptive value of the analysis, in terms of policy redesign, lies not only in this identification but in also identifying what particular type of capacity is required, and how (and if) such incapacity is linked to, or may be influenced by, other variables. It is in addressing the entirety of the 5C schemata that we begin to address such practical issues as whether a capacity deficit is best addressed through merely providing more monetary and human resources or through attempting to influence the content of the policy itself, the institutional context of the agencies involved, the commitment of the implementers, or the coalitions actively opposed or supportive of the endeavor.

Even where scholars may differ about the relative criticality of the five variables identified here—or their placement within top-down/bottom-up, industrialized/developing, or specific issue contexts—it is remarkable that a very broad set of implementation scholars have identified these or similar variables as their key determinants of implementation effectiveness. For example, in his extensive survey of empirical implementation research, O'Toole (1986: 189), reports that roughly half of the published studies identify what we call 'content' as a key variable and about the same number consider 'capacity' to be crucial. The other frequently identified categories also collapse into the critical variables identified here: implementing-actor or multi actor structure (context); attitudes of implementing personnel (commitment); and

alignment of clientele (and coalitions). O'Toole (1986: 203) goes on to hint at (but not develop) his own list of variables on which implicit agreement exists which include, "policy characteristics, resources, implementation structure, implementer disposition, implementer-client relationship, and timing." The reader should note the similarity of the first five to content, capacity, context, commitment, and coalitions as defined here.⁴⁷

TABLE 1: 'Critical' Explanatory Variables—Who is Proposing What

<i>Variable</i>	<i>This, or similar, variable also considered 'critical' by...</i>	
Content	Lowi (1964, 1972) Smith (1973) Rein and Rabinovitz (1978) Barrett and Fudge (1981) Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983) Sabatier (1986) Elmore (1987) Linder and Peters (1987)	Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) Grindle (1980) Hargrove (1983) O'Toole (1986) Witrock and deLeon (1986) Lester et al. (1987) Goggin et al. (1990)
Context	Smith (1973) Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) Berman (1978) Scharpf (1978) Grindle (1980) Warwick (1982) O'Toole (1986) Migdal (1988)	Hargrove (1975) Bardach (1977) Hanf (1978, 1982) Edwards (1980) Barrett and Fudge (1981) Hjern and Hull (1982) Lester et al. (1987) Goggin et al. (1990)
Commitment	Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) Berman (1978) Scharpf (1978) Edwards (1980) Williams (1982) O'Toole (1986)	Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) Lipsky (1978, 1980) Elmore (1979) Nakamura and Smallwood (1980) Warwick (1982)
Capacity	Smith (1973) Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) Edwards (1980) Williams (1982) O'Toole (1986) Goggin et al. (1990)	Hargrove (1975) Rein and Rabinovitz (1978) Barrett and Fudge (1981) Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983) Sabatier (1986)
Clients and Coalitions	Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) Berman (1978) Lipsky (1978, 1980) Scharpf (1978) Grindle (1980) Barrett and Fudge (1981) Warwick (1982) Sabatier (1986) Migdal (1988)	Bardach (1977) Hanf (1978, 1982) Rein and Rabinovitz (1978) Elmore (1979) Nakamura and Smallwood (1980) Hjern and Hull (1982) Downing and Hanf (1983b) Witrock and deLeon (1986);

Our claim to representativeness is further validated by Table 1 which surveys influential works of analytic scholarship on implementation and identifies other scholars who have considered the same, or similar, variables as being critical to effective implementation. The table highlights two important points: a) the ‘critical’ factors, as identified by the key scholars of the field, converge in the five variables suggested in this study; and b) although some expected patterns of bottom-up/top-down differences are apparent, they are far less prominent than one might have expected.⁴⁸

Having said the above, even where the broad gist is similar, the exact implication of each variable may differ between various scholars, and between them and this paper. For example, both Grindle (1980) and Lester et al. (1987) identify ‘content’ and ‘context’ as key variables; however, their understanding of these differs—and in both cases is somewhat broader than what is proposed here. For example, in Grindle’s model, all five of the variables identified here would be subsumed under ‘content’ and ‘context.’ Thus, while the 5C protocol proposed here remains a valid and representative synthesis of implementation scholarship thus far, it is important to explicate the specifics of what each variable entails in this paper’s understanding. In some cases this may be slightly different, but nowhere dramatically divergent, from the usage of the same word by other implementation scholars. The following five sections describe each variable separately.

CONTENT

The seminal typology of policy content is provided by Theodore Lowi (1964, 1969, 1972) who characterizes policy as either *distributive*, *regulatory*, or *redistributive*. In very broad terms, distributive policies create public goods for the general welfare and are non-zero-sum in character; regulatory policies specify rules of conduct with sanctions for failure to comply; and redistributive policies attempt to change allocations of wealth or power of some groups at the expense of others.⁴⁹ Fundamental to Lowi’s work is his assumption that “policies determine politics” and that “the most significant political fact is that governments coerce” (Lowi, 1972). The content of policy, then, is a function of the level and type of coercion by government. A more charitable, but related, view of government and its use of what Van Meter and Van Horn (1975: 470) call the “arsenal of influence” is provided by Etzioni’s identification of remunerative, normative, or coercive powers (these roughly correspond to distributive, regulatory, and redistributive policies).

Although this, and such, classifications have been found useful by a wide variety of implementation scholars (e.g. Smith, 1973; Van Meter and Van Horn 1975; Grindle, 1980; Hargrove, 1983),⁵⁰ there is also a widespread implicit realization that the content of policy is important not only in the means it employs to achieve its ends, but also in its determination of

the ends themselves and in how it chooses the specific means to reach those ends. This, more elaborate, understanding of the criticality of policy content is best exemplified in the path-breaking work of Pressman and Wildavsky (1973: xv) who view implementation as “a seamless web... a process of interaction between the setting of goals and actions geared to achieving them.” Mediating this choice of ends and means is the content of the policy. Importantly:

Policies imply theories. Whether stated explicitly or not, policies point to a chain of causation between initial conditions and future consequences. If X, then Y. Policies become programs when, by authoritative action, the initial conditions are created. X now exists. Programs make the theories operational by forging the first link in the causal chain connecting actions to objectives. Given X, we act to obtain Y. Implementation, then, is the ability to forge subsequent links in the causal chain so as to obtain the desired results.... Once a program is underway implementers become responsible both for the initial conditions and for the objectives toward which they are supposed to lead. The longer the chain of causality, the more numerous the reciprocal relationships among the links and the more complex implementation becomes.... When objectives are not realized, one explanation is the assertion of faulty implementation.... Another appropriate explanation may be that aspirations were set too high.... The possibility of a mismatch between means and ends calls into question the adequacy of the original policy design. Perhaps implementation was good but the theory on which it was based was bad.... The study of implementation requires understanding that apparently simple sequences of events depend on a complex chain of reciprocal interaction. Hence, each part of the chain must be built with the others in view. The separation of policy design from implementation is fatal. (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973: xv-xvii)

The above excerpt highlights three elements of policy content that this paper considers important: a) what the policy sets out to do—the *goals*;⁵¹ b) how it problematizes the issue it sets out to address—the imbedded *causal theory*; and c) how it aims to solve the perceived problem—the choice of *methods*. Although inextricably linked, the three need to be identified as distinct entities.

Consider, for example, the international population regime set up with the adoption of the World Population Plan of Action at the World Population Conference held at Bucharest in 1974 and since strengthened at the 1984 International Conference on Population (Mexico City) and the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo).⁵² The goal of the regime is to check the rate of population growth. However, in pursuing the same general goal various national governments and international and domestic agencies adopt a variety of causal theories which problematize the issue in widely (and sometimes diametrically) different ways. These range from the view that people do not have the knowledge of (or access to) contraceptive technologies to the belief that, for the poor, children are an economic resource and they simply cannot ‘afford’ to have fewer children. Such differences can obviously affect the policy content dramatically. Even if we narrow it down to a constant causal theory, say the view that population growth is a function of lack of knowledge about contraception, the content may differ substantively according to the means chosen to address this particular problematization. A distributive solution might encourage knowledge creation through publicly provided family planning clinics; a redistributive policy may seek knowledge creation through

incentive programs for smaller families; while a regulatory program might choose to coerce knowledge creation through penalties for larger families.⁵³

It is not only how the choice of different goals, causal theories, or methods will effect the policy content and the implementation process that is of concern to us but also how these will impact the other four variables. Such impacts are worthy of careful and systematic analysis. At a minimum, building on earlier works, the goal saliency is likely to influence both the commitment of the implementers and the makeup of actor coalitions opposing or supporting particular policies—one might hypothesize, then, that greater goal consensus will lead to greater commitment and more supportive clients and coalitions (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975; Rein and Rabinovitz, 1978). Distributive, redistributive, or regulatory policies require distinctly different types and levels of implementation capacity and contexts—and are likely to engender differing levels of implementer commitment and supportive clients and coalitions (Smith, 1973; Grindle, 1980; Hargrove, 1983). The intervening causal theory that translates particular goals to a particular choice of design may similarly impact the other four variables but its greatest analytic value is in identifying a) why a particular design choice was made and b) what alternative design choices may be available that might potentially lead to more effective implementation of the same goal.

To caricature the dynamic nature of our 5C protocol at work consider, again, the case of population policy. Imagine a situation, not at all implausible, where the goal of population control is accepted by the national policy elite for developmental reasons but resented at the popular level for religious, social or cultural reasons. It is likely, then, that any population program will elicit mild commitment from street-level implementers and also generate hostile clients and coalitions strongly opposed to the policy. Assuming the causal theory and design choices introduced earlier, a regulatory policy would require strong policing capacity and authoritarian state contexts to overcome strong popular (including street-level bureaucrat) preferences. In the case of a redistributive (incentive-based) policy, the combination of extremely decentralized implementation and low implementer commitment may well lead to goal deflection, purposeful nonimplementation, and corruption (*see* Lipsky, 1980). A distributive policy, however, may ‘sweeten’ the pie and moderate the levels of implementer noncommitment and hostile coalitions but may necessitate a different type and level of implementation capacity and context—namely, monetary (as opposed to policing) capacity and a participatory (as opposed to authoritarian) institutional context. This brings us back to the policy content which may, or may not, facilitate such a context in relevant agencies or provide such capacity. In the case of the latter, supportive coalitions of non-implementers—for example, international donor agencies—could provide the necessary resources to create the desired capacity. Alternatively, a different causal theory—for example, one that views ‘development as the best contraceptive’—may, in fact, influence different levels of implementer

commitment and coalitions of actors or require different types of capacity and institutional contexts.

Till now, this section has largely discussed policy content as it is framed by government ‘at the top.’ In that, we accept the argument that ‘policy design matters’ (Linder and Peters, 1987). However, this protocol is also premised on the view that policy is a ‘moving target’ which ‘travels’ (Wittrock and deLeon, 1986) through the ‘seamless web’ of causal linkage (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973). While explored later in more detail, it is important to note that through exactly the type of linkages introduced above, the content of ‘policy in action’ may be significantly different from policy as originally stated. For example, a case where lack of implementer commitment, strongly hostile clients and coalition, lack of administrative capacity or conducive context creates a situation where the stated policy is not being implemented can, and in fact should, be viewed as a case of policy restatement where the policy in action is to ignore the stated policy—maybe it was ‘unimplementable’ because of a weak causal theory or inappropriate design. The ultimate purpose of implementation analysis as envisaged in this protocol is to manipulate the variables and the linkages between them so as to match the policy in action with the desired goals. This may sometimes be achieved through trying to influencing the policy in action to match the stated content, and in other instances by appropriately changing the content of the policy itself.

CONTEXT

It is fairly common wisdom within all streams of implementation scholarship that “a context-free theory of implementation is unlikely to produce powerful explanations or accurate predictions” (Berman, 1980: 206). However, as O’Toole (1986: 202) has noted, “the field of implementation has yet to address, as part of its research strategy, the challenge of contextuality, beyond fairly empty injunctions for policy makers, implementers, and researchers to pay attention to social, economic, political, and legal setting.” In becoming a catchall that is always important to consider but never easy to systematically study, there is the danger of a) losing cumulation of learning and b) failing to account for contextual impacts on implementation effectiveness.

Contextuality is offered here not as a black box variable of all things social, economic, political and legal. Instead, we focus here on the *institutional* context—which, like the other four variables, will necessarily be shaped by the larger context of social, economic, political and legal realities of the system. This is, in no way, an attempt to understate the importance of the larger contextuality, but merely to emphasize that of principal concern to us is how this impacts the implementation process, primarily via the institutional corridor through which implementation must pass and, as we shall explore later, the support of clients and coalitions.

A systematic discussion of the context variable comes from Grindle (1980). However, she adopts an expansive definition of context which includes: a) power, interests, and strategies of actors involved; b) institutions and regime characteristics; and c) compliance and responsiveness. In our schemata, the first would roughly fit under clients and coalitions and the last under commitment. What we define as institutional context, then, aligns most closely to Grindle's second element, and lies at the conjunction of what others have broadly labeled 'environmental factors' (Smith, 1973; Warwick, 1983), and 'institutional setting' (Hargrove, 1975; Berman, 1978; Scharpf, 1978). We agree, moreover, with Warwick (1982: 182) that, "the most common difference between programs that are carried out and those that fail is that the former link policy intentions to environmental realities whereas the latter proceed as if the environment were either invariant or irrelevant."

To facilitate a meaningful understanding of implementation, at least three related tasks concerning the institutional context need to be performed: a) to identify the key institutional actors influencing, or being influenced by, the process; b) to trace the interests and power relationships between and within the relevant institutions; and c) to recognize the institutional characteristics as influenced by the overarching structure of social, economic, political and legal setting in which they operate.

As has already been discussed, in the suite of issues of concern to us, "multiorganizational implementation is the rule" (O'Toole, 1986: 182). The criticality of understanding the importance of interorganizational implementation is highlighted by Hanf (1978: 1-2):

Territorial and functional differentiation has produced decision systems in which the problem solving capacity of governments is disaggregated into a collection of sub-systems with limited tasks, competencies and resources, where the relatively independent participants possess different bits of information, represent different interests, and pursue separate, potentially conflicting courses of action.... Under such conditions, problem solving arrangements will involve participants from different decision levels and from a variety of functionally specialized organizational units. The ability of individual decision units to achieve their objectives will depend not only on their own choices and actions but also on those of others; actions at any one level of decision making will be influenced by the relationships that exist between levels as well as across functional boundaries.

In realizing that the methodological imperative for describing a policy system is to identify the decisionmakers who populate it, Hjern (1982: 307) emphasizes that "an explicit organizational perspective becomes indispensable in policy relevant implementation analysis" because to understand how politics and administration are linked "requires an understanding of more than just how clause is added to clause. It also takes an understanding of how organization is linked to organization."⁵⁴ Bish (1978) provides a useful framework for studying relations in organizational networks. He characterizes these relations as *cooperative*, *competitive*, *collusive*, or *coercive* and argues that the performance of any particular agency is significantly impacted by such relations. Although focusing on intergovernmental relations in the United States, Bish's formulation is broadly applicable to other implementation relevant institutional

contexts. In writing about developing countries, for example, Warwick (1982: 188) points out:

Effective working relations typically result from bargaining, cajoling, accommodation, threats, gestures of respect, and related transactions. Straight lines that link square boxes mean little if the underlying reality is a jumble, whereas effective working relations can be established by transactions among agencies with no formal connections whatever. In short, bureaucratic contexts favorable to implementation more often grow out of human interactions than hierarchical regulation.

Institutional context, however, includes more than just the web of inter- and intra-agency relationships. Another important element of this variable is the process of mutual adaptation between implementing agencies and policy being implemented. Not only is it likely that many different agencies will be directly or indirectly involved in the implementation of particular policies and programs, but also that particular agencies will be directly or indirectly involved in the implementation of many different policies and programs. In conjunction with implementer commitment (*discussed below*), such competing agency priorities will shape the agency response to particular elements of particular policies—which, in turn, may well reshape the policy itself.

The resulting agency priorities—arrived through mutual adaptation—are often manifest in standard operating procedures (*see* Allison, 1971).⁵⁵ As Berman (1978: 178) points out “the implemented practice cannot produce a continuing flow of outcomes unless it becomes a routinized part of the local delivery system, i.e., becomes institutionalized.” Moreover, he hypothesize that effective implementation is “characterized by mutual adaptation between the project and the organizational setting” (p. 172). This implies that in studying the institutional context of implementation, especial care should be given to standard operating procedures (SOPs) of the relevant agencies; how these have been influenced by, or influenced, the policy in question; what SOPs might potentially facilitate more effective implementation; and whether particular actor coalitions, changes in policy content, or provision of particular resources (capacity) might facilitate such SOPs.

The major purpose of the foregoing discussion has been to move the focus of what we call the ‘institutional context’ from a sterile administrative concept to a complex political one. In this, we agree with Hargrove (1983: 294) that “implementation analysis becomes sterile and technocratic when practiced apart from the political context.” Specifically, we have constructed this variable as, in Smith’s (1973: 205) terms, “a sort of constraining corridor” through which implementation must pass. However, the concept of mutual adaptation underscores the dynamic nature of this variable—or, in the words of Wittrock and deLeon (1986: 45), “changing contextuality.” As Warwick (1982: 182) points out: “Program environments [contexts] are (1) multiple; (2) shifting; and (3) difficult to predict in an detail before implementation takes place.”

Just as implementation cannot be understood without appreciating the institutional context in which it exists, the institutional context itself cannot be understood devoid of the larger societal structure in which it operates. As Migdal (1988: 241) argues, “the structure of society has an important indirect effect on policy implementation.” In his fascinating study of state-society relationships in developing countries—which he characterizes as strong societies and weak states—he finds that:

Society’s structure [affects] politics at the highest levels of the state and the administration of state policy at much lower levels. If we want to understand the capabilities and character of states—their ability to make rules for their population and the degree to which the politics of survival predominate over other agenda items—we must start with social structure. (Migdal, 1988: 256)

While his conclusion that policy implementation by state agents in weak states is more prone to the deflection of in the face of fragmented societies and the politics of survival is more focused on developing countries, the general statement above is useful for all societies. The importance of being sensitive to the larger social, cultural, political and legal structure in which implementation takes place is further highlighted in the work of Merilee Grindle (1980: 14):⁵⁶

The process of implementation may vary considerably depending upon whether the political regime is an authoritarian one, or a more open system where elections impose a greater degree of responsiveness on both political and administrative officials.... Matters of ideology, culture, political alliances and payoffs, and international events are other environmental influences that may also have considerable impact on the administrative process. Moreover, programs are not implemented in isolation from other public policies; a program’s success may easily be affected by the priorities of political officials or the outcome of other programs. *These factors imply that programs identical in content may still be implemented differently if the context in which they are pursued differs substantially. (Emphasis added)*

As with all other elements in our 5C schemata, the institutional context will influence, and be influenced by, other variables. Some such linkages have already been hinted at, a few others can be explored by continuing with our example of the population control regime. Assume that in a particular country, the regime has been translated into a national population policy—one of whose programs include the provision of subsidized contraceptives through specially created family planning centers. Of the number of potential interorganizational relationships, rivalries, and turf-battles that such a program might create (even though a single ‘lead agency’ has been designated), let us focus only on how existing public health agencies might react. One question to ask would be whether the relationship between particular health agencies and the new family planning centers is cooperative, collusive, competitive, or coercive. The answer would be shaped by (and can, therefore, be reshaped by) the content of the original policy; the resource tussle (i.e. capacity), if any, between agencies; implementer commitment; and the coalitions that may support, or oppose, the program. Moreover, characteristics of the institutional context—e.g. the organizational structure of various ministries, the national decisionmaking process, etc.—would itself impact what levels and types of capacity may be available to the new agency; what existing or new coalitions may organize on the issue; what

levels of commitment may be forthcoming; and, in fact, what options are considered feasible to be included in the original policy content.

In essence, then, the variable of institutional context forces our attention on understanding the institutional environment, or corridor, through which policy must pass as it translates to action. The critical contribution of this variable is an identification of the key institutional players, conflicts between and within such institutions, and the dynamic and evolving relationship between the goals of the policy in question and of the agencies charged to implement it.

COMMITMENT

“Governments may have the most logical policy imaginable, the policy may pass cost/benefit analyses with honors, and it may have a bureaucratic structure that would do honor to Max Weber, but if those responsible for carrying it out are unwilling or unable to do so, little will happen” (Warwick, 1982: 135). This sentiment, most often associated with bottom-up scholars, is, in fact, also central to the top-down perspective—often under the title of ‘disposition’ (see Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975; Edwards, 1980; Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983). While both consider the variable to be ‘critical’ to effective implementation. A hardline top-down perspective would view implementer commitment being fashioned primarily by the content of the policy and its capacity (resource) provisions—both of which can supposedly be ‘controlled’ from the top. A fundamentalist bottom-up view, even while accepting the influence of content and capacity, would tend to view commitment as being influenced much more by the institutional context, and clients and coalitions (see especially Lipsky, 1980). Our synthesis schemata of key implementation variables reinforces the criticality of the commitment factor and makes two further propositions:

- First, commitment is important not only at the ‘street-level’ but at *all* levels through which policy passes—in cases of international commitments, this would include the regime-level, the state-level, the street-level, and all levels in between.
- Second, in keeping with our weblike conception of interlinkages between the five critical variables, commitment will be influenced by, and will influence, *all* the four remaining variables: content; capacity; context; and clients and coalitions. Those interested in effective implementation cannot afford to ignore any of these linkages and are best advised to identify the ones most appropriate to ‘fix’ particular implementation processes.

In discussing the subject of commitment, the literature has overwhelmingly focused on the commitment of what have been variously called “front-line workers” (Wilson, 1967), “policy deliverers” (Berman, 1978), and “street-level bureaucrats” (Lipsky, 1980). This emphasis has not been misplaced since, as we shall later argue, the ultimate implementation effectiveness will often depend on how this strata of implementers actually ‘deliver’ the policy and, thereby, on

how much they are committed to what they are entrusted with delivering. However, the street-level is by no means the only level at which commitment becomes a critical variable.

For example, the work of Migdal (1988) on developing countries and Goggin et al. (1990) on the United States implies that various levels of society may well have varying levels of support for particular policies. It is not at all inconceivable, for example, to have situations where street-level bureaucrats and top-level decision makers in fact have similar interests but middle-level officials at the provincial or State (in the US context) have a lower level of commitment. Moreover, this paper also challenges the prevailing, often unstated, assumption that those who frame particular policies are automatically deemed 'committed' to them—that at the very top there can be no lack of commitment since that is where policy is framed! We submit that it should not be considered heresy to suggest that, in industrialized and developing countries alike, policies and programs are often born out of political expedience rather than commitment. In such cases, then, a lack of commitment at the top, rather than at the bottom, may be the cause of ineffective implementation.

In contrast to the literature surveyed here, the literature on international environmental regimes and their implementation also identifies "concern" (Levy, Keohane, and Haas, 1993) and "willingness" (Andresen, Skjærseth, and Wettestad, 1995; Jacobson and Weiss, 1994) as critical variables but focuses entirely at the state-level. In conjunction with our earlier formulation of policy as a moving target which travels through various levels, it is important to identify commitment at every level. The first task in analyzing the commitment variable, then, should be to catalog *all* points in the process where a lack of commitment might influence implementation effectiveness.

To continue with our example of an international population control regime, a lack of commitment at the international (regime-) level to fulfill promised resource transfers, or at the national (state-) level to translate the international policy into priority domestic legislation, or at the agency-level to formulate well-endowed projects, or at the street-level to translate mandated programs into action could each equally lead to ultimately ineffective implementation. Importantly, at each level the minimum legal requirement (i.e. compliance) may well be fulfilled without it leading to effective implementation due to a lack of commitment to the policy goal.⁵⁷

The point to be made is that "bureaucracy is a complex and varied phenomenon, not a simple social category or political epithet" (Wilson, 1989: 10). It needs to be understood as such at *every* level that it effects the implementation process. Having said that, no actor in the bureaucratic complex is likely to be as critical to the effective implementation of social policy as the street-level bureaucrat—it is there that policy actually translates into action. The

commitment to the policy of street-level bureaucrats is especially critical because their unique position of proximity to the problem implies that a) their priorities are shaped not only by their agency but also by the realities and concerns of their clients, and b) the level of discretionary power they usually enjoy grants them the ability to not only influence the implementation of the policy, but to *de facto* 'define' policy in action. A detailed portrait of the street-level bureaucrat, and why their commitment is of such importance to effective implementation is provided by Lipsky (1980) and summarized in Box 3.⁵⁸

BOX 3: Understanding Street-Level Bureaucrats

In the most authoritative work on the subject, Michael Lipsky (1980) describes "the portrait of the street-level bureaucrat [as] one of considerable responsibility in allocating social value but little effective external determination as to how to define and achieve objectives" (p. 81).⁵⁹

Lipsky points out that "most citizens encounter government (if they encounter it at all)" through such street-level bureaucrats and that each encounter of this kind represents "an instance of policy delivery" (p. 3). He views them as effective 'policy-makers' and argues that "the decisions of street-level bureaucrats, the routines they establish, and the devices they invent to cope with uncertainties and work pressures, effectively *become* the public policies they carry out" (p. xii). He goes on to suggest that "public policy is not best understood as made in legislatures or top-floor suites of high-ranking administrators, because in important ways it is actually made in the crowded offices and daily encounters of street-level workers" (p. xii). The policy-making roles of street-level bureaucrats stems from two facets of their positions: a) they enjoy a relatively high degree of discretion, and b) are relatively autonomous from organizational authority.⁶⁰ While the first allows them to 'make' decisions, the later implies that these decisions of individual street-level implementers, when taken together, define both agency behavior and *de facto* agency policy.

According to Lipsky the very nature of the job that street-level bureaucrats perform makes it "difficult, if not impossible, to severely reduce discretion" for at least two reasons: a) they often work in situations too complex to be reduced to programmatic formats of elaborate rule, instructions, and guidelines, and b) they work in situations that often require [immediate] responses to the human dimensions of situations (p. 15). With respect to organizational autonomy, Lipsky posits that "one can expect a distinct degree of noncompliance if lower level workers' *interests* differ from the interests of those at higher levels, and the incentive and sanctions available to higher levels are not sufficient to prevail" (p. 17, *original emphasis*). He adds to this that street-level bureaucrats have "distinctly different interests from the interests of others in the agencies for which they work" and, moreover, the position that they are in allows them to make these differences manifest even where others at the same level may not. Instances where street-level workers simply consider agency goals to be illegitimate (even though they consider the agency's right to set directives to be legitimate) aside,⁶¹ interests of street-level bureaucrats which essentially differ from those of agency managers include: a) their need to process large work loads expeditiously, free from real and psychological threats, often under conditions of resource shortage; b) their desire to maintain and expand their autonomy and discretion; and c) their ongoing, direct, and complex relationship with clients (pp. 18-23). By virtue of their position—as defined by their degree of expertise, level of implementation discretion, and relative autonomy—street-level bureaucrats often possess the ability to thwart agency policies that they do not prefer (pp. 23-5).⁶²

In sum, an understanding of the nature of street-level bureaucracies enables us to question the assumption that there may be an intrinsic shared commitment to achieving agency goals between functionaries at various levels. The relationship between street-level bureaucrats and managers that Lipsky describes is characterized a) as a relationship that is, in large part, intrinsically conflictual, and b) a relationship of mutual dependence. It is a relationship complicated by the ability of street-level bureaucrats to resist agency pressures.

Without returning to the big debate (*see* Box 2) about whether the discretionary powers of street-level bureaucrats are a threat to democracy (*see* Lowi 1969; Linder and Peters, 1987) or an opportunity for adaptive policy redefinition (*see* Elmore, 1979; Palumbo and Harder, 1981),

this paper simply reaffirms Warwick's (1982: 183) observation that "implementer discretion is universal and inevitable" and:

...whatever the policy and whatever the formal structure of authority, implementers can advance or destroy a program. If they are suitably prepared and favorably motivated, they can mobilize the resources necessary to overcome seemingly insuperable obstacles; if they are dissatisfied with their jobs and unconvinced of the program's worth, they can sabotage a program even with the strictest system of controls. Indeed, more creative implementers can use bureaucratic regulations as one means of subversion, by working to rule or stalling action by referring procedural minutiae to their superiors for clearance.

A major purpose of implementation analysis, then, is to understand how implementer discretion and commitment combine to impact implementation and how this impact may be structured to enhance overall implementation effectiveness. In cases of low implementer commitment, a top-down approach might attempt to control discretion by either trying to change the standard operating procedures (context), designing more stringent evaluation routines within the policy (content), or influencing implementer disposition through the provision of greater resources (capacity) (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975: 475). However, it is important to remember that "the true test of commitment is not whether implementers execute a policy when their superiors force them to, but whether they carry out a policy when they have the option of not doing so" (Warwick 1982: 135).

Alternatively, a bottom-up strategy might attempt the exact opposite by viewing the commitment of the implementers in conjunction with signals from client coalitions as a basis for encouraging adaptive redesign of the policy at the street-level. In this case, too, the prescription would be to change content, capacity and institutional contexts but to do so in response to, rather than in retaliation to, implementer commitment. It might be argued that "when implementation consists essentially of controlling discretion, the effect is to reduce reliance on knowledge and skill at the delivery level and increase reliance on abstract, standardized solutions.... adaptive behaviors by street-level bureaucrats are never well understood by policymakers because they are viewed as illicit.... [and] one's view of implementation has to put a higher value on discretion than compliance" (Elmore, 1979: 610).

CAPACITY

On no other variable does the analytic literature on implementation seem as unanimous as on the issue of implementation capacity. It is, after all, intuitively obvious that a minimum condition for successful implementation is to have the requisite administrative ability... that is, the resources... that is, the capacity to implement it. However, this simple articulation of the 'capacity problem' is deceptive. Indeed, administrative capacity *is* necessary for effective implementation. However, providing the necessary resources is nowhere a simple matter; in fact, merely knowing *what* the 'necessary resources' are can be a non-trivial problem. More

importantly, it is a political, rather than a logistic, problem—like implementation itself, resource provision deals with questions of ‘who gets what, when, how, where, and from whom.’ The critical question, then, in understanding how capacity may influence implementation effectiveness is not simply one of ‘what capacity is required, where?’ but also of ‘how this capacity can be created and operationalized?’

Before exploring the above proposition, a note on definitions is warranted. Indeed, there is great unanimity on the importance of capacity—or rather ‘resources’—as a “crucial” variable. Roughly, half of the over 300 empirical studies surveyed by O’Toole (1986: 189) feature resources as a critical variable. The analytic literature surveyed for this paper identifies capacity as a key variable even more overwhelmingly. However, note that the focus of both streams of the literature on domestic implementation is on *administrative capacity*—or, more narrowly, on ‘resources’ (e.g. Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975; Edwards, 1980; Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983). However, the literature on the implementation of international assistance (see Fairman and Ross, 1994) and the emerging literature on implementing international environmental commitment (Keohane, et al., 1993) tend to define capacity much more broadly. Such notions of capacity are focused not simply on administrative resources but on much wider spectrum of institutional development, and ultimately on the “ability [of states] to govern and to influence society” (Andresen, et al. 1995).

This paper adopts the more focused definition of capacity as administrative resources. While sympathizing with the intent of the broader conception, we reject it as an explanatory variable for two important reasons. First, the wider, all-inclusive, conception is so broad as to be analytically unmanageable; it is likely to lead only to very general conclusions that risk ignoring, or missing, the intricacies of the issue—as, indeed, much of the literature on international ‘capacity building’ has. Second, and more importantly, the ability of government to influence society is what implementation is, arguably, all about. In our 5C protocol, then, the wider issues of creating broader governmental ability cannot be understood through the lens of a single variable, but through the interrelationships of all the five variables identified here.

This paper subscribes, therefore, to the narrower definition of capacity suggested by early scholars from the top-down school: “Successful implementation is also a function of the implementing organization’s capacity to do what it is expected to do. The ability to implement policies may be hindered by such factors as overworked and poorly trained staffs, insufficient information and financial resources, or impossible time constraints” (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975: 480). The most detailed discussion of this variable appears in Edwards (1980) who identifies four important types of administrative resources: a) size and skill levels of agency staff; b) knowledge about the substantive issue and access to compliance information for monitoring; c) mandated authority to provide incentives or to sanction behavior; and d) physical

facilities—e.g., buildings, supplies, technology, etc. Moreover, as Rein and Rabinovitz (1978: 329) point out, “we expect that the pattern of implementation will vary according to the nature of the resources required.”

While the first task in attempting to understand this variable is to catalog the level of administrative capacity mandated in the said policy, and available to the relevant agencies; the second, more important and much more difficult, task is to identify what types and levels of capacity are required at what points of the administrative hierarchy, in which relevant agencies, for effective implementation. This is where the problem moves from being one of assessing ‘capacity logistics’ to appreciating ‘capacity politics.’ As has already been suggested, this is not a trivial exercise.

To begin with, there is the dilemma of assessing capacity requirement. The most legitimate repository of such information are the implementing agencies themselves. However, these agencies have a vested interest in exaggerating this assessment. More importantly, they, too, have only limited information of the ‘real’ requirements, which can only become fully known once the process actually begins, and will often change as the implementation process proceeds. As such, not only will the initial administrative capacity be a function of what is mandated in the original policy, but for effective implementation the content may have to change to respond to new needs. However, the challenge to the implementation analyst is more than simply that of administrative capacity as a moving target. There are at least two level of bureaucratic politics to unravel.

The first is at the level of *intra-agency politics* where officials at various levels and sections of the same agency are likely to identify different capacity requirements. For example, those dealing with the technical aspects may place highly trained human resources at a premium, while others entrusted with service delivery might consider the number of field staff or physical facilities (e.g. vehicles) as more important. Moreover, middle- and bottom-level functionaries (including street-bureaucrats) are less likely to influence capacity politics and their needs, arguably the most critical to effective implementation, may often be sidelined, leading to less effectual implementation.

A second level of importance is that of *inter-agency politics* where different agencies may contend for resources in the same policy area, or for competing priorities. For example, family planning centers, basic health clinics, and population education programs may simultaneously have competitive and cooperative relationships (*see Context, above*) when they are simultaneously required to cooperate in implementing the larger population control policy while also competing for the same pot of scarce resources. Also, even if they are competing internally, they may also be colluding with each other to ensure that the funds in question are,

in fact, earmarked for population activities area and not for rival social sector programs. Both levels of bureaucratic politics are extremely important because agency survival, and therefore implementation effectiveness, may often hinge on the dynamic *balance of bureaucratic power* that results.⁶³

This complex web of intra- and inter agency capacity politics underscores the imperative to concentrate on the 5C schemata in its entirety. The link between content and capacity is obvious in that the two will essentially define (and redefine) each other. The link to the institutional context has also been traced above in that it is the two-way influence between institutional context and administrative capacity that determines the dynamic balance of bureaucratic power between relevant agencies which, in turn, will impact implementation effectiveness. Moreover, the standard operating procedures are likely to shape what form of capacity provision is most suited to which agency, just as the provision of certain forms of capacity and resources may themselves reshape the SOPs. Similarly, the fact that commitment can be ‘sweetened’ through additional capacity provision, also implies that the level of commitment for a said program will be a determinant of the level and type of capacity required. Finally, as shall be seen in the next section, the linkage with clients and coalitions, although less obvious, is equally critical. Not only can client support legitimize agency claims to administrative capacity-building but supportive coalitions—especially international institutions in the case of international regimes—can provide additional capacity resource and thereby influence the bureaucratic balance of power in important ways.

CLIENTS AND COALITIONS

Our discussion thus far has focused, almost entirely, on the governmental/bureaucratic mechanism for delivering policy. However, implementation scholarship, particularly of the bottom-up variety, has come to realize that the ultimate effectiveness of any implementation process depends equally on nonstate actors, particularly upon *target groups to whom policy is being delivered*—i.e., the clients. Stated most simply, clients can “speed, slow, stop or redirect implementation” (Warwick, 1982: 163). However, clients are not the only nonstate actors who impact implementation. Coalitions of interest groups, opinion leaders, and other outside actors who actively support or oppose a particular implementation process can be equally influential. As Rein and Rabinovitz (1978: 314) remind us, “a power shift among the different outside interest groups produces a corresponding shift in the implementation process.” Taken together, the support of clients and outside coalitions is our final critical variable. In fact, Elmore (1979: 610) considers the finding that implementation is affected, in some “critical sense,” by the formation of local coalitions of individuals affected by the policy as one of the “most robust” findings of implementation research.

A useful concept to invoke at this point is Rein and Rabinovitz's (1978: 308) identification of the *consensual imperative* "to do what can establish agreement among contending influential parties who have a stake in the outcome." Those who formulate policy and those who are entrusted with putting it into action have obvious stakes in implementation; our first four variables are designed to provide powerful descriptors of their interests and strategies in any given implementation episode. In introducing this fifth variable—i.e., clients and coalitions—we seek first to identify other key stakeholders and then proceed to understanding their interests and strategies in relationship to those of decisionmakers and implementers. It is the interplay (or negotiation) between various actors, their interests, and their strategies, that influences ultimate implementation effectiveness.

As with the other variables, the first task is one of cataloging—of determining the *potentially influential* clients and coalitions from the larger cast of characters in the implementation theater. The constellation of actors who are directly or indirectly affected by any implementation process is likely to be far larger than the set of key constituencies whose interests are impacted enough for them to have the desire, or the ability, to influence the implementation process in return. The danger of so limiting the scope of enquiry as to leave out key actors is both real and serious. However, being bogged down with so many 'minor' actors that any exploratory investigation becomes unmanageable is equally dangerous. It is important, then, to underscore the saliency of consciously seeking to identify key relevant stakeholders, as opposed to all identifiable actors.

Such stakeholders can be categorized into two, potentially but not necessarily, overlapping groups: clients and coalitions. Our conception of 'clients' is similar to that used by Lipsky (1980) and Warwick (1982) and implies all actors whose behavior is targeted by the implementation; i.e. those "who must change to meet the demands of the policy" (Smith, 1973: 204). By 'coalitions' we imply those interest groups whose individual behavior may not be affected, but who have sufficient motivations and ability to actively seek particular outcomes. We label them 'coalitions' because they are likely to operate as *de facto*, and sometimes formal, coalitions supporting particular outcomes, and it is useful to recognize both their specific interests and the potential allies they might attract for whatever particular outcomes they prefer.

It is important to identify not only the clients recognized by the said policy but also those not recognized. Very often, it is the later who, by virtue of not being recognized or catered for, have the greatest incentive to disrupt implementation; moreover, they can often do so with success since implementers are not expecting resistance from them. For example, early population programs in many developing countries only saw women of reproductive age as their clients. They failed to recognize, however, the impact such programs had on the livelihood of traditional midwives, who not only had the incentive but the ability to thwart the

implementation process; which they did to great effect in many cases.⁶⁴ Later programs consciously attempted addressing the interests of this group of actors by incorporating them as service providers; in many cases this converted them from being active opponents to active supporters of the programs. Also, Smith (1973: 204) lists three characteristics of the target group that might influence the strategies they employ: a) the degree of organization or institutionalization; b) leadership; and c) prior policy experience.

With regards to identifying interest-groups which may facilitate coalitions for particular outcomes the literature has little guidance to offer about potentially important interest groups, beyond the very general. However, a few points are worth noting. For example, in looking at developing countries Grindle (1980) and Migdal (1988) identify nonstate local leaders—including politicians, economic elites, and opinion leaders—as key players. In studying the implementation of environmental regulation in the United States and Western Europe, Downing and Hanf (1983b) similarly highlight the role of local political interests. They also highlight the important influence of those whose behavior may be changed by ‘successful’ implementation, as well as those whose behavior is impacted by ‘failed’ implementation. In the case of pollution control, then, the interests and strategies of the industries (including labor interests) being regulated are only as important as those of the groups being affected by the pollution. Other potentially important coalition partners, not identified in the literature, include nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and, in the case of international regimes, international institutions including regime secretariats, donor agencies, and the international epistemic community. The resources such actors can harness—financial, technological, informational, and even moral authority(as in the human rights regime)—can significantly tilt the balance of power between the relevant constellation of implementation players.

A more generalized formulation is suggested by Sabatier (1986) who bases his model on *advocacy coalitions* which, apart from agency officials, are composed of politicians, interest group leaders, and intellectuals who share a set of normative and causal beliefs on core policy issues.⁶⁵ Warwick (1982) provides a more thorough empirical analysis on the subject and his study on population policy implementation in eight developing countries leads him to focus on *local and national opinion leaders* as the key coalitions. Specifically on population issues, he finds that “herbalists, midwives, mullahs, and parish priests may have little else in common, but they are often the gatekeepers for family planning programs in rural communities.... family planning is also affected by persons with regional and national influence, including journalists, party leaders, elected officials, and intellectuals.” While the choice of specific actors will obviously depend on the specific implementation process, useful advice about the general web of influences can be derived:

Local leaders can provide national leaders with grist for controversy or for support... both local and national leaders may give voice to client fears, doubts, and apprehensions... thereby legitimizing debate

at all levels and confirming the validity of client concerns.... thus opinion leaders can affect client attitudes at all levels of the society—national, regional, and local. Local leaders usually have the greatest influence, mainly because they are known, trusted, and close to the clients.... National leaders may also have a crucial impact on the climate for implementation, but their impact is usually mediated through local contacts. Finally, there are often three-way interactions among clients, local leaders, and national leaders, many of which are roundabout but still potent in their impact. In the end client attitudes toward population programs must be understood in the total context of a society, with all of its crosscurrents and interdependencies of opinions, rather than in the narrow setting of personal preferences. (Warwick, 1982: 162)

Our focus on coalitions implies that we are not only interested in cataloging the interests and strategies of various stakeholders but of categorizing these actors along clusters of potentially allying interests. This can sometimes throw up some pretty unlikely partners. For example, in the recent international debate on population policies the two groups most opposed to contraceptive strategies have been religious leaders (both the Vatican and Muslim clerics) and feminists. The important point is that just because interests are similar does not imply that the strategies would be too. More importantly, while a simple unison of interests will not necessarily translate to a formal coalition, it may often have the same general effect on the prospects of implementation.

As with other variables, the makeup of clients and coalitions will influence, and be influenced by, the other four variables. As Warwick (1982: 189-90) reminds us: “The transactions most vital to implementation are those between the programs and the clients. No amount of success on other fronts can compensate for the rejection of a program by its intended clients.” However, he adds that, “a program’s treatment of its clients and client reaction to the program are interconnected, but not in any simple or deterministic fashion” (p. 176). This interconnection, in fact, passes through the maze that links all five variables in our 5C protocol. For example, as we have already seen, the clients and coalitions that the original framers of policy content recognize would influence their choice of policy goals, causal theory, and methods. However, once stated in the content, these are likely to spurn new supportive or opposed coalitions.

By similar token, the power of local leaders are likely to be as influenced by the institutional context of state governance, as the later is shaped by the local realities. This linkage is likely to be especially important in weak states (*see* Migdal, 1988). A lack of required capacity is likely to strengthen the hand of opposing clients and coalitions, but influential coalitions (e.g. international secretariats or donor agencies in the case of international regimes) can shift such a balance by providing additional capacity. With regards to commitment, the linkages are likely to be the strongest. For example, street-level bureaucrats are likely to be far more committed to implementing programs that elicit strong client support, than the ones which do not.

Hjern and Hull (1982: 112) highlight the fact that policy “follows the twists and turns of definition and displacement while implementation moves from originally set political goals to results on the ground.” The 5C protocol detailed above is proposed as a useful vehicle for making sense of these twists and turns. The five variables have been treated separately for heuristic purposes. As has been repeatedly highlighted in the exposition, all five are likely to act together—often simultaneously and synergetically—any change in one producing changes in the others. This interconnectedly of the variables creates both a challenge and an opportunity.

The challenge is to analytically appreciate the resulting complexity. Like so much of the literature on domestic implementation, we consider implementation to be intrinsically complex. As Kenneth Hanf (1982: 160) points out: “if the observed complexity of implementation situations is inherent in the conditions under which programmes are carried out, models must be developed which capture this reality.” We would add that although a search for parsimony is desirable, seeking to suppress complexity where it is, in fact, endemic will only give us false models. Having said that, although we expect all implementation to be dynamic and complex, not every episode of implementation is likely to be equally complex. Depending on particular situations some variables are likely to be more manifestly complex in some situations than in others.⁶⁶ Also, the set of variables proposed here is, in fact, more parsimonious than many alternative sets. Most importantly, it consciously sets out to define each variable in detail rather than introducing seemingly parsimonious black boxes. Even where the labels may seem all too familiar, the difference is in the level of detail: these may be seen as ‘deep descriptors’. The complexity is not as much in the breadth of the variables as in their depth. Unraveling that complexity, we claim, is imperative to unraveling implementation effectiveness.

It is here that the opportunity is introduced—it is the opportunity of *strategically* using the complex interlinkages between the five Cs to ‘fix’ the implementation game (*see* Bardach, 1977). Once an initial investment has been made in understanding the complex linkages at work, these can be strategically manipulated to create an ‘implementation environment’ conducive to effective implementation. For example, consider a situation where an internationally induced deforestation policy is not being implemented, despite supporting national legislation, because street-level implementers, say forest rangers, are not committed to it and are not fully enforcing its provisions. For someone sitting at the relevant international regime secretariat (a coalition actor) it is likely to be difficult to directly influence the commitment of the said forest rangers. However, the secretariat may be in a much better position to influence the capacity provision in the policy which in turn could influence

implementer commitment. The key question here may be to decide what type and level of capacity would be most likely to trigger a shift in implementer disposition; the argument of this paper has been that answers to questions like this cannot be arrived at without first delving into the complex web of actors, interests, and strategies defined by the 5C protocol.

It is in the space defined by such interlinkages between the variables that the negotiation, both explicit and tactic, between the various actors will take place. Where the interplay of contending interests, strategies, and power positions will ultimately define the effectiveness, or otherwise, of any specific implementation episode. If one accepts, as this paper does, Bardach's (1977: 278) characterization of implementation as a 'political game,' then "fixing the game is a job for a coalition of political partners with diverse but complementary resources." Grindle (1980: 12) adds:

Frequently, the goal of the actors will be in direct conflict with each other and the outcome of this conflict and consequently, of who gets what, will be determined by the strategies, resources, and power positions of each of the actors involved. What is implemented may thus be the result of a political calculus of interests and groups competing for scarce resources, the response of implementing officials, and the actions of political elites, all interacting within given institutional contexts. Analysis of the implementation of specific programs therefore may imply assessing the 'power capabilities' of the actors, their interests and the strategies for achieving them, and the characteristics of the regime in which they interact.

What the interlinked dynamic 5C protocol implies is that implementation cannot be seen as an activity to be planned and the carried out according to a carefully predetermined plan; rather, it is a process that can only, at the very best, be managed. Managing it, and steering it towards a more effective outcome, entails strategically 'fixing' those variables over which we have some direct or indirect influence so as to induce changes in the ones over which we do not have such influence. The defining variables—either in that they define the main stumbling block to effective implementation or in that they can be better influenced—will vary in each case. The strategic imperative is to identify which, amongst the five, are the defining variables and how we might best influence them to arrive at the desired results. In essence then, the management of implementation is akin to rewriting the music in the act of playing it. This paper makes no claim about this being an 'easy' thing to do. However, it does suggest that the payoff is worth the effort.


In closing, let us reiterate the task this paper set for itself: a) to review the literature on domestic policy implementation in general, and b) on the basis of the accumulated learning from implementation scholarship to identify critical explanatory variables that may help understand implementation processes on a variety of issues, in a variety of locales including industrialized and developing countries. Chapters #2 and #3 address the first assignment while Chapter #4 tackles the second, more ambitious, task.

It is also useful to mention at least one set of questions, out of many, that this paper did not attempt to address but which presents itself as the logical next step: To take the general schemata developed from our survey of the scholarship on domestic policy implementation and apply it specifically, and empirically, to international environmental commitments in both developing and industrialized country contexts. This would involve reassessing the five variables identified here in light of the accumulated wisdom of the scholarship on international regimes and to map the areas of commonalty and complementarity. More specifically, it will involve empirically exploring what, if any, unique features are added to, or exposed by, this framework when the focus is on particular international environmental issues. Part of this exercise is now in progress in the shape of a companion paper (by the author) that attempts using the variables identified here to specifically focus on the implementation of international environmental commitments in developing countries.

EXPLANATORY NOTES

- 1 A growing number of research initiatives are now focusing on the question directly or indirectly. These include projects on the Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments led by Eugene B. Skolnikoff and David G. Victor (at IIASA); on Social Learning in the Management of Global Environmental Risk led by William C. Clark; on International Law and Global Environmental Change led by Harold K. Jacobson and Edith Brown Weiss; on the Effectiveness of International Regimes led by Marc A. Levy and Oran R. Young; on the Effectiveness of International Resource and Environmental Regimes led by Steinar Andresen and Jørgen Wettestad; on the Domestic Bases of International Environmental Accords led by Kenneth Hanf and Arild Underdal; and on Compliance with International Environmental Accords led by Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes. For more on these initiatives see Young and von Moltke (1994).
- 2 An exception is found in Andresen, Skjærseth, and Wettestad (1995) which explicitly begins with a review of domestic implementation research. A draft of "Domesticating International Commitments: Linking National and International Decision-Making" by Kenneth Hanf and Arild Underdal (forthcoming; draft reviewed) probably goes the furthest in actually incorporating the lessons of domestic implementation research.
- 3 This is *not* a suggestion to discard the conception of the state as used in international relations, but only a plea that when it comes to understanding the state's response *at the domestic level*, it becomes imperative to adopt a more complex view. For example, 'state concern' for a particular issue is, as few serious scholars would doubt, a composite of the concerns of multiple actors that make up the many-headed monster we call the state. This paper merely suggests that understanding (and acknowledging) these subsystemic actors and

- their concerns is critical to making sense of domestic implementation of international policy.
- 4 Note that we draw a distinction between the domestic *implementation of* international commitments and *compliance with* the same (for more on this see Roginko, 1994; Chayes and Chayes, 1993). Also, a distinction needs to be maintained between the *international implementation of* international commitments and the *domestic implementation of* the same. International implementation would, for example, imply fulfillment of resource, technology, or information transfers *between* nations. These points, however, are not the subject of this paper but are dealt at length in a companion paper now in progress by the author which, using the framework developed here, focuses exclusively on why implementation of international environmental commitments is likely to be more problematic in developing countries.
 - 5 This theme, too, is not explored here but will be dealt with at length in the companion paper referred to in the previous note. One may add for background clarification, however, that this paper agrees entirely with Andresen et al. (1995) that the interactions between actors and institutions at three important levels—i.e. society, state and regime—will influence each other mutually when international environmental commitments are implemented. It is implicitly suggested in Chapter #4, that the cross-influences between society, state, and regime (see figure) can be accommodated in the 5C protocol suggested here.
 - 6 In keeping with the substance of this paper, one is tempted to add that we take a 'bottom-up' approach to the study of implementing international commitments a opposed to the 'top-down' perspective adopted by much of the existing literature.
 - 7 The reader should note that the references in the next three chapters are deliberately, and almost entirely, from the literature on domestic policy implementation. Arguably, since that is where the accumulated experience of actual implementation is, any understanding emanating from this scholarship is likely to be more legitimate and robust. Much of that literature, however, derives its empirical evidence from



- implementation of environmental policies in the United States and Western Europe (e.g., Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983; Downing and Hanf, 1983a; Goggin et al., 1990). Moreover, Warwick (1982) studies implementation of the international population regime in eight developing countries and is especially appropriate to our purpose not only because the issue area of population is most similar to that of the environment in its policy features but because it is amongst the most complex and difficult issue area for implementation.
- 8 Moreover, in demonstrating the generalizable quality of what has largely been 'domestic' research conducted in specific national settings, our claim of such research being of use to scholars of international policy is strengthened.
- 9 It is remarkable that one could potentially collapse these five variables into the "three C's" (concern, contractual environment, capacity) suggested by Keohane, Haas and Levy (1993), the three "explanatory perspectives" (willingness, ability, feasibility) proposed by Andresen, Skjærseth, and Wettestad (1995), or even into the four factors (characteristics of the activity involved, characteristics of the treaty, factors involving the country, the international environment) identified by Jacobson and Weiss (1994). However, as the discussion in Chapter #4 demonstrates, our five C's are decidedly different in their details: not only is the focus entirely domestic, but an attempt has been made to delve into the details of what each variable means in action, how it is influenced by the other variables, and how it is likely to influence them. In short, learning from the literature on domestic policy implementation both allows and necessitates 'opening' up and going 'deep' into the said variables.
- 10 Two years later Van Meter and Van Horn (1975: 449) observed that "at present we know relatively little about the process of policy implementation." It may, however, be argued that such comments signified a new set of scholars (political scientists) beginning to write about what had till then been the concern of administration science practitioners. For example, Kai Lee (1978: 225-6) in reviewing Bardach's book *The Implementation Game* (1977) argued that it was an improvement over "Pressman and Wildavsky's *Implementation*, the book that heralded the [implementation] fad," but chided the "Berkeley Know-Nothing School" for its failure to appreciate earlier work. He concluded that "nothing in the slender implementation literature of the 1970s so far improves noticeably upon the vast—if largely disappointing—output of students of public administration dating back six decades" (quoted in Williams, 1982: 15) [Pressman, Wildavsky, and Bardach were all associated with the public policy program at the University of California at Berkeley]. O'Toole (1986: 181), however, points out that although "a number of case studies and some early forays into theoretical analysis had been produced prior to Pressman and Wildavsky's attention-getting, suggestive study... but the volume, and in many respects the quality, of efforts increased markedly following the publication of their findings."
- 11 Earlier Bardach (1977: 36-7) defines another feature of implementation as being an "assembly process... Putting the machine together and making it run is, at one level, what we mean by the 'implementation process.'" Later he goes on to describe some of the most common implementation games, which include: a) the division of resources; b) the deflection of goals; c) the dilemmas of administration; and d) the dissipation of energies.
- 12 Doing so follows, and borrows, from earlier 'generational' classification of the literature (e.g., Nakamura and Smallwood, 1980; Lester et al., 1987; Goggin et al., 1990; Andresen et al., 1995). However, our choice of 'generational boundaries' do not entirely match earlier classifications.
- 13 A chronological arrangement of the literature is suggested by Lester et al. (1987) who trace the evolution of implementation research through four phases: case studies (1970-75), development of frameworks (1975-80), application of frameworks (1980-85), and synthesis and revision (1985-onwards). In a subsequent study the same authors discuss two generations of thinking on implementation which correspond to the second and third generations of this organization (Goggin et al., 1990)—This same generational formulation is followed by Andresen et al. (1995). Unlike the above set of authors, we take the 'classical' conception as our starting point (rather than the critique of that conception) because many politicians sitting in national and regional capitals, and many students of international politics, still seem wedded to classical assumptions about implementation.
- 14 This characterization is derived from Nakamura and Smallwood (1980) and reinforced by Warwick (1982).
- 15 David Hume, *Essays Moral, Political, and Literary*, ed. T.H. Green and T.H. Grose (London: Longmans 1882).
- 16 Max Weber, *Essays in Sociology*, ed. H.H. Gerth and C. W. Mills (New York: Oxford University Press 1946).

- 17 Woodrow Wilson, "The Study of Administration," *Political Science Quarterly* 2(June 1887).
- 18 Frederick W. Taylor, *The Principles of Scientific Management* (New York: Harper and Row, 1911).
- 19 This characterization is derived from Rein and Rabinovitz (1978).
- 20 This characterization is derived from Linder and Peters (1987).
- 21 Indeed, much the work in the third generation is also grounded in detailed case studies. However, it is different from second generation studies in its strong tilt towards either testing or trying to develop analytic explanations of the implementation process.
- 22 In his wide-ranging survey of implementation studies, O'Toole (1986: 200-1) goes on to summarize the key prescriptive advice of the top-down approach and the bottom-upper's critique of why it is inappropriate: "[The top-down multi-actor implementation literature suggests that:] To maximize the probability of implementation success, from the standpoint of the center, one should (1) design policies to keep the degree of required behavioral change low; (2) simplify the structure of implementation and minimize the number of actors; (3) seek more consideration of the problems of implementation during the initial stages of policy formulation; and (4) take care to leave the responsibilities of implementation among units sympathetic to the policy.... Proponents of bottom-up perspective have offered several criticisms of these and related suggestions. Such efforts at central control, it is remarked, direct attention to variables that are difficult or impossible to manipulate; ignore the necessity for and productive effects of conflict, negotiation, and politics during implementation; neglect several of the important participants in the implementation process; are ill-tuned to many policy problems that can only be addressed through widespread discretion, local presence, and adaptive implementation mode; and attempt to perform the impossible: decide all the important questions at the outset (thus ignoring the leaning that must perforce take place as policy problems are actually tackled)."
- 23 This statement was, however, made very much in support of the bottom-up approach which, Hanf (1982: 170) implies, begins from the bottom but does not necessarily focus on the bottom and is essentially "agnostic" about who the relevant actors are: "It starts from programme outputs and works its way causally backwards to uncover the full range of actors who in one way or another contributed to those outputs. It assumes neither a superior nor inferior role for the mandated organizations—nor for any other actors. It simply asks empirically who was involved." As opposed to this, he suggests, that the top-down approach "presumes" that actors and agencies mandated in the programmatic statements are of principal importance.
- 24 The use of this, most fitting, epigram is borrowed from Aye (1994: 199).
- 25 A much more exhaustive exploration is available in O'Toole (1986) who surveys over 300 implementation studies (including case studies) and lists over 100 according to their key variables and prescriptions.
- 26 Although, for practical reasons, we narrow our focus here to research that explicitly deals with implementation *per se* and concentrates on model development, it is recognized that other streams of the literature are also relevant to understanding implementation. Students of implementation who seek a broader understanding of the subject should also find interest and insight in the broader literature on policy processes, public administration, bureaucracies, organizational studies, institutionalism, the principal-agent problem, and related issues (*see especially*, Cohen, March and Olson, 1972; Downs, 1967; Durant et al., 1986; Etzioni, 1961; Hirschman, 1967; Kingdon, 1984; Majone, 1988; March and Olson, 1989; Perrow, 1986; Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1988; Schultze, 1977; Stone, 1988; Truman, 1953; Wilson, 1989).
- 27 This chapter is neither designed as a comprehensive review of the field nor a detailed critique of the models discussed. Instead, its purpose is to articulate my understanding of the debates that have shaped the literature on domestic policy implementation, which in turn influence the synthesis offered by this paper in the next chapter.
- 28 Lowi's influential work (1964, 1972) on the importance of the nature of policy posed important challenges to the typical perspectives on the subject and included the suggestion that "policies determine politics."
- 29 Elmore (1978) does not claim that these are the *only* four models. Also, he acknowledges that he has "cribbed the idea of alternative organizational models" directly from Graham Allison's (1971) acclaimed study of the Cuban missile crisis.
- 30 Note how different this is from Hume's view quoted earlier: "So great is the force of laws and of particular forms of government, and so little dependence have they on the humors and tempers of men, that consequences almost as general and certain may sometimes be deduced from them as any which the mathematical sciences afford us."

- 31 This assessment is shared by Sabatier (1986). These West European scholars and their colleagues—including Chris Hull, Peter Knoepfel, David Porter, Fritz Scharpf, and Helmut Weidner—were, at various times, associated with the International Institute of Management at the Science Center in Berlin and collaborated on a number of important papers on the analytic development and empirical application of the bottom-up approach to studying implementation.
- 32 Without even including the research done by scholars of, or published in, developing countries the volume and breadth of studies that can be broadly classified as dealing with policy implementation in developing countries that have been published in and accessible to U.S. and European scholars is immense. To get a picture of the breadth of this literature (much of which is case oriented rather than analytic in a model-building sense) see the references cited in Riggs (1964), Grindle (1980a; 1980b), Warwick (1982), Cheema and Rondinelli (1983), Migdal (1988) and Ayee (1994).
- 33 Moreover, the type of analytic models we have discussed in this paper are already at an abstracted and generalized level and already include notes of caution about adapting them to local and issue conditions.
- 34 See, for example, the references cited in Riggs (1964), Grindle (1980a; 1980b), Warwick (1982), chapters in Cheema and Rondinelli (1983), Migdal (1988) and Ayee (1994) in comparison to those cited in the works discussed above.
- 35 However, the *practice* of program implementation design (by government agencies) tends to be much more in the ‘central control’ tradition in most developing countries. Since much of the literature on implementation in developing countries is, in fact, a critique of why such centrally controlled (top-down) implementation has *not* worked, it tends to highlight a bottom-up approach to the issue and suggests the prevalence of top-down practice as a reason for failed implementation efforts.
- 36 Ayee (1994: 2) makes an important observation in this regards in pointing out that in developing countries there is a much larger “concentration of political activity on the implementation process” which implies that “delayed politics is a major feature of the implementation process in developing countries.” In building on earlier work by Riggs (1964), Ayee (1994: 2) explains that “while in the developed countries much political activity is focused on the input stage of the policy process, in the developing countries a large portion of individual and collective demandmaking, the representation of interests, and the emergence and resolution of conflict occur at the output stage.”
- 37 Although a defined international treaty was not the motivation, the domestic policies Warwick (1982) studies can be considered to have been all triggered by the broad ‘population regime’ established by the 1974 World Population Conference. His focus is explicitly on the nexus of the international, domestic, and local politics. He focuses on the role of intergovernmental and international nongovernmental organizations in domestic implementation and concludes that “the possibility, shape, vigor, and results of population programs are organically related to a country’s social and political environment” (Warwick, 1982: ix).
- 38 Although he does not refer to Smith (1973), note that the concept of ‘transaction’ is central to both models, although there are some differences in how the two define it.
- 39 Migdal (1988) cites Anthony Downs (1967: 134).
- 40 This, *framework-building* exercise, is much less ambitious than other *theory-building* efforts in that it does not pretend to be predictive in any but the most general sense. It does, however, claim to be explanatory in that it is argued that the five broad variables identified can provide a useful framework within which to begin studying the effectiveness of any implementation process. The claim is that implementation explanations will be found in the area bounded by these five variables. *Which* variable is *how* important under *what* conditions and *when* remains the theory building question that may only be answered through focused empirical research designed to answer this question. However—given the multiple linkages between the variables (at least 20)—parsimony will require a level of simplification in the proposed hypotheses which is incompatible with the importance of accommodating the complexity inherent to most implementation processes and therefore loses whatever predictive charm it might otherwise have.
- 41 Pressman and Wildavsky’s (1973: xiii-xvii) brave (and eloquent) attempt to disentangle the many meanings of the word and its many popular useages is one of the few attempts to do so and reading their discussion on this issue is highly recommended.
- 42 In most real situations a little of all variants will happen. That is, some steps will not be followed, some will be followed, and yet others will be transformed in the act of following them. Much of implementation research is disentangling and explaining these differences—not only what happens, but why.

- 43 This implies that in reality there are "various types and degrees of implementation success or failure" (Goggin, 1986: 331). That is, some activities may be 'successfully' implemented while others are not. Equally, time plays a critical role in the study of implementation. The cut-off point of where an implementation process is evaluated for its effectiveness can spell the difference between the verdict being a 'success' or a 'failure'.
- 44 That the policy process is iterative and passes through phases of formulation, implementation, and reformulation is generally acknowledged by top-down and bottom-up scholars alike. For top-downers, the study of implementation is the linear leg of the larger cycle which begins once an authoritative policy has been formulated and ends with an evaluation of how far the stated statutory goals have been accomplished. Under a fundamentalist bottom-up view, the study of implementation would also begin with the stated policy intent but end with how implementers at the 'bottom' (re-) formulate it in the act of putting it into practice. In pure top-down terms, then, reformulation would happen at the 'top' in response to evaluation while in pure bottom-up terms it would happen at the 'bottom' in the process of putting policy to practice. More recent developments in the literature have recognized that the two approaches are essentially two different levels of analysis and that both are important to the study of implementation (see Sabatier, 1986; Goggin et al., 1990).
- 45 'Accommodation' of interests does not imply that all interests are 'met.' For example, if those at the 'bottom' feel exceptionally strongly against a certain policy that those at the 'top' are not sufficiently committed to, then accommodation of interests may just mean that the top would ignore non-compliance at the bottom. However, if the interests of the top are very strongly aligned to the said policy, then it may impose penalties and constraints that are sufficiently strong to overcome non-compliance. Alternatively, those at the top may provide incentives or inducements to overcome the indisposition of those at the bottom. In all cases 'accommodation' is not only a function of the interests of the various actors but of how strongly those interests are held.
- 46 In introducing five broad explanatory variables and then highlighting the interconnectedness of all with each other, this organization of the 5C protocol is obviously open to criticism of losing on parsimony. Furthermore, in thinking about using these variables for empirical research the issue of what the dependent variable might be or whether all these variables are truly and completely interlinked crops up as very practical concerns. Neither of these criticisms is trivial. However, it is argued that in specific cases some variables would, in fact, be less important than others but the judgment of which variables are the most critical to any particular implementation episode should be made at the case level rather than at this general stage. At the level of identifying key general variables, our set of five explanatory variables is comparatively more parsimonious than the long laundry lists that have been thrown up by other models discussed earlier. In the discussion that follows, the variables are (by necessity) described in all their manifest complexity so as to include their maximum possible breadth. However, this does not imply that each variable would be present in its entire breadth in each case of implementation that may be studied. The very first step in using any broad list of this nature must be defining the specific content of the said variables in the particular case being studied. It is this definition which will highlight the most important variables and, more significantly, the most important linkages between variables amongst all possible linkages.
- 47 O'Toole's (1986: 203) sixth variable (timing) is also considered critical in this paper's understanding of implementation but is covered in our understanding of how implementation operates (previous section) rather than how it is influenced (this and following sections).
- 48 In most cases, all five variables identified here are discussed in one form or the other by the majority of the scholars whose works have been surveyed. However, for the purpose of this table only the variables that these authors consider the most critical are highlighted.
- 49 Regarding the distinction between distributive and redistributive policies, Lowi acknowledges that in the very long run all governmental decisions either redistribute or threaten to redistribute resources. But in the short run some decisions can be made involving resources already on hand (e.g. public land, franchises, tariff privileges), and in these cases, the participants obviously bear a quite distinctive relation to one another.
- 50 For example, Hargrove (1983) employs Lowi's classification to develop a 'middle range theory' to propose hypotheses about the three types of policy content.
- 51 These are also important for the purpose of evaluating implementation effectiveness.
- 52 For more on the international population regime set by these conferences see Najam (1994a; 1994b; 1995).
- 53 This example is chosen because a) it is an international issue, b) it is relevant of

- developing countries; and c) it is one of the most difficult policy areas. It allows us, therefore, to highlight our claim to universality. It is implied that the 5C protocol would be equally applicable if, say, the issue was one of domestic taxation policy in an industrialized country.
- 54 The chapters in *Interorganizational Policy Making* (Hanf and Scharpf, 1978) and *International Comparisons in Implementing Pollution Laws* (Downing and Hanf, 1983) are a powerful case-demonstration of the value of applying such an 'organizational network approach' to contextualizing policy implementation.
- 55 I owe this insight into the importance of standard operating principles to my correspondence with G. Kristin Rosendal of the Fridtjof Nansens Institut, Norway and having read the draft of her doctoral study, "Towards an Analytical Framework for the Study of International Environmental Agreements in Less Developed Countries."
- 56 The social, economic, political and legal differences are important not only in comparing implementation in different countries but, as Goggin et al.'s (1990) work demonstrates, between different political units within the same country.
- 57 Arguably, in the case of international commitments the commitment to, and legitimacy of, a policy may be even more in question because not only might street-level bureaucrats consider it an unjustified imposition, but relevant agencies (and even national decision-makers) might harbor the same sense of policy illegitimacy (especially if they view it as the imposition of outside preferences) and therefore not pursue the goals as vigorously.
- 58 David G. Victor (personal communication) suggests that a related concept to commitment, and possibly a 6th 'C' should be control within the bureaucratic complex. Especially as it relates to authoritarian regimes where the level of control enjoyed by those at the top of the hierarchy might, in fact, overwhelm whatever commitment street-level bureaucrats may or may not have towards particular policies. Barrett and Fudge (1981), in fact, suggest such an explanatory focus in their focus on 'control and coordination.' Migdal (1988) also points toward the importance of control over bureaucrats—in fact, as does Lipsky (1980). The issue of bureaucratic, especially authoritarian, control is considered important by this paper but is included within the 'context' variable rather than as a separate variable.
- 59 Lipsky's study focuses on domestic policy implementation in the United States and his examples of street-level bureaucracies include schools, police and welfare departments, lower courts, and other "agencies whose workers interact with and have wide discretion over the dispensation of benefits or allocation of public sanctions" (p. xi). His analysis, however, is applicable—in fact, even more so—to street-level bureaucrats in developing countries, who operate under similar decentralized circumstances of high discretion, low oversight, minimum remuneration, and maximum contact with client groups, especially in the implementation of many environmental issues.
- 60 Lipsky (1980: 14, 16) stresses that "this is not to say that street-level workers are unrestrained by rules, regulations, and directives from above, or by the norms and practices of their occupational group" and that "workers for the most part accept the legitimacy of the formal structure of authority, and they are not in a position to dissent successfully." However, he argues that although both 'discretion' and 'autonomy' are relative concepts and although the said functionaries operate within the bureaucratic boundaries of their agency, street-level bureaucrats, by virtue of the mandate of their positions, exercise relatively higher orders of discretion and autonomy within their agencies than functionaries at the same levels in agencies that cannot be described as street-level bureaucracies.
- 61 The observation that implementors may view certain policies unfavorably and act to circumvent them is also fairly common in the literature. For example, Edwards and Sharkansky (1978: 308) point out that "Not only must implementors know what to do and have the capability to do it, they must also *desire* to carry out a policy if implementation is to proceed effectively" (*emphasis added*). Like Lipsky, they consider implementor disposition important because "those who implement policies are in many ways independent of their nominal superiors... [and] independence means discretion." This discretion, they point out, will be exercised where the implementor's judgment of a said policy differs from that of the decision-makers. In such cases, implementors may selectively interpret instructions, slippage may increase because implementors feel uncomfortable with a particular policy, or implementors are likely to feel that they know best about a policy area and to purposively oppose the implementation of policies they consider inappropriate. While most top-down scholars consider such use of discretion as examples of mal-implementation, many bottom-uppers view them as conscious policy-reformulation.

- 62 Also, agencies and managers are themselves dependent on street-level subordinates—and their sanctioned exercise of discretion and autonomy—in demonstrating their own competence.
- 63 Although the focus of the discussion has been entirely on administrative capacity of governmental agencies, the same applies to the capacities of nongovernmental agencies that may be responsible for policy implementation. Moreover, in a growing number of environmental policies NGOs are being tapped both as the actual implementers of policy and the providers of additional capacity to governmental agencies. This is likely to add a third level where capacity politics may become important. Some discussion on this issue is included in the following section.
- 64 Warwick (1982: 154-6) discusses the neglect of traditional midwives in some detail but treats them as opinion leaders rather than clients. However, in our somewhat broader definition of clients we would see these midwives as clients since their behavior was being actually affected.
- 65 Note the similarity between Sabatier's (1986) last category and what Peter Haas (1989) refers to as 'epistemic communities' in his work on international environmental regime formulation.
- 66 A possible next step in this research may be to broadly classify implementation processes by the level of expected complexity of particular variables. That, however, requires a level of systematic empirical evidence not yet available.

REFERENCES CITED

- ALEXANDER, ERNEST R. 1982. "Implementation: Does a Literature Add up to a Theory?" *Journal of American Planning Association* 48(1): 132-5.
- ALEXANDER, ERNEST R. 1985. "From Idea to Action: Notes for a Contingency Theory of the Policy Implementation Process." *Administration and Society* 16(4): 403-26.
- ALLISON, GRAHAM T. 1971. *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Boston: Little, Brown and Co.
- ALTSHULER, ALAN A. 1988. "A Comment on 'Groping Along.'" *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 7(4): 664-7.
- ANDRESEN, STEINAR; JON BIRGER SKJÆRSETH; AND JØRGEN WETTESTAD. 1995. "Regime, the State and Society—Analyzing the Implementation of International Environmental Commitments: A Plea for the Semi-Complex Rational Actor." IIASA Working Paper WP-95-43. Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
- AYEE, JOSEPH R. A. 1994. *An Anatomy of Public Policy Implementation: The Case of Decentralization in Ghana*. Sydney: Avebury.
- BARDACH, EUGENE. 1977. *The Implementation Game: What Happens After a Bill Becomes a Law*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- BARRETT, SUSAN AND COLIN FUDGE. 1981. "Examining the Policy-Action Relationship." In *Policy and Action: Essays on the Implementation of Public Policy* edited by Susan Barrett and Colin Fudge. Pages 3-32. London: Methuen.
- BEHN, ROBERT D. 1988. "Management by Groping Along." *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 7(4): 643-63.
- BERMAN, PAUL AND MILBREY W. MCLAUGHLIN. 1977. *Federal Programs Supporting Educational Change. Volume VII: Factors Affecting Implementation and Continuation*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.
- BERMAN, PAUL. 1978. "The Study of Macro- and Micro-Implementation." *Public Policy* 26(2): 157-84.
- BERMAN, PAUL. 1980. "Thinking about Programmed and Adaptive Implementation: Matching Strategies to Situations." In *Why Policies Succeed or Fail* edited by Helen M. Ingram and Dean E. Mann. Pages 205-27. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
- BISH, ROBERT. 1978. "Intergovernmental Relations in the United States: Some Concepts and Implications from a Public Choice Perspective." In *Interorganizational Policy Making: Limits to Coordination and Central Control* edited by Kenneth Hanf and Fritz W. Scharpf. Pages 19-36. London: Sage Publications.
- BURKE, JOHN P. 1987. "A Prescriptive View of the Implementation Process: When Should Bureaucrats Exercise Discretion?" *Policy Studies Review* 7(1): 217-31.
- CHAYES, ABRAM AND ANTONIA CHAYES. 1993. "On Compliance." *International Organization* 47(2): 175-205.
- CHEEMA, G. SHABBIR AND DENNIS A. RONDINELLI (editors). 1983. *Decentralization and Development: Policy Implementation in Developing Countries*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
- COHEN, MICHAEL; JAMES MARCH; AND JOHAN OLSEN. 1972. "A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice." *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 17: 1-25.
- DELEON, PETER. 1994. "Reinventing the Policy Sciences: Three Steps Back to the Future." *Policy Sciences* 27(1): 77-95.

- DERTHICK, MARTHA. 1972. *New Towns In-Town*. Washington DC: Urban Institute.
- DOLBEARE, KENNETH M. 1974. "The Impact of Public Policy." In *Political Science Annual: An International Review, Volume Five* edited by Cornelius P. Cotter. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
- DOWNING, PAUL B. AND KENNETH HANF (Editors). 1983a. *International Comparisons in Implementing Pollution Laws*. Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff Publishing.
- DOWNING, PAUL B. AND KENNETH HANF. 1983b. "Modeling Environmental Regulation." In *International Comparisons in Implementing Pollution Laws*. Pages 318-34. Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff Publishing.
- DOWNS, ANTHONY. 1967. *Inside Bureaucracy*. Boston: Little, Brown, & Co.
- DURANT, ROBERT ET AL. 1986. "From Complacency to Compliance: Towards a Theory of Intergovernmental Regulation." *Public Administration Review*, 17(4): 433-59.
- EDWARDS III, GEORGE C. 1980. *Implementing Public Policy*. Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- EDWARDS III, GEORGE C. AND IRA SHARKANSKY. 1978. *The Policy Predicament: Making and Implementing Public Policy*. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Co.
- ELMORE, RICHARD F. 1978. "Organizational Models of Social Program Implementation." *Public Policy* 26(2): 185-228.
- ELMORE, RICHARD F. 1979. "Backward Mapping: Implementation Research and Policy Decisions." *Political Science Quarterly* 94(4): 601-16.
- ELMORE, RICHARD F. 1985. "Forward and Backward Mapping: Reversible Logic in the Analysis of Public Policy." In *Policy Implementation in Federal and Unitary Systems: Questions of Analysis and Design* edited by Kenneth Hanf and Theo A. J. Toonen. Pages 33-70. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff.
- ELMORE, RICHARD F. 1987. "Instruments and Strategy in Public Policy." *Policy Studies Review* 7(1): 174-86.
- ETZIONI, AMITAI. 1961. *A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations*. New York: Free Press.
- ETZIONI, AMITAI. 1964. *Modern Organizations*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- FAIRMAN, DAVID AND MICHAEL ROSS. 1994. "International Aid for the Environment: Lessons from Economic Development Assistance." Working Paper Series No. 94-4. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Center for International Affairs.
- FUDGE, COLIN AND SUSAN BARRETT. 1981. "Reconstructing the Field of Analysis." In *Policy and Action: Essays on the Implementation of Public Policy* edited by Susan Barrett and Colin Fudge. Pages 249-78. London: Methuen.
- GOGGIN, MALCOLM L. 1986. "The 'too few cases/too many variable' problem in implementation research." *Western Political Quarterly* 38: 328-347.
- GOGGIN, MALCOLM L.; ANN O'M. BOWMAN; JAMES P. LESTER; AND LAURENCE J. O'TOOLE, JR. 1990. *Implementation Theory and Practice: Toward a Third Generation*. Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman & Co.
- GRINDLE, MERILEE S. 1980a. "Policy Content and Context in Implementation." In *Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World* edited by Merilee S. Grindle. Pages 3-34. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- GRINDLE, MERILEE S. 1980b. "The Implementor: Political Constraints on Rural Development in Mexico." In *Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World* edited by Merilee S. Grindle. Pages 197-223. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

- HAAS, PETER M. 1989. "Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control." *International Organizations* 43(3): 377-403.
- HANF, KENNETH AND ARILD UNDERDAL. *Forthcoming*. "Domesticating International Commitments: Linking National and International Decision-Making." *Forthcoming in The International Politics of Environmental Management* edited by Arild Underdal. Kluwer Academic Publishers, for the European Science Foundation.
- HANF, KENNETH AND FRITZ W. SCHARPF (editors). 1978. *Interorganizational Policy Making: Limits to Coordination and Central Control*. London: Sage Publications.
- HANF, KENNETH AND THEO A. J. TOONEN (editors). 1985. *Policy Implementation in Federal and Unitary Systems: Questions of Analysis and Design*. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff.
- HANF, KENNETH. 1978. "Introduction." In *Interorganizational Policy Making: Limits to Coordination and Central Control* edited by Kenneth Hanf and Fritz W. Scharpf. Pages 1-15. London: Sage Publications.
- HANF, KENNETH. 1982. "Regulatory Structures: Enforcement as Implementation." *European Journal of Political Research* 10(June): 159-72.
- HARGROVE, ERWIN C. 1975. *The Missing Link: The Study of the Implementation of Social Policy*. Washington DC: Urban Institute.
- HARGROVE, ERWIN C. 1983. "The Search for Implementation Theory." In *What Role for Government? Lessons from Policy Research* edited by Richard J. Zeckhauser and Derek Leebaert. Durham, N.C.: Duke University.
- HIRSCHMAN, ALBERT O. 1967. *Development Projects Observed*. Washington DC: Brookings.
- HJERN, BENNY AND CHRIS HULL. 1982. "Implementation Research as Empirical Constitutionalism." *European Journal of Political Research* 10(June): 105-115.
- HJERN, BENNY AND DAVID O. PORTER. 1981. "Implementation Structures: A New Unit of Administrative Analysis." *Organizational Studies* 2: 211-27.
- HJERN, BENNY. 1982. "Implementation Research—The Link Gone Missing." *Journal of Public Policy* 2(3): 301-8.
- JACOBSON, HAROLD K. AND EDITH BROWN WEISS. 1994. "Improving Compliance with International Environmental Accords: A Preliminary Report." Presented at the Harvard-MIT Joint Seminar on International Environmental Institutions, 17 November 1994.
- KAUFMAN, HERBERT. 1960. *The Forest Ranger*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- KAUFMAN, HERBERT. 1973. *Administrative Feedback*. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution.
- KEOHANE, ROBERT O., PETER M. HAAS, AND MARC A. LEVY. 1993. "The Effectiveness of International Environmental Institutions." In *Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection* edited by Peter M. Haas, Robert O. Keohane, and Marc A. Levy. Pages 3-24. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- KINGDON, JOHN. 1984. *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*. New York: Harper Collins.
- KNOEPFEL, PETER AND HELMUT WEIDNER. 1982. "A Conceptual Framework for Studying Implementation." In *The Implementation of Pollution Control Programs* edited by Paul Downing and Kenneth Hanf. Tallahassee: Policy Sciences Program.
- LEE, KAI. 1978. "Review on Eugene Bardach's 'The Implementation Game.'" *Policy Sciences* 10(4): 225-26.

- LESTER, JAMES P., ANN O'M. BOWMAN, MALCOLM L. GOGGIN, LAURENCE J. O'TOOLE, JR. 1987. "Public Policy Implementation: Evolution of the Field and Agenda for Future Research." *Policy Studies Review* 7(1): 200-16.
- LINDBLOM, CHARLES E. 1959. "The Science of Muddling Through." *Public Administration Review* 19(1): 79-88.
- LINDER, STEPHAN H. AND B. GUY PETERS. 1987. "A Design Perspective on Policy Implementation: The Fallacies of Misplaced Prescription." *Policy Studies Review* 6(3): 459-75.
- LIPSKY, MICHAEL. 1978. "Standing the Study of Public Policy Implementation on Its Head." In *American Politics and Public Policy* edited by Walter Dean Burnham and Martha Wagner Weinberg. Pages 391-402. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- LIPSKY, MICHAEL. 1980. *Street-Level Bureaucracy*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- LOWI, THEODORE J. 1964. "American Business and Public Policy, Case Studies and Political Theory." *World Politics* 16: 677-715.
- LOWI, THEODORE J. 1969. *The End of Liberalism*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- LOWI, THEODORE J. 1972. "Four Systems of Policy, Politics, and Choice." *Public Administration Review* 32: 298-310.
- MAJONE, GIANDOMENICO AND AARON WILDAVSKY. 1978. "Implementation as Evolution." In *Policy Studies Review Annual* edited by Howard Freeman. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
- MAJONE, GIANDOMENICO. 1988. *Evidence, Argument and Persuasion: Analysis and the Policy Process*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- MARCH, JAMES AND JOHAN OLSEN. 1989. *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics*. London: Macmillan.
- MAZMANIAN, DANIEL A. AND PAUL A. SABATIER. 1981. "Introduction." In *Effective Policy Implementation* edited by Daniel A. Mazmanian and Paul A. Sabatier. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
- MAZMANIAN, DANIEL A. AND PAUL A. SABATIER. 1983. *Implementation and Public Policy*. Chicago: Scott Foresman & Co.
- MIGDAL, JOEL S. 1988. *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- MITNICK, BARRY M. AND ROBERT W. BACKOFF. 1984. "The Incentive Relation in Implementation." In *Public Policy Implementation* edited by George C. Edwards, III. Pages 59-122. Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press.
- MOYNIHAN, DANIEL PATRICK. 1970. *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding*. New York: Free Press.
- NAJAM, ADIL. 1994a. "United Nations Population Conferences: The International Politics of Population." Mimeo.
- NAJAM, ADIL. 1994b. "Predictions for Cairo: A Reaffirmation, a Reversal, a Realignment, and a Refusal." *Environmental Conservation*, 21(2): 105-9
- NAJAM, ADIL. 1995 (forthcoming). "A Developing Countries' Perspective on Population, Environment, and Development." *Population Research and Policy Review*.
- NAKAMURA, ROBERT T. AND FRANK SMALLWOOD. 1980. *The Politics of Policy Implementation*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

- O'TOOLE, LAURENCE J. JR. AND ROBERT S. MOUNTJOY. 1984. "Interorganizational Policy Implementation: A Theoretical Perspective." *Public Administration Review* 44(6): 491-503.
- O'TOOLE, LAURENCE J., JR. 1986. "Policy Recommendations for Multi-Actor Implementation: An Assessment of the Field." *Journal of Public Policy* 6(2): 181-210.
- PALUMBO, DENNIS J. AND MARVIN A. HARDER. 1981. "Introduction." In *Implementing Public Policy* edited by Dennis J. Palumbo and Marvin A. Harder. Pages ix-xvi. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
- PERROW, CHARLES. 1986. *Complex Organizations: A Critical Theory* (third edition). New York: Random House.
- PRATT, JOHN AND RICHARD ZECKHAUSER (editors). 1988. *Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business*. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
- PRESSMAN, JEFFREY L. AND AARON WILDAVSKY. 1973. *Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington are Dashed in Oakland; or Why It's Amazing that Federal Programs Work At All*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- PUTNAM, ROBERT D. 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games." *International Organization* 42(3): 427-60.
- REIN, MARTIN AND FRANCINE F. RABINOVITZ. 1978. "Implementation: A Theoretical Perspective." In *American Politics and Public Policy* edited by Walter Dean Burnham and Martha Wagner Weinberg. Pages 307-35. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- RIGGS, FRED W. 1964. *Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.
- RIPLEY, RANDALL B. AND GRACE A. FRANKLIN. 1982. *Bureaucracy and Policy Implementation*. Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press.
- ROGINKO, ALEXEI. 1994. "Domestic Compliance with International Environmental Agreements: A Review of Current Literature." IIASA Working Paper WP-94-128. Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
- SABATIER, PAUL A. 1986. "Top-down and Bottom-up Approaches to Implementation Research: A Critical Analysis and A Suggested Synthesis." *Journal of Public Policy* 6(1): 21-48.
- SABATIER, PAUL A. AND KENNETH HANF. 1985. "Policy Learning in Interorganizational Structures." In *Policy Implementation in Federal and Unitary Systems: Questions of Analysis and Design* edited by Kenneth Hanf and Theo A. J. Toonen. Pages 301-33. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff.
- SCHARPF, FRITZ W. 1978. "Interorganizational Policy Studies: Issues, Concepts and Perspectives." In *Interorganizational Policy Making: Limits to Coordination and Central Control* edited by Kenneth Hanf and Fritz W. Scharpf. Pages 345-70. London: Sage Publications.
- SCHULTZE, CHARLES L. 1977. *The Public Use of Private Interest*. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution .
- SIMON, HERBERT A. 1947. *Administrative Behavior*. New York: Macmillan.
- SMITH, THOMAS B. 1973. "The Policy Implementation Process." *Policy Sciences* 4(3): 197-209.
- STONE, DEBORAH A. 1988. *Policy Paradox and Political Reason*. Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman and Co.
- TRUMAN, DAVID. 1953. *The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion*. New York: Knopf.

- VAN METER, DONALD S. AND CARL E. VAN HORN. 1975. "The Policy Implementation Process." *Administration and Society* 6(4): 445-88.
- WARWICK, DONALD P. 1982. *Bitter Pills: Population Policies and their Implementation in Eight Developing Countries*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- WILDAVSKY, AARON. 1979. "Implementation in Context." *Implementation* edited by Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky (second edition). pages 163-76. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- WILLIAMS, WALTER. 1975. "Editor's Comments: Special Issue on Implementation." *Policy Analysis* 1(3): 458.
- WILLIAMS, WALTER. 1982. "The Study of Implementation: An Overview." In *Studying Implementation: Methodological and Administrative Issues*, Walter Williams et al. Pages 1-17. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.
- WILSON, JAMES Q. 1967. "The Bureaucracy Problem." *Public Interest* 6(Winter): 3-9.
- WILSON, JAMES Q. 1989. *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It*. New York: Basic Books.
- WITTRICK, BJÖRN AND PETER DELEON. 1986. "Policy as a Moving Target: A Call for Conceptual Realism." *Policy Studies Review* 6(1): 44-60.
- YOUNG, ORAN R. AND KONRAD VON MOLTKE. 1994. "The Consequences of International Environmental Regimes: Report from the Barcelona Workshop." *International Environmental Affairs* 6(4): 348-70.
- ZÜRN, MICHAEL. 1993. "Bringing the Second Image (Back) In: About the Domestic Sources of Regime Formation." In *Regime Theory and International Relations* edited by Volker Rittberger. Pages 282-311. New York: Oxford University Press.