International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis
Schlossplatz 1
A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria

Tel: +43 2236 807 342
Fax: +43 2236 71313
E-mail: publications@iiasa.ac.at
Web: www.iiasa.ac.at

**Interim Report** **IR-10-010**

# Theory and Practice: Do They meet?

Professor Rudolf Avenhaus, rudolf.avenhaus@unibw.de
Ambassador Franz Cede, franz.cede@a1.net

*Dedicated to the master of dialogue Jürgen Habermas*

*At the occasion of his 80th birthday*

**Approved by**

Detlof von Winterfeldt
Director, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis

September 28, 2010

Processes of International Negotiation (PIN) Program

## Contents

## Abstract

The impressive wealth of literature to international negotiation research testifies to the ever growing interest in and relevance of international negotiation theory as a field of academic study. While the scientific value of this research has never put into doubt, its practical usefulness for operational diplomatic activities is sometimes questioned by practitioners who either ignore the basics of negotiation theory or flatly discard them as being not relevant for real life conflicts and situations. Against this background it appeared timely and appropriate to confront some of the theorists´ key concepts with diplomats´ practical experience in relevant areas of international negotiations.

## Acknowledgments

We express our most profound gratitude to the following speakers of the theorists meet practitioners workshop which was held on June 20, 2008 at IIASA:

H.E. Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations Office in Vienna, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and other international organizations in Vienna

H.E. Ambassador Wolfgang Petritsch, Permanent Representative of Austria to the OECD, Paris

Dr. Gregor Obenaus, Cabinet Director, Principality of Liechtenstein

Dr. Gijs de Vries (Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, The Hague)

Dr. Kristine Höglund (University of Uppsala)

## About the Authors

**Rudolf Avenhaus** is Professor of Statistics and Operations Research at the University of the Federal Armed Forces, Munich, Germany. Prior to his academic appointment in 1980, he was Research Assistant at the Universities of Karlsruhe and Geneva, Research Scholar at the Nuclear Research Center Karlsruhe, and Lecturerer at the University of Mannheim.

From 1973 to 1975 and again in 1980, he worked at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA).

Professor Avenhaus has written numerous scientific journal publications, as well as *Material Accountability* (1977), *Safeguards Systems Analysis* (1987), *Compliance Quantified* (together with M. Canty, 1996), *Verifying Treaty Compliance* (edited with N. Kyriakopoulos, M. Richard and G. Stein, 2006).

In 1989 and 1990 he was Chairman of his Faculty, in 1993 and 1994 Vice President and in 1994 Acting President of his University.

**Franz Cede**, who is legal adviser to the Austrian Foreign Ministry, has participated in numerous international conferences and bilateral negotiations. Previously, he was a regular delegate to the General Assembly of the United Nations. In the Legal Body of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Dr. Cede chaired two working groups that finalized guidelines on remote sensing by satellites and on nuclear power sources in outer space. In 1991, Ambassador Cede was elected vice president of the diplomatic conference that elaborated, under the aegis of ICAO, an international convention on the marking of plastic explosives. In 1993, Dr. Cede chaired the Senior Officials Meeting in preparation for the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights. He headed the Austrian delegation to this conference. Since September 2003, Dr. Cede has been Austrian Ambassador in Brussels.

Ambassador Cede is a frequent lecturer at Austrian and foreign academic institutions. He is a member of the German Society of International Law, the Austrian ILA-Branch, and the scientific consultative groups of the Austrian Human Rights Institute in Salzburg. He is co-editor of the Austrian Review of International and European Law (AREIL). His fields of interest are the codification process in the UN system, European Law, and human rights issues.

**Theory and Practice: Do They meet?**

*Dedicated to the master of dialogue Jürgen Habermas*
*At the occasion of his 80th birthday*

Rudolf Avenhaus and Franz Cede

## Introduction

The topic of negotiation processes is gaining increasing recognition in political science and international affairs. In the domestic and the international context negotiation theory and training have become a "growth industry" attracting enormous interest in the academic community. On both sides of the Atlantic universities and think tanks devote considerable energy to negotiation research. Today no political science department or institute dealing with international affairs can afford to ignore the study of the different aspects of negotiations.

Negotiation theory and practice have conquered a central place in political science curricula. The study of negotiation processes is blossoming and has produced an impressive output of scientific literature which can fill entire book shelfs. This evolution of negotiation research is to be welcomed without reservation. No doubt, in the modern world negotiations have become the most common mode of human interaction. Global networking, global interdependence and cooperation, these are some of the keywords of the 21st Century. The interface of this web of human relations is verbal communication, in other words negotiation in the broadest sense, between the participants of the system. Communication and negotiation are at the heart of modern societies. With this in mind it appears only fitting that academic institutions promote and emphasize the study of negotiations in all their aspects.

Paradoxical as it may seem the surge of negotiation studies did not yet lead to any significant synergies between negotiation theory and practice. The impact of negotiation research and teaching on the actual conduct of real life negotiations is still rather limited. The key players involved in negotiations rarely carry in their intellectual baggage the knowledge which is currently taught by negotiation theorists. Those who happen to sit at the negotiation table usually come from very different career backgrounds. Only few of them could be called experts in negotiation theory. The lack of theoretical training in negotiation theory apparently does not disqualify those who are called upon to conduct the business of negotiating. This state of affairs differs fundamentally from other disciplines where it would be totally unthinkable to see a practitioner without profound theoretical knowledge of his discipline. For example, who could imagine a heart surgeon without a sound theoretical background in internal medicine? Apparently, in the field of negotiations things are different. The assumption there seems to be that one can learn by doing, i.e. by negotiating, and that the art of negotiation is something one acquires by inspiration or common sense rather than by reading books written by negotiation theorists.

The exchange between the academic community specializing in negotiation theory and practitioners appears underdeveloped to put it mildly. Undeniably, there is a communication gap between theory and practice in the field of negotiation processes. This deficit separates professionals and academics to the extent that a number of practitioners even challenge the findings of negotiation theory by asserting that they have little or no relevance for real life situations. Practitioners appear to be particularly reticent about formal models developed by negotiation research. They often question the

practical value of mathematical approaches to negotiation processes. The assertion that negotiation theory is somewhat aloof and out of sync with "the real needs of real negotiators" is often heard in diplomatic circles. Another critique made to researchers is the jargon that they sometimes use. This critique should not be taken lightly because negotiation theory can not be disconnected from practice. Negotiation theory must not remain in the ivory tower of academia but has a responsibility to contribute to the solution of the great problems of today`s world. No doubt, a peaceful solution of these problems requires negotiated agreements.

It is in this spirit that members of the Steering Committee of the Processes of International Negotiations (PIN) program of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Laxenburg near Vienna, Austria,
organized a one day workshop "Theorists meet Practitioners" and assembled eminent scholars, diplomats and practitioners with a view to find a common ground among the two groups of participants.

Of course this subject has been addressed many times in the past 20 years, see e.g. (George 1993)[1]. Attempts have also been made by the PIN Program (Caldwell 2003), and eminent practitioners have been invited regularly to PIN workshops and published their views in the resulting books in the past. In view of the assessment made by the PIN Steering Committee some time ago (PINPoints Editorial 2006), that in the age of globalization the new negotiators "are likely to be more receptive to communications from the research community concerning the conditions, mechanisms and functions of international negotiations", it appeared now timely and appropriate to confront some of the theorists´ key concepts, which had been developed in a number of PIN books, with diplomats´ practical experience in relevant areas of international negotiations,

The basic concept of the workshop was to confront researchers and practitioners on a given theme or method such as *formal models*, the concepts of *escalation*, *power symmetry versus asymmetry*, and the burning issue of *international terrorism* in order to see whether the findings of negotiation theory had relevance for the topics chosen in the view of the practitioners. The workshop was conceived as a structured dialogue between academics and practitioners on issues of common concern. It was held on 20 June 2008 under the auspices of IIASA in its headquarters. More than 50 participants including ten Ambassadors, military officials, NGO representatives, University professors and students attended the workshop. Ambassador Franz Cede opened the workshop and explained its objectives. Thereafter, the four themes mentioned above were examined in four panels respectively. In each panel one theoretical concept was presented by a theorist and then commented by a practitioner[2]. A general discussion with an outlook on future plans concluded the day.

The following presentation of the four panels ist not so much a summing up but rather a reflection of what the organizers understood to be the substance of the debates. Therefore, independent conclusions are drawn and a number of recommendations are offered.

## First Panel: Formal Models

The relevance of formal models for real life negotiations was examined by the theorist with the help of a game theoretical model of the current conflict between the International Community and the Iran about the latter´s nuclear program (Avenhaus und Huber 2007).

Before, he presented a classification of the role of formal models in the context of international negotiations which had been developed in a PIN project the results of which were published in a book a year ago (Avenhaus and Zartman 2007): In short "Formal models *of* international negotiations are either abstract mathematical theories…which present solutions to bargaining problems, but do not really describe negotiation processes, rather, they give advise on how to agree immediately. Formal models *in* international negotiations are heuristic and dynamic by their very nature…, Formal models *for* international negotiations are used to combine the preferences of the parties into optimal outcomes… ."

After this classification the theorist turned to the presentation of a game theoretical model of the conflict about Iran´s nuclear program. Technically speaking, it is a non-cooperative two-person game with vector-valued payoffs in normal form. The pure strategies of the Iran are the five combinations of i) remaining party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty for Nuclear Weapons (NPT) or not, ii) if yes, fulfilling the treaty obligations or not and iii) if yes, enriching Uranium or not. The pure strategies of the international community are i) using military force to destroy Iran´s nuclear facilities, ii) accepting Iran as a nuclear power, iii) flexible sanctions and iv) grand bargain.

The payoffs to both parties are given in terms of a vector with three components, the values of which express for the Iran i) independent nuclear power supply, ii) national security and iii) status of a dominant regional power. For the International Community they express i) preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear power, ii) maintenance of regional stability and iii) continuing supply of oil and gas from the region.

This game has two Nash equilibria (Nash 1951)[3]. The first one means that the Iran does not remain party to the NPT and that the International Community uses military force. The second one means that the Iran remains party to the NPT and fulfills its obligations but enriches Uran, and that the International Community enters into a grand bargain. Also, for both sides all payoffs of the first equilibrium are worse than those of the second one, technically speaking, the first equilibrium is *payoff-dominated* by the second one.

The presentation of this game theoretical model was closed with some remarks about the insight gained with the help of this model which were elaborated in the subsequent discussion and about the limitations of the model: In particular the reduction of the International Community to one player was mentioned, and also the neglect of

dynamical aspects of negotiations. These limitations, however, were necessary for the tractability of the model, otherwise more and questionable assumptions would have become necessary, and more equilibria would have been produced which then could no longer be evaluated.

The practitioner opened his contribution by reminding the audience to those important international negotiations held in Vienna like the Vienna Congress in 1814 and the meeting between J.F. Kennedy and N. Khrushchev in 1960. Referring to these examples he went on to his first important observation: “Diplomacy is human. We make mistakes. How can formal models take care of these facts?”

The second observation dealt with the assumptions of the Iran model. Having studied the model already a year ago, in view of its limitations he raised the question if the model could still provide useful information. In particular he discussed the assumption that the International Community was just one player – even though he found the level of consensus among the states remarkable – and that even in the Iran different opinions can be observed. He mentioned also Non-Governmental Organisations which have to be taken into consideration. Nevertheless, he concluded, “ I am a novice in all of this, and I appreciate in you informing me”.

The general discussion centered about the two major aspects raised by the practitioner. One of the theorists considered formal models to be the bones, to which practice puts the flesh. The panel´s theorist added information, after some comments on simplification, on the relevance of the assumptions about Iran´s strategies and the conclusions which were drawn: He showed, e.g., that the military option of the International Community stabilizes its Grand Bargain equilibrium strategy in that sense that the pure existence of the military option makes any deviation of the Iran from the equilibrium much more costly for the Iran than for the International Community. Finally, the practitioner emphasized the necessity of taking into account uncertainties, e.g. about the adversaries´s intentions.

## Second Panel: Escalation

The dramatic negotiations with the Yugoslav regime prior to the NATO air campaign in 1999 are a textbook case of escalation. Here, all the elements of the structures of escalation and negotiations can and have been identified as demonstrated in one of PIN´s projects, the purpose of which was “whether negotiation is the possible sequel to escalation; that is, not whether stalemates must take place before negotiation, but whether negotiation can take place after escalation “ (Zartman and Faure 2005).

The theorist pointed out that behind or underneath the idea of escalation leading to a mutually hurting stalemate in negotiation are the idea of hurt and the idea of negotiation. In other words, escalation can go on forever, but it comes into the situation or creates a situation that both sides feel stuck in this escalation, they can go no further

and this business of being stuck hurts them. Then the idea of negotiation is that they start a process of crafting together a common outcome that will be attractive to both sides, mutually hurting stalemate leading to the opening of the negotiation.

He then developed these concepts at the hand of the Kosovo case, and he discussed why the Ramboulliet negotiations failed. One position identified interim autonomy but was not worked out between parties. Negotiation was absent. So the mediation did not mediate negotiation and it did not make the stalemate felt or hurt. And it did not bring the parties to produce an outcome. Was the theory wrong? No, the theory was perfectly correct. It pointed out conditions that, if they existed, would lead to particular results. But the conditions did not exist and the parties who were working to implement them did not succeed. The value of the theory in cases like that, the theorist concluded, is to point out what had to be done even though it was difficult to do.

The practitioner, who took part in the negotiations in Rambouillet in 1999 as the Representative of the European Union, had agreed to test PIN´s theoretical findings with his long years of practical experience in the Balkans. He confirmed that practitioners should avoid simplifications and that his presentation would mirror the complexitiy of not just the Kosovo issue but also its environment. In so doing he referred to his and two colleagues´ book published in 1999 (Petritsch, Kaser and Pichler 1999).

In that spirit he started with the Dayton agreement in 1995 where the decision was taken to fully focus on Bosnia and Herzegowina and leave all the other trouble spots in the former Yugoslavia for methodological, political and other reasons. But the consequences for the Kosovo was that it changed forever the situation there, and this was the turning point. The practitioner then described in detail the development which finally led to the unsuccessful negotiations in Rambouillet in 1999. In so doing he referred to the concept of escalation. It was the tool of S. Milosevic throughout the Yugoslavian conflict; he used it whenever something went wrong for him. So he did when he abrogated the autonomy fo Kosovo in 1985 which was the starting point of the Kosovo conflict.

The practitioner made a big leap after Dayton to 1997 at which time the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) had been transformed from a guerilla movement into a people´s army which he defined as another step on the escalation ladder. In June 1998 S. Milosevic and B. Yeltsin had agreed to let the international community play a role in the conflict which resulted in the so-called Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM) with the three partners United States, Russia and European Union. However the escalation went on in the field, resulting in an exodus of 365 000 ethnic Albanians at the end of August 1998.

Thus it was clear that the KDOM did not work and consequently, the next step was the so-called Milosevic-Holbrook agreement leading to the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), meaning not just observation but verification, and for the first time including NATO. By December 1998 and only two months after the installation of the

KVM it was clear that this was too little and too late and in parallel, the conflict on the ground was escalating.

And then, yet another turning point in January 1999, the so-called real massacre of Rajak, took place. Whereas the response on the United States´ side was to urge for military action, the European side emphasized coercive dipomacy. In any case S. Milosevich agreed the first time to negotiate outside his country, grudgingly accepting the KLA as a partner. On 25 February the negotiations in Rambouillet started, however, without Milosevich.

In the theorist´s words, the practitioner put with his practical experience flesh to the bones. Following this remark, the discussion centered first around the concepts of escalation, mutually hurting stalemate and related issues. “How can the perception in a mutually hurting stalemate be measured?” asked on participant. Also the threat for escalation was discussed. It cannot be a bluff instead, the consequences of such threat have to be thought through, another practitioner remarked. And again, he emphasized “People matter. When Milosevich was negotiating, he was not negotiating based on the interest of Serbia. He was based on his own interest and I think in the end what was critical to the negotiation and escalation was putting at risk his grip on power...”

Another major issue in the general discussion was the role of the mediator who was mentioned at varius occasions. Is he party to negotiation? No, he is not, but he is interested in an outcome; he can even be interested in a particular outcome which happened quite a few times. Thus, he may become a very engaged or manipulative mediator.

**Third Panel: Symmetry versus Asymmetry**

In his introductory statement the theorist started with some deliberations on the definition of power, which is in his words a very elusive concept, difficult to grasp. He defined power as an action by one party intending to produce movement by the other.This way power is neither defined as a source nor as a result, but something in between the two – he called it purposeful action.

Thereafter he drew the attention to the case of Andorra to illustrate a typical situation in which the relationship between the actors in the political process is characterized by asymmetry (Faure and Klaousen 2003). In fact, this case study exemplifies asymmetry in its extreme form, i.e. interaction of a micro-state (Andorra) with much larger entities (France, Spain, EU) being able to exert a great measure of power over the small entity. It was shown that such an asymmetric relationship does not necessarily lead to the complete submission of the mini-entity to the larger ones. The theorist demonstrated how a small state, by coincidence of happy circumstances, e.g., lack of interest by France, may increase its room of manoeuvre considerably. Another successful strategy for a weaker party, he explained, is to put its destiny in the hands of a third party.

The conclusion to be drawn from the case of Andorra was to show that negotiations between parties in an asymmetric system need not be a lost cause for the weaker party and, to some degree, the imbalance between the actors can be evened out by clever strategies or fortunate circumstances.

The practitioner then presented the case of Liechtenstein as seen from the vantage point of practice. He was also able to show how in real life the slogan "small is beautiful" applies to this tiny principality which has successfully survived as an independent subject of international law. He put the focus of his exposé on the experience of Liechtenstein within the framework of international organizations where, according to the rules of the game, each member, great or small, enjoys the same formal status. Through her membership in a number of intergovernmental organizations Liechtenstein is able to make her voice heard at the international level. Formal rights are thus another factor which flattens out, at least to some extent, the power disparities present in the international system.

In the course of the discussion the theorist stressed the fact that there is no such thing as a completely symmetric relationship between the actors involved. Another practitioner added a further interesting aspect of "symmetry versus asymmetry" in today´s world by referring to the capacity of the representatives of small states to influence the global agenda. In recent years the key agenda of global negotiations was shaped by small states rather than by the big powers. One example was mentioned: The driving force in the negotiations on climate change or on certain aspects of disarmament was a coalition of small states and not that of powerful nations. In any asymmetric framework, small states may thus play, a far greater role than their actual size and economic resources would suggest. The reason for this comparative advantage of small actors on the international scene resides in their lean management and the fact that, in general, they conduct their foreign policy unbridled by domestic considerations which usually hamper powerful states to take clear cut positions abroad.

**Fourth Panel: International Terrorism**

The theorist discussed the principal problems and challenges involved in negotiations with terrorists or organizations deemed as terrorist (Faure and Zartman, forthcoming). She identified first the difficulty of finding an area in which the minimum acceptable positions of all actors overlap. This area is also referred to as "zone of possible agreement" (ZOPA). Secondly, she dealt with the distinction between "absolute" and "contingent terrorists" meaning those who are not disposed to negotiations and others who use terrorist acts for instrumental purposes. Only in the latter case there a ZOPA can be looked for.

Thirdly, the theorist stressed the importance of influencing the support base of terrorists in order to make them realize the infeasibility of absolute demands and extreme positions. She went on to underline the problem of recognition as a key factor

in negotiations with terrorists. Without some sort of recognition meaningful negotiations with terrorists can hardly begin. Finally, she touched upon the problems of commitment, meaning the difficulties of both sides to commit themselves to a settlement in a credible manner.

The practitioner brought with him the experience of the former European Union coordinator in counter-terrorism. He informed the participants about the policies of the European Union in fighting international terrorism. There are four main categories, namely

- To prevent attacks,
- To pursue terrorists and to bring them to justice,
- To protect borders and critical infrastructures, and
- To respond effectively in case an attack takes place.

"Where does negotiation fit in?" he then asked, and answered "Not very well", even though he admitted that at occasions indeed there is room for negotiation.

There can be, for example, a role for negotiation if a terrorist organisation or network is divided internally to such a degree that negotiation can help the moderate side obtain a victory against the radicals.

The valuable insights of the practitioner drawn from practice greatly contributed to a substantial discussion that followed. He spoke at some length about the issue of listing a group as terrorist organization. Some speakers stressed the importance of preventive measures in order to combat terrorism effectively. The discussions about the controversial topic became sometimes contentious themselves. They showed that negotiation theory could not offer simple recipes for dealing with terrorists in practice.

In the discussions it became apparent that, in a concrete situation, negotiations with terrorists were unavoidable when the lives of innocent hostages were at stake. However, the point was stressed quite convincingly that the combat against terrorism required a better response than taking action when it is already too late, i.e. when the terrorist attack had already occurred. In this spirit the practitioner spoke in favour of examining the root causes of international terrorism. Such an approach would aim at developing a strategy designed to prevent terrorist acts by addressing the major grievances that feed into radicalization. With this focus the debate about "negotiation with terrorists" took on a completely new dimension as it put the problem of terrorism into a broader political context. It may please theorists and practitioners alike that it was concluded that whatever ought to be done to design and to carry out such a strategy against terrorism for all actors and stakeholders the instrument of negotiations will remain indispensable.

## Conclusions

Formal conclusions were not drawn at the end of this very rich one day workshop, but a few observations, which included discussions subsequent to the workshop, may reflect the experience gained by this enterprise. Even though one of the organizers had been a professional practitioner, the workshop was organized also by him on behalf of PIN therefore, at present the following remarks tend to reflect the theorists´ impressions.

Two issues which were raised by the practitioners, recurred in all four panels namely the human factor in negotiations and the complexity of the problems to be negotiated. All practitioners raised doubts – keyword oversimplification – if theorists were able to cope with these two issues in a way that they could produce results which might help in real negotiations.

The answer of the theorists went into two directions. First, they argued, in general theorists are trying to find guiding principles and underlying laws, but they can rarely solve immediate problems. Physicists for example detected the laws which determine wind and weather, formulated finally as Bernoulli and Navier-Stokes differential equations, but this does not mean that they are now able to predict the form of the clouds in the sky of Vienna at the next day. Yet these equations have tremendous practical applications. Similarly, negotiation theorists develop concepts like prisoners´ dilemma or chicken for practitioners, or hurting stalemate and ripeness, but they cannot model, e.g., the chemistry between two chief negotiators. According to one of the panelists, as mentioned, theorists provide the bones, and practitioners put the flesh on it.

Second, there may be “hot issues” which suddenly require attention and which pose new problems to practitioners. As an example the Ecuador-Peru border conflict was mentioned in which theorists brought constructive analysis to area specialists who knew in depth all the reasons why the conflict was not and could not be resolved (Einaudi 1999). Practical advice can also be given in those situations where technological, in particular quantitative problems are at stake. Examples from the past, which were mentioned in this context, were the negotiations of the verification agreement for the Non-Proliferation Treaty for Nuclear Weapons (Ungerer 2002), the Law of the Sea negotiations (Sebenius 1981) or the role of IIASA´s RAINS model for European environmental negotiations (Tuinstra, Hordijk and Amann 1999). In these latter cases, it has to be admitted, advise was given rather by technical experts than by negotiation theorists.

It was known before that the workshop´s objective was not simple, and it turned out to be true: theorists tended to talk about their theories, and practitioners about their experience. Both sides listened carefully and interested to what the other sides said and what was new to them in most cases. But only in a few situations really a dialog developed in the sense that both sides were learning for their own benefit – theorists for

improving their theories, and practitioners for using theoretical findings in negotiations to come.

Of course nobody expected that in a one day workshop. It was a first attempt, using Habermas´ words “to create a healthy dialogue which does not necessarily aim at a substance, but rather at a form of interaction” (Habermas 1981). Thus, and this was widely accepted, this kind of enterprise should be continued, with specific topics, and next time perhaps organized by a practitioner.

For a future dialogue of this kind a framework should be developed by which the discussion can be held in a highly structured manner. At the end of such an exercise a joint assessment by the participating theorists and practitioners should be made evaluating the outcome.

Two types of theoretical expertise can be distinguished which were represented in the four panels. The first type refers to the theoretical knowledge of negotiation analysts who formulate genuine, even abstract theoretical concepts. The second one relates to scientific expertise required in a particular negotiation process.

The following four aspects address the first type.

i) Origin of the theory: Practical experience of the theorist, or induction from practice, or deduction from assumptions?
ii) General experience of the practitioner with theoretical concepts: Useful in general or even in a concrete case?
iii) Ways of communication between both sides: Textbooks and lectures given by the theorist? Participation of theorists in negotiations? Kind of consulting?
iv) Joint analysis after the negotiation?

The following three aspect address the second type.

i) Purpose of the models: Descriptive, predictive or normative? Models of, for, or in negotiations?
ii) Practitioners´ understanding: What degree of understanding of quantitative analysis is necessary for the negotiator? How much time can he spend for learning?
iii) Reaction to negotiation progress: Should the theorist be available during the negotiations?

For both types it would be highly desirable that practitioners offer their views on a concrete negotiation problem and suggest topics for research. It might well result from such an exchange that these topics receive a closer study by the academic community.

In this way with time a joint body of knowledge would develop which could be used both by theorists and practitioners. In this context we are pleased to note that one of the pioneers of international negotiation analysis, Howard Raiffa, alluded to this challenge, confronting theorists and practitioners alike, already in 1991 (Raiffa 1991):

“Regrettably, a lot of profound theorizing by economists, mathematicians, philosophers, and game theorists on topics related to negotiation analysis has had little or no impact on practice. An important question for the PIN Project to answer will be why this is so. An important reason is clearly the lack of effective communication and dissemination of theoretical research results. Such communication could be improved if there were more intermediaries who are comfortable in both worlds and who could act as inventive go-betweens to facilitate the transfer of information that shows how theory can influence practice and how practice can influence the research agendas of theorists. The
information must flow in both directions: many practitioners have developed valid, extremely useful, and often profound insights and analyses, which should help to guide the agendas of researchers in this field.”

These findings are as valid today as they were 18 years ago when they were formulated at the occasion of the foundation of the PIN Project.

## Endnotes

[1]A. George did not explicitly report on dialogues between theorists and practitioners, and half of his small book is devoted to the US policy in the Iraq from 1988 to 1991. His overall subject, however, is precisely the gap betwen theory and practice in international relations which he thinks can not be closed but only be bridged.

[2]The theorists of the four panels were Rudolf Avenhaus, I. William Zartman, Johns Hopkins University, Guy Olivier Faure, Sorbonne University, and Kristine Höglund, University of Upsala. The practitioners were Gregor L. Schulte, United States Ambassador to the International Organisations in Vienna, Ambassador Wolfgang Petritsch, former High Representative of the International Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dr. Gregor Obenaus, Director of the Cabinet of the Prince of Liechtenstein, and Ambassador Gijs de Vries, former European Uninion Coordinator in Counter-Terrorism.

[3]A Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative game is defined as a pair of strategies with the property that any unilateral deviation of one player from that equilibrium strategy does not improve the deviator´s payoff.

## References


Avenhaus, R. and Huber, R. K. 2007. A Game Theoretical Analysis of the Conflict about Iran´s Nuclear Program. PINPoints **28**, 13 – 15, Laxenburg: IIASA.

Avenhaus, R. and I. W. Zartman (eds) 2007. Diplomacy Games – Formal Models and International Negotiations. Berlin and Heidelberg: Springer.

Caldwell, N. 2003. A Qualitative Interview with Thirteen Practitioners. In: Professional Cultures in International Negotiations by G. Sjöstedt (ed). Lanham: Lexington Books.

Einaudi, L.R. 1999. The Ecuador-Peru Peace Process. In: Herding Cats. Multiple Mediation in a Complex World by Ch. A. Crocker, F.O. Hamson, P. All (eds), 407-429. Washington DC: US Institute of Peace Press.

Faure, G. O. and P. Klaousen 2003. The Andorra-European Community Trade Agreement Negotiations 1979-1987. In: I.W. Zartman and J. Z. Rubin (eds), Power and Negotiation. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

Faure, G.O. an I.W. Zartman (eds) Forthcoming. Negotiating with Terrorists.

George, A. L. 1993. Bridging the gap. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Habermas, J. 1981. Herrschaft der Dialoge. In: Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns. Handlungsrationalität und gesellschaftliche Rationalisierung. Band 1. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Nash, J. 1951. Non-Coooperative Games. Ann. of Math. **54**: 289-295.

Petritsch, W., Kaser K. and R. Pichler 1999. Kosovo – Kosova: Mythen, Daten Fakten. Mit dem Vertrag von Rambouillet. Klagenfurt: Wieser.

PINPoints Editorial **26**, 2006. Laxenburg: IIASA.

Raiffa, H. 1991. Contributions of Applied Systems Analysis to International Negotiation. In: International Negotiation by V. Kremenyuk (ed), 5–21. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Sebenius, J.K. 1981. The Computer as Mediator: Law of the Sea and Beyond. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management **1**, 77-95.

W. Tuinstra,W., Hordijk, L. and L. Amann 1999. Using Computer Models in International Negotiations. The Case of Acidification in Europe. Environment **41** (9): 33-42.

Ungerer, W. 2002. The Treaty on the Non-Poliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its Safeguards. In Containing the Atom – International Negotiations on Nuclear Security and Safety by R. Avenhaus, V. Kremenyuk and G. Sjöstedt (eds), 133-161. Lanham: Lexington Books.

Zartman, I. W. and G.O. Faure, (eds) 2005. Escalation and Negotiation in International Conflicts. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.